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PREFACE 
This dissertation seeks to investigate the problem of 
transplantation of administrative institutions via a case-study of the 
Damodar Valley Corporation. The Damodar Valley Corporation was 
established in 1948 soon after Indian Independence, partly under the 
inspiration of the Tennessee Valley Authority, partly under that of 
British public corporations. 
The dissertation first traces the impact of these models on 
Indian public opinion and on the legal and administrative elaboration 
of the Project. It then describes the deployment of the DVC 
organization and programme, and the various disappointments which 
deflated the original high expectations. 
On the basis of this factual narrative, the dissertation then 
seeks to provide theoretical explanations for the problems thus 
encountered. These are seen to lie partly in the complexities of the 
Federal Structure of the Indian Constitution which exacerbated a 
variety of administrative, legal, technical, financial and political 
problems. But in practice these are of subordinate importance 
compared with ecological factors, stemming partly from traditional 
Indian political culture, partly from the stresses of political and 
social development, and partly from a growing deterioration of 
administrative and political relations in the Indian subcontinent. 
A number of general questions about the problems of 
introducing new administrative arrangements in an alien environment 
are thus answered by focusing on the fate of one administrative 
experiment. 
In addition to the necessary amount of printed matter, the 
material for this study was collected through elaborate questioning 
of various respondents in the Government of India and the two State 
Governments of West Bengal and Bihar, in the Damodar Valley 
Corporation, as well as public figures, during the field work 
conducted in 1962. Since the events which determined the final 
shape of the Damodar Valley Corporation occurred in the early-
years of i ts his tory, the material thus collected would have proved 
sufficient for our analysis . Even so, in order to ensure the 
certainty of answers , these questions were la ter formulated into a 
detailed questionnaire which was despatched to various individuals, 
including some of those already interviewed. This questionnaire is 
attached as Appendix ' C ' . The answers to this questionnaire helped 
to crystal l ize certain tentative hypotheses made during the field 
work and la ter in synchronizing the analysis . 
Chronologically, the terminus ad quern for the whole study 
is approximate: (a) the factual information on various projects of 
the DVC is upto 1967; (b) the events that moulded the s t ructural 
and functional course of the DVC do not go beyond the formative 
period of the Third Five Year Plan, i . e . 1960-61 ; (c) the analyses 
of the social , political and administrative environments under which 
the DVC functioned, and which led to the main conclusions, a re 
valid even today. 
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Chapter I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This i s a study of the development of the Damodar Val ley 
Corporation^ a s an example of the transfer of a foreign administrative 
institution to a very different constitutional , pol i t ical and 
administrative sys tem. The DVC highlights the general izat ions made 
by various c r i t i c s with r e s p e c t to the Indian administrative s y s t e m , 
r e v e a l s the growing trends of parochial ism, r e f l e c t s on in ter - s ta te 
e s trangements , shows the s t r e s s e s and s tra ins of ex i s t ing 
inst i tut ions , planning p r o c e s s e s and p r a c t i c e s . 
The DVC i s a joint development venture undertaken by the 
Government of India^ in col laboration with two State governments of 
West Bengal and Bihar . It was es tabl i shed in 1948 and formed one 
of India ' s most important planned p r o j e c t s . Two foreign examples 
w e r e of great s ignif icance in the framing of the DVC: the T e n n e s s e e 
Val ley Authority^, and the Bri t i sh public corporat ion . While the 
multipurpose r i v e r development of the T e n n e s s e e Valley s e r v e d a s 
an inspirat ion, the Brit ish public corporation s e r v e d as an 
administrative yards t i ck .^ 
The environment to which this model was to be transplanted, 
however , was very different . 
The Indian administration i s widely regarded as one of the 
w o r l d ' s be t ter , more s tab le , more honest , l e s s fragmented s y s t e m s . 
At the same t ime, complaints are made about i t s out-of-date personnel 
p r a c t i c e s , di latory procedures , antiquated accounting and financial 
s y s t e m s , lack of coordination and maladministration. Ruling party 
l e a d e r s , wedded to the soc ia l i s t pattern of soc i e ty through 
a c c e l e r a t e d economic development, were therefore caught between 
this posi t iv ism and negativism: one forcing them to reta in the whole 
l egacy of the Br i t i sh administrative s tructure , and the other 
necess i ta t ing changes for adjustment to the new condit ions . E v e r 
s ince independence, e v e r y Home Minister has tr ied to create 
1. Hereafter referred to as DVC in this study. 
2. Government of India, Central Government, and Union Government are 
interchangeable terms and so will they appear in this study. 
3. Hereafter referred to as TVA in this study. 
4. It is by no means a comparative study. Only those features of the TVA and 
the organizational device of public corporation will, therefore, be treated 
which set the DVC's pace and have direct relevance to it. 
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deterrents to the continuation of negative elements. · ' Even so , 
Tarlok Singh could still report in 1963 that experience "has tended 
to strengthen the view that in its s t ruc ture , methods of functioning 
and capacity to meet the requirements of rapid development, the 
administration has not been able to catch up, and the distance may 
be increasing ra ther than diminishing"." 
Administrative odds thus create a cleavage between hopes 
and their real izabi l i ty . Such odds are further compounded by the 
peculiari t ies of the Indian political and constitutional system. The 
constitutional s t ructure has character is t ics which make India a 
federation, and yet not a federation. ' The process of central 
planning, in addition to the existing unitary elements in the Const i-
tution, has further led to concentration of authority at the Centre . 
In joint development ventures the absence of a wellknit and 
co-ordinated machinery at State and Central levels , both political 
and administrative, and of understanding to cooperate and meet the 
new challenges jointly, make the working of foreign models such as 
the DVC somewhat difficult. 
REASONS FOR TVA INFLUENCE 
India has some 110 r i ve r s cutting acros the country. These were the 
providers of certain basic needs for agr icul ture , but were mostly 
unharnessed and often caused floods, bringing havoc to people and 
property , while the major volume of water was wasted. Taming these 
r i ve r s meant not only controlling the frequent floods but also the 
proper utilization of the abundant water r e sou rces , so essential for 
5. The number of committees and commissions appointed merely to suggest 
administrative reforms might run into 17 since independence, including the 
recently appointed Administrative Reforms Commission. The Administrative 
Reforms Commission (hereafter referred to as ARC), a very high-powered 
body, was appointed in 1965 under the chairmanship of Mr. Morarji Desai. 
After Mr. Desai fjoined Mrs. Indira Gandhi' s Cabinet in 1967, Mr. 
Hanumanthaiya, earl ier a member of the ARC, became its Chairman. The 
ARC formed several teams to study and recommend changes in government 
machinery at various levels. Among the major changes effected thus far 
is that in the Planning Commission. 
6. Tarlok Singh, "Administrative Assumptions in the Five Year Plans", 
I n d i a n J o u r n a l of P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I X , 3 
(July - September 1963), p . 336. 
7. In its formal setting the Indian Constitution maintains a federal outlook, 
but in division of powers between Central Government and the federated 
units its spirit and content brings it nearer to unitary form. Features of 
the Constitution which make this distinction clearer are dealt with at 
appropriate places below, pp. 19 ff. 
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cheap electric power supply for industrial development and for a 
broad agricultural base for the economy. Certain plans were made 
even before independence. After independence, the sense of urgency 
mounted. The national government regarded the devising of suitable 
r i ver valley schemes as one of its major t a s k s . 
Due to its particularly vulnerable position the Damodar River, in 
North-East India, attracted the Government's immediate attention. 
The TVA model exerted a peculiar fascination. The Tennessee 
Valley formerly presented a fairly similar picture to the Damodar 
Valley. The Tennessee River posed the continuous danger of damaging 
floods, and the valley had all the character i s t ics of an economically 
depressed region. As compared to other par t s of the country, there 
was a higher r u r a l population, lower standard of nutrition, higher 
mortality, poorer educational provisions, and higher population growth. 
There was underemployment in agriculture, low agricultural productivity 
and a need for industrialization. At the same time, the Valley was 
r ich in r e s o u r c e s : water power, minerals, soil, and forests (though 
vastly consumed for timber, e t c . ) . According to F i n e r , five forces 
led to the establishment of the TVA: (l) local interest in the 
navigability and wider, but still local, interest in protection from 
floods; (2) the national interest in electric power development; 
(3) the policy of conserving r e s o u r c e s leading to the idea of an 
appropriate a r e a of government with multiple and integrated purposes; 
(4) further use of national defence plants already existing at Muscle 
Shoals (Alabama); and (5) the economic depression of the 1930s, which 
sharpened the realization that governmental economic planning was 
essent ia l . 
In a society which had developed on the assumption that ''the sum 
of individual decisions based on individual se l f- interests , would 
total up to a resul t furthering the best interests of the community as 
a whole" ," such a large-scale State activity was a novel phenomenon, 
which has met with some res is tence to this very day. Some of the 
States did not want federal funds to be diverted for the benefit of 
only 7 Southern Sta tes ; the administration in Washington saw a 
depletion of its power; private industry did not want State ownership 
of hydro-electric power production. But the needs of the time were 
impelling. The general problems posed by the depression and the 
part icular conditions in the Tennessee Valley, helped to mould the 
social and economic climate of the time, and a large section of 
society sought for more thoughtful solutions to existing problems. 
8. H e r m a n F i n e r , T h e T . V . A . L e s s o n s f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
A p p l i c a t i o n (Montreal , 1944), p p . 5-14. 
9 . С . Herman P r i t c h e t t , T h e T e n n e s s e e V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y : 
A S t u d y i n P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (Chapel H i l l , 1943), 
p . 27 . 
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T h e T e n n e s s e e r e g i o n " w a s wi l l ing to p a r t i c i p a t e in any programme 
that promised re l ie f from an intolerable s i tuat ion". ^ 0 Pres ident 
R o o s e v e l t r e a l i z e d the need and met it through total regional planning 
which ensured better distribution of the population through the removal 
of e x c e s s population from the c i t i e s , and r e s t o r e d the balance 
between i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e . T h e g e n e r a l mood of the nation 
f u r h t e r added to R o o s e v e l t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n to c h a l l e n g e " t h e new" 
and " t h e u n t r i e d " . He s a i d : " I am convinced that one of the greatest 
v a l u e s of t h i s t o t a l r e g i o n a l p lanning i s the fact that i t d a r e s us to 
make e x p e r i m e n t s . " 
In the e a r l y f o r t i e s , some widely pub l i shed volumes appeared 
on the wor ld m a r k e t by w r i t e r s such a s C . H e r m a n Pr i tchett , Herman 
F i n e r and David E . L i l i e n t h a l . The l a t t e r ' s book: TVA: 
D e m o c r a c y o n t h e M a r c h , in h i s own w o r d s , w a s a 
" t e s t a m e n t of t h e w r i t e r ' s f a i t h " , and had a s t r o n g impact in t h e 
United S t a t e s a s e l s e w h e r e . ' ^ More d e t a i l e d informat ion w a s p r o v i d e d 
in r e p o r t s from the s e v e n S t a t e U n i v e r s i t i e s , the T . V . A . ' s 
R e s e a r c h D i v i s i o n , and s e v e r a l o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Above a l l , the Information Divis ion of the T . V . A . f looded the world 
l i b r a r i e s ( including U . S . L i b r a r i e s and E m b a s s i e s a b r o a d , a s wel l 
a s U . N . S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies) and r e s e a r c h i n s t i t u t i o n s with e x t e n s i v e 
informat ion w h i c h , e v e n on i t s face v a l u e , p o r t r a y e d the T . V . A . a s 
a f a s c i n a t i n g e x p e r i m e n t in m u l t i p l e - p u r p o s e r i v e r v a l l e y p r o j e c t s . '^ 
10. Gordon R. Clapp, "The Meaning of TVA", in Roscoe C. Martin (..eti.), 
T.V.A. T h e F i r s t T w e n t y Y e a r s (The University of 
Tennessee P r e s s , 1956), p . 3. 
11 . The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 
1938), Vol. I, p . 740, quoted by С Herman Pritchett, o p с i t . , p . 28. 
12. Lilienthal ' s book, TVA - D e m o c r a c y o n t h e M a r c h (Harper 
and Brothers, New York, 1944/1953), was later circulated by U . S . I . S . 
in a very cheap edition. The rich experiences of the author, one-time 
Chairman of the T.V.A. , are still being cashed in on by the Federal 
Government of the U.S.A. As late as 1967, Mr. Lilienthal headed a U . S . 
Team to study Vietmanese post-war economic development. U . S . S t a t e 
D e p a r t m e n t B u l l e t i n , January 9, 1967. 
13. On the basis of the information collected (1963-64), some of its achievements 
are : The TVA power system produces about 60 billion KWh a year. 97%, 
against 3$ in 1933, of the region's farms, and 1 ,400,000 consumers (about 
Five times more than in 1933) are supplied. TVA's multipurpose dams, its 
forestry and agricultural aids and its service to industry have helped the 
people to increase their per capita income more than 671 percent against 
the national increase of 449 percent. There has been an net increase of 
3500 manufacturing and processing plants in the region since 1933. 
Fert i l izers are made in times of peace and munitions in times of war by 
the chemical laboratories and plants. TVA dams provide 14j million a c r e -
feet of useful water storage capacity which help in regulation of floods in 
the valley, in flows necessary to maintain navigation. 
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The TVA was, therefore, very much in people 's minds when 
the Government of India thought of establishing a public corporation 
in the Damodar Va l l ey . 1 4 
THE T . V . A . MODEL 
What was the T . V . A . ? It was established in 1933 to ensure 
multipurpose development of the Tennessee River Basin, which covers 
regions of seven states of America (40,000 square miles falling in the 
States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, 
Mississipi and Alabama). It has achieved considerable success in the 
fields of flood control, power production, fert i l izer development and 
agr icul ture , forestry growth, industrial development, navigation, 
health, recreat ion, vil lage construction and so on. American wr i te rs 
have attributed these achievements to the well-calculated and 
systematized efforts of the Directors , Managers and Engineers who 
had "a belief in the feasibility and wisdom of" the T . V . A . A c t , 1 5 to 
cooperation with local population and agencies in the Tennessee 
Valley and, most important, to administrative determination. The 
TVA has become a kind of symbolic ideology of American wri ters and 
foreign app ra i se r s . 
Some organizational and operational features of topical 
significance have been advanced by those who have tried to analyse 
the TVA as a federal agency. According to these analysts , these 
features have helped the TVA in securing its present esteem and may 
also be adduced as causes for its success . From the administrative 
point of view these may be elaborated as follows: 
F i r s t ly , the corporation is an autonomous agency. Having beei 
assigned a specific task and given the legal authority ' to ca r ry it 
out, the Corporat ion 's general accountability to the nation remained 
only through the President and Congress. It is not a federal 
department, and therefore does not have to report to the Secre tary of 
the P re s iden t ' s Cabinet. But it has its own Board which works, with 
"initiative and genuine responsibility" under the guidance and control 
14. To what extent the TVA case appeared in Parliamentary Debates at the time 
of DVC's establishment will be seen below, p.36 
15. T e n n e s s e e V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y A c t , 1933, Section 2(h). 
16. In broad terms, the task entrusted to the TVA was the control, conservation 
and wise utilization of the natural resources of the Tennessee Valley. See 
the preamble, i b i d . , p . 1 . 
17. "The Board shall direct the exercise of all the powers of the Corporation", 
Section 2(g), i b i d . For powers, see vast provisions contained in Section 
4(a) to 4(1), i b i d . 
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of the Executive and C o n g r e s s . " It is "a strange hybrid among the 
regular departments, bureaus and commissions in Washington - a 
semi-independent, quasi-autonomous corporat ion". ° 
Secondly, the Board of Directors has a position of paramount 
importance. The selection of members of the Board is made "from 
among the most eminent persons" with long experience in several 
technical fields. ^0 The appointment of Board members is made for 
a long, staggered term of nine y e a r s . This not only ensures 
stability, continuity and consistency, but makes the Corporation 
relatively immune against immediate political influence. 
Thirdly, no detailed instructions a re incorporated in the Act 
for internal administrative arrangements. This contributes towards 
strengthening the B o a r d ' s position in taking administrative decisions. 
The ear l iest y e a r s , however, were years of experimentation, of t r ia l 
and e r r o r . It was not surpris ing, in those early y e a r s , that "the 
respective authorities of the Federal Government have often attempted 
to bring the TVA operations under their normal procedure and control". ' 
But "men and women of imagination, a high sense of social purpose, 
and enthusiasm for work at creat ive ta sks" , as John Oliver put it, 
"responded to the challenging call of T . V . A . " ^ Gradually, a "clean-
cut organization" evolved and in 1937 the Board appointed a General 
Manager as chief administrative officer. At the same time, a basic 
administrative s tructure was adopted which remains unchanged in its 
essentials to this day. Under this system, the tools of administration, 
namely: budgeting, accounting, property management and personnel 
administration, were developed and enabled the Board to pursue their 
duties in an orderly and systematic manner. In a broader sense, the 
financial links were directly with the Bureau of the Budget and the 
18. Joseph C. Swidler, "Legal Foundations", in Roscoe C. Martin (ed.), ο ρ . 
с ι t ., p . 27. 
19. С. Herman Pritchett, o p . c i t ., p . 3. 
20. The criteria of qualification is indicated in the often quoted btatement: "It 
is a great responsibility imposed upon the members of the Board, but it is 
a great opportunity that will come to those chosen for this great service. 
For such position of trust and responsibility, undoubtedly the President 
will search the nation over for the right men to whom to entrust not only 
this vast investment of money but this great responsibility not only to the 
people of that section of the country, but to the people of the whole nation", 
H.R. 5081 , as quoted by Herman Finer, ο ρ . с ι t ., p . 128. 
21 . D.G. Karve, "Some Reflections on the T.V.A." , I n d i a n J o u r n a l 
of P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , III, 2, 1957, p . 100. 
22. John Oliver, "Administrative Foundations", in Roscoe C. Martin ( e d . ) , 
o p . c i t ., p . 42. Also, see i b i d . , for major difficulties and 
evolution of organizational structure of TVA. 
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C o n g r e s s . The TVA had no capital s tock. TVA funds are rece ived a s 
"operating p r o c e e d s " and "congress ional appropriat ions". Operating 
p r o c e e d s , however, may be used only for certa in designated purposes. 
S e c t i o n 26 of the T V A A c t authorized the use of proceeds "in 
conducting i ts bus iness in generating, transmitting, and distributing 
e l e c t r i c energy and m manufacturing, se l l ing , and distributing 
fer t i l i zer and fer t i l i zer ingred ients" . "The right to use i ts operating 
proceeds does not make TVA independent of the Congress . . . TVA 
p r e s e n t s annually i ts appropriation request , together with comprehen­
s ive program and f i scal plans cover ing all of i ts a c t i v i t i e s , to the 
Bureau of the Budget and the C o n g r e s s . Like any regular department 
of the government, TVA must justify i ts budget in hearings before the 
Bureau of the Budget and the appropriation committees of the Congress . 
Through the appropriation procedures , TVA i s subject to such degree 
of control a s the Congress may wish to e x e r c i s e . "^З 
Fourthly, the TVA's functions were decentra l ized through the 
local and state a g e n c i e s , effected by " s c o r e s of contracts sett ing up 
a joint partnership between T . V . A . and c i t i e s , towns, count ies , state 
boards of health, state conservat ion commiss ions, city power boards, 
farmers ' cooperat i ves , county extension s e r v i c e s , state agricultural 
c o l l e g e s , state geology departments"; 24 the l i s t could be continued 
almost indefinitely. ^For carry ing out proper r e s e a r c h in var ious 
2 3 . Donald C. Kull, "Decentral ized Budget Administration in the Tennessee 
Valley Authority" . P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n R e v i e w , IX, 
1949, p. 2 1 . 
24. David E . Lilienthal, "Big Government Not Inevitable", N a t i o n a l 
M u n i c i p a l R e v i e w , February, 1947. 
25. Various wr i ters have highlighted these cooperative efforts of jointpartner-
ship of the TVA. Herman F iner , ο ρ . с ι t . , p. 120, recorded: The TVA 
has entered into " s c o r e s of contractual relat ionships with S t a t e s , counties, 
c i t i e s , local co-operat ives, Federal departments, academic, c iv ic , and 
scientif ic institutions, for specific purposes, and has thus sought to 
produce a continuous and dynamic inter-connection. In this procedure 
the TVA stands in the centre, as it were, as the co-ordinator of activity, 
usually giving the lead and planning the joint attack on the connected problems 
of the region, from the ear l ies t stage on. Its contractual arrangements 
often imply a sharing of expense with the Federal agencies or a financial 
grant-in-aid, on conditions, from itself to the local agenc ies , whether 
S t a t e s , counties or universit ies . . . " Clapp c i t e s an example, pointing 
out that such ass i s tance could generally be reduced as the state or local 
agency grew in strenght: "In 1943 in the state of T e n n e s s e e , $ 18,000 was 
spent on regional library s e r v i c e s , of which local sources provided 
$ 4,000 and TVA $ 1 4 , 0 0 0 . The state contributed no funds. Ten years later 
S 295,000 went into this same s e r v i c e ; $ 125,000 came from local funds, and 
the state provided S 1 7 0 , 0 0 0 . The Authority contributed no funds at a l l" , 
Gordon R. Clapp, T h e T V A - A n A p p r o a c h t o t h e 
D e v e l o p m e n t o f a R e g i o n (The University of Chicago P r e s s , 
1955), pp. 7 4 - 7 5 . "In i ts relat ions with collaborating organizations within its 
area", writes D.G. Karvey, o p . c i t . , "the TVA follows the same 
policy of helpful influence, rather than of a regulatory authority". Also, 
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fields of activit ies, even collaboration with local universities is 
secured. 
Fifthly, each major policy decision is generally preceded by 
meticulous deliberations, and followed by strong administrative 
determination. "Build up a body of adequate technical knowledge 
and guidance, and make these available to people concerned at the 
appropriate time - this with a little further backing of support or 
special concession produces the right decision. " ^ ' 
This apparent success of the TVA noi only became an 
ideology by itself, it stimulated a host of countries which took to 
rais ing the standard of living of their people through the development 
of r iver valley schemes along the lines of the "TVA Approach". 28 
REASONS OF BRITISH INFLUENCE 
The British conquest of India and their long stay had a powerful 
political, economic, social and technological impact on the country, 
and profoundly affected its social and cultural life. The British 
withdrawal did not mean cessation of British influence; it is even 
arguable that its impact has actually increased. To quote Srinivas: 
"The economic revolution which the British began with the gradual 
introduction of a new technology under a capitalist and laissez-faire 
ideology has given place to a vast and planned effort to develop the 
country as quickly as possible under a socialist and democratic 
ideology. The idea of Five-Year-Plan may be described as the 
culmination of the slow and unplanned attempts of the British to 
transform the country industrially and economically. The political 
integration which the British began is also being car r ied further."29 
see Philip Selznick, TVA a n d T h e G r a s s R o o t s (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1949), particularly Part II of his book on the TVA's grass­
roots approach. 
26. Lawrence L. Durisch and Robert E. Lowry in "The Scope and Content of 
Administrative Decision - the T.V.A. Illustration", P u b l i c 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n R e v i e w , ХШ, 4, 1953, have given examples 
of twelve major decisions which individually and collectively have had a 
part in developing new frontiers of administration. 
27. D.G. Karvey, ο ρ . с i t . 
28. In Appendix " С " of his book, T.V.A. D e m o c r a c y o n t h e M a r c h , 
David E . Lilienthal has enumerated a number of such r iver valley schemes 
in various countries of the world. A more comprehensive list is given in 
T V A - S y m b o l of V a l l e y R e s o u r c e D e v e l o p m e n t 
(TVA Technical Library, Knoxville, June 1961). 
29. M.N. Srinivas, C a s t e i n M o d e r n I n d i a , a n d O t h e r 
E s s a y s (Asia Publishing House, London, 1962), p . 55. This does not, 
however, mean that the forces inherent in Indian society have been destroyed 
by the British impact; they may have either undergone a modification or have 
been strengthened, i b i d . 
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Another wri ter of eminence, K.M. Panikkar, υ has observed the 
Western, or Brit ish, influence on traditions of modern India extended 
to vaster fields: (l) spirit of crit icism; (2) interest in science and 
technology; (З) political ideas: concept of nationalism as a binding 
factor of political organization based on a unity of culture; liberalism 
as a creed, strength of l iberal tradit ions, such a s , the insistence 
on civil l ibert ies , the supremacy of law, government by public debate 
and moral suasion, elections based on universal franchise, and the 
extension of the conception of political community to the entire nation; 
(4) political institutions: opportunities for practical training in the 
work of democratic government from lower level upwards, elected 
parl iaments, assemblies, and councils, judicial system, and municipal 
administration; (5) organization of large-scale industr ies, that is to 
say, demonstration on how large-scale production could be organized, 
financed and marketed. "A belief in progress , a forward-looking 
attitude, acceptance of change when change is found to be necessary", 
concludes Panikkar, "these are the most far-reaching contributions 
of the West to the ideals of modern India; and it is with the help of 
these that she is building her new society. "31 
Of these varied influences, however, British socialist thought 
had a particularly strong influence. Socialism, whether of the early 
Fabian model associated with the Labour Party in Britain or with 
various shadings of the Marxist creed, and even Communism, have 
been accepted as potent political philosophies and remain important 
ingredients in the political thought of most senior Indian politicans. 
This influence was the result of various factors. The men who came 
to rule the country after independence had mostly had a long training 
in British schools and universit ies. Also, in India itself, education 
and training (unless one preferred the "Sanskri t ized" style) had 
developed along western, particularly Brit ish-oriented, l ines. The 
Indian leaders were in close touch particularly with the Left in 
Britain, who regarded the question of Indian independence with 
sympathy. Also, among Indian leaders and British Left there was 
common recognition of the defects of capitalism, and a shared belief 
in the need to promote the people 's good by collective action. The 
30. K.M. Panikkar, T h e F o u n d a t i o n s of N e w I n d i a (George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1963), pp. 61-75. See also another 
interesting account of some legacies by W.H. Morns-Jones, T h e 
G o v e r n m e n t a n d P o l i t i c s of I n d i a , (Hutchinson 
University Library, London, 1964), pp. 13-47. 
31 . K.M. Panikkar, ο ρ . с 1 t ., p. 75. 
32. In this connection, see among others, Richard Park, "India", in R.E. 
Ward and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), M o d e r n P o l i t i c a l 
S y s t e m s : A s i a (Prentice Hall Inc. , Englewood Cliffs, N. J . , 1963), 
p. 256. 
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Labour P a r t y ' s ideology was particularly attractive to Indian 
intellectuals, faced with the massive miseries of the Indian sub-
continent. They followed closely the British discussions about the 
need for nationalization of means of production, distribution and 
exchange, and had seen the theories developed by eminent wri ters 
like Morrison ( S o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d T r a n s p o r t , ! 933), 
T . H . O ' B r i a n ( B r i t i s h E x p e r i m e n t i n P u b l i c 
O w n e r s h i p , 1937), and W.A. Robson ( P u b l i c E n t e r -
p r i s e , 1939). They also knew the Fabian doctrine of "collectivism", 
"permeation", and "inevitability of gradualism."-^-5 Various Fabian 
Research Ser ies on Nationalization and Labour Par ty l i terature 
published in the 1930s and 1940s had also not escaped their attention. 
In fact, Fabian Socialism was of part icular interest because it 
provided something of both worlds: the democratic way of bringing 
about change in the economic s t ructure , as well as fruits of 
socialism - State ' s entering into la rger and la rger fields of 
economic activity. The Fabian argument of not discarding the 
existing governmental s t ruc ture , but ra ther of fruitfully utilizing 
the bureaucratic organizations for running government owned 
enterpr ises of one kind or another, was of special appeal. However, 
when the bureaucratic structure expanded and doubts were raised 
as to whether the existing machinery could foresake ordinary 
government procedures and run public enterpr ises efficiently, a 
mid-way type of organization, namely, the public corporation, 
seemed to offer a solution: advantages of government control as well 
as commercial freedom. As will be seen below, the model developed 
in Britain and provided an alternative to direct departmental 
management on the one hand, and workers ' control of industry, 
favoured by Guild Socialists and Syndicalists , on the other . Those 
who came to lead India, being nearer to Britain than elsewhere, 
watched these developments, with an eye to the future. 
The depression of the 1930s, in par t icular , strengthened the 
conviction of the British Left, shared equally by many Indian 
intellectuals, that "socialism requires the public ownership and 
operation, in the interest of the whole community, of the basic 
33. " . . . national policy is the policy of Nehru, More than any thing it 
resembles Fabian Socialism; and its latter day prophets are Harold Laski 
and Kingsley Martin", Hugh Tinker, I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n , A 
P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , (Praeger Umversitv Series, New York, 
1963), p . 100 
34. Fabian Socialism was born in the drawingrooms of London and was indulged 
in by intellectuals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Indians of the same stature who came in contact with Britain were 
especially attracted to this developing shade of Socialism: Annie Be sant, 
Sydney Webb, Bernard Shaw and other Fabians occupied an important place 
in the lives of Gandhi, Nehru, Krishna Menon, Shastri and others . 
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industries concerned with fuel and power, transport and the essential 
raw materials on which the entire economy depends", 35 and that 
control over these basic industries was essential to effective economic 
planning. In India, conditions included: (a) a low per capita income 
and living standards near subsistence level; (b) a highly uneven 
distribution of income between individuals, social groups and regions; 
(c) a high population p r e s s u r e ; (d) large-scale unemployment and 
under-employment; (e) a large percentage of unexploited r e s o u r c e s ; 
(f) low levels of l i teracy and primitive techniques and ski l ls; (g) low 
levels of communication and t ransport . In the view of Indian leaders 
these conditions required state action to plan and direct the destinies 
of the nation. 
Fur thermore, Britain had actually applied and formalized the 
idea of public corporations in legislation and administration. Both 
socialist and non-socialist governments previously had established 
such public corporat ions. The Port of London Authority (1908), 
The F o r e s t r y and Electricity Commission (1919), British Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Central Electricity Board (1926), the London 
Passenger Transport Board (1933), and the British Overseas 
Airways Corporation (1939) a r e some examples representing the 
period pr ior to 1945. The ideological inspirations of the Labour 
Party helped in transforming the concept of public corporations into 
practice even more rapidly when it was in power from 1945-51 . This 
period witnessed the enactment of some 23 Acts, including the Bank 
of England Act (1946), Coal Industry Nationalization Act (1946), 
Transport Act (1947), Electricity Act (1947), Coal Industry (No. 2) 
Act (1949), Iron and Steel Act (1949), Air Corporations Act (1949), 
F o r e s t r y Act (1951).36 The public corporation model was chosen 
particularly because it implies "a high degree of freedom, boldness 
and enterpr ise in the management of undertakings of an industrial 
or commercial character and the des i re to escape from caution and 
circumspection which is considered typical of government departments".^' 
The institution thus came to England to stay. ° Later Conservative 
governments, though ideologically opposed, nonetheless came to 
recognize the value of the existing institutions, although in some 
fields (such as iron and steel) they undid what had been done by the 
Labour Government.39 
35. In terms of TUC Interim Report on Public Ownership (1953), 
quoted by W.A. Robson, N a t i o n a l i z e d I n d u s t r y a n d 
P u b l i c O w n e r s h i p (George Allen and Unwin Ltd. , I960), p .42. 
36. For a detailed list, see i b i d . , p . 499. 
37. I b i d . , p . 47. 
38. Though the impending economic situation has not led the present Labour 
Government in England to launch on nationalization with renewed vigour, 
as many anticipated, the issue cannot be said to have lost their attention. 
39. Refer, W.A. Robson, ο ρ . с i t ., especially the section on "Nationalization 
and Denationalization Legislation since 1945", pp. 48-59. 
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In the late 1940s , the Labour Government's mass ive 
nationalization and planning programme had a vast propagandist 
e f fect . When independence dawned on India in 1947» the stage was 
se t to translate into pract ice the deeply rooted influence of 
soc ia l i sm (of whatever shading), of economic planning, State action 
and nationalization. The TVA model, the Bri t i sh public corporation, 
and Sovie t e x p e r i e n c e s in the field of planned development, all 
pointed in a s imilar d irec t ion . 
THE PUBLIC CORPORATION MODEL 4 
The term 'public corporat ion' c o v e r s a great variety of organizational 
s tructures and general izat ion i s difficult. Some institutional 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , however , can be condensed from the vast variety of 
l i terature in this f i e l d , 4 2 re lat ing to the following points in part icular . 
(1) Establishment: A public corporation i s a statutory body. 
It i s e i ther created by a spec ia l law passed by the l eg i s la ture or 
under an ex i s t ing law on public corporations through a spec ia l 
char ter . 
(2) Aim: A public corporation i s es tabl i shed to perform 
certain speci f ic t a sk ( s ) . Its main purpose i s to s e r v e the national 
interes t and not to maximize prof i t s . Hence , such bodies differ from 
private e n t e r p r i s e s in which maximization of profits i s the main 
cr i ter ion for e f f ic iency . In many c a s e s , the state has to subs idize 
the e x p e n s e s of a public corporat ion, which does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
imply that the concern runs ineff iciently. 
(3) Composition: The Managing Board: A public corporation 
has a governing board. There are two types of Boards , the Functional 
type and the Po l i cy type , used according to various c ircumstances 
and organizational n e e d s . Further , Mixed-type Boards , that i s to 
s a y , pol icy-cum-funct ional , a r e a l so pract i sed in some c a s e s . The 
functional board c o n s i s t s predominantly of profess ional fulltime 
managers , sometimes drawn from inside the e n t e r p r i s e , and these 
managers have a dist inct top leve l execut ive respons ib i l i ty for a 
40. Russian efforts in planned development, alongside British ideological 
developments towards State ' s intervention in economic sphere, parallelly 
influenced Indian political leadership. For the analytical touch, see J .L . 
Dholakia, "Influence of Russian Economic Planning on India's Five Year 
Plans", U n i t e d A s i a , Bombay, Sept.-Oct. , 1967. 
41. Apart from drawing a model in this section, I have aimed at discussing how 
the ingredients of a public corporation came to be understood and have 
developed through the years, in India as elsewhere. 
42. Some characteristics of public corporations are given in U.N. , S o m e 
P r o b l e m s i n t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d A d m i n i s t r a -
t i o n a n d Pu b l i c E n t e r p r i s e s i n t h e I n d u s t r i a l 
F i e l d (New York, 1954), p .9 . 
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part icular sphere within the organization. ^ They not only play an 
important part in policy formulation, but also closely supervise the 
implementation of the programme. The Policy Board, on the other 
hand, has no functional responsibility at a l l . The members of such 
a Board are mostly drawn from outside the organization, exercise 
a kind of collective supervision over it, and render advice both to 
the Minister and the management. They may be appointed on a par t-
time or fulltime bas is . 
The Board is appointed by the government. F o r the sake of 
ensuring some security to members of the Board, their tenure of s e r ­
vice is mostly fixed, either in the statutes or by way of written r u l e s . 
The period of service may differ from case to c a s e . Equally essential 
is the maintenance of continuity of policy and administration. F o r 
this purpose, the government may adopt the means of ret i r ing one 
or more members of the Board after every two or three years as the 
case may be. 44 
The emoluments of Board members have to be fairly high so 
that they will not be exposed to any material temptation or be lured 
to other sources of revenue. Robson s t r e s s e s that "generous sa lar ies 
must be paid to members of the governing boards" ,45
 s o
 that men of 
the highest ability may be attracted to the nationalized industr ies . 
The qualifications of members have to correspond to the 
functions of the organization. The general c r i t e r i a , as Robson 
suggests, should be to "get the ablest men available to run these 
great enterpr i ses . . . The qualities most needed on the governing 
board a r e drive, imagination, insight and capacity for grasping large 
questions of policy without becoming confused or absorbed by a mass 
of detai l . "4° Robson also points to the cr i ter ion of geographical 
qualification in some c a s e s . 4 ' In pract ice, however, the qualifications 
have much to do with the availability of personnel, particularly in 
developing countr ies . In India, for instance, the government has mostly 
43. A.H. Hanson, M a n a g e r i a l P r o b l e m s i n P u b l i c 
E n t e r p r i s e s (Asia Publishing House, London, 1962), p . 37. Also 
refer, idem, P u b l i c E n t e r p r i s e s a n d E c o n o m i c 
D e v e l o p m e n t (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1959), 
wherein the author deals with the relevant issues in greater detail. 
44. "It is also helpful", writes Hanson, "to have overlapping terms of office. 
In that way you can from time to time introduce new blood and yet at the 
same time preserve continuity", M a n a g e r i a l P r o b i о m s i n 
P u b l i c E n t e r p r i s e s , pp. 57-58. A.D. Gorwala considers four 
to five years tenure as reasonable, and suggetss that it is often desirable 
to arrange a staggering of appointments so that all members should not 
ret i re at the same time and continuity of policy and administration may be 
maintained. See R e p o r t o n t h e E f f i c i e n t C o n d u c t o f 
S t a t e E n t e r p r i s e s , (Planning Commission, Government of India, 
New Delhi, 1951), p . 21 . 
45. W.A. Robson, ο ρ . с ι t . , p . 214. 
46. I b ι d . , p . 216. 
47. I b i d . , p . 215. Robson here cites the case of the B . B . C . Charterof 1952 
whereby the Board is required to have a national governor for each of the 
three countries of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland on its strength. 
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drawn on the civ i l s e r v i c e for appointments to governing boards.^8 
Some importance has a l s o been attached to the s i z e of the 
Board, but i ts strength does not rea l ly depend on i t s numbers. Two 
members of high cal ibre and repute can wield a s much influence on 
government to s e e their plans through, and command a s much 
authority lower down in the organization, a s four, eight o r ten. 
Individual c a s e s thus differ. T . V . A . has had a three-member B o a r d , * ' 
while the Atomic Energy Authority in England has between seven and 
ten members. There have been c a s e s when even s ix teen members have 
been on the B o a r d . 5 0 "There i s no magic in a particular number", 
wr i tes Robson, "despite the incantations of certa in ef f ic iency e x p e r t s : 
and it may often be worthwhile se i z ing the opportunity to appoint of a man 
unusual abil ity at the moment when he happens to be a v a i l a b l e . " ' Th is 
i s , of c o u r s e , only poss ib le when the statutory prov is ions a r e f lexib le. 
(4) Management: Internal management of the public corporation 
i s under e x c l u s i v e control of the Board. Such bodies evo lve their own 
personnel p o l i c i e s . "The fundamental nature of management", wr i tes 
Gorwala, " i s the p r o c e s s of getting things done through the agency of 
community, that i s . fulfilling a purpose through the agency which e x i s t s 
for i ts fulf i lment." 5 To pave the way for the governing board to 
introduce new methods in management, it i s s t r e s s e d that even key posts 
such a s the General Manager or Chief Execut ive and other staff, a r e 
under the b o a r d ' s control for the purpose of appointment, d i sc ip l ine, 
promotion e t c . Usual ly, the n e c e s s a r y prov is ions re lat ing to such 
matters are incorporated in the statutes o r stipulated under written 
r u l e s . 
The responsib i l i ty of the Boards a l s o embraces quest ions of 
economy, c o s t s of production, pr ice determination, e t c . In the c a s e 
of River Val ley Administration, matters such a s irr igat ion r a t e s , r a t e s 
for hydro-e lectr ic power, reimbursement to uprooted population, a l s o 
fall within the sphere of the B o a r d ' s p o w e r s . ' ^ 
48. Whether it is proper to have civil servants on the Board or not is also a 
controversial question. K.C. Reddy, while admitting the outstanding ability 
of civil servants, disagrees with the practice. "The majority of civil servants 
do not have the background and the training for becoming successful industrial 
managers", "Management of State Enterprises - Some Aspects Outlined", 
M a j o r I n d u s t r i e s o f I n d i a , IV, Bombay, 1994-55, pp. 81-85. 
49. Robson considers this "too small" to obtain sufficient diversity of outlook 
and experience for a comprehensive view of all the major aspects of policy, 
W.A. Robson, ο ρ . с i t . , p. 214. 
50. I b i d. 
51. I b i d . 
52. A.D. Gorwala, o ρ . с i t , . p. 22. 
53. As discussed by K.M. Mukerji and К. John Mammen, T h e E c o n o m i c s 
of R i v e r B a s i n D e v e l o p m e n t i n I n d i a (Vora & Co., 
Bombay, 1959), p. 5. 
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(5) Legal Autonomy: A public corporation has legal autonomy, 
can sue and be sued in the law courts , enter into contracts and acquire 
property in its own name. Provisions of the statute, just as any other 
law οΓ government, are open to interpretation by the judiciary. 54 
(6) Executive (Ministerial) Control: A 
public corporation is placed under the charge of a Minister. The 
relationship between the minister-m-charge and the governing board 
remains undefined, and provides a welcome subject for rhetorical 
speeches and statements. -* Herbert Morrison who, as Minister in 
Att lee ' s government of 1945-51 , established a great many conventions 
on this question, s tates , for example: 
"Clearly it is desirable that the Minister should keep himslef familiar 
with the general work of the Board or Boards with which he is concerned. 
It is wise for him with his parliamentary secretary and principal 
officers concerned from time to time to meet the chairman and, indeed, 
the members of the Board, to discuss matters of mutual interest either 
formally or informally. On such occasions both the Board and the 
Minister will be conscious of their legal rights: the legal right of the 
Minister to give gen arai directions or to withhold approvals, and the 
legal rights of the Board within the field of day-to-day management; 
but it is also desirable that such discussion should be free, frank, 
forthcoming, and cooperative. "5" 
Legally, however, the Minister has the right to be informed on 
all mat ters . If the relationship between him and the Board is a 
confidential one, he may even enquire into matters such as recruitment 
of any high executive in the organization. The power to issue directives 
is generally given to him in the statutes. A.K. Chanda, while pleading 
5 4 . "It i s a child of the state which grows into maturity a s soon as it is born", 
wri tes Om Prakash, T h e T h e o r y a n d W o r k i n g o f S t a t e 
С o r p o r a t i o n s (With Special Reference to India) (George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd. , London, 1962), p . 1 5 . The author has covered many other 
a s p e c t s which character ize the public corporat ions, pp. 15-34.But there 
can be exceptions to this "maturity" aspect , s e e W. Friedman, who c i t e s the 
example of 'The Australian Dried Fruits Board' , which i s 'mature' enough 
I but "without having been equipped with such personality by any legis lat ive 
or administrative document", in "The Public Corporation", University of 
Toronto School of Law, C o m p a r a t i v e L a w S e r i e s , I, 1954, 
Part IV. 
5 5 . Although free from normal secretar ia l routines of a government department. 
a formal link between a public corporation and the ministry gets establ ished, 
because the Minister, being answerable to Parliament, usually r e l i e s on 
secre tar ia l a s s i s t a n c e of his Ministry. A public corporation, so far as 
formal relationship i s concerned, is thus one of the various functions of the 
Minister - the usual sett ing of Minister-Cabinet-Parliament in a 
Parliamentary type of government being unaffected. 
56. Herbert Morrison, G o v e r n m e n t a n d P a r l i a m e n t (London, 
1954), p. 264. It was on Morr i son ' s c lose study of State Enterpr ises that 
most Brit ish theoret ic ians have based their conclus ions. Morrison has him­
self won the scholarly title of ' father' of public corporations F o r further 
readings, s e e a l so Herbert Morrison, "Public Accountability", P u b l i c 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , (Autumn 1950), and S o c i a l i s m a n d 
T r a n s p o r t (London, 1933). Also, Lord R e i t h ' s a r t i c l e , "Public 
Corporations: Need to Examine Control and Structure", reproduced in 
P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , XXXIV, 1956, wherein he pleads 
that government interference should be specif ic and formulated in unambiguous 
terms. 
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for this right to i s s u e d i r e c t i v e s , to safeguard national in teres t s and 
to ensure that the pol icy of government as a whole i s free from 
contradict ion, makes the limitation that this right i s not intended to 
influence or d irect day- to -day administration or the execution of 
approved po l i cy . He d i s a g r e e s with the conclus ions of the Krishna 
Menon Committee Report which suggested that "apart from d i r e c t i v e s 
the minister may and will give guidance from exper ience and from a 
c o r r e c t appreciat ion of the constitutional i s s u e s . It does not appear 
to us the c o r r e c t procedure to lay down the speci f ic i s s u e s on which 
such guidance may or may not be i s s u e d . The Government alone should, 
in the e x e r c i s e of their respons ib i l i ty , make this dec is ion and a l so as 
to what kind of d irect ive or other procedures should be fo l lowed."· 5 ' 
Against t h i s , Chanda wr i t e s : "This would enlarge the functions of the 
Minister beyond his legitimate field of policy-making to the field of 
execut ive administration. While strengthening his control , it would 
diminish parliamentary control to a corresponding extent . By she l ter ing 
behind a facade of autonomy, the Minister wil l e s cape accountability even 
though his control over these undertakings wil l be no l e s s pervading 
than his control over his Ministry, for which he i s fully accountable . "58 
(7) Parliamentary Control: The Parliament e x e r c i s e s i t s control 
over public corporations by means of questioning the Minister . It i s 
usually des irab le that such quest ions should be limited only to policy 
i s s u e s , that they should be given only at t imes of budget approval or 
for a s e t number of days after the annual report of the public 
corporation has been laid before Parliament for debate . ^ ' F o r i ts 
information, however , the Parliament r e l i e s on its spec ia l committees -
Est imates Committee, Public Accounts Committee and the l ike - which, 
among other government uni ts , a l so include public corporations in their 
frequent repor t s to Parl iament. These committees , in some way, wield 
a perpetual Parliamentary control . 
37. Krishna Menon Committee . R e p o r t On P a r l i a m e n t a r y 
S u p e r v i s i o n O v e r S t a t e U n d e r t a k i n g s , (¿>eing the 
report of the sub-committee of the Congress Party in Parliament)(NewDelhi, 
November, 1959). This Committee was appointed to consider the problems 
relating to State-owned Corporations and Companies and to suggest how a 
board supervision may be maintained by Parliament without interference in 
day-to-day activities of the concerns. 
58. Asok Chanda, "Public Enterprises in India", I n d u s t r i a l I n d i a , 
Bombay, I960, pp. 39-40. Asok Chanda was one time the Auditor and 
Comptroller General of India. 
59. "The autonomy which is inherent in any form of public enterprise", writes 
Chanda, "does not mean an adbication of government's responsibility and 
authority; nor does it mean the abrogation of parliamentary control. The 
problem is to find systematized and streamlined control, both executive and 
parliamentary, in which the essentials will remain and the irritants 
disappear, in which the undertakings win be free to function without undue 
let or hindrance, a freedom which will be scrupulously honoured so long as 
they function eeonomically and efficiently." I b i d . , p. 22. 
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(8) Treasury Control: In order to ensure freedom from ' r e d - tape' , 
,too s t r ic t Treasury control i s not cons idered des i rab le . It i s often pleaded 
that the whole set-up of financial administration should be made a s 
independent as poss ib le from normal financial contro l s . Under their 
s tatutes , public corporat ions are therefore ensured of separate funds, 
independent budgetary arrangements, powers to r a i s e funds and to 
spend them in consonance with the broad policy laid down in advance. υ 
In I n d i a , a F i n a n c i a l A d v i s e r o r a F i n a n c i a l O f f i c e r i s n o r m a l l y 
a p p o i n t e d to the p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n to s e e that f i n a n c e s a r e p r o p e r l y 
r e g u l a t e d and that r i g h t a d v i c e i s r e n d e r e d to the o r g a n i z a t i o n . " 1 . 
T h e a u d i t i n g of a c c o u n t s i s d o n e on c o m m e r c i a l l i n e s . 
T H E INDIAN S C E N E 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l : F e d e r a t i o n a n d y e t n o t a 
F e d e r a t i o n 
India i s a " U n i o n of S t a t e s " ° 2 and i s c o m p o s e d of t w o c a t e g o r i e s of 
6 0 . There are no set procedures applicable to all public corporations in respect 
of financial r e s o u r c e s . The arrangements are stipulated in individual statute/ 
charter and financial r e s o u r c e s , rais ing of loans, limits on price policy e t c . 
are prescr ibed as far as possible at the time of establishment of a public 
corporation. Dependent on the ex igenc ies of the situation, such financial 
provisions remain changeable. "The statutes require - the Bank of England 
Act i s an exception in this respect - that the public corporations, in framing 
their programmes of reorganization or development involving substantial 
capital outlay, shall act on l ines settled from time to time with the approval 
of the appropriate Minister", W.A. Robson, ο ρ . с i t . , p. 299. 
61 . Such an officer i s part of the organization but i s general ly the appointee of 
government and not the Board. The relationship between him and the Board, 
therefore, tends to develop in an unhealthy manner. The Krishna Menon 
Committee Report, o p . c i t . , p. 32, severe ly cr i t ic ized this pract ice . 
6 2 . "India, that i s Bharat, shall be a Union of S t a t e s " , reads the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n o f I n d i a , Part I, Article 1(1). Although India has 
a superstructure of a federation, the word ' federation' has been avoided. 
This was mainly because of the general wish among the Constitution makers 
to have a strong Central Government and the constituent units more or l e s s 
subordinate to i t . S e e K.V. Rao, P a r l i a m e n t a r y D e m o c r a c y 
o f I n d i a (A Critical Commentary) (World P r e s s , Calcutta, 1961), p. 270; 
a l so C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y D e b a t e s , Vol. VII,1 949,pp .35-37. 
Some constitutionalists have used the term "quasi-federation" for India, K.C. 
Wheare, F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t (Oxford Paperbacks, 1963), p. 28. 
The i ssue has been controversial; for instance, C.H. Alexandrovicz would 
d isagree with Wheare's definition, s e e his art ic le : "Is India a Federat ion", 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d C o m p a r a t i v e L a w Q u a r t e r l y , 
July 1954, and, espec ia l ly , i d e m , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
D e v e l o p m e n t i n I n d i a (Oxford University P r e s s , 1957), pp. 
1 5 5 - 7 1 . 
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constituent uni t s .63 There are 17 Sta tes and 8 Union-Terr i tor i e s a s 
fo l lows: 
States; 
Andhra Pradesh, Madras (Re-named as Tamilnadu in 1967), Kerala, 
Mysore, Punjab, Haryana, Bihar, Rajas than, Madhya Pradesh, West 
Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Gujerat, and Nagaland. 
Each State i s headed by a Governor and a Council of Minis ters , 
with a democratical ly e lec ted l eg i s la ture , and with governmental 
machinery more ore l e s s on the l ines of Central Government. 
Union-Territories; 
Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, Andeman and Nicobar 
Islands, Goa, Chandigarh, and Pondicherry. 
The Union-Terr i tor i e s are headed by Chief Commiss ioners , or 
Lieutenant-Governors , and are under the overal l control of Central 
Government. 
Two s e t s of governments c o - e x i s t , cover ing the same terr i tory 
and both e x e r c i s i n g sovere ign powers in l e g i s l a t i v e , administrative and 
financial s p h e r e s , according to the distribution of authority between 
the S ta tes and the Union, regulated under the Constitution. The 
following a r t i c l e s of the Constitution are the most important 
regarding distribution of powers between the S ta tes and the Union: (a) 
Art i c l e s 246(1), (2) and (3) for Legis la t ive powers given in three L i s t s : 
Union L i s t , Concurrent Liât and State Lis t of the Seventh Schedule . 
The State List i s based upon local i n t e r e s t s , the Union Lis t on 
national i n t e r e s t s , while the Concurrent List includes matters which 
have varying d e g r e e s of local and national i n t e r e s t s . These l i s t s 
contain 97 , 47 , and 66 items respec t ive ly ; (b) Art i c l e s 256 to 263 for 
administrative p o w e r s ; (c) Art i c l e s 264 to 300 regulate financial 
63. This division has been in vogue since 1956 on the recommendation of the 
States Reorganization Commission. According to the C o n s t i t u t i o n 
o f I n d i a , 1950, the division was into Parts А, В, С and D 
States, consisting respectively of the areas: (l) mainly the British 
Indian Provinces plus some small princely states merged into them: 
(2) smaller states, contiguous and having some cultural and linguistic 
affinity, grouped together; (3) remaining princely states and such other 
territories which had strategic and special consideration; (4) the islands 
of the Bay of Bengal. For the background of this division, see V.P. Menon, 
T h e S t o r y o f t h e I n t e g r a t i o n o f I n d i a n S t a t e s 
(Bombay, 1956); also, K.V. Rao, ο ρ . с i t . , p. 265. The division into 
А, В, С and D States presented а тегу inconsistent picture because of 
varying stages of development of the States. The States Reorganization 
Commission was appointed following the demand for some kind of division 
on a linguistic basis. For these details, and also the developments which 
resulted in the creation of Andhra State, of Telugu-speaking population 
of Madras State (a Part 'A' State) in 1953, giving a sudden tempo to 
agitation for reorganization of the States, see M.V. Pylee, 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t i n I n d i a (Asia Publishing 
House, Bombay, I960), pp. 160-61. The States Reorganization Commission 
submitted its Report on September 30, 1955, and the Parliament passed the 
R e o r g a n i z a t i o n B i l l , Seventh Amendment Act of the Constitution 
in 1956. 
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re la t ionsh ips . The financial subjects on which the Union and Sta tes 
can make laws are enumerated in the three L i s t s mentioned above, 
Union Lis t containing 12 i t ems , State Lis t 19 , and the Concurrent 
List containing 2 . 
The general nature of this distribution makes the Indian 
Constitution a somewhat central ized instrument of government, more 
Unitary than F e d e r a l . "In the power relat ionship among the regional 
components of the Unions", wri tes Harr i son , "there e x i s t s . . . an 
imbalance not found in any other modern federal s ta te . ""4 The text of 
the Constitution g ives the impress ion that the federating S t a t e s , in 
spite of a c l e a r demarcation of their p o w e r s , are almost subordinate 
to the Central Government. F o r example: 
Art ic le 3 g ives right to the Union Parliament to change the 
b o u n d a r i e s , name e t c . of any State;"5 Art ic le 248 g ives res iduary 
powers to the Union Parl iament; Artic le 254 g ives validity to a law 
passed by the Union Parliament when it c l a s h e s with a State Law; 
Art i c l e s 352 to 360 give emergency powers to the Pres ident of India; ° ° 
and Art ic le 275 provides for grants - in -a id by the Central Government 
to the S t a t e s . ' A separate List has been provided of laws to be made 
by the S t a t e s , but under c l o s e examination these powers look frail in 
content . Thirty of the 66 items relate to ordinary police functions 
which are of no spec ia l s igni f icance . Twenty-two items deal with 
64 . S e l i g S . Harrison, I n d i a : T h e M o s t D a n g e r o u s D e c a d e s 
(Oxford University P r e s s , 1960), p . 7 . 
65 . This can be done by a bare majority of the Parliament. As noticed above 
(p.18 footnote 63) , vast changes took place in 1956 as a result of the 
recommendations of the States Reorganization Commission under these 
powers of the Union Parliament. S e e a lso Ch.V below. 
66 . Three types of emergency are conceived: war, constitutional breakdown 
(in all or any part of India) and financial trouble. During an emergency 
period, even the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the 
Constitution, can be suspended. Parliament can a lso take over any item of 
the State List under i t s control . 
67 . "There i s a curious provision . . " wri tes Santhanam, "The Parliament may, 
by law, decide which State should get what amount of grant but, till 
law i s p a s s e d , the Pres ident may make grants by order , but when 
Pres ident i s s u e s the orders he should do so only after considering the 
recommendations of the Finance Commission", K. Santhanam, U n i o n -
S t a t e s R e l a t i o n s i n I n d i a (Asia Publishing House, New 
Delhi , I960) , p . 33 . The Finance Commission i s appointed under Article 
280 (1 ) of the Constitution every fifth year to make recommendations 
to the President on two specific items: (a.) the distribution between 
the Union and the States of the net proceeds of taxes which are to be , or 
may be , divided between them and the allocation between the States of the 
respect ive shares of such proceeds; and (b) the principles which should 
govern the grants - in-a id . In the interest of sound national finance, the 
Commission may be ass igned any other matter by the Pres ident . 
6 8 . F o r example, items like "Pilgrimages, other than pilgrimages to p laces 
outside India", "Burial and burial grounds", "Cremation and cremation 
grounds", e t c . 
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measures of taxation which do not yield revenue anywhere near self-
sufficiency . °9 Only 14 items relate to development activities and here 
too, an item like education is subjected to item 25 of the Concurrent 
List (vocational and technical training of labour) and items 63, 64, 65 
and 66 of the Union List (regulating the institutions of various kinds 
of education, technical and professional training). Similarly, an item 
such as Industries is given in the State List (item 24), but under item 
52 of the Union List any industry can be declared by Act of Parliament 
to be expedient in the public interest and hence be taken under its 
wing. Item 20 of the Concurrent List (Economic and Social Planning) 
read with Article 254 of the Constitution, can delete almost anything 
from the State List. 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e : C e n t r a l i z a t i o n - D e c e n t r a l i -
z a t i ο η: 
The two sets of governments also imply different departments/ 
ministries at State and Central levels looking after their respective 
functions stipulated under the Constitution. The Central Government 
is responsible for the overall policy of the country. This responsibility 
is exercised firstly, by the ministries of the Central Government who 
work through various controlling agencies in many developing activities, 
even when they fall within the limits of the States. The Community De­
velopment movement, for instance, while theoretically a decentralizing 
programme, has paradoxically worked in India as a centralizing force. 70 
The same seems true, at least at the present stage, of another attempt 
69. The States not only depend on grants-in-aid from the Centre, but under 
Article 293 of the Constitution, they borrow funds on the security of their 
own Consolidated Fund in order to meet deficits in financial resources. 
Finance Commission, 1957, reported the total outstanding debts of the 
States, made for a variety of purposes, as being approximately Rupees 
9000 million on 31 st March 1956, F i n a n c e C o m m i s s i o n ' s 
R e p o r t (New Delhi, 1957), pp. 52-53. This figure was estimated to have 
doubled by the end of the Third Five Year Plan, 1966. See an interesting 
analysis of loans and grants-in-aid by K. Santhanam, T r a n s i t i o n i n 
I n d i a a n d O t h e r E s s a y s (Asia Publishing House, London, 1964) 
pp. 93-125. 
70. P.R. Dubhashi, in his article "Unitary Trends in a Federal System", 
I n d i a n J o u r n a l o f P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , VI, 1960, 
has quoted many such instances of 'central agencies' whereby the Central 
Government keeps the final decision on various local programmes in its 
hands. Dubhashi cites the example of Community Development Programmes 
in the country, which is a subject in the 'State List', yet the Ministry of 
Community Development at the Centre is responsible for the basic decisions 
on planning, directing, and coordinating community projects throughout 
India, which involves training institutions for providing suitable personnel, 
important conferences, seminars, literature, and programme evaluation 
organizations, extending tremendous influence on the whole scheme. Paul H. 
Appleby cites another instance in the Directorate General of Supplies and 
Disposals under Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply (as it then was) at 
the Centre, in which all the purchases, inside and outside the country were 
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at strengthening " g r a s s r o o t s " activ ity, i . e . , the P a n c h a y a t i 
R a j . 7 ' Whereas the Community Development programme s p e l l s out the 
national plan targets and pr ior i t ies in the form of more speci f ic s c h e m e s , 
the Panchayati Raj inst i tut ions, by and l a r g e , perform "only agency 
functions with regard to the Community Development programme, almost 
o b s t r u c t e d and baffled in their initiative by the dead weight of schematic 
budgets" .72 
Of the var ious min i s t r ies , the ro le of the Ministry of F inance 
at the Centre appears to be diffused through the whole extent of 
administrative machinery. The Ministry of Finance i s respons ib le for: 
a) The administration of the finance of the Central Government and 
dealing with financial matters affecting the country as a whole. 
b) Raising the necessary revenues for carrying on the administration 
and regulating the taxation and borrowing policies of the Government. 
c) The administration of problems relating to banking and currency, and 
in consultation with the Ministries concerned, arranging for the proper 
utilization of the country's foreign exchange re sources . 
d) Controlling the entire expenditure of the Government in cooperation 
with the administrative Ministries and Departments concerned. J2 
centralized. This Agency is utilized by the State Governments, local bodies, 
quasi-public bodies, e t c . and, remarks Appleby, "when it is overloaded, 
delays in its procedure make it inadvertently a control agency which gives 
priority to some purchases and postpones others" , R e - e x a m i n a t i o n 
o f I n d i a n A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S y s t e m , With Special Reference 
to Government's Industrial and Commercial Enterprises (Cabinet Secretariat, 
Government of India, 1956), p . 29. 
7 1 . "Panchayati Raj" has been conceived as a democratic decentralization 
whose smallest nucleus is the village. Each village has a Council of members 
known as "Panchayat" (Panch meaning ' five ' ) ; a number of villages (forming 
a "Block") have a "Panchayat Samity" which is a Block Council; a number of 
Blocks (forming a District) have a "Zila Parishad", which is a District CounciL 
All these bodies are composed of elected members for a number of years . 
For further description, see T h i r d F i v e Y e a r P l a n 
(Government of India, New Delhi, 1961), pp. 337-41 . 
72. Iqbal Narain and P . C . Mathur, "Union-State Relations in India - A Case 
Study in Rajasthan" . J o u r n a l o f C o m m o n w e a l t h P o l i t i c a l 
S t u d i e s , Π, 2, May 1964, p . 120. Narain and Mathur s t ress that if the 
present phase continues "the impact of Panchayati Raj on the pattern of 
Union-State Relations can hardly be different from that of the Centre-
oriented Community Development programme", p . 121 . 
73 . The Indian Institute of Public Administration, T h e O r g a n i z a t i o n 
o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a (Asia Publishing House, New 
Delhi, 1958), p . 61 . Ministry of Finance has been covered in some detail, 
i n f r a . , pp. 88 f f. 
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Since the States often have to depend on the Centre, the Ministry of 
Finance, directly or indirectly, tends to control most of the financial 
stakes of the S t a t e s . 
Similarly, the Reserve Bank of India is an example of a 
Central administrative and regulating agency, which is becoming 
steadily transformed into a vast police force, whose primary job is 
to pry and probe into the detailed functioning of the nation ' s banking 
system. ' 4 
F u r t h e r , to keep India together,75 the Government of India took 
over the whqle of the Indian Civil Service and Indian Police Serv ice, 
only changing the name of the former into Indian Administrative Service. 
The Constitution guarantees service conditions.7° in P y l e e ' s words, 
the "All India Serv ices , by their very nature, a re instruments of na­
tional cosolidation and unity. They ensure the maintenance of common 
standards all over the country in certain vital fields of administration. 
They facilitate the existence of a hard core of officials in every State 
who, because of their membership of a service which falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, feel more free and independent to act with 
a national outlook and keeping in view the national i n t e r e s t . "77 
The Audit is also highly central ized. The Auditor and 
Comptroller General of India is appointed under the Constitution; 
his statutory duties and powers cover both the auditing and 
accounting of all financial transactions of the Union and the S t a t e s . 
The Parl iamentary Committee on Public Accounts has described him 
as its guide, philosopher and friend. He submits his r e p o r t s directly 
to Parl iament. He is independent, and at times severely cr i t ical when 
expressing his opinions. 
74. The Banking Laws (Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1964, has further 
enhanced the Reserve Bank of India's powers, see Editorial, E a s t e r n 
E c o n o m i s t , New Delhi, December 13, 1963, p . 1203. 
75. The phrase is used by K. Santhanam, U n i o n - S t a t e s 
R e l a t i o n s i n I n d i a , p. 25. 
76. Articles 308 to 314 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a . See, also, 
D.D. Basu ' s S h o r t e r C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a (Calcutta, 
I960), pp. 554-602, for his criticisms and comments on these service 
conditions. 
77. M.V. Pylee, o p . с i t . , p . 636. 
78. The functions and powers of the Auditor and Comptroller General of India 
have not been viewed very favourably by some cr i t ics . Appleby has remarked: 
"Nothing could be more calculated to stop the Plan in its t racks, to under­
mine responsible government and to establish government of, by and for 
auditors", Paul H. Appleby, R e - e x a m i n a t i o n of I n d i a ' s 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S y s t e m , pp. 2 7 - 2 9 . The system of audit 
in India is also often criticised by individual government officials who 
brand it as highly bureaucratic and at some places causing harrassment. 
For a reply to all this criticism, however, see Asok Chanda, A s p e c t s 
o f A u d i t C o n t r o l (Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1959). See 
also, i d e m , I n d i a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , (George Allen and 
Unwin, 1958), particularly pp. 241-56. 
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F i n a l l y , p e r h a p s the most effective agency making for 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is the P l a n n i n g Commiss ion, which was c o n s t i t u t e d in 
J a n u a r y 1950.79 D e r i v i n g i t s pol i t ica l s t a t u s from the " D i r e c t i v e 
P r i n c i p l e s of S t a t e P o l i c y " ^ laid down in the C o n s t i t u t i o n , and 
e s t a b l i s h e d a c c o r d i n g to item 20 of the C o n c u r r e n t L i s t (Economic 
and S o c i a l Pl .mning) by thp Government of India, the P l a n n i n g 
Commiss ion i s a s s i g n e d t o : 
"( l) make an assessment of the material, capital and human resources 
of the country . . . . 
(2) formulate a Plan for the most effective and balanced utilization of 
the country's resources; 
(3) on a determination of priorit ies, define the stages in which the Plan 
should be carried out and propose the allocation of resources for 
the due completion of each stage ; 
(4) indicate the factors which are tending to retard economic development 
and determine conditions which . . . should be established for the 
successful execution of the Plan; 
(5) determine the nature of the machinery which will be necessary for 
securing the successful implementation of each stage of the planning 
in all its aspects; 
(6) appraise from time to time the progress achieved in the execution 
of each stage of the Plan . . . ; 
(7) make such interim or ancillary recommendations as appear to it to 
be appropriate either for facilitating the discharge of the duties 
assigned to it; or . . . "°' 
T h e P l a n n i n g Commiss ion i s h e a d e d by a Deputy C h a i r m a n with 
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , by v i r t u e of h i s off ice, a s the C h a i r m a n . Until 
r e c e n t l y (1967-68), o t h e r members of the Commiss ion included some 
Cabinet M i n i s t e r ( e . g . F i n a n c e and D e f e n c e ) , and a number of e x p e r t s 
in s o c i a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , e c o n o m i c , t e c h n i c a l and sc ient i f ic f i e l d s . 
At t i m e s , t h e M i n i s t e r of P l a n n i n g was s i m u l t a n e o u s l y the Deputy 
C h a i r m a n of the P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n . On the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of the 
ARC (1967-68), the r e o r g a n i z e d P l a n n i n g Commiss ion i s a t p r e s e n t 
composed of the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ( C h a i r m a n ) , an economis t (Deputy 
C h a i r m a n ) , and four fulltime e x p e r t s . The F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r , b e c a u s e 
of h i s being r e s p o n s i b l e for ( i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l ) f inancia l г о ь о и г с е ь , 
79. Ever since its inception, the Planning Commission's role m Indian political, 
economic, social and administrative spheres has been that of constant 
ascending order . The ascending curve lasted till 1967-68 when a need to 
reorganize the whole planning machinery was felt and eventual reorgani­
zation effected. Because of its importance in India, the Planning 
Commission will be often referred to. In particular,see 1 η f г a . , pp.181 ff. 
80. A somewhat unique feature of the Indian Constitution, these Principles of 
State Policy are contained in Part IV. The provisions of this part are not 
enforceable in any court, but the principles laid down are nevertheless 
fundamental in the governance of the country, Article 37, I n d i a n 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . For principles as such, see Article 39, 1 b i d . 
81. F i r s t F i v e Y e a r P l a n , Government of India, 1952, p . l . 
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is retained, contrary to the ARC's recommendations, as an ex-
officio member,°2 
The Planning Commission is not a statutory body, but in the 
administrative and political structure of the country it has played a 
vital ro l e . Although areas of development, such as public health, 
education, land, agricul ture, irr igation, electr ici ty, local govern-
ment and a wide range of activities under industries and t ransport , 
fall within the State List , the Five Year Plans have m-practice 
comprehended the entire range of development activities and crossed 
the lines set by the Constitution. In other words, "planning in India 
has made possible a degree of inter-penetration of interest and 
concern between the Central and State Governments. In such a s t ruc -
tu re , the Centre assumes a large role in the formulation of policy 
and overall plans, while the States take on steadily expanding 
administrative and development functions. Since important development 
programmes have to be undertaken at the local level in towns and 
vil lages, as a consequence of planned development, the Cen t r e ' s 
in teres t also extends to the institutions closest to the people, throueh 
which local resources are mobilized and local plans implemented." 
All important economic issues and problems ar is ing in the 
various ministries are generally discussed in the Planning Commission 
before they are put up to the Cabinet.Its functions have extended over 
the entire administration and it has played a significant role in the 
formulation of public policies, even in matters not connected with 
development. The association of the Prime Minister as its Chairman 
and other senior Cabinet Ministers as its members, vested the 
Commission with unusual prestige and influence, so that it sometimes 
becomes difficult to distinguish the role of the Cabinet from that of 
the Planning Commission, particularly m regard to the formulation 
and adoption of part icular economic and social policies. 
Planning procedures take place m various s tages . During 
the first stage, which begins some three years prior to commencement 
of the plan, the general state of the economy is examined, and past 
trends are appraised. A careful study is made of the need for 
correct ive action to r ed r e s s imbalances. At this stage there is no 
attompt to settle priori t ies in quantitative te rms . 
82. See I n t e r i m R e p o r t o f t h e S t u d y T e a m of t h e 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e f o r m s C o m m i s s i o n o n t h e 
M a c h i n e r y o f P l a n n i n g (Govt. of India P r e s s , 1967) ; 
F i n a l R e p o r t (December, 1967); and A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
R e p o r t o n t h e M a c h i n e r y of P l a n n i n g (Delhi, March 
1968). 
For purposes of this study, the Planning Commission's role and planning 
process in the country will be restricted largely to the pre-reorgamzed 
stage, i . e . , 1967-68. 
83. T h e P l a n n i n g P r o c e s s (Planning Commission, Government of 
India, 1963), p . 7 . For the planning procedure as such, which 
immediately follows, I have relied on this publication. 
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At the bocond stage, the Planning Commission constitutes a 
se r ies of working groups composed of its own specialists and 
those of the minibtrios at the Centre, to study the physical content 
of the Five Year Plan from various angles. At the same time, 
the States aro advised to constitute similar working groups of their 
own, which build up a picture of the development plan of each Sta te . 
The working groups at the Contre and at the State level remain in 
constant informal contact with one another. The Planning Commission 
also constitutes panels composed of loading experts drawn mainly from 
outside the government. The studies made by these working groups, 
panels e tc . are compiled into a Draft Memorandum. 
In the third stage, a Draft Outline of the Five Year Plan is 
prepared, which is a detailed elaboration of the ear l ie r Draft 
Memorandum. The Draft outline is given widest publicity inside and 
outside th^ country. Discussions are held with the S ta tes , at expert 
and political level. These discussions open up certain new dimensions 
which, at the fourth stage, lead to a preparation of a fresh Memorandum, 
which ultimately takes the form of a Report to be submitted to 
Parliament for approval. 
The weight of the Planning Commission's position vis-à-vis 
the States lies in its pivotal position as the Central agency for 
drawing up plans, fixing priori t ies and making recommendations for 
allocation of r e sou rces . At every stage indicated above, the Planning 
Commission submits its preliminary conclusions, Draft Memorandum, 
Draft Outline, Fresh Memorandum, and the Final Report, to the 
Cabinet and to the National Development Council. The National 
Development Council is the highest body, whose decisions with regard 
to development planning are final. It is composed of the Prime minister 
of India , a few Cabinet Ministers, the Chief Ministers of the Sta tes , 
and Members of the Planning Commission. 
Also, during every stage, the Planning Commission holds 
discussions regarding the plans of individual S ta tes . These 
discussions at ear l ie r stages are just preliminary, but a re intensified 
and become thorough in later s tages . They involve a study of financial 
aspects , which include proposals for raising additional resources 
and detailed plans for development in different sec to r s . The State 
plans do not continuously keep the national outlook in view. Even 
within their individual boundaries, the plans are built up on the basis 
of sectoral studies. There is no well-defined arrangement for setting 
such vital issues as the total size of the S t a t e ' s plan, coordinating 
all sectors within the Sta te , and further adjusting them to the overall 
national dimensions. The preparation of their plans, at least in par t , 
remains a regional political p rocess . The National Development 
Council which meets at every intermediary stage, in the midst of 
exchanges of proposals to and from the Planning Commission, provides 
a well-organized platform for political influences. P r e s s u r e s and 
compromises, therefore, inevitably play their part in determining 
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the final size of the S ta tes ' plans, particularly in developing 
different sec tor s . Since the financial relationship makes the states 
more dependent upon the Centre for the fulfilment of the plan, the 
political wranglings become more and more vehement. In the National 
Development Council meetings, a careful watch is kept by the States 
on each o t h e r ' s manoeuvring on the one hand, and a constant pressure 
is put on the C e n t r e ' s diminishing purse to meet their individual 
demands, on the other hand. In one of the first meetings of the 
National Development Council for the Fourth Five Year Plan, held 
in October 1964, "to the great regret of the planners and the 
Central l eaders , the State Chief Ministers, who constitute the main 
body of the Council, gave little thought to the problems of planning. 
All that they were concerned with at the meeting was their particular 
state or regional needs and demands. "°4 
The Constitutional s t ructure, the division of powers between 
the Centre and the S ta tes , and the administrative procedures , create 
obvious impediments in the implementation of plans, policies, and 
decisions. F o r the implementation of national plans, however, the 
Central Government has to rely heavily upon the S t a t e s . Since the 
requisite amount of decentralization of authority does not accompany 
the devolution of responsibility, the "centralized power ' and "decen­
tralized responsibility" become somewhat uneasy bed-fellows. 
Whereas regional disparit ies compel the national leaders to make an 
integrated approach to national development, the States become 
gradually resentful of the C e n t r e ' s dominance and their own 
subordinate position. The reorganization of Indian States on linguistic 
bas is , consciously or unconsciously, has further led the States to 
jealously guard their respective boundaries against any social, 
economic or political encroachment either by the Centre or by the 
neighbouring S t a t e s . The des i re for rapid economic development and 
such cleavages seem to have a reciprocal effect upon each other, which 
"locks the Union in a stalemato of f rustrat ion". °5 
TRYING THE UNTRIED 
Henry C. Hart records that till "perhaps the tenth and the sixteenth 
centur ies " , Indian experience in irrigation and flood control works 
was "unsurpassed by foreign contemporaries . . . unsurpassed, too, 
84. L i n k , Weekly Magazine, New Delhi, November 1 , 1964, p. 11 . The Fourth 
Five Year Plan, due for 1966, was suspended for some three years, and 
launched in 1969. For a brief refenrence to it, see also ι η Г г a. , p. 183. 
85. Selig S. Harrison, o p . c i t . , p. 7. 
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by la ter generations of Indians down to the nineteenth c e n t u r y " . и ь 
In the twentieth century, before independence in 1947, immediate 
examples of some kind of r iver control and use of r i ver waters for 
irr igation were available in the Ganges Canal project in the north 
of India, and the Krishnaraja Sagar project in Mysore in the 
South. However, these were isolated works, planned and established 
in a completely different political setting of British Indian Provinces 
and quasi-Sovereign princely s ta tes . They were administered 
separately and not under unified control by the Central Government. 
While they provided established knowledge in the techniques of 
designing and building an irrigation system, there was no example 
in the country of a multipurpose project of the magnitude of the 
latter-day DVC. These projects did not involve legal, political or 
administrative intr icacies of any consequence. And even when they 
did, decisions on them were more of an arb i t rary nature, which cannot 
be said to be of any precedental value. ' 
Taming a r i ver and utilizing its waters for various purposes 
is not an engineering feat only. Independent India, governed under 
new arrangements, "left herself free to build on the pas t " ,88 but 
nevertheless looked outside to find similar situations and methods to 
tackle them before experimenting with them at home. E a r l i e r , we 
painted a picture of two foreign administrative models. In their 
broader perspective, these institutions appeared promising enough 
to be tr ied on the Indian soi l . The DVC programme was launched in 
1948. To plan and to successfully c a r r y forward a multi-dimensional 
project of this magnitude was an effort not previously tr ied in the 
country. It demanded the working together of different sets of 
governments. The situation entailed not only a formal s t ructural 
set-up of governmental machinery at different levels, but also two sets 
of people with different approaches to their socio-economic problems 
which, in a democracy, necessari ly has political dimensions. 
The ensuing signs of strain and s t r e s s in developments efforts 
have been indicated in a general way above in the prefatorial account 
of the Indian setting. However, it may not be possible to transplant 
foreign institutions in precise forms: adjustments to the indigenous 
environment must necessari ly be made. Yet the process of adjustment 
entails the danger of making the transplanted models unrecognizable 
86. Henry C. Hart, N e w I n d i a ' s R i v e r s (Orient Longmans, Calcutta, 
1956), p.20. 
87. See i b i d . , pp. 31-33, for the Krishnaraja Sagar case which 
necessitated negotiations between the princely State of Mysore and the 
Madras Governement. the Government of India and the British Government. 
Hart has dealt with the Ganges Canal project and Krishnaraja Sagar in 
some detail, and considers them as "Two Forerunners" of other great 
river projects to follow after independence in 1947, see pp. 22-41 . 
88. I b i d ., p. 41. 
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if the indigenous environment makes ceaseless demands for modifications 
and if these modifications are carried too far. In the following chapters 
we shall examine the actual records in detail to see what happens to 
abstract schemes and good intentions when faced with realities internal 
or external to an organization - be they constitutional, political, economic 
social or administrative. 
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Chapter II 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE D.V.C. 
THE RIVER AND THE VALLEY 
The Damodar River r i s e s in Chota Nagpur and, after t ravers ing 
about 180 miles in the State of Bihar and 150 miles in West Bengal, 
joins the Hooghly River some 30 miles below Calcutta. From its 
source to its union with the Hooghly, the r i ver runs a zigzag course 
of approximately 336 miles, and during this long journey is joined by 
a number of wild streams and t r ibutar ie s . The nature of its course 
forms a distinct r i ver basin which covers an a r e a of 9,240 square 
miles, spreading over five distr icts of Bihar (Palamau, Ranchi, 
Hazaribagh, Santhal-Parganas and Manbhum) ; and four d i s t r ic t s 
of West Bengal (Burdwan, Bankura, Hooghly and Howrah). The 
whole valley is divided into two regions: the Upper Valley, covering 
the upper parts of the r i v e r basin which lies mainly in Bihra, and 
the Lower Valley, which covers the lower par t s falling in West 
Bengal. (See Map). 
The history of the River, like many others in India, has not 
been a very happy one. The r e c o r d s , available since 1730 or so, 
indicate recurr ing floods of varying intensity every eight to ten 
y e a r s . The destruction of life and property following these floods, the 
most frightful of which occurred in 1943, made the Damodar a r iver 
which the people came to fear. Although in comparison to r e c o r d s of 
previous y e a r s , the 1943 flood was not very high, the catastrophe it 
brought with it created alarm for the whole country. The countryside 
was flooded to 6 or 7 feet in some places . The Grand Trunk Road, 
connecting Calcutta to Delhi, was breached. Railway bridges were 
washed away and communications seriously interrupted. The flood 
threatened the Allied War efforts, at a time when Japanese forces had 
almost reached India ' s b o r d e r s . They even threatened Calcutta, which 
was isolated for nearly 3 weeks. The aftermath of the flood was 
te r r ib le , bringing large-scale destruction and dislocation of life and 
property. This flood also became one of the (indirect) causes of the 
Bengal famine of 1943, which took the lives of approximately 3 million 
people during the course of a few months. 2 
1 . F o r a brief history of floods and their magnitude from 1730 onwards, see 
P r e l i m i n a r y M e m o r a n d u m o n t h e U n i f i e d 
D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e D a m o d a r R i v e r (Abridged) (Government 
of India P r e s s , Calcutta, 1948), pp. 4 - 5 . 
2 . An elaborate account of these events has been given by Henry C. Hart, ο ρ . 
c i t . , pp. 6 1 - 6 3 . 
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Concern was felt in all qua r t e r s . As an immediate step, the 
Government of Bengal jointly with the Government of India (still a 
part of colonial regime at both levels) , both of whom took the matter 
more seriously than on previous occas ions , J appointed a Board of 
Enquiry, known as the "Damodar Flood Enquiry Committee". In 
August 1944, this Committee submitted a repor t recommending that 
an overall development of the whole Damodar River basin on the pattern 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States of America, 
should be considered. The Flood Enquiry Committee, besides dealing 
with flood control measures , detailed the benefits which would 
resul t from controlled waters of the River Damodar. It summarized 
the geological, agricultural , industrial and economic potentialities of 
the Damodar valley and concluded that the valley taken as a whole 
offered great prospects for development. The available minerals 
such as Coal, Mica, China Clay, Alluvial, Bauxite, Kyanite, 
Steat i te , Copper Ores and Iron Ores , part icularly in the upper 
va l ley , 4 were thought to have a great indust r ia l potential. 5 Likewise, 
the controlled waters of the r iver could be utilized for: a) irrigation 
which would increase food production; b) hydro-electr ici ty which 
would help in developing industries as well as provide for domestic 
consumption; c) water t ranspor t , by way of building navigable 
waterways. 
The Government of India, prompted by the suggestions of the 
Flood Enquiry Committee, commissioned the Central Technical 
Power Board to study the proposals . This led to a conference of 
representat ives of the Government of India and the Governments of 
Bihar and Bengal on 3rd January 1945. This Conference concluded that 
adequate data relating to unified r iver development should be collected 
and a preliminary memorandum drawn up. Mr. W.A. Voorduin, an 
3 . F rom 1863 on, the Government of Bengal had approached the Government of 
India for some kind of flood cont ro l m e a s u r e s in the Damodar R ive r B a s i n . 
No s t e p s were taken due to shor tage ol lunds . Cal l ing these efforts "half-
h e a r t e d " , a DVC publicat ion gives a brief h i s t o r y of s t eps taken by the 
P r o v i n c i a l Government of Bengal which "did not yield more fruit than 
producing some valuable data in r e s p e c t of va r i ous a s p e c t s which could be 
usefully employed a t a l a t e r s t a g e " , D . V . C , i n P r o s p e c t a n d 
R e t r o s p e c t (Calcu t ta , 1958). 
4 . Accord ing to a l a t e r s u r v e y , some of these minera l s were found to be abundant 
in the va l l ey . F o r i n s t a n c e , about 80% and TOfc of I n d i a ' s total product ion of 
coal and mica r e s p e c t i v e l y , was ava i lab le from the va l ley , see M i n e r a l 
R e s o u r c e s o f t h e D a m o d a r V a l l e y a n d A d j a c e n t 
R e g i o n a n d t h e i r U t i l i z a t i o n f o r I n d u s t r i a l 
D e v e l o p m e n t (Geological Survey of India, Calcut ta 1950). 
5 . As l a t e r d e s c r i b e d , "in i t s indus t r i a l po ten t ia l i t i e s the Damodar Valley has 
the same signif icance a s the Ruhr Valley for Germany and the Monangehala 
Valley for the L . S . A . " , W h y D a m o d a r V a l l e y S c h e m e 
D e s e r v e s T o p P r i o r i t y A m o n g I n d i a ' s 
D e v e l o p m e n t P r o j e c t s (DVC, Ca lcu t t a , 1948), p . 6 . 
DAMODAR VALLEY PROJECTS 
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e n g i n e e r from the T . V . A . , whose s e r v i c e s had e a r l i e r been a c q u i r e d 
by the C e n t r a l T e c h n i c a l P o w e r B o a r d , was c h a r g e d to d r a w up t h e 
in tended p r e l i m i n a r y memorandum for the unified deve lopment of the 
D a m o d a r Va l ley . With t h e h e l p of some Indian and fore ign e n g i n e e r s , 
Voorduin went into both t e c h n i c a l and f inancia l d e t a i l s . ' In J u l y 1945, 
he submit ted a p r e l i m i n a r y memorandum r e c o m m e n d i n g a Damodar 
Val ley Author i ty a s an example of the m u l t i - p u r p o s e deve lopment of a 
w a t e r s h e d for Ind ia , a s the TVA had been d e v e l o p e d for t h e U . S . A . 
T h i s Memorandum w a s sub jected to examinat ion by e x p e r t s of 
the United S t a t e s T e c h n i c a l Miss ion and a l s o by some l e a d i n g Indian 
e n g i n e e r s who a p p r o v e d the p r o p o s a l s of Voorduin and submitted a 
r e p o r t t h e the Government of I n d i a . In the m e a n t i m e , a n u m b e r of 
Indian e n g i n e e r s he ld c o n f e r e n c e s u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s of the C e n t r a l 
T e c h n i c a l P o w e r B o a r d on 1 3th D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 5 , 26th M a r c h 1946 and 
22nd Apr i l 1946, to hammer out some t e c h n i c a l f e a t u r e s of the p l a n . 8 
S u b s e q u e n t l y , a C o n f e r e n c e of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the G o v e r n m e n t s 
of B i h a r and Benga l and the Government of India held on 23rd and 
24th A p r i l , 1946, c o n s i d e r e d the r e p o r t of the U . S . T e c h n i c a l 
Miss ion and the p r e l i m i n a r y memorandum submit ted by V o o r d u i n . T h i s 
meet ing had p a r t i c u l a r s igni f icance b e c a u s e the G o v e r n m e n t s of 
B i h a r and B e n g a l , pending many t e c h n i c a l i t i e s , a g r e e d to the Voorduin 
and U . S . T e c h n i c a l Miss ion p r o p o s a l s , and u r g e d the C e n t r a l 
Government to cont inue to d i r e c t and s u p e r v i s e p r o g r e s s in r e g a r d to 
f u r t h e r a r r a n g e m e n t s , i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and s u r v e y s . In t h e same 
C o n f e r e n c e , the C e n t r a l Government a g r e e d to appoint an a d m i n i s t r a t o r 
to s u p e r v i s e a l l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s in c o n n e c t i o n with the 
e n s u i n g s c h e m e , a s wel l a s to frame p r o p o s a l s for i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
s e t - u p . M r . S . N . M a z u m d a r , an Indian Civi l S e r v i c e Of f icer , was 
appointed A d m i n i s t r a t o r in O c t o b e r 1 9 4 6 . " 
6. Mr. Voorduin played a vital role in the development scheme of the Damodar 
Valley in its initial stages. For his experience and background in engineering 
and planning, as well as in the process of drawing up the preliminary 
memorandum for the Damodar Valley, see a lyrical description given by Henry 
C. Hart, o p . с i t . , pp. 66-72. 
7. Voorduin gave a rough idea of the costs likely to be incurred in various 
projects in the Damodar Valley. Further questions covered in his plan were: 
What would be the sizes of the dams and reservoirs in order to control floods 
of the highest magnitude? How would the problem of rehabilitation of the 
people, uprooted because of reservoirs , be solved? How would water stored 
in reservoirs be utilized for irrigation, power production and navigation? 
What steps would be taken to augment the power production capacity of the 
scheme, e t c . ? See Preliminary Memorandum, o,p . c i t . , for relevant 
details. 
8. The items generally discussed centred round the effects of various reservoirs 
on coalfields, sand stowing operations, design flood and sequence of 
construction programme, e tc . 
9. In fact, the first Administrator was Mr. B.K. Gokhale, who was appointed in 
May 1946. He was succeeded by Mr. S.N. Mazumdar in October 1946. Mr. 
Gokhale's short stay as Administrator does not appear in DVC publications. 
Mention has, however, been made in P . Prasad, T h e D a m o d a r 
V a l l e y C o r p o r a t i o n - Α Brief Study (Mimeographed) (Indian Institute 
of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1963), p . 10. 
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THE P A S S I N G OF THE D . V . C . A C T , 1948 
The Damodar Val ley scheme involved m e a s u r e s l ike flood c o n t r o l , 
i r r i g a t i o n , w a t e r supp ly , c a n a l s , embankments and w a t e r s t o r a g e ; 
s u b j e c t s which fell u n d e r the p o w e r s of the P r o v i n c i a l Governments 
a c c o r d i n g to the Government of India Act of 1 9 3 5 . Difficult p rob lems 
had to be s e t t l e d , such a s : What benef i ts would a c c r u e to the 
P r o v i n c e s of B i h a r and Benga l r e s p e c t i v e l y ? How should the cos t 
be s h a r e d ? Would P r o v i n c i a l Governments be wi l l ing to fo rego some 
of t h e i r p o w e r s ? In o r d e r to d i s c u s s such q u e s t i o n s , a s e r i e s of 
C o n f e r e n c e s w e r e held be tween r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Gove rnmen t s 
of B i h a r and Bengal and the Government of Ind ia . B e s i d e s the 
t e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s , which a p p e a r e d r a t h e r f requent ly in t h e s e 
c o n f e r e n c e s , the d i s c u s s i o n predominant ly r e v o l v e d round the 
q u e s t i o n s posed a b o v e . B i h a r and Bengal w e r e a p p a r e n t l y r e l u c t a n t 
to u n d e r t a k e the f inancia l ob l iga t ions , which did not make coope ra t i on 
e a s i e r . '^ The C e n t r a l Government in the Confe rence held on 
4th O c t o b e r 1946, r e g r e t t e d that n e i t h e r the Government of B i h a r 
n o r of Benga l had ev inced the n e c e s s a r y i n t e r e s t in the p r o j e c t . Under 
t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , sa id M r . N a r h a r i R a o , F i n a n c i a l S e c r e t a r y to 
the Government of Ind ia , it was difficult to s e e what the Government 
of India could do if P r o v i n c i a l Governments did not show any 
adequa t e s e n s e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in m a t t e r s which p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d 
them. The r e a s o n for the lack of coope ra t i on on the p a r t of the 
P r o v i n c i a l Governmen t s was appa ren t l y f i nanc i a l . As e a r l y a s 
J a n u a r y 1945 , the Government of B i h a r had s a id that the " o r i g i n a l 
p r o p o s a l s of the Benga l Government made no appea l to the B i h a r 
Government b e c a u s e B i h a r s tood to gain l i t t l e by t h e s e p r o p o s a l s " . ^ 
The Government of B e n g a l , for that m a t t e r , no twi ths tand ing i t s 
major i n t e r e s t in the s c h e m e , was equa l ly he s i t an t to s h o u l d e r the 
whole bu rden of e x p e n d i t u r e . Both P r o v i n c i a l Governmen t s w e r e 
uni ted in t r y i n g to shift the load to C e n t r a l Governmen t . Summar i z ing 
t h e s e deve lopments up to O c t o b e r 1946, the F i n a n c e S e c r e t a r y 
10. Although the Government of India Act, 1935, had clearly demarcated 
Provincial and Federal sources of revenue, the net revenues of the Provinces 
could not be diverted to large-scale schemes of this nature. The financial 
arrangements under the Act of 1935, including shared taxes on incomes 
(other than agricultural income and incomes of Corporations) and devolution 
of funds to the Provinces under the regulation that proceeds of certain duties 
to be levied and collected by the Federation (viz. , duties on salt, on excise 
and exports) could, under an Act of the Federal Legislature, be shared with 
the Provinces, were the prototype for the financial arrangements devised 
under the present Constitution of India. Cf. pp.19-20 For a comparative 
analysis,see K.R. Bombwall, T h e F o u n d a t i o n s of I n d i a n 
F e d e r a l i s m (Asia Publishing House, 1967) especially "The Federal 
Structure (1935)", pp. 185-222. 
11 . Mr. S.M. Dhar, on behalf of the Bihar Government, in the Conference of 
Participating Governments relating to waterways development in the Damodar 
basin held on 3rd January 1945, at Calcutta. Marked "For Official Use Only", 
the summary records of Minutes and Proceedings of the Conferences and 
Meetings of the three Participating Governments (before and after the 
establishment of the DVC) are available in:1) P r o c e e d i n g s of t h e 
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emphasized that "everything depends upon the capacity of the 
Provinc ia l Governments to cooperate in a measure of this sort with 
a full s e n s e of respons ib i l i ty instead of attempting to throw the ent ire 
burden on the Government of India who have done a great deal to 
a s s i s t them". He was not optimistic about the material ization of 
suggest ions regarding the Damodar Val ley Authority, "since it 
involves courage and faith and a determination on the part of the 
Provinc ia l authorit ies to cooperate with each other and the Centre 
in a spiri t of mutual trust and confidence. S o far evidence of this i s 
lacking. "13 
Ultimately, in la ter Conferences , such dif ferences were 
c leared up step by s t e p . Reviewing the p r o g r e s s made until January 
1947, C . H . Bhaba, then Member for Works, Mines and P o w e r , 
re ferred to various constitutional and administrative diff iculties of 
the past few months. But, in spite of these factors which had hampered 
p r o g r e s s , the scheme had now come to a s tage when it was poss ible 
to take final d e c i s i o n s . 1 5 H . S . Suhrawardy, then Premier of Bengal , '° 
a l so c larif ied the posit ion briefly and sa id , inter a l ia , that "the 
Government of Bengal was most anxious to get on with the job . "17 He 
a l so s t r e s s e d that his government wanted the scheme to be treated as 
a whole and at once , and that a large measure of agreement with 
representa t ive s of the Government of Bihar regarding subjects in 
dispute had been forthcoming. He pledged: "The Bengal Government 
has no objection to surrender to the Damodar Val ley Corporation 
such n e c e s s a r y powers of the Provinc ia l Government as might be 
n e c e s s a r y to ensure that the Corporation would be an autonomous 
body with full control over i ts own administration and f inance, without 
interference by the two Provinc ia l Governments ." 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e s , 
Proceedings of Conferences held before the establishment of the DVC 
(Calcutta, October, 1959); 2) M i n u t e s o f t h e P r o c e e d i n g s 
of t h e P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e s 
(Calcutta, March 1956); 3) P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e P a r t i c i -
p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s 1 C o n f e r e n c e s , Agenda and Agenda 
Notes After the establishment of the DVC (Calcutta, June 1961). 
12. Proceedings of the meeting held in New Delhi on 4th October, 1946 in 
connection with the Damodar Valley Scheme. 
13. I b i d . 
14. Member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General of India. 
1 5. Proceedings of the Inter-Provincial Conference held in New Delhi on 6th 
January 1947, in connection with the development of the Damodar Valley. 
16. Later Prime Minister of Pakistan, in post-independence years. 
Mr. Suhrawardy died in December 1963. 
17. Proceedings of the Inter-Provincial Conference held in New Delhi on 6th 
January 1947. 
18. I b i d. 
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Another point which occupied much of the time in these Conferences 
was that of the resettlement of inhabitants of the a r e a s where the main 
contruction programmes of the Damodar scheme were to take place. 
Since all dams and r e s e r v o i r s were to be built in the upper valley, the 
Bihar Government was concerned about the future of these people and 
the cost of their rehabilitation. In a Conference held on 26th April 
1947 (the last but one in the ser ies) , the Central Government assured 
the Government of Bihar that the "Corporation would bear all 
reasonable charges on account of resettlement and welfare of the 
displaced population". ' 9 In the same Conference, the three Governments 
also considered the draft constitution of the Damodar Valley-
Corporation to be submitted to Parl iament. The Minister for Irrigation 
(Bihar), Mr. Ram Charitar Singh, on this occasion insisted that Bihar 
should be represented on the Governing Body of the Corporation. 
Mr. C.H. Bhaba res i s ted this suggestion and held that "the scheme 
entirely res ted on the independence of the Board" and that the "Bihar 
representat ives should reconsider their att i tude".20 
Having resolved the disputed issues in principle, the next step 
was to pass a resolution in the Legislatures of Bengal and Bihar under 
section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in order to 
authorize the Central Government to present the draft Bill to the 
Central Legis lature. This resolution was passed by the two Provincial 
Legis latures in November, 1947. 
A Bill to provide for the establishment and regulation of a 
corporation for the development of the Damodar Valley in the 
provinces of Bihar and West B e n g a l ^ was presented to the Constituent 
Assembly of India on 12th December 1947. While moving the Bill, the 
Minister in charge, N.V. Gadgil, spoke to the House of the magnitude 
of the problems of the valley and of the benefits expected from the 
scheme, remarking: "The whole scheme is worked on the principle of 
a unified scheme and no part icular aspect of that can be isolated and 
can be given under-importance. I will request the House and the public 
at large to look at this scheme as a whole, not in terms of this dis tr iat 
19. Proceedings of the Inter-Provincial Conference held in New Delhi on 26th 
April 1947 in connection with the development of the Damodar Valley. 
20. I b ι d . 
21 . Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935, reads: "If it appears to 
the Legislatures of two or more provinces to be desirable that any of the 
matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List should be regulated 
in those Provinces by Act of the Dominion Legislature, and if resolutions 
to that effect are passed by all the Chambers of those Provincial 
Legislatures, it shall be lawful for the Dominion Legislature to pass an Act 
for regulating that matter accordingly, but any act so passed may, as 
respects any Province to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an 
Act of the Legislature of that Province." Since most of the subjects 
covered by the Scheme fell within the Provincial List, such resolutions were 
required to be passed by the Legislatures of Bengal and Bihar. 
22. India was partitioned in August 1947. Nearly half of Bengal having gone over 
to Pakistan, the Indian part of Bengal was named West Bengal. 
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which may be submerged; not in terms of some benefits that may-
accrue to another d is t r ic t ; not in terms of another province which may 
get the benefits of i r r igat ion, but take the Damodar Valley a rea as a 
whole and let us see if we are able to show and possibly to convince 
that as a resul t of this scheme the standard of life will decidedly be 
bet ter , and this valley which has been the subject of flood and 
consequent destruction of life and property is turned into a valley 
of prosperi ty and happiness. "23 Then Mr. Gadgil explained the broad 
principles of the Bill, its aims and objectives, and its financial and 
technical a spec t s . After this introduction, the Bill was submitted to 
a Select Committee of the House. 
The Select Committee of the House took some two months to 
examine the Draft Bill , which finally came before the House for 
consideration on 13th February 1948. It faced a mixture of optimism 
and pessimism in the House. On the one hand, it caught the imagination 
of the members and great hopes were expressed; on the other hand, 
many difficulties were pointed out. Prof. K . T . Shah, for example, 
feared the danger of nepotism and political influence, and pointed out 
that in view of the shortage of technical experts in India, espacially 
in the field of electr ici ty, flood control measures and i rr igat ion, the 
Government might have to look for suitable men outside the country 
and, given time, train its own people who would later on take over 
the task. 24 Mr. B . Das, another member, spoke of the general 
character of the Indian people, which he described as "undisciplined" 
and far away from "the high sounding ideas - the machine ideas -
which the T . V . A . or the American people p rac t i se . "25 Notwithstanding 
these doubts, all congratulated the Minister in Charge on his singular 
good fortune to introduce such a Bill in the House, which they thought 
was the first measure of benefit to a large number of people in 
independent India. 
The Bill was finally passed on 18th February 1948, and was 
placed on the Statute Book on 27th March 1948. Out of this Act of 
Parliament the Damodar Valley Corporation was born on 7th July 
1948. 
THE STATUTE 2 6 
A. A i m s a n d O b j e c t i v e s 
The DVC was entrusted with the following six functions, as stipulated 
23. C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , 
December 12, 1947. 
24. I b i d. , February 14, 1948. 
25. I b i d . , December 12, 1947. 
26. For Tuli text of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948, see A p p e n -
d i x A. 
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u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 2 of t h e D V C A c t , 1 9 4 8 : 
" fa) The promotion and operation of schemes for irrigation, water supply 
and drainage. 
(b) The promotion and operation of schemes for the generation, transmission 
and distribution of e lectr ica l energy, both hydro-electr ic and thermal. 
(c) The promotion and operation of schemes for flood control in the 
Damodar River and i ts tributaries and the channels, if any,excavated 
by the Corporation in connection with the scheme and for the 
improvement of flow conditions in the Hooghly River. 
(d) The promotion and control of navigation in the Damodar River and i ts 
tributaries and channels, if any. 
(e) The promotion of afforestation and control of so i l eros ion in the 
Damodar Valley, and 
(f) The promotion of public health and the agricultural, industrial, economic 
and general well-being in the Damodar Valley and i ts area of operat ion." 
T h e s e a i m s , a s l a t e r t r a n s p i r e d , w e r e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o 
" p r i m a r y " a n d " s e c o n d a r y " : f l o o d c o n t r o l , i r r i g a t i o n a n d p o w e r f a l l i n g 
u n d e r the f o r m e r , the r e s t f a l l i n g u n d e r t h e l a t t e r c a t e g o r y . F i n a n c i a l 
p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e s t a t u t e w e r e b a s e d on t h e a s s u m p t i o n of b e n e f i t s that 
w o u l d a c c r u e to t h e t w o p r o v i n c e s f rom t h e s e p r i m a r y and s e c o n d a r y 
f u n c t i o n s of t h e C o r p o r a t i o n . 
(i ) P r i m a r y F u n c t i o n s : 
(a) F l o o d C o n t r o l : T h e main p u r p o s e f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e D V C 
w a s f l o o d c o n t r o l . B e n e f i t s f rom f l o o d c o n t r o l m e a s u r e s w e r e 
to a c c r u e t o West B e n g a l , w h i c h f a c e d t h e c a l a m i t i e s f rom r e c u r r i n g 
f l o o d s . B i h a r w a s c l e a r l y not a p a r t y t o i t , but t h e G o v e r n m e n t of 
India w o u l d a l s o b e n e f i t . In a d d i t i o n t o i t s s h a r e of i n d i r e c t b e n e f i t s , 
i t w o u l d g e t f l o o d p r o t e c t i o n f o r the E a s t Ind ian R a i l w a y s ' m a i n l i n e 
a n d f o r t h e G r a n d T r u n k R o a d . In s o m e q u a r t e r s , i t w a s e v e n f e l t 
that C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t w a s l i k e l y to d e r i v e m o r e b e n e f i t s f rom f lood 
c o n t r o l than West B e n g a l , and t h e y c o n s e q u e n t l y d e m a n d e d that the. 
G o v e r n m e n t of Ind ia s h o u l d b e a r t w o - t h i r d s of t h e t o t a l c o s t of f l o o d 
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c o n t r o l m e a s u r e s and B e n g a l o n l y o n e - t h i r d . ' T h e p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n 
of t h e C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t h e r e w a s w e a k ; e s c a p e f rom o v e r a l l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w a s d i f f icu l t w h e n p r o t e c t i o n f rom f l o o d s had b e e n 
w i d e l y r e g a r d e d a s a n a t i o n a l i s s u e . T h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n , on w h i c h 
C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t e f f e c t i v e l y i n s i s t e d , w a s that t h e c a p i t a l c o s t f o r 
f l o o d c o n t r o l m e a s u r e s w a s to be e q u a l l y s h a r e d b e t w e e n t h e C e n t r a l 
G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e G o v e r n m e n t of West B e n g a l , w i t h t h e maximum 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of 7 0 m i l l i o n r u p e e s f rom t h e C e n t r e . S e c t i o n 3 6 of t h e 
A c t r e a d s : " T h e t o t a l amount of c a p i t a l upto f o u r t e e n c r o r e s ^ " of 
27. This view was mainly expressed by Mr. Suhrawardy, in the Conference of 
6th January, 1947, ο ρ . с i t . 
28. One crore equals ten million. 
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r u p e e s a l l o c a t e d to f l o o d c o n t r o l s h a l l be s h a r e d e q u a l l y b e t w e e n 
t h e C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t of West B e n g a l and a n y amount in e x c e s s 
t h e r e o f s h a l l b e t h e l i a b i l i t y of the G o v e r n m e n t of West B e n g a l , " 
(b) I r r i g a t i o n : T h e D a m o d a r V a l l e y , in i t s l o w e r r e g i o n s , 
s u f f e r e d a n a c u t e s h o r t a g e of d e p e n d a b l e w a t e r s u p p l y . O n l y o n e 
c r o p ( K h a r i f ) 2 9
 W a s g r o w n , t h e s e c o n d c r o p ( R a b i ) ™ b e i n g a l m o s t 
n e g l i g i b l e . " O n e of t h e t h r e e p r i n c i p a l p u r p o s e s " , r e c o r d s t h e 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' s t u d y , "of m u l t i p u r p o s e d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e 
D a m o d a r V a l l e y w a s i r r i g a t i o n and d r a i n a g e s c h e m e s . " 3 ' T h e b e n e f i t s 
of the i r r i g a t i o n and w a t e r s u p p l y w e r e t o be r e a p e d by t h e l o w e r 
v a l l e y , w h i c h i n c l u d e d p a r t s of West B e n g a l a n d not of B i h a r . T h e 
t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s r e p o r t e d a g a i n s t i r r i g a t i o n b e i n g p r o v i d e d i n 
B i h a r o n t h e g r o u n d that i t w a s u n e c o n o m i c . F u t u r e b e n e f i t s w e r e 
not r u l e d o u t , h o w e v e r . 3 3 T h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e A c t r e g a r d i n g 
i r r i g a t i o n w e r e a c c o r d i n g l y d e v i s e d . S e c t i o n 3 4 s t a t e s : 
"The total amount of capital allocated to irrigation shall bo shared 
between the Provincial Governments as follows, namely: 
(1) The Government concerned shall be responsible for the capital cost 
of the works constructed exclusively for irrigation in its Province; and 
(2) The balance of capital cost under irrigation for both the Provinces 
of Bihar and West Bengal shall be shared by the Provincial Governments 
in the proportion to their guaranteed annual off-takes of water for 
agricultural purposes: Provided that the divisible capital cost under this 
clause shall bo provisionally shared between them in accordance with 
their previously declared intentions regarding their respective 
guaranteed off-takes and any payments made accordingly shall be adjusted 
after the determination of the guaranteed off-takes." 
(c ) P o w e r : " T h e e x t e n t of p o w e r g e n e r a t i o n in a n y c o u n t r y i s 
t h e t r u e i n d e x of i t s e c o n o m i c p r o s p e r i t y a n d t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g 
of i t s p e o p l e " , r e c o r d s a G o v e r n m e n t of Ind ia p u b l i c a t i o n . 3 4 B o t h in 
West B e n g a l and B i h a r , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w a s a n t i c i p a t e d on a l a r g e 
s c a l e . P o w e r w a s not o n l y n e e d e d by both S t a t e s f o r t h i s a n t i c i p a t e d 
d e m a n d f r o m i n d u s t r i e s , but a l s o for r u r a l and u r b a n e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n . 
29. Kharif i s the summer c r o p in India, which depends mainly on the r a i n s . It i s 
mostly paddy and s t r a w . 
3 0 . Rabi a r e w i n t e r c r o p s and need dependable w a t e r supply . T h e s e include 
wheat , l e n t i l s , g r a m , w i n t e r p u l s e s , v e g e t a b l e s , s u g a r c a n e s , p o t a t o e s , 
m u s t a r d , l i n s e e d , e t c . 
31 . F o r th is , and all o t h e r t e c h n i c a l and e n g i n e e r i n g informat ion, see the U . N . 
publ icat ion: A C a s e S t u d y o f t h e D a m o d a r V a l l e y 
C o r p o r a t i o n a n d I t s P r o j e c t s , Flood Contro l S e r i e s N o . 16 
(Bangkok, 1960). 
32 . P r o c e e d i n g s of the Meeting, 4th O c t o b e r , 1946, ο ρ . с i t . 
3 3 . "It i s true. S i r , that a s u b s t a n t i a l benefit of t h i s will go to the P r o v i n c e of 
Benga l" , sa id N . V . G a d g i l . Then he a d d e d : "But it i s p o s s i b l e , S i r , that in 
c o u r s e of t i m e addi t ional benefit in the m a t t e r of addi t iona l a r e a s u n d e r 
i r r i g a t i o n may be made ava i lab le in c e r t a i n p a r t s of B i h a r a l s o , " 
C o n s t i t u e n t A s s em b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , 
12th December, 1947. 
34. P l a n n i n g f o r P o w e r a n d I r r i g a t i o n ( P u b l i c a t i o n s 
Division, Government of India, 1954). 
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Benefits from the power schemes were therefore to go to both S t a t e s . 
In the foreseeable future Central Government could also utilize power 
if it should choose to establish centrally-owned industries in the a r e a , 
or to electrify the Railways. With this in view, it was decided that the 
capital cost for power be devided into t h r e e , to be provided by the 
State Governments and the Central Government in equal s h a r e s . 
Section 35 thus says: "The total amount of capital allocated to power 
shall be shared equally between the three Participating Governments." 
A further provision was made in sections 18 and 19 of the Act, 
giving powers to the Corporation in respect of Railways, Collieries 
and such industries or agencies which already owned the small power 
installations in the valley. 
(n) Secondar Functions: 
Sub-sections (d), (e) and (f) of Section 12 of the Act lay down the 
secondary functions of the Corporation. 
(a) Navigation: As a natural corollary to the Corporat ion 's 
irrigation schemes, the development of navigation and water t ransport 
was thought to provide cheaper means of t ransport than by ra i l or 
road. It was expected that water transport would carry about two 
million tons of cargo annually. This included coal (mined mainly in 
the Ramganj Coal belt), paddy, industrial products, construction 
materials, colliery s t o r e s , agricultural produce and so on. The 
benefits from navigation wore to accrue to industries located both 
in West Bengal and Bihar. 
(b) Afforestation and о~Л Conservation: In the upper 
catchment of the Damodar River, which covers an area of about 
7,200 square miles, "ruthless exploitation of forests, over-grazing 
of grass lands and improper management of agricultural lands through 
many j e a r s was exposing the undulating land surface to the beating 
action of monsoon r a i n s . Most of the rain that fell on such a r e a s , 
therefore, rushed down the slope of the land as run-off water eroding 
away the surface soil which was the store house of plant nutrients, 
gradually rendering it unfit for sustaining plant l ife."- 3 ' Soil 
conservation and afforestation programmes were therefore included 
as essential features of the DVC scherno, the benefits to go to the 
State of Bihar of which the upper vallev formed part . Moreover, it was 
thought that people affected by the Corporat ion 's construction 
programme could bo re-settlod on the reclaimed land. 
(c) Whatever escaped under sub-section (a) - (e) ol Section 12 
was covered under sub-section (f) regarding the economic and social 
well-being of the people in the vallex plus industrialization. Benefits 
emanating from these functions wore to accrue to the whole valley, 
and consequcntlj to both S t a t e s . 
The Act did not stipulate separate financuil .uT.ingemcnts for 
the sccondar\ functions. A general provision was made under 
3=). D.V.C, ι η P r o s p e c t a n d R e t г о s ρ ι ο t , p . 33. 
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s e c t i o n s 32 and 33 of the Act which r e a d a s fol lows: 
"The Corporation shall have power to spend such sums as it thinks fit 
on objects authorized under this Act other than irrigation, power and 
flood control and such sums shall be treated as common expenditure 
payable out of the Fund of the Corporation before allocation under 
Section 3 3 . " (Section 32). 
"The total capital expenditure chargeable to a project shall be allocated 
between the three main objects, namely, irrigation, power and flood 
control as follows, namely: 
(1) expenditure solely attributable to any of these objects, including a 
proportionate share of overhead and general charges, shall be charged 
to that object, and 
(2) expenditure common to two or more of the said objects,including a 
proportionate share of overhead and general charges, shall be allocated 
to each of such objects in proportion to the expenditure which, according 
to the estimate of the Corporation, would have been incurred in 
constructing a separate structure solely for that object, less any amount 
determined under clause (1) in respect of that object." (Section 33). 
B . B o a r d o f D i r e c t o r s 
S e c t i o n s 4 and 5 of the Act conta in p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g to the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the C o r p o r a t i o n and c o n d i t i o n s of s e r v i c e of 
M e m b e r s of the B o a r d . T h e s e p r o v i s i o n s r e a d a s fo l lows: 
"(1) The Corporation shall consist of a Chairman and two other members 
appointed by the Central Government after consultation with the Provincial 
Governments. 
(2) A person shall be disqualified for being appointed, or for continuing 
as , a member of the Corporation (a) if he is a member of the Central or 
any provincial legislature; or (b) if he has, directly or indirectly, any 
interest in a subsisting contract made with, or in any work being done for 
the Corporation except as a share-holder (other than a director) in an 
incorporated company provided that where he is a share-holder he shall 
disclose to the Government the nature and extent of shares held by him in 
such company. 
(3) No act or proceeding of the Corporation shall be invalid by reason 
only of the existence of any vacancy amongst its members or any defect 
in the appointment of a member thereof." (Section4). 
"(1) Every member shall be a whole-time servant of the Corporation. 
(2) The remuneration and other conditions of service of the members shall 
be such as may be prescr ibed." (Section 5). 
С. P o w e r s o f t h e C o r p o r a t i o n 
The C o r p o r a t i o n ' s p o w e r s have been s t i p u l a t e d u n d e r s e c t i o n s 22, 
2} and 24 of the Act which dea l with the holding of p r o p e r t y , c o n s t r u c ­
tion p r o g r a m m e s , w a t e r c o n t r o l , r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , hea l th m e a s u r e s , 
d i v e r s i o n o r c l o s u r e of r o a d s , and so o n . T h e s e p o w e r s a p a r t , the 
C o r p o r a t i o n , u n d e r s e c t i o n 60 of the Act , was e m p o w e r e d to draw up 
36. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 has been omitted vide D a m o d a r V a l l e y 
C o r p o r a t i o n ( A m e n d m e n t ) A c t 1957 ( No. 59 o f 1957). Until 
1957 all members of the Board, including the Chairman, were fulltime. 
From 1957 till 1964-65, all three members were part-time. Since then, the 
Chairman is fulltime and two members part-time. Cf. i n f r a . , pp.1 27 ff. 
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regulations for executing its functions. ' Without prejudice to the 
generality of these powers , specific authority was given to the 
Corporation in the following fields: 
(a) appointment and promotion of its officers and servants ; 
(b) other conditions of service of i ts officers and servants ; 
(c) the manner in which water ra tes and charges for electr ical 
energy shall be recovered; 
(d) prevention of pollution of water under its control; 
(e) regulation of taking of fish from water under i ts control; 
(f ) its own proceedings and business ; 
(g) punishment for breach of regulations. 
Under the Act, the DVC was empowered to acquire land 
(section 50); in the judicial field, to take disputable cases to an 
arb i t ra tor (section 49); its authorized officers could file complaints 
in any court which was to give them due cognizance (section 54) ; i ts 
officars or servants could enter upon any land or premises for 
carrying out any of i ts works (section 55); its members, servants 
and officers were deemed to be public servants (section 56); its 
act ions, taken in good faith, had due protection of law (section 57). 
These powers of the Corporation were of a purely administrative 
nature and only served to strengthen its position in carrying out i ts 
programme. The Act also imposed certain obligations on the 
Corporation, namely, to pay interest on the amount of capital provided 
by each Participating Government (section 38); to prepare a budget 
for each financial year and make printed copies of the same available 
to the three Participating Governments on a prescr ibed date 
(section 44) ; to prepare an annual repor t within six months after 
each financial year covering, in par t icular , certain specific topics 
(section 45) ; to prepare such other financial statements in such forms 
and by such dates as might be prescribed and make them available 
to the three Participating Governments (section 46). 
D. P o w e r s o f t h e C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t 
Since the Central Government had created the DVC, it had 
uncontested powers in matters of policy. Section 48 made a general 
provision in this respect : "In discharge of its functions the 
Corporation shall be guided by such instructions on questions of 
policy as may be given to it by the Central Government. If any 
dispute a r i s e s between the Central Government and the Corporation 
as to whether a question is or is not a question of policy, the decision 
of the Central Government shall be final. " 
The Central Government was also empowered to make rules 
under section 59, thereby prescribing the lines on which business 
of the Corporation was to be conducted. Various sections of the Act 
37. The DVC has made the following regulations under this section: 
(1) Damodar Valley Corporation (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1951 ; 
(2) Damodar Valley Corporation Fishery Regulations, 1955; (3) Damodar 
Valley Corporation (Prevention of Pollution of Water) Regulations, 1957; 
(4) Damodar Valley Corporation Service (Conduct) Regulations, 1955; and 
(5) Damodar Valley Corporation Service Regulations, 1957. 
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contained the words "as prescribed" which, as explained under section 
2(5), meant "prescribed by rules under section 59". 
Section 51 stipulated that the Central Government could 
control the Corporation by removing members of the Corporation under 
certain circumstances, with due protection of their r ights under 
se rv ice . The powers to appoint members of the Governing Board 
(though in consultation with the Provincial Governments), a 
Secre tary and a Financial Adviser, were also vested in Central 
Government. 
E . P o w e r s o f t h e t w o S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s 
The Act did not allow many powers to the State Governments. The 
relevant provisions dealt mostly with technicalities and obligations 
of, or to , the Governments of the two S ta tes . Examples may be 
cited in: section 25, requiring the Corporation to cooperate with 
the Part icipating Governments, railway and local authori t ies; and 
section 26, res t r ic t ing the Corporation from submerging coal mines 
or mineral deposits in the Damodar Valley a rea ; sections 30 and 31 , 
requiring the Participating Governments to provide capital to the 
Corporation on specified dates ; and section 41 , requiring the 
Provincial Governments to credit the Corporation its share of 
betterment levy.-*" 
UNSETTLED AREAS AND DEFECTS 
IN THE STATUTE 
The Corporation was to be an autonomous body insofar as the 
implementation of the programme was concerned. This programme, 
with the backing of the law, covered li terally all possible areas of 
development inside the valley. " Under the Act, the Corporation was 
empowered to "do anything which may be necessary or expedient for 
purposes of carrying out its functions" .40 A number of c lauses , such 
as those which empowered the Corporation to stipulate its own 
regulations regarding direction and control of personnel policies, 
recovery of water r a t e s and electricity charges , prevention of 
water pollution and so on,41 were in conformity with this administrative 
autonomy. Likewise, were the clauses giving it authority to construct 
dams, close roads , acquire land, rese t t le the displaced population, 
develop f isher ies , establish cooperative societ ies.42 These powers 
were consistent with the understanding given by the Minister in 
Parliament: "The general principles on which this Corporation will 
have to work are that for all purposes it is going to be an autonomous 
38. Betterment levy is a tax charged on lands, the value of which increases as 
a result of assured irigation. 
39. Sub-sections of section 1 2 of the DVC Act, 1948, quoted above, p. 37. 
40. Section 22 of the DVC Act, 1948, see Appendix A. 
41 . Section 60, i b i d . 
42. Sections 22, 23, 24, 50 and 60 were elaborate in describing these powers 
of the Corporation, i b i d . 
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body, that it will be free - within the framework as contemplated in 
the provisions of the Bill - to manage the affairs . . . "^З However, 
some provisions were r a t h e r strange in character : 
(1 ) The Corporation did not have the authority to appoint 
two of i ts most important officers, namely, the S e c r e t a r y (Executive 
Head) and the Financial Adviser. These powers were vested in the 
Central Government, which seemed to conflict with the spirit of the 
Act.44 Also, the Act did not make specific provisions with respect 
to qualifications of members of the Board; not even a general 
indication was given as in the case of the T.V.A. Act.45 The 
B o a r d ' s continuity was also not ensured. Section 4 of the Act only 
stipulated the conditions under which a member could be disqualified. 
(2) Terms like "joint e n d e a v o u r " ^
 a n
d "participating 
governments" implied a kind of equal partnership of the Governments 
of Bihar and West Bengal and the Central Government in the 
e n t e r p r i s e , but this equality was not evident, whether in respect of 
investment s h a r e s , or of the benefits accruing to each of them, or 
as to rights of control over the Corporation. As the Corporation was 
established by the Union Parliament, the authority of the Centre 
was not made very specific. The Centre was allowed to lay down 
general policy, ' and to prescribe the rules for conduct of b u s i n e s s . ^ 
The C e n t r e ' s power of appointment of the Board, also rooted in its 
over-al l executive control, was qualified to the extent that the two 
State Governments had to be consulted. ° But the Act laid down 
that the financial statements, audit repor t s and annual repor t s were 
not only to be submitted to the Union Parliament, but to the State 
Legislatures as w e l l . ' 0 While this ensured the equality of the 
Participating Governments, it left the question of legislative 
accountability of the Corporation largely undejfjined. 
The contribution of each government to the investment 
capital also indicated inequality. With respect to floçd control the 
Central Government and the Government of West Bengal were to 
share a maximum limit for the Centre of 70 million rupees whatever 
the increase in total expenditure on this account. 51 Irrigation 
43. C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s F 
13th February, 1948. 
44. See the speeches by Prof. Saxena and Mr. Jaipal Singh in the 
C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , 
14th and 16th February, 1948, respectively, both of whom vehemently 
opposed these provisions. 
45. "All members of the Board shall be persons who profess a belief in the 
feasibility and wisdom of this Act", Section 2(h) of the T.V.A. Act, 1933. 
46. N.V. Gadgil, in C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) 
D e b a t e s , 1 2th December, 1947. 
47. Section 48, D.V.C. Act, 1948, see Appendix A. 
48. Section 59, i b i d . 
49. Section 4 , i b i d . 
50. Sections 45.and 46, i b i d . 
51 . Section 36, i b i d . 
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expenditure was purely a matter for West Bengal;52 expenditure on 
power was to be shared by all three governments in equal proportions.53 
This distribution was devised in view of the benefits that each State 
was to derive from these individual projects which, again, were in 
unequal proport ions. The Central Government was not to gain much 
in re turn of huge amount it was to invest; the West Bengal Government 
was to gain most; and the Bihar Government was to get re turns 
mainly from power production. 
(3) Although sections 34, 35 and 36 clarified the share of the 
three Participating Governments in the three primary objects of the 
Corporation, the provisions of section 32, indicating the expenditure 
on secondary objects, were ambiguous. Section 32 read with section 
33 not only created confusion with regard to sharing expenditure on 
secondary objects, it also mixed up the order of sections 34, 35 and 
36. Terms such as "overhead and general charges" , "common expen-
diture" appearing in these a r t i c les , were open to various in te rp re -
tations and, as we shall see below, were to create complications 
for the Corporation. 
(4) The scope of section 58 of the Act: "The provisions of this 
Act or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding 
anything contained in any enactment other than this Act or any 
instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this 
Act ," was ra ther extensive. As compared to the compromising nature 
of Section 24, whereby the Corporation might ca r ry out all or any 
functions, and exercise all or any powers of the Provincial 
Governments in the Damodar Valley under certain specified Acts , 
the provisions of section 58 were also too s trong. 
52. Section 34, i b i d . 
53. Section 35, i b i d . 
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Chapter III 
T H E D V C P R O G R A M M E O P E R A T I O N 
-A D E S C R I P T I V E A C O C U N T -
Soon a f te r the DVC \ аь e s t a b l i s h e d in July 1948, the Government 
of India appointed the Members of the B o a r d u n d e r s e c t i o n s 4 and 5 
of the DVC A c t . M r . S . N . Mazumdar, who had held the post of 
A d m i n i s t r a t o r from O c t o b e r 1946 o n w a r d , jo ined a s C h a i r m a n ; 
M r . P . P . V a r m a , a l a w y e r p r a c t i s i n g in P a t n a (Bihar) and a member 
of the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly and the B i h a r L e g i s l a t i v e A s s e m b l y , and 
D r . B . C . Guha of t h e C a l c u t t a U n i v e r s i t y Col lege of S c i e n c e , jo ined 
a s two M e m b e r s . 
A l s o , u n d e r sec t ion 6 of the Act , the Government of India 
appointed D r . S u d h i r S e n a s S e c r e t a r y and M r . N . R . C h a k r a b o r t y 
a s F i n a n c i a l A d v i s e r of the DVC. D r . S e n , the chief e x e c u t i v e 
off icer of the DVC, was an a g r o - e c o n o m i s t and had made a s p e c i a l 
t r i p to the U . S . 4. to study the p r o g r a m m e , o r g a n i z a t i o n and methods 
of the T . V . A . M o r e o v e r , he had worked a s S e c r e t a r y to the 
A d m i n i s t r a t o r , and thus had been c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with the a c t i v i t i e s 
from the beg inning . L a t e r , it was spec i f ica l ly r e g u l a t e d that it was 
h e , and h i s J o i n t - S e c r e t a r i e s , D e p u t y - S e c r e t a r i e s , U n d e r - S e c r e t ­
a r i e s and A s s i s t a n t - S e c r e t a r i e s , u n d e r whose s i g n a t u r e s and 
a u t h e n t i c i t y the o r d e r s and o t h e r i n s t r u m e n t s of the C o r p o r a t i o n 
w e r e to be made and e x e c u t e d , and a r o u n d whom the whole complex 
of the DVC S e c r e t a r i a t was to grow . ' M r . C h a k r a b o r t y had been 
Deputy S e c r e t a r y of the Minis t ry of F i n a n c e of the Government of 
I n d i a . It was his duty to a d v i s e the C o r p o r a t i o n on a l l m a t t e r s 
r e l a t i n g to r e v e n u e and e x p e n d i t u r e ; he had the r ight to a t tend a l l 
m e e t i n g s of the C o r p o r a t i o n , but not to v o t e ; he had the r ight to 
r e f e r to the C o r p o r a t i o n any m a t t e r which he c o n s i d e r e d ought to be 
brought to i t s n o t i c e ; he was r e s p o n s i b l e for the p r e p a r a t i o n of the 
Budget of the C o r p o r a t i o n , the compilat ion of annual and o t h e r 
f inancial s t a t e m e n t s , and for s u p e r v i s i o n of the m a n n e r in which 
a c c o u n t s w e r e maintained and made a v a i l a b l e for a u d i t . 
The H e a d q u a r t i ι ь of the DVC w e r e p r o v i s i o n a l l y located 
1 . Section 1 2(1 ) of the D a m o d a r V a l l e y C o r p o r a t i o n ( C o n ­
d u c t o f B u s i n e s s ) R e g u l a t i o n s , 1951. 
2. These functions and duties of the Financial Adviser were prescribed by the 
Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, Government of India, vide their 
N o t i f c a t i o n N o . D W - I I I - A - 4 ( 7 ) D a m , d a t e d 2 3 r d 
к A p r i l , 1 9 4 8 , under section 59(2) of the DVC Act, 1948. 
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at Calcutta because of the advantages offered by that city: its easy 
accessibility by road and ra i l , an important consideration when huge 
imports of material were expected; the fact that it was the head-
quar te rs of one of the Participating Governments (West Bengal); the 
existence of educational, medicai facilit ies, e tc . , for the staff and 
their families. This was a temporary measure, however, with the 
c lear understanding that later they were to be established at a cen-
t ra l place from which the whole a!rea of operations would be read i -
ly access ible . ^ 
THINGS AT HAND 
A. Aims: 
According to Voorduin 's plan and the DVC Act, the primary con-
sideration of the DVC was flood control , thermal and hydro-electric 
power production, and the maximum use of the regulated flow for 
i r r igat ion. "The primary consideration for a plan of development of 
the Damodar Valley", wrote Voorduin, "should be control of floods. 
It is further deemed desirable that as far as possible the system of 
dams should be capable of producing the largest amount of power 
which could be made available and that the maximum use be made of 
the regulated flow for irrigation purposes . "4 In a wider context, 
the DVC was to better the economic and social well-being of the 
people. For this purpose, they aimed at improving navigational fa-
c i l i t ies , controlling malaria incidence, controlling silt carr ied by 
t r ibutar ies of the Damodar River and conserving the soil by means 
of re-fore station for agricultural purposes; at the proper drainage 
of railway and road embankments; and at the rehabilitation of d i s -
placed persons by means of "an enlightened policy", training them 
in new methods of livelihood, and making facilities available to 
them. 
These aims were to be achieved by the construction of eight 
multi-purpose dams, hydro and thermal-power plants, a weir across 
the Damodar and a network of canals providing perennial i rr igat ion, 
and by a power transmission grid in the Damodar Valley." 
B . Resources which were Available at the Star t : 
Before the DVC Act was finally passed by the Constituent Assembly 
3. Dhanbad, Hazaribagh, Ranchi, and Maithon (all in the State of Bihar) often 
appeared in DVC publications as possible sites for Headquarters. See,f or 
instance, DVC A n n u a l R e p o r t l 9 4 8 - 4 9 (Calcutta, 1949) pp. 
3-4. Transferring DVC Headquarters to some central place was to pose 
problems later. See i n f r a , pp.140-143 
4. Voorduin, o p . c i t . , p.6. 
5. I b i d . , p .17 . 
6. I b i d . , passim. See, also, Annual R e o o r t of t h e D a m o d a r 
V a l l e y C o r p o r a t i o n , 1 9 4 8 - 4 9 , p. 1 ; D. V. C . D a t a B o o h 
(Calcutta, 1961), pp.6-7. 
47 
in February/March 1948, preliminary work had been done from 1946 
onwards by the Administrator and the Secretary at the Ministry of 
Works, Mines and Power at New Delhi. Worked out under their 
charge were: 
1) draft project repor t s on the Tilaiya, Konar and Maithon dams t o ­
gether with detailed plans, designs and estimates for the Tilaiya Dam; 
2) preliminary report on a thermal power station; and 3) a nucleus 
organization composed of different survey exper t s , i rr igat ion and 
barrage invest igators, and the Directorate of Rehabilitation. 
In planning, designing, estimating and organizing the 
operations the DVC was assisted by three all-India bodies: (i) the 
Central Technical Power Board, whose ass is tance had been availa­
ble since the birth of the idea of a Damodar r i ver scheme ; (ii) the 
Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission; and (iii) 
the Central Electr icity Commission. These bodies were storehouses 
of expertise in highly technical field, and not only helped the DVC 
in drawing up preliminary plans and specifications, inviting and 
analyzing tenders from foreign manufacturers for certain plant and 
equipment, but also made some of their staff available. 
The DVC had made a rough survey of expected capital 
costs amounting to Rupees 550 million. ' This was to be provided by 
the three Particigating Governments under stipulations laid down in 
the D . V . C . Act . ° 
THE START 
Although all aspects of the Damodar River scheme were to be pursued 
par i passu and note one in preference to the other, the limited tech­
nical know-how, inadequate data and information, inadequate field 
investigations and explorations, and lack of funds, meant that prefer­
ence had to be given to one construction work over the other in r e s ­
pect of time and place. 
(a) Phasing: The decision that implementation of the uni­
fied scheme was, a p r i o r i , to be divided into two phases was taken 
by the DVC soon after i ts creat ion. The first phase was to cover 
four dams with the connected hydro-electric s tat ions, v i z . , Tilaiya, 
Konar, Maithon and Panchet, Bokaro Thermal Power Station, with 
the transmission system and the irrigation barrage and canals , 
whilst the second phase was to include the four remaining dams and 
7. After great deliberation, Voorduin calculated a capital expenditure on the 
scheme (not including possible navigation facilities and water supply works) 
at 479 million rupees, plus approximately 15 $ allowance f^r contingencies, 
thus making a round figure of 550 million. However, he specifically stated 
that "the'basis of estimating used in the memorandum is extremely rough 
and can serve no other purpose than that of obtaining an approximation of the |magnitude of the capital expenditure required". Voorduin, ο ρ . с i t.pp. 17-20. 
8. See Ch.II 
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hydro-electric stations, viz, Balpahari, Aiyar, Bokaro and Bermo. 
(b) Organization: Apart from expanding the departments 
already functioning, steps were taken to establish and systematize 
some other departments such as Civil and Electrical Engineering, 
Personnel, Purchases and Stores, Accounts, Medical, Information, 
and Soil Conservation, with their respective divisions and sub­
divisions. 
One essential appointment was missing in the organization. 
The DVC was to undertake work of a highly technical nature, but 
despite the establishment of various departments, there was no Chief 
Engineer in overall control of the project. In March 1948, the 
Government of India temporarily appointed Mr. M.P. Mathrani as 
Chief Engineer (Barrage and Irrigation) ; his continuance in office 
beyond six months was subject to approval by the Corporation. His 
relationship to the Board was not specified in the terms of his ap­
pointment. Being the only Chief Engineer in the organization, albeit 
for Barrage and Irrigation, he appears to have stretched his authority 
rather widely. As a result, frequent disagreements arose between 
him and the Board. On one occasion, acting on his own initiative, he 
prepared a report regarding various projects in the DVC which he 
sent to various engineers in the country without the knowledge of the 
Board. The Board decided not to renew his contract and his ser­
vices were dispensed with as from 23rd September 1948. His dis­
missal was later to create difficulties for the DVC.° Although the 
DVC never doubted the necessity of having a Chief Engineer, the 
appointment was not made until December 1950.Ю 
DEPLOYMENT OF PROGRAMME 
A. Inter-connected Factors: 
The DVC project had a complex nature. Its area of operation fell in 
two adjoining States of India which were constitutionally independent 
units of the Indian 'Federation' , and both committed to finance the 
DVC. In addition, the Central Government gave it its statute and 
was financially committed. These three centres of power necessita­
ted considerable coordination. 
9. For this information I have relied on my interviews with former Members/ 
Executives of the DVC. 
10. The Corporation continued its efforts to appoint a qualified Chief Engin­
eer who would coordinate the engineering activities, and felt "that it must 
not take any chance on a vital issue like this and must take every possible 
step to ensure, through the appointment of a high calibre Chief Engineer, 
both quality and economy in the execution", A n n u a l R e p o r t of 
t h e D V C , 1 9 4 8 - 49, p.5 
The Chief Engineer 's appointment was one of those controversial issues 
for which the DVC came to be criticized. I have dealt with this question 
in some greater detail, i n f r a . , pp. 99-101 . 
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Soon after independence, severa l other smaller or larger 
projectb were undertaken in the country. The demand for technical 
exper t i s e , quick supply of machinery and plants was expected to 
grow. Being es sent ia l for any kind of planning, c o r r e c t data was 
a l so required. All these problems were faced by the DVC and because 
of their inter-connected nature, called for proper planning of d e s i g n , 
engineering and construct ion. 
(i) Coordination and Liaison: In view of the multiple a c -
t iv i t ies undertaken by the DVC, overlapping of policy and execution 
was p o s s i b l e . This cal led for some kind of collaboration with the 
Participating Governments. This necess i ty was e x p r e s s e d during 
d i s c u s s i o n s between the Minister in Charge , N . V . Gadgil , and the 
Chairman and Members of the Board in November 1948. Problems 
were faced even before the DVC was e s tab l i shed , and were hammer-
ed out in meetings of the Central and Provincial Governments . It 
was decided to re sor t to the same forum (of joint meetings) in order 
to improve cooperation and coordination by, and to attain better un-
derstanding among , the Participating Governments . The first 
Conference of the Participating Governments after the establishment 
of the DVC took place on 9th May 1949, at New Delhi , and this 
pract ice has been continued throughout the life of the D V C . ^ 
However , the Conferences of the Partic ipating Govern-
ments were not those of an organization involved only with ""DVC 
af fa i r s . Other bodies were n e c e s s a r y to preserve efficient l ia ison 
between the Corporation and the Participating Governments, on 
technical a s well a s administrative mat ters . On the initiative of 
D r . B . C . Roy (the West Bengal Chief Minister) , it was decided to 
appoint and Advisory C o m m i t t e e . ^ This was done in 1949 under 
sect ion 10 of the DVC Act , and the Committee was given the following 
composition and functions: 
"The Advisory Committee shall consist of: 
Three representatives of the Central Government, one of whom shall 
be a representative of the Ministry of Finance; 
Two representatives each of the Government of West Bengal and 
Bihar; one of the representatives being preferably a Minister and the 
other a Secretary to the Provincial Government or a Technical 
Officer. (The representatives of the Central and Provincial 
Governments may be accompanied by their technical advisers, if so 
desired). 
The Advisory Committee will elect its own Chairman. The Secretary 
of the DVC shall act as Secretary of the Advisory Committee. 
The functions of the Advisory Committee will be: 
(i) to note the progress made by the Corporation from time to time 
and the manner in which each project is taken up, so that reports 
thereon may be sent to the respective Governments; (ii) to arrange 
11 . For a general role of these Conferences, see , i n f r a . , pp. 130- 32 
12. A summary record of the proceedings of the Participating Governments' 
Conference held at New Delhi on 9th May, 1949, to discuss matters relating 
to the Damodar Valley Corporation. 
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. .ι discussions fpr facilitating mutual apprftciatiOn Pf;the respective 
, viewpoint^ qf ^he4P£irticipa.tpg Governrnpnts and. the. Corporation in... 
regard to the overall plan, the ргрсгапцпе and the pace of develppmeñt; 
(iii) tb communicate, thèse suggestions of the respective governments 
" ' ' witHregai-d'to' thé issüfe'of jbrópbsed directives' 'db mattersof'policy '•'-'• 
•'· '.^- •••·•·•! by-thé Cyntre'under'seckion 48 oï!tHe;-iA<iti",'3"li; ί : ' '- - ' ' " ¡ μ · · ·.!'.. 
. Í : I ' . . ' ; ' Ί ' - Ι Î ' i : : ) • - . - 1 1 ! : ' T . C i ' 1 ' ; • ' : | i •> I : • • 
.In íidditip.n^to the Advisory Cpmmittee, , .o ther bodi.eç w e r e 
appoint.ed to c o o r d i n a t e apd d i r e c t var ious , e n g i n e e r i n g a c t i v i t i e s of •. , , 
the DVC: {ψ) ín 1 9 5 р
л
. а p o a r d óf Consu l t an t s ¡ а з formed, o r i g i n a l l y , ., 
c o n s i s t i n g of two A m e r i c a n and, one Indian iEngineei;.. , Late.r
r I i pn, the,. i.,· 
b a s i s of a d e c i s i o n taken ^n 1,^ '5j1
 {. -f .it cpnstisted^pf .two Indian.and, , . , : | > 
one A m e r i c a n E n g i n e e r . .As the УРгк aciyance4,and aya i lab i l i ty oX., ¡ , 
e x p e r t knowledge ,ίη the c o u n t r y i n c r e a s e d . , t J ^ B o a ^ d ' s, cçmppsit ipn, 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y changeur , (b). A Teclinic^l, Expert , , Cornfnittee çf , ,,, ,,. 
E n g i n e e r s , composed of, p y Ç E n g i n e e r s , a n d the E n g i n e e r ^ pf p p n n e c - , 
ted depa r tmen t s , of S ta t e^government s , , By i t s v e r y na tu re , . . i t ^ 
composi t ion changed f ^ om, time, to t ime. . (с), А І з о , f i rms of çpusiLiiting. , 
e n g i n e e r s ' Л such ag Gr¡uner B r o t h e r s pf Basel,.(Switzerland],.. .Sopiétjé-> 
de Cons t ruc t i on d e s Ba i iguo j i es (S .C, ·В^, , fpr' shor t ) , , э F r e n c h C i r n j j
 І м 
and the Americaix ï e p h n i c a l . M i s s i o n , gaye teçhniç.ai açlviçe fpï- some 
y e a r s ; a s the wp^k adyancpd, . t h e i r strength,β,ηα .дгоіе c h a n g e d , and 
at t imes, they .^еге r e p l a c e d by; nat ive f i rms ,oí cp,nsultin1g,e'?giflperi'S.., . . 
(d) O y e r and . aboye , these c o m m i t t e e s / c o n s u l t a n t s , we.fp,,p-U-Lhcüa ^ 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , spmetirnes functioning sinpult^nepusly a.xid ppmetinies ,.,.
 (j 
redes igna ted , : Cen t ra l , Techn i ca l Power; Boar^ i^Çen t i^a l /E lec t r i c i ty ,
 ; w i ( 
Commiss ion , C e n t r a l Wate rways Irr iga^ipi) and IjJavigatipn Comm.i^çio.n^, 
C e n t r a l Water and l^ovyer Çommissipn,! Cen t r a l , Boa rd of Irrigatipii; . . , , . , , , 
and P o w e r . , . . . : , .. ·, ,..:..,. . , .; • · , / , ·! , :
 r !. , , ; . , . ;• . . . ' . . 
F rom the p r a c t i c a l admin i s t r a t i ve ppipt pf v ipw, h p w e y e r , 
o t h e r u rgen t p r o b l e m s needed t a c k l i n g . How was the DVC to keep iri 
touch with the Minis t ry in c h a r g e a t the C e n t r e ? How was it to 
a p p r o a c h di f ferent departri ie 'p^s/ministri .eá for i t s ' y à i ì o u s n e e d s ? 
How was it to pu rchase ' i tg ,s tpres^and.equipment '? , Althougti not so 
v i s i b l e , these , m a t t e r s attr .aGt,ed ;attention and inv.ply.ed, эрще R e b a t e . 
Опв quest ion, yvas . r a i s e d ,a,t t h e f i r s t meeting.of the; P a r t i c i p a t i i n g 
G o v e r i i m e n t s i Why s h o u l d t h e DiVG^not: r o u t e a l l " c a r r r e s p o n d e n c e with 
o t h e r mimstries/agfe 'nei 'éS at thè !Cefilfäl : level · thro !u¿h the -Minis try 
of Works , Mines and Po'Wét '-(Mìtìis-try ïn dhàrge) ' so tha t t h e j - ^ e r e 
kept, in. the p i c t u r e a t a l l s t a g e s , and w e r e ab le to adv i se , t h e ' m i n i s t r i e s 
on p rob lems put fort)} Ъу.p/èupp.rpp'çatVPn?^6l/ |lti%Yg,'s decidevi .tfiat the 
13. A p.p e η d i χ I I,. attacji.ed. to th,e ÇonXe.re nee minimes., i b i d . - For 
detailed covejrage ,9η Ady.isory, Comfnittee, see .i η f r a ,
 t.,, ρ,« ,103.» 
14. A 'sümiriairy record' òf the procèetüWgsr 6f the PaHicipaWiigGóvèrninents ' 
Conference held at New Delhi on 5th May, 1951 to discuss certain matters 
relating to the Damodar Valley Corporatiçm., , , ..~'~"."^."'-j'~" 
15. For justification of the appointment o,f .Consulting Engineers, see D V Ç, 
. Д η 'h 11 a 1 ' R ерЪх Vi ' 9 4 8 - 4$ι, pju' %-§.{', "'r¡' ., . . ' / ' ; ' . . • ' ./.¡'.'.'''.'Λ •<•, ', 
16. A summary record of the Conference, 9th'May·· 1949'j Ί о é.'è:Л-tv'·';ί ' ·•'? ' ' 
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DVC should correspond direct ly with other a g e n c i e s / m i n i s t r i e s , 
provided that a copy of each le t ter , together with a summary of the 
relevant c a s e , was forwarded to the Ministry of Works, Mines and 
P o w e r . ' This dec is ion bound the DVC for the future. 
The Directorate General of Industries and Suppl ies ( l a t e r , 
Suppl ies and Disposa ls ) attached to the Central Ministry of Industry 
and Supply ( later, Commerce and Industry ), was a special agency 
for purchasing s t o r e s and equipment for various projects m the 
country. On receipt of an indent from the agency concerned, the 
Directorate consulted the national d irectory of f irms. If no firms 
manufactured the des i red equipment, a s was usually the c a s e , the 
Directorate cal led for foreign tenders . Outside the country, the 
Directorate was a s s i s t e d by two big purchasing miss ions : the India 
S t o r e Department, London aod the India Supply Miss ion, Washington. 
S i n c e speed was n e c e s s a r y eind s ince the spec ia l i zed agency had 
to be u t i l i z e d , ' " spec ia l agreements were drawn up. Standardized 
s t o r e s were to be purchased through the Directorate , but for the 
r e s t , the matter was left to the d iscret ion of the DVC.^O 
This dec is ion was given more concrete form when the DVC Enquiry 
Committee (1952-53) recommended: "It would not be proper to compel 
the Corporation to make i t s purchases through the D . G . S . & . D . " , 
and that, if requirements had to go through the required channel, 
they should be " f o r e s e e n by indenting of f icers a s lar a s p o s s i b l e " . ^ ' 
Th is pract ice was adhered t o . 
(ii) Pract ica l D i f f i c u l t i e s : 2 2 It was n e c e s s a r y to undertake 
detai led s u r v e y s and invest igat ions for every component of the DVC 
scheme. Planning and designing of schemes depended on these data, 
and only when they were available could c o r r e c t e s t i m a t e s , financial 
or o t h e r w i s e , be prepared. The programme could be launched only 
17. I Ь i d. 
18. S t r e s s e d by the DVC, i b i d . 
19. Mr. S . Bhoothalingam, representative of the Ministry of Industry and 
Supply, raised this point, i b i d . 
20. I b i d . On this matter of cohesion, the DVC and the Directorate General 
of Supplies and Disposals later agreed formally that the Central Purchase 
Agency be utilized as far as poss ib le . This decis ion was forn Uzed after 
an audit objection, see D V C A u d i t R e p o r t , 1949-50. 
2 1 . R e p o r t o f T h e D a m o d a r V a l l e y C o r p o r a l i o n 
E n q u i r y C o m i n i t t e e ( l 9 5 2 - 5 3) (Government of India P r e s s , 
New Delhi, 1953),Ch.VI, para .49. The DVC Enquiry Committee was 
appointed by the Government of India, the Ministry of Irrigation and Power, 
in 1952, on the recommendation of the Estimates Committee of Parliament 
(Fifth Report 1951 -52), This Committee will hereafter be referred to a s 
the R a u C o m m i t t e e (after i ts Chairman, P . S . Rau). 
22. All formal documents were studded with various difficulties that the 
Corporation faced during the y e a r s ; s e e , for example, DVC Data Book, 
o p . c i t . , pp. 163-67 
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after these time consuming preliminary steps had been taken, but 
they posed difficulties. 
(a) The DVC was faced with the overall shortage oi 
trained technical personnel in India. Although they had the ass i s t­
ance of some established organizations, such as the Public Works 
Departments of the Central and State Governments and the Central 
Water and Power Commission, this was not sufficient. After working 
under this disadvantage for some y e a r s , the DVC was able to train 
some technicians within its own organization. Demand for these per­
sonnel, trained in a multiproject, multi-purpose organization, then 
increased elsewhere in the country. "Unfortunately, the requisite 
number of experienced operators were not available in the valley. 
The same condition probably prevailed in other par ts of India a s 
frequent ' r a i d s ' were made and many of the DVC operators were 
lured away", wrote Komora. ^Э Resignations by engineers became 
frequent and caused serious setbacks. However, the work continued 
with whatever technical,mechanical or civil know-how was locally 
available, supplemented from time to time with help from elsewhere. 
(b) Undertaking the surveys and investignations involved 
technical handling; the correctness and details of collected data 
were insufficient because technical knowledge in the DVC was 
inadequate. 
(c) It was difficult to find funds for the DVC schemes ; 
when they were made available, they were generally less than budget 
est imates, mainly due to the following factors. F i r s t l y , the financial 
stringency of the country in general, which was aggravated by devalua­
tion of the Indian rupee; the allround increase in p r i c e s ; and, in the 
case of the DVC in part icular , the expansion of various schemes. 24 
This difficulty was overcome somewhat in later y e a r s , especially after 
the Five Year Plans were introduced in 1950. Secondly, most of the 
e lectr ical plant and equipment, as well as all the heavy construction 
machinery, had to be imported from abroad, usually from the U . S . A . 
The hard currency necessary for this purpose was acutely short . In 
the e a r l i e r y e a r s , it was extremely difficult to procure equipment 
and plant from the U . S . A . , and this problem continued throughout 
the y e a r s . Foreign loans ultimately helped to ease the situation some­
what. These loans, negotiated by the Government of India for the 
DVC, ran into millions of dollars through the y a e r s , as shown by 
the following figures:25 
2 3 . A . M . K o m o r a , Chief E n g i n e e r of the DVC, " C o n s t r u c t i o n of Maithon and 
P a n c h e t Hil l P r o j e c t s " , I n d i a n J o u r n a l o f P o w e r 
a n d R i v e r V a l l e y D e v e l o p m e n t , V,6, June 1955. 
24 . P . S . R a u , onte-t ime C h a i r m a n of the DVC ( e a r l i e r , C h a i r m a n of the DVC 
E n q u i r y Committee), s t a t e d : " the deva luat ion of r u p e e made a net 
addit ion of 4 c i o r e s (40 million) to the tota l cos t ; that t h e r e was a n e a r l y 
hundred p o i c e n t r i s e in p r i c e s ince 1945; that the scope of the scheme had 
changed beyond al l r e c o g n i t i o n . . . " , A N e w A p p r o a c h t o t h e 
D.V С (Calcutta, 1956), p . 8 . 
' 2 5 . F i g u r e s provided by the DVC, J a n u a r y 1967. 
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Table 1 
Loans for the DVC from Foreign Agencies 
Agency 
I . B . R . D . 
I . B . R . D . 
World Bank 
D . L . F . 
D . L . F . 
I . D . A . 
A . I . D . 
Loan authorized 
( i n million US Dollars) 
16.72 
10.50 
22.00 
0.87 
30.00 
18.50 
16.00 
Amount of loan drawn up to 
31 . 3 1966 (ι in million US Dollars ) 
16.72 
10.50 
22.00 
0.87 
26.28 
12.00 
6.84 
(d) As noted above, plant and equipment had to be imported 
from abroad. Once put to work, they had to be maintained and repaired 
in order to keep up the working schedule, requiring large quantities 
of spare parts which also had to be imported. Since deliveries could 
not be made on time during the post-war period, delays in work were 
caused. ° Although the position eased somewhat during later y e a r s , 
the DVC could not overcome these difficulties. 
The overall effect of these difficulties was seen in frequent 
changes in cost est imates, so that the final amount spent on each con­
struction varied from the estimated and re-estimated costs through 
the y e a r s . Figures pertaining to four dams (Tilaiya, Konar, Maithon 
and Panchet), the main construction work undertaken and completed 
by the DVC upto 1959, throw some light on how great these variations 
were in terms of moneyi^' 
Table 2 
Variations in estimated and actual cos t s 
(in C r o r e s of rupees: 1 c r o r e = 10 million) 
Dam 
Tilaiya 
Konar 
Maithon 
Panchet 
Estimates 
in 
1951 
1.91 
10.49 
12.32 
14.04 
Revised 
Estimates 
in 1952 
3.00 
13.77 
13.78 
14.99 
Revised 
Estimates 
in 1955 
3.66 
9 .94 
16.74 
14.99 
Revised 
Estimates 
in 1960 
3.71 
9.75 
1 7 . 9 3 
19.14 
Actual 
Amount 
spent(as 
at 3 1 . 3 . 6 6 
4 . 9 0 
13.89 
19.95 
19 .62 
Increase 
of 1966 over 
1951 e s t i ­
mates in $ 
158 # 
32 % 
62 Іо 
40 lo 
26. Recording these delays, the DVC Data Book, o p . c i t . , states that 
delivery of the concreting plant for Konar, which had to be procured from 
Germany, delayed the operation for a whole year . Likewise, unexpected 
delays in the delivery of transformers from the U.K. delayed work on the 
transmission system. Such delays are covered in specific cases further 
in the text. 
27. These figures have been compiled from the DVC Data Book, ι b ι d. ,p.31 , 
and from figures supplied by the DVC, January 1967. Figures pertaining 
to other projects and works, where relevant, appear later in the text. 
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(iii) Construction: Under the Act, the functions of the 
DVC seemed to cover about all the activities of a State. The 
achievement of these ends involved the simultaneous handling of: 
conservation and utilization of water requiring construction of big 
dams and barrages, power stations for the generation of hydro and 
thermal electricity, canals for irrigation and inland navigation, 
using large storage lakes for the development of fish culture, and 
numerous other items such as soil conservation, afforestation, road 
and other building activities, water supply, sanitation, distribution 
and marketing of power, etc. The DVC Project was thus not only 
multi-purpose but also multi-project. 
The phasing of the programme was only one of the planning 
processes which tried to adapt the whole scheme to its ends and the 
scarce available means. But the huge constructions also needed 
inside planning. Questions arose as to whether the different schemes 
should be designed and planned separately from their construction 
and wh3ther design and construction should be handled departmentally 
or entrusted to consulting engineers and contractors. In the beginning 
no clear-cut policy could be laid down. After consultations and 
debates on the pros and cons of these matters, the DVC invited 
A . E . Morgan (one time Chairman, T.V.A.) to examine some import­
ant features of the DVC Project. Morgan submitted a detailed report 
to the DVC, stating: "In my opinion the organization both as to field 
work, planning and design, should be separate from the construction 
organization. It i s very difficult indeed for a contracting firm which 
is doing construction to be an entirely independant and critical judge 
of the quality of its own work and of the proper prices for compens­
ation. Your engineers should be so independent of your builders 
that they can handle the issues which arise, fully independently and 
without any financial bias. Especially where foreign relations are 
concerned, and where diplomatic considerations enter into making 
contracts, it has been customary in some cases for a single firm 
both to supply engineering service and to have contracts for 
construction. This, I believe, leaves those for whom the work is 
being done with inadequate protection. "28 χ^β DVC thus took the 
following decisions: (a) to separate design from construction; (b) 
to appoint a firm of consulting engineers to serve the DVC ; (c) to 
appoint competent contractors to carry out construction work in 
strict accordance with detailed designs, under joint supervision of 
the consulting engineers and DVC engineers. ^9 
The DVC engaged competent foreign firms of consulting 
engineers and contractors, arguing that "reputed construction firms 
would be able to obtain equipment more readily as such firms are as 
a rule treated on a preferential basis by producers of heavy capital 
goods".30 This arrangement on the construction side continued all 
28· A.E. Morgan, R e p o r t to the DVC, dated August 29, 1949 
29. D V C A n n u a l R e p o r t 1 9 4 8 - 4 9, pp.7 - 8. 
30. I b i d., pp. 8-9 
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through the уеа.гьі' except that as work p r o g r e s s e d , some changes 
in matter of detail occurred. 32 Gradually, the Indianization of 
consult ing eng ineers and contractors a l s o took p lace. 
B. Programme per s e : 
The DVC' s main programme was broadly divided into: flood control, 
i rr igat ion, power, and miscel laneous development schemes which 
included soi l conservat ion, f i s h e r i e s , forestry, rehabil itation and 
navigation. For th i s , a vast organization, in usual hierarchical order, 
grew. 
(1 ) Flood Control: 
The n e c e s s i t y to control the recurrent floods in the val ley had 
brought the DVC into being. There was no separate department 
(like the Department for Flood Control Operation - with i t s sub-
departmental organization) for this function. It was c l o s e l y connected 
with the general construction of dams, and r e s e r v o i r s with requis i te 
s torage capacity, which were built and maintained under the charge 
of the Chief Engineer (Cwi l ) with his organization at Maithon.-" 
(a) Original Plans: The original plans for flood protec­
tion were that not only the highest flood recorded should be control led, 
but that floods under the most adverse combinations of c i rcumstances 
could be checked. Voorduin 's project provided for the full control 
of a ' d e s i g n ' flood of 1 million c u s e c s (or 2 8 , 0 0 0 m^ per s e c o n d ) ^ 
result ing from rain-storms in the uppermost catchment of 20 i n c h e s . 
The control flood was to be limited to the assumed channel capacity 
of 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 c u s e c s at Rhondia. The total flood r e s e r v e provided in 
the eight dams of Ti la iya, Konar, Maithon, Panchet, Aiyar, Bokaro, 
Balpahari and Bermo, was to be 2 .90 million a c r e - f e e t . 35 
(b) Diff icult ies: The greatest difficulty in construct ing 
the dams was that of f inance; a s we stated e a r l i e r , this caused the 
planners to decide to construct only four dams in the f irst phase. 
These were completed in 1959, but did not provide adequate protec­
tion against f loods. " 
(c) Achievements: The phasing, it seemed, changed the 
term "most adverse foreseeable combination of c i rcumstances" into 
that of "for the time being". The actual flood control measures 
' 31 . See various Annual Reports of the DVC which carefully separate their 
Planning and Design functions from other divisions in the Corporation. 
32. For such changes the DVC was criticized, however. Cf. .infra pp.102 et.seq. 
33. See organization chart of the Chief Engineer (Civil)"s office,! η f г a. ,ρ. 76 
34. Cusec: cubic feet per second: each cusec equals a stream pne foot wide and 
one foot deep, moving one foot per second. The measurement has been 
defined by Henry C. Hart, ο ρ . с i t . , p. 23. 
35. For details, see Voorduin, o p . c i t . , p.5. His details were summarized 
for the author by the DVC. 
36. The construction of further dams has been abandoned by the DVC for the 
present at the instance of the West Bengal Government, which considered 
-jf> 
provided a r e d u c e d d e g r e e of p r o t e c t i o n . F l o o d r e s e r v e s prov ided 
at Maithon and P a n c h e t w e r e effective for c o n t r o l l i n g t h e maximum 
o b s e r v e d flood of 650,000 c u s e c s at Rhondia r e s u l t i n g from the r a i n ­
s torm of 11 ..9 i n c h e s in the v a l l e y . 37 T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n t r o l flood 
was 250,000 c u s e c s . T h e flood r e s e r v e a c t u a l l y a v a i l a b l e in the four 
dams' was 1 ,0-17,000 a c r e fee t . 38 
T h i s r e d u c e d s c a l e of flood p r o t e c t i o n , w h a t e v e r the 
c a u s e s , t h e r e f o r e , did hot make the a r e a immune from f l o o d s . F i v e 
floods o c c u r r e d : in 1956, 1958, 1959, 1961 and 1 9 6 3 . 3 9 The e x i s t ­
ing s t r u c t u r e s w e r e suff icient to m o d e r a t e t h e i r i n t e n s i t y , but they 
brought the u s u a l t r o u b l e in t h e i r w a k e : many DVC c o n s t r u r t i o n s 
w e r e d e s t r o y e d , life in the val ley was d i s l o c a t e d . ^ As la te a s 1964, 
T . S i v a s a n k a r , unt i l r e c e n t l y C h a i r m a n of the D V C , w r o t e : "The 
l o w e r val ley which e s c a p e d d e v a s t a t i o n in 1958 faced in the following 
y e a r a flood of f a r g r e a t e r i n t e n s i t y . At i t s peak it touched the 
fantas t ic r e c o r d of some 810,000 c u s e c s . With only four dams 
completed out of the e ight or ig ina l ly p lanned t h i s u n p r e c e d e n t e d 
flood could be m o d e r a t e d only to 288,000 c u s e c s e x c l u d i n g the flow 
from the u n c o n t r o l l e d c a t c h m e n t , a t the D u r g a p u r B a r r a g e . "41 
In f inancia l t e r m s , the t o t a l amount s p e n t , a s a t 31st 
March 1966, was R u p e e s 2 0 . 3 3 c r o r e s , a s a g a i n s t R u p e e s 14 c r o r e s 
e s t i m a t e d in 1 9 4 5 , U n d e r t h e DVC A c t , the C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t was 
bound to pay only R s . 7 c r o r e s , leaving the r e m a i n i n g R s . 1 3 . 3 3 
c r o r e s for the West B e n g a l G o v e r n m e n t . 4 2 
(2) I r r i g a t i o n : 
The B a r r a g e and I r r i g a t i o n P r o j e c t w a s u n d e r the d i r e c t c h a r g e of 
a Deputy Chief E n g i n e e r , and the m a i n t e n a n c e and o p e r a t i o n of the 
dams u n d e r a S u p e r i n t e n d i n g E n g i n e e r , both h e a d q u a r t e r e d at 
the present capacity of four dams/reservoirs to control floods sufficient 
and resisted any further constructipn. For further details see i n f r a . , 
p . 110 ff. 
37. The figure was put so as to pass peak flood of 650,000 cusecs. It was felt 
that though this figure was not to give complete immunity to the lower 
valley, it was sufficient to cover all floods recorded in the last 100 years , 
see DVC Data Book, o p . c i t . , p . 8 . 
38. Information supplied by the DVC, January 1967. 
39. Various publications by the DVC refer to these floods. For comprehensive 
information, mostly technical, see: U . N . , A c a s e s t u d y of t h e 
D a m o d a r V a l l e y C o r p o r a t i o n a n d I t s P r o j e c t s , 
pp. 17-29. Also see A n n u a l R e p o r t s of t h e D V C , 1956-57, 
1958-59, 1959-60, 1961-62 and 1963-64; N . S . Iyengar, "The Problems 
of the Damodar Valley and the Aspects Under Development", I n d i a n 
J o u r n a l o f P o w e r a n d R i v e r V a l l e y De v e l o p m e n t 
(Calcutta, November 1959). 
40. 1958 and 1959 floods were comparatively severe. See, U.N. , ο ρ . с i t . , 
pp. 17-29; also, see F i f t e e n Y e a r s of D . V . C . (Damodar 
Valley Сorparation, 1964). 
4 1 . T. Sivasanker, in 'Foreword' to Fifteen Years of D.V.C. , I b i d . 
42. Figures supplied by the DVC, January, 1967, 
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Maithon, where the office of the Chief Engineer (Civil) was located. -' 
(a) Original Plans : Under the Irrigation scheme, the 
DVC aimed at constructing a Barrage at Durgapur. This was to 
help in developing a navigational canal, and a network of canals of 
about 1 ,550 miles length on the right and left banks of the Damodar 
River, including branches and distr ibutar ies as well as drainage 
channels. Under Voorduin1 s proposed development plans, it was 
thought possible to undertake the perennial irr igation of about 
760.000 a c r e s , including 186,000 a c r e s already under partial 
i r r igat ion. The DVC, however, put these targets at 973,000 a c r e s 
for Kharif and 100,000 for Rabi land under irr igation command.45 
(b) Difficulties: Since only the lower valley was to reap 
irr igat ion and water supply benefits, the success of the scheme 
depended on close cooperation and coordination of different organs 
under the DVC and the State Government of West Bengal. The DVC 
Act46 elaborated the arrangement according to which the Corporation 
was responsible for construction, maintenance and operation of 
canals and making water а гііІаЫе to the State Government. The 
West Bengal Government was responsible for the reta i l supply of 
irr igation after a guaranteed annual off-take, committing itself to 
the payment of water ra tes to the DVC. A guaranteed off-take by 
the State Government was only possible after executing contractual 
leases with individual farmers, binding them to payment. The State 
Development and Irrigation Act, however, did not provide for any 
such guarantee. 
The farmers were not prepared to pay for the water, 
which they considered, as N a t u r e ' s gift, should be f ree. They 
mostly depended upon rainfall . Thus, whenever the rainfall was 
satisfactory, the necessity for lease-contracts disappeared. The 
farmers even resor ted, wherever and whenever possible, to un­
authorized use of water for which they did not have to pay. 
Nature also did not look very favourably on the irrigation 
schemes. There was an over-abundance of rainfall at t imes. Though 
a blessing in itself, this caused heavy floods. As we have indicated, 
such rainfalls caused heavy damage to the DVC canal s t ructures in 
1956, 1958 and 1959. This situation greatly reduced the re lease of 
water in the canals.47 
In financial te rms, the irr igation schemes were far from 
remunerative. Capital for the construction of canal system and dams 
e t c . had been supplied by the West Bengal Government, but the system 
4 3 . S e e o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a r t , i n f r a . , p . 77 
4 4 . Voorduin, o p . c i t . , p p . 9-10 
4 5 . DVC Data Book, о p . с i t . , p . 4 2 . 
4 6 . S e c t i o n s 13 and 14 of the DVC Act, 1948, see Appendex A . 
4 7 . F o r i n s t a n c e , 1959 floods c a u s e d s e v e r e damage and b r e a c h e s in c a n a l 
embankments , see A n n u a l R e p o r t s o f t h e D V C 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 
( p . 6 ) , and 1 9 6 1 - 6 2 ( p . 6 ) . 
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had to be maintained and controlled. Charges fixed by the DVC for 
water supply generally covered maintenance and operation cos t s , 
but the State Government was not able to recover i ts costs from 
τ 
the inidvidual consumer. The DVC was ready to supply water in 1954 
-55, increasing i ts capacity in 1955-56. The Agriculture Department 
of West Bengal undertook propaganda work in the a r e a , even 
distributing seeds and manures to persuade the farmer to use the 
water, but to no avail . As a resul t , there were no demands from 
the West Bengal Government even upto the end of 1956. 
Some t r a c e s of insufficient coordination between legal 
and administrative instruments were noticeable. At the lower levels, 
there was lack of understanding, duplication of work and of staff. 
In 1959, S . R . Ghosh wrote: "Canals were new and required soaking, 
staunching, stabilisation and testing. Operational staff were in­
experienced. Quick movement was not possible as inspecition paths 
were not ready. Intercommunication system through canal telephone 
line was not complete. Coordination was difficult."'* 
(c) Achievements: In spite of the difficulties, the DVC 
was able to show somewhat satisfactory resul ts in providing water 
for i r r igat ion. During 1948-52, there was practically no work on the 
Barrage and canals,49
 a
n d actual construction did not s tart until 
October 1952. The Durgapur Barrage was completed in August 1955, 
and i ts subsidiary s t ructures were more or less completed by 1958. 
By 31st March 1966, the DVC showed completion of Main Canal 
(right bank) 55 miles, Irrigation-cum-navigational Canal (left bank) 
85 miles, other s t ructures 1410 miles, thus bringing the total length 
of canals and subsidiary s t ructures to 1550 miles, as originally 
targetted.50 Against the anticipated acreage to be covered under 
irr igat ion: 973,000 a c r e s for Kharif crop and 100.000 a c r e s for 
Rabi c r o p , the DVC reported year-wise utilization potential as 
follows:51 
Year Kharif Rabi 
(in a c r e ^ ( in acres) 
1963-64 636,000 36,000 
1964-65 654,000 38,000 
1965-66 668,000 42,000 
Against the amount which the Participating Governments 
anticipated spending on irrigation schemes, i . e . Rupees 13 c r o r e s , 
4β. S.R. Ghosh, "Irrigation Potentials of DVC Project and Its Problems", 
I n d i a n J o u r n a l of P o w e r a n d R i v e r V a l l e y 
D e v e l o p m e n t , o p . c i t . , 1959. 
49. D. Mookerjea, "My experiences in the Execution of Barrage and Irrigation 
P r o j e c t " , I n d i a n J o u r n a l o f P o w e r a n d R i v e r V a l l e y 
D e v e l o p m e n t , V, 6 June 1955. Mr. Mookerjea was the Project 
Manager in 1955. His article is full of technical detai ls . 
50. Figures supplied by the DVC, January 1967. 
51 . I b i d. 
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the t o t a l amount spent upto 31st March 1966 r e a c h e d R s . 4 4 . 8 2 
c r o r e s , of which the West Bengal Government paid R s . 4 4 . 5 1 c r o r e s , 
and the B i h a r Government R s . O . 31 c r o r e s . ^ 
Due to f inancia l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o m p l i c a t i o n s , the 
o p e r a t i o n and m a i n t e n a n c e of the D V C ' s B a r r a g e and I r r i g a t i o n 
c a n a l s was t r a n s f e r r e d to West Bengal in 1964. 
(3) P o w e r : 
T h e E l e c t r i c a l D e p a r t m e n t of the DVC was by far the l a r g e s t d e p a r t ­
ment in the whole o r g a n i z a t i o n . The Chief E l e c t r i c a l E n g i n e e r 
( O p e r a t i o n and Maintenance) was s t a t i o n e d a t C a l c u t t a . T h e Deputy 
Chief E l e c t r i c a l E n g i n e e r s ' offices at C a l c u t t t a and Maithon looked 
a f t e r g e n e r a t i o n and t r a n s m i s s i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . The D e p a r t m e n t had 
s u b o r d i n a t e offices to look a f t e r p o w e r g e n e r a t i o n , p o w e r t r a n s ­
m i s s i o n , e n g i n e e r i n g and p l a n n i n g . T h e Addi t ional Chief E l e c t r i c a l 
E n g i n e e r ( C o n s t r u c t i o n ) had h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s a t C a l c u t t a and was 
r e s p o n s i b l e for e n g i n e e r i n g , planning and c o n s t r u c t i o n of p o w e r 
h o u s e s and t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s . He was a s s i s t e d by a Deputy Chief 
E l e c t r i c a l E n g i n e e r , a l s o s ta t ioned a t C a l c u t t a . 54 
(a) O r i g i n a l p l a n s : The a r c h i t e c t s of the DVC had planned 
to u t i l i ze the v a l l e y ' s w a t e r r e s o u r c e s for the g e n e r a t i o n of e l e c t r i ­
c a l p o w e r . Voorduin had worked out the feas ib i l i ty of h y d r o - e l e c t r i c 
p o w e r f a c i l i t i e s at a l l the dams for an a g g r e g a t e i n s t a l l e d c a p a c i t y of 
200,000 KW.55 Assuming that the a n n u a l load was to i n c r e a s e , 
Voorduin a l s o recommended combination of the h y d r o - e l e c t r i c sys tem 
with the t h e r m a l sys tem ( p a r t i c u l a r l y if t h e r m a l p l a n t s w e r e located 
at the coa l mines) in o r d e r to d e c r e a s e c o s t s . F o r t h i s , he p lanned 
150.000 KW of t h e r m a l g e n e r a t i n g c a p a c i t y to be located a t su i tab le 
p l a c e s . 5 6 
U n d e r the o r i g i n a l p l a n s , to ta l c a p a c i t y (hydro and t h e r ­
mal) w a s aimed at 350,000 KW, with 132 Kv t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s of . 50 
52. I b i d. 
Section 1 3 of the DVC Act made provision in this respect by which, sub­
ject to compensation and after due notice, the Provincial Government couid 
take over maintenance and operation of any such canal or distributary. 
See Appendix A for relevant portion of the Act. The proposal for transfer 
was first discussed in the Conference held at New Delhi on the 6th April 
1959; it was agreed that transfer of the canal system, including the 
navigational canal should be effected by first December 1959. The transfer 
was not effected until 1964. The question of transfer will be discussed in 
some detail further on, see i n f r a . , pp. 114 -16. 
54. See organization chart, infra. , pp. 77 -78 . 
55. Voorduin, o p . c i t . , p.13 
56. I b i d . Also see, U . N . , ο ρ . с i t . , pp. 41-62, covering every technical 
aspect, of the power programme of the DVC. This particular question of 
thermal power initially caused some controversy in Indian c i rc les . For 
its justification see Sudhir Sen (the DVC's first Secretary), "Why 
a Steam Power Station - Some facts about Bokaro Project", I n d i a n 
J o u r n a l o f P o w e r a n d R i v e r V a l l e y D e v e l o p m e n t 
(Calcutta, October 1952). 
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mi les t o t a l l e n g t h . T h e whole p o w e r p r o d u c t i o n sys tem was a n t i c i p a t e d 
to c o s t R u p e e s 28 c r o r e s . " 
(b) Di f f icu l t ies : The p o w e r p r o g r a m m e stood a p a r t from 
o t h e r s c h e m e s i n s o f a r a s i t s demand, supply and m o n e t a r y i m p h ' t i o n s 
( c o s t s a s wel a s prof i t s ) w e r e c o n c e r n e d . 
It was felt in some c i r c l e s that the DVC was about to 
launch a r a t h e r ambi t ious programme for p o w e r p r o d u c t i o n and t h a t , 
when a l l the h y d r o and t h e r m a l power s t a t i o n s would go into o p e r a t i o n 
supply would fa r s u r p a s s d e m a n d . 5 8 i
n
 the e a r l y y e a r s , at l e a s t , the 
pos i t ion was soon to p r o v e o t h e r w i s e . The whole c o u n t r y w a s s t r i v i n g 
for i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t , but nowhere so r a p i d l y a s in West B e n g a l . 
The West Bengal Government was i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g the D u r g a p u r -
Аьапьоі be l t : the D u r g a p u r b t e e l P l a n t was l a t e r l o c a t e d in t h i s 
a r e a and f u r t h e r a t t r a c t e d a number of o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s . M o r e o v e r , 
p o w e r was needed in big towns both in West Bengal and B i h a r . At 
f i r s t the g r e a t e s t demand for power supply had been from B i h a r . 
E v e n b e f o r e T i l a i y a h y d r o s ta t ion and B o k a r o T h e r m a l p o w e r s t a t i o n 
w e r e r e a d y in 1953, B i h a r demanded a bulk supply of p o w e r from the 
DVC for i t s i n d u s t r i e s , to which the DVC immediately committed i t ­
self . B i h a r f u r t h e r demanded power for the towns of P a t n a , Gaya 
and D a l m i a n a g a r from B o k a r o T h e r m a l s t a t i o n . The West Bengal 
Government made a s i m i l a r a p p r o a c h to supply p o w e r to C a l c u t t a 
from B o k a r o . C a l c u t t a , P a t n a , Gaya and D a l m i a n a g a r w e r e o u t s i d e 
the v a l l e y , and by t r a n s m i t t i n g power to t h e s e far-off a r e a s , a l l the 
v i l l a g e s and i n d u s t r i e s en r o u t e would be able to ut i l i ze it and t h u s 
he lp the deve lopment a c t i v i t i e s of the r e g i o n , a s wel l a s r e d u c e u n ­
employment . T h i s was s t r o n g l y a d v o c a t e d by the West Bengal 
G o v e r n m e n t . 
T h e demand for power t h u s i n c r e a s e d . -'" T h e DVC on i t s 
p a r t , was keen to c a p t u r e the demand: f i r s t l y , p o w e r was r e m u n e r ­
at ive and would pay for i t se l f in the long r u n ; secondlyyin W( st 
B e n g a l , DVC f e a r e d that if the C a l c u t t a E l e c t r i c i t y Supply 
C o r p o r a t i o n (the major p o w e r p r o d u c i n g company in West Bengal) 
should e r e c t i t s own plant in o r d e r to meet future d e m a n d , "not 
only will the immediately r e m u n e r a t i v e load be lost to the DVC but 
the Government of West Bengal will have to find funds for a c q u i r i n g 
the a b b o t s , ιΓ,ιη c o n s o n a n c e with the pol icy of n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of 
public u t i l i t i e s , they d e c i d e to p u r c h a s e the e l e c t r i c sys tem of the , 
C a l c u t t a L l e c t n c i t y Supply C o r p o r a t i o n . " ^ ^ P e n d i n g the complet ion 
57. Voorduin, o p . c i t . , p . 14 
58. Pandit H.N. Kunzru, for example, suspected that "the production may be 
so large that a large surplus may remain even after all existing requirements 
within the Damodar Valley and the area of operation of the Corporation have 
been satisfied". C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) 
D e b a t e s, 14th February, 1948. 
59. See A n n u a l R e p o r t s from 1951 onwards, for position of load 
development and supply position in Bihar and West Bengal. 
60. Agenda with Notes, for Meeting held at New Delhi on 26th/27th October,1953. 
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of power plants, therefore, the DVC kept on committing itself, even 
when it was to purchase power from outside s u p p l i e r s . " 1 But there 
was no end to the demand, and supply always fell short . 
The evep-increasing demand called for augmenting the 
power generation capacity of the DVC, by extending existing plants 
or installing new ones. Such steps required funds. Anticipating the 
load, planning and designing, constructing and then supplying, were 
time-consuming processes in themselves, but the DVC had to look to 
the Participating Governments for funds, and this also necessitated 
long negotiations., In 1954, for example, when the DVC wanted to 
extend the Bokaro Thermal Power plant and instai hydro-power 
plants at Konar and Maithon, a meeting took place in New Delhi 
between the Ministries of Finance and of Irrigation and Power, and 
the Central Water and Power Commission. The latter insisted that 
the new installations were necessary, but the Ministry of Finance, 
while agreeing in principle to the extra expenditure, did not want to 
commit itself."^ The Ministry of Irrigation and Power was requested 
to submit the proposals to the Planning Commission for consideration 
under the Second Five Year Plan. 
In view of the increasing demand, the two State Govern­
ments,considering investment in a joint-pool such as the DVC as 
being disadvantageous, planned the installation of their own power 
plants, inside and outside the Valley. "^ The West Bengal Govern­
ment was quicker in taking this step, and installed i ts own power 
plant at Durgapur. The Bihar Government which only reaped 
benefits from the DVC ' s power scheme and was more or less content, 
came in later in the race and also planned to establish its own power 
plants inside the valley (the power plant at Purulia is not yet 
complete). The dimensions of the power scheme thus changed from 
the original intentions. Competition now ensued between the two 
State Governments and the DVC in respect of demand and supply. 
The power programme, like other schemes, also needed 
foreign exchange. Extensive transmission systems and other equip­
ment involved huge import. Here again, foreign aid came to DVC's 
r e s c u e . " 4 
Lack of administrative coordination and legal conflicts 
were also t raceable . Apart from direct supply to major industries 
and .some' privato l i c e n s c o , the general power supply of the DVC 
61 . See Data Book, ο ρ . с i t . , p.178, where in 1952-53 the DVC purchased 
69.131 million KWh from Sindri and distributed to 10 consumers. See,also, 
D V C A n n u a l R e p o r t s from 1951 onwards. 
62. Minutes of the Meeting held in the room of Mr. S.Ratnam, Ministry of 
Finance, New Delhi, on 12th June 1954, to consider the DVC Project 
Estimate No. ED-600,. See, also i n f r a : pp. J 17-22 . 
63. Cf., I b i d . 
64. The first World Bank loan was granted in 1953 for meeting expenditure on 
transmission lines. 
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was channe l led trouffh the s t a t e E l e c t r i c i t y B o a r d s of both S t a t e s . 5 
A c e r t a i n amount of anomaly w a s involved in the DVC and the se two 
S t a t e a g e n c i e s functioning p a r a l l e l to e a c h o t h e r in the same a r e a . 
Complete account ing on sound commerc ia l l i n e s , which the DVC 
s t r i ved to fol low, r e q u i r e d coope ra t ion and mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
be tween the t h r e e p a r a l l e l u n i t s . S i n c e that was a b s e n t , the 
c o n s u m e r s complained that DVC p o w e r was e x p e n s i v e . 
Lega l ques t ion a r o s e about the taxa t ion of e l e c t r i c 
e n e r g y . T h i s ques t ion w a s brought f o rwa rd by the B i h a r Government . 
Unde r the B i h a r E l e c t r i c i t y Duty A c t , 1948, that Government was 
a u t h o r i z e d to tax e l e c t r i c e n e r g y , s t o r e d , g e n e r a t e d , consumed , 
d i s t r i b u t e d o r sold by any agency in the S t a t e , and they had a c c o r d i n g -
ly c h a r g e d the DVC for the sa l e and consumption of e l e c t r i c i t y a f t e r 
the p a s s i n g of the A c t . But , a c c o r d i n g to the Indian Cons t i tu t ion 
p a s s e d in J a n u a r y 1950, " s ave in so fa r a s the P r e s i d e n t may by 
o r d e r o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e , no law of a s t a t e in fo rce immediately 
before the commencement of th is Cons t i tu t ion sha l l i m p o s e , o r 
a u t h o r i s e the imposi t ion of, a tax in r e s p e c t of any w a t e r o r e l e c t r i -
c i ty s t o r e d , g e n e r a t e d , consumed, d i s t r i b u t e d o r sold by any 
au thor i ty e s t a b l i s h e d by any ex i s t ing law o r any law made by P a r l i a -
ment for r e g u l a t i n g o r developing any i n t e r - s t a t e r i v e r o r r i v e r 
v a l l e y . " ° ° The cons t i tu t iona l p r o v i s i o n s w e r e thus c l e a r l y in c o n -
flict with those of the B i h a r E l e c t r i c i t y Duty Ac t , 1948, and Bi l iar 
Government a s k e d the Government of India to i s s u e an o r d e r unde r 
A r t i c l e 288(1) of the Cons t i tu t ion to p rov ide for con t inuance of the 
tax l evy . The Governement of India sought the opinion of the Minis t ry 
of Law on t h i s i s s u e , and was adv i sed in 1953 that a g e n e r a l policy 
should be formed, and t h a t , a s far a s Cons t i tu t iona l p r o v i s i o n s went , 
they gave d i s c r e t i o n only to the P r e s i d e n t of India to lay down the 
e x t e n t , if a n y , to which S t a t e Governments may levy tax on c o n s u m p -
tion of e l e c t r i c i t y by r i v e r val ley c o r p o r a t i o n s such a s the DVC. 
L a t e r , the point was a l s o r a i s e d w h e t h e r the l i c e n s e e s who obtained 
the bulk supply from the DVC and f u r t h e r d i s t r i b u t e d it for r e t a i l 
consumpt ion , w e r e a l s o exempt unde r a r t i c l e 288 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The At to rney G e n e r a l of India confirmed in 1953 , that t h i s was not 
the c a s e . T h u s , the B i h a r Government could i nd i r ec t l y l e \ y tax on 
DVC power supp ly . The p r e c e d e n t w a s a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d for West 
B e n g a l . The Ca lcu t ta E l e c t r i c i t y Supply C o r p o r a t i o n and o t h e r 
l i c e n s e e s in West B e n g a l , a s well a s in B i h a r which followed l a t e r , 
had to pay the t a x . 
(c) A c h i e v e m e n t s : " ' The mounting demand for power and 
i t s p rof i tab le n a t u r e , made the DVC forge ahead v\ith i t s power p r o -
65. Such regional Boards were established throughout the country under the 
Central Electricity Act of 1948, to rationalize the production and supply 
of electricity and to take measures conducive to the electrical development 
of the Provinces of India. 
66. Article 288(1) of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a . 
67. Figures appearing in this sub-section were provided by the DVC, 
January 1967. 
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g r a m m e . Aga ins t the o r ig ina l p l a n s , the DVC had i n s t a l l e d , by 1966, 
6 un i t s att&ched to t h r e e h y d r o - e l e c t r i c i t y p l a n t s (Ta i l a iya 2 , 
Maithon 3 , and P a n c h e t l ) with an i n s t a l l e d capac i ty of 104 MW, and 
10 un i t s a t t a ched to t h r e e t h e r m a l p l a n t s (Bokaro 4 , C h a n d r a p u r a 3 , 
and D u r g a p u r 3) with an in s t a l l ed capac i ty of 677 MW. The t r a n s -
miss ion l i nes r a n into 1070.01 mi les (132 KV l ines 950 .91 m i l e s , 
and 33 KV l i n e s 119 .10 m i l e s ) . 
The following fac t s lead to the conc lus ion that the diff i -
c u l t i e s of funds , n e g o t i a t i o n s , expans ion , p lanning and c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
c a u s e d de lay in the complet ion of each uni t : 
O r i g i n a l Date of Complet ion 
of e ach plant 
T i l a i y a : March 1953 
Maithon: November 1954 
P a n c h e t : March 1956 
Actua l Complet ion Date 
HYDRO 
B o k a r o : 
1 s t 3 un i t s 
4th Unit : 
D u r g a p u r : 
1 st 2 un i t s 
3rd Unit 
August 1953 
Augus t 1959 
Ju ly 1959 
March 1966 
C h a n d r a p u r a : 
1st 2 u n i t s : 1964 
3rd Unit : June 1 967 
1st Unit : F e b r u a r y 1953 
2nd Unit : June 1953 
1st Unit : O c t o b e r 1957 
2nd U n i t : May 1958 
3rd U n i t : S e p t e m b e r 1958 
S e p t e m b e r 1959 
THERMAL 
1st Unit : F e b r u a r y 1953 
2nd U n i t : August 1953 
3rd U n i t : O c t o b e r 1953 
4th Unit : March 1960 
1 st Unit : O c t o b e r 1 960 
2nd U n i t : F e b r u a r y 1961 
3rd U n i t : 1967 
1 st Unit : O c t o b e r 1 964 
2nd Unit : May 1965 
3rd Unit : Ju ly 1968 
In f inancia l t e r m s , aga ins t the e s t ima ted 28 c r o r e s 
r u p e e s , the e n t i r e p o w e r sys tem cos t 141 .32 c r o r e s s h a r e d equal ly 
by the P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s . A r e v e n u e account was opened 
by the DVC on 1st Apr i l 1963 , and r e v e n u e s w e r e divided in to : 
G e n e r a l R e s e r v e , Di s t r ibu t ion to P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s , and 
Development R e b a t e , a s shown below: 
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Year 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
Total 
General Reserve 
(Rupees Million) *) 
4.6 
"5.9 
9.2 
19.7 
Dibtribution to 
Participating **) 
Governments. 
(Rupees Million) 
7.0 
8.9 
9.2 
25.1 
Development 
Rebate Re-
serve )(Rupees 
Million) 
Nil 
Nil 
4.6 
4 . 6 
Total profits 
(Rupees 
Million) 
11.6 
14.8 
23 .0 
49.4 
*) The General Reserve, created from power profits, remained utilized 
in business. 
**) The net surplus on power for the year 1963-64 was credited to 
participating governments in equal shares . The share of the Government 
of India was paid fully in cash. Bihar ' s share was paid in cash after 
adjustment of the irrigation deficit debited to its account. 
The share of West Bengal was adjusted in full against i ts share on 
irrigation deficits so that no cash payment was made.The net distribut-
able profits in later years were likewise accounted for against the 
Participating Governments in equal proportions. 
The DVC supplied power in bulk under contract to: 
(i) Pr ivate l i c e n c e e s such a s the Calcutta Electr ic i ty Supply Corpor-
ation L t d . , Assoc ia ted Power Co. Ltd . ;(ii) Iron and S t e e l Industr ies , 
l ike Indian Iron and S t e e l Co . L t d . , Tata Iron and S tee l Co . L t d . , 
Durgapur S t e e l P r o j e c t ; (iii) other i n d u s t r i e s , like Chittaranjan 
Locomotive Works, Assoc ia ted Cement C o . ; and (iv) S t a t e A g e n c i e s 
of Bihar and West Bengal State Elec tr ic i ty B o a r d s , for further d i s -
tribution, and for Eas tern (one div is ion only) and South-Eas tern 
Rai lways . The DVC a l s o supplied power direct ly to Eas tern Rai l -
way, their own construction works and for DVC colony r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
In 1 9 6 5 - 6 6 , the demand and supply posit ion ins ide and 
outside the val ley was a s follows:"" 
Inside the val ley 
West Bengal 
Bihar 
Outside the Valley 
West Bengal 
Bihar 
Demand 
( In me 
1 9 4 . 4 
1 5 3 . 7 
146 .5 
201 .5 
Supply 
gawatts) 
1 3 5 . 3 
1 4 5 . 3 
174 .6 
2 4 5 . 8 
696 .1 7 0 1 . 0 
68. These figures were supplied in January 1967 by the DVC. They show some 
contradiction: supply is greater than demand, especially outside the Valley. 
It is assumed that competition with State Governments in power production 
caused this irregulari ty, whereby the DVC stnved to prove that it could 
supply more power and meet demands. At the same time, however, their 
Annual Report 1964-65 showed that they were purchasing power from non-
DVC power plants. 
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(4) Development S c h e m e s : 
The DVC had two d e p a r t m e n t s d i r e c t l y connec ted with a c t i v i t i e s 
c o v e r i n g g e n e r a l development : (a) The Medical Depar tmen t u n d e r 
the Chief Medical Off icer s ta t ioned at C a l c u t t a , 6 9 with a numer of 
d i s p e n s a r i e s and h o s p i t a l s a t the r e s e r v o i r s i t e s and in the v a l l e y . 
T h i s Depar tment looked a f t e r public hea l th and m a l a r i a e r a d i c a t i o n , 
in p a r t i c u l a r . 7 0 (b) The so i l C o n s e r v a t i o n Depa r tmen t , with a 
F o r e s t r y Sec t ion at H a z a r i b a g h ( B i h a r ) , '' which was e s p e c i a l l y 
impor tan t for the modera t ion of f loods and a l s o for r e g u l a t i n g s i l t 
in the r e s e r v o i r s . F o r e s t r y was looked a f t e r mainly by the B i h a r 
Government , a s the D V C ' s Agen t , u n d e r mutual a g r e e m e n t . 
Navigat ion was an a n c i l l a r y funct ion, an offshoot of 
cana l c o n s t r u c t i o n for i r r i g a t i o n , and fell u n d e r the Deputy Chief 
E n g i n e e r ( B a r r a g e and I r r i g a t i o n ) . O t h e r a c t i v i t i e s l ead ing to 
soc i a l and economic we l lbe ing such a s s c h o o l s , i n d u s t r i e s , a g r i -
c u l t u r e f a r m s , f ish c u l t u r e , fell unde r the c h a r g e of v a r i o u s 
d e p a r t m e n t s of the D V C . 
What was c o n s i d e r e d to fall unde r development a c t i v i t i e s 
of the DVC? No-one knew the extent b e t t e r than N . V . Gadg i l , the 
Min i s t e r who s t e e r e d the DVC Bill th rough the Cons t i tuen t Assembly 
in 1 9 4 7 - 4 8 . He sa id : "I and th i s House have a s i n g u l a r good for tune 
of say ing that t h e r e i s an effort which i s going to r evo lu t i on i ze the 
e n t i r e economy of the coun t ry and when y e a r s p a s s by those who 
will come to take ou r p l a c e s in th i s v e r y House will s ay : H e r e i s 
something which they s t a r t e d and made ou r coun t ry a s wor thy a s i s 
d e s c r i b e d in ou r na t iona l song - Su j a l am, S u p h a l a m , S a s y a 
S h a m a l a m . " ' 2 T h e r f o r e , while flood c o n t r o l , i r r i g a t i o n , and power 
w e r e the D V C ' s p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e s , funct ions for the g e n e r a l 
development of the va l ley inc luded: nav iga t ion , a f fo res t a t ion and 
con t ro l of soi l e r o s i o n , and the promotion of publ ic hea l th and a g r i -
c u l t u r a l , i n d u s t r i a l , economic and g e n e r a l we l l -be ing in the Damodar 
Val ley and i t s a r e a of ope r a t i o n . ' J 
No t a r g e t s w e r e fixed for the development of the v a l l e y . ' ^ 
The DVC a t tended mainly to soi l c o n s e r v a t i o n , a f f o r e s t a t i o n , 
69. The department functioned under Dr. Neogi, one of the first officers of 
the DVC. For the organization chart of this Department, see i n f r a . ,p.80 
70. The incidence of malaria was alraedy high in the valley and the r e s e r -
voirs caused it to increase . 
71 . See organization chart , i n f r a . , p .79 
72. C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y (Le g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , 
12th December, 1947. The words are from the song "Vandé Mätaram" 
(Mother, I bow to thee) written by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee in his 
novel, Anand Math, and later adopted as the national song of India. They 
mean "rich with thy hurrying streams, bright with thy orchard gleams, 
dark fields waving". 
73 . Section 12(d),(e)and (f) of the DVC Act, quoted supra . , p.37 
74. Except for navigation; where the construction of DVC main irrigation-cum-
navigational canal was anticipated to handle two million tons of cargo yearly. 
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development of fisheries (fish being the most important food item in 
both S ta tes , but particularly in West Bengal), and anti-malaria 
measures . At f irst , small-scale and cottage industries were also 
taken u p . ' ^ 
Difficulties: 
(a) The area of activities defined under section 12(f) of the DVC 
Act covered the entire spectrum of welfare and development functions 
of the State Governments. Eastern India was not a sparsely populat-
ed country with concentrations only in r iver valleys. While the r iver 
valley was a unit for i rr igat ion, power generation, afforestation, 
soil conservation, e tc . it was not distinct from the res t of the States 
in matters concerning public health, agr icul ture , industry and 
economic and general well-being of the people for which, ultimately, 
the State Governments were responsible under the Constitution. The 
State powers and the DVC functions therefore showed some legal 
i r regu la r i t i es . Moreover, within the S ta tes , various other formal 
institutions attended to these functions, such as local governments, 
distr ict boards (later Zila Par ishads and Panchayat Samities), as 
well as State undertakings or State-owned or controlled organizations 
like the Industrial Development Corporation, Small Scale Industries 
Corporation, Handloom Boards, Khadi and Village Industries Boards , 
Road Transport Corporation e tc . It was inconceivable for the State 
Governments that a Government Corporation, mainly intended for un-
dertaking i rr igat ion, flood control and power generation in a r iver 
valley should assume all functions of the Central , State and Local 
Governments in the a r e a . 
The Rau Committee deliberated on these questions, and 
recommended that "we a re of opinion that the normal functions of a 
corporation should include only such essential ancillary activities 
of a bénéficient nature , as are obligatory on the p r o j e c t . . . . Most 
of the functions of the Corporation listed in sub-section 12(f) of the 
Act form part and parcel of the social welfare activities of the 
States concerned and may equally well be handed over to State 
Governments. . . each such scheme should be undertaken only after 
it has been specifically sanctioned by the Central Government; it 
should, however, be open to a State Government to entrust any 
such work to the Corporation for execution in order to take advant-
age of the special facilities available to the Corporation in the 
a r e a . " ' " Similarly, functions listed under Section 12(e), the 
Committee recommended, "should be subject to the pr ior approval 
of the Central Government".77 These recommandations of the Rau 
Committee were not accepted by the DVC. While the Bihar 
75. These industries included Central Finishing Workshop for handforged items, 
cold storage, ceramic industry, lock industry, aloe fibre industry e t c . , 
see D V C A n n u a l R e p o r t s for years 1950-51 to 1955-56. 
76. The DVC Enquiry Committee Report, Ch. VIII, para . 56 
77. I b i d . , para 57 
78. G o v e r n m e n t ' s D e c i s i o n s o n R e c o m m a n d a t i o n s of 
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Government shared the D V C ' s o p i n i o n / " the Government of West 
Bengal, accepting the Committee's recommandations, added that 
the State Government's concurrence should a l s o be obtained. 
Final ly, the matter was d i s c u s s e d in a Conference of Participating 
Governments in July 1954 which, by and large, endorsed the 
Committee 's recommandations. 
(b) The implementation of development programmes 
entailed yet another difficulty of legal interpretat ion, because 
Sect ion 32 of the DVC Act was not c lear ly w o r d e d . 8 ^ The DVC 
included expenditure on items other than the three main objectives 
under "overhead and general charges ' ' , and thus charged the P a r t i ­
cipating Governments before making any a l locat ions under the main 
object ives."- ' According to the West Bengal Government, " common 
expenditure", a s mentioned in sect ion 32 was to be c lass i f i ed into 
two c a t e g o r i e s ; namely, expenditure n e c e s s a r y to further the three 
main object ives under the f irst category and al located between these 
ob ject ives, the r e s t falling under the second category and charged 
in proportion to the benefits accruing therefrom to the respect i ve 
Part icipating Government. According to the West Bengal Govern­
ment, so i l -conservat ion and forestry fell under the first category, 
and malaria control m e a s u r e s , smal l-sca le industr ies , e t c . under 
the second. The West Bengal Government a l s o contended that navi­
gation, a s defined in Sect ion 12(d) was to be treated a s common 
expenditure, whereas the Bihar Government held that this was 
linked with irr igation and flood control, and expenditure on it was 
to be charged under these two heads. 
F o r c o r r e c t interpretation of the relevant portions of the 
Act, the DVC sought the opinion of the Attorney General of India. 
Justifying their stand under the Act, they sought his opinion on three 
points:84 
"(i) Whether the expenditure not directly chargeable to irrigation,power 
and flood control is covered by section 32; 
(ii) whether the development expenditure... will come under 'overhead 
and general expenses' or under a separate head under section 32; 
t h e D V C E n q u i r y C o m m i t t e e T o g e t h e r w i t h t h e 
C o m m e n t s o f . т е G o v e r n m e n t s o f B i h a r a n d W e s t . 
B e n g a l Αι>Ί c i t h e D V C o n t h e R e p o r t (Govt, of India 
Press, New Delhi, }'}5Л), p.68. Hereafter this document will be referred 
to as "Comments and Decisions". 
79. I b i d . , p.43 
80. I b i d . , p.47 
81. A Summary record of the Proceedings of the Participating Governments ' 
Conference held at Calcutta on the 13th July 1954, to discuss certain 
matterns relating to the Damodar Valley Corporation. See also lnfra,p.12? 
82. For relevant portion, see Appendix A. 
83. See section 32 read with section 29 and 33 of the DVC Act., i b i d . 
84. Letter No.WG-19/55-11776, dated 24th December 1955, from P.P.Varma, 
Chairman DVC, Calcutta, to Mr. M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General of 
India, New Delhi. 
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(ui) what would be the meaning of "common expenditure" mentioned in 
section 32 for the purpose of apportionment among the 
Participating Governments." 
In his opinion, the Attorney General gave a brief expla-
nation of sect ion 32 under interpretat ion, and opined on three 
specif ic points a s fol lows: -' 
(il Yes. 
(ii) It would, I think, be preferable to have heads of expenditure 
corresponding with each of the main and other functions and the 
activities of the Corporation; 
(in) I understand the words " common expenditure" to mean to be shared 
equally by the Participating Governments." 
Obviously, the opinion of the Attorney General tall ied with 
that of the DVC. While the Bihar and Central Governments agreed 
with this opinion, the Government of West Bengal d i s a g r e e d . In the 
absence of unanimous agreement, the accounts could not be s tra ight-
end out and the DVC, in the last r e s o r t , took the c a s e to arbitration 
in 1 9 5 8 . ° ° D r . Rajamannar, ret ired Chief Just ice of the Madras 
High Court , was appointed Arbitrator, reaching his dec i s ion after 
about 4 y e a r s in May 1963. This d e c i s i o n , which became binding on 
the three Participating Governments and the DVC, ran as fol lows: 
"The common expenditure should f irst be al located to power , flood 
control and irr igat ion , in the ratio of the direct c o s t s a l locable to 
these three objec t s , and should then be shared between the P a r t i c i -
pating Governments, in the ratio in which the c o s t s al locable to 
these objects are s h a r e d . " " ' Navigation was to be common expendit-
u r e . 
Achievements: 
For the r e a s o n s mentioned above, the DVC ' s a c t i v i t i e s , apart from 
the three main objec t ives , centred round soi l conservat ion , a f fores t -
ation, malaria eradication and f i s h e r i e s . On these ac t iv i t i e s the 
DVC showed yearly p r o g r e s s . ° ° Malaria was eradicated: The 
DVC ' s medical and public health department functioned eff ic iently. 
The Soi l Conservat ion Department showed sat is factory r e s u l t s : i t s 
r e s e a r c h programmes at Panagarh Agricultural Farm helped in 
evolving a suitable crop pattern in the irr igated area and, at 
85. Opinion, No.AGF -(3l)/56-4610/5, dated 29th February, 1956, by Mr. 
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, New Delhi. 
86. Under Section 49 of the ACT, the DVC was authorized to do so. See 
Appendix A for relevant portions. 
87. From a Note sent to the author by the Government of Bihar. The 
Rajamannar award ran into some 68 pages and was given wide coverage by 
Calcutta and Patna press; for example, see H i n d u s t h a n S t a n d a r d , 
Calcutta, 22nd May 1963. 
88. For details, see various A n n u a l R e p o r t s o f t h e D V C . 
69 
Deochanda Experimental Station, helped in evolving suitable 
techniques for soil and water conservation; soil surveys and soil 
studies were regularly conducted. Also, afforestation progressed: 
The DVC brought total afforestation to 59,211 acres at the end of 
1965, as against the Fourth Five Year Plan target of 70.000 a c r e s . 8 9 
On f isheries, a lso, the DVC reported a yearly increase in total 
catch and receipts from sales , licence fees, etc.90 
On the general welfare side, the DVC did not have much 
to show, except the opening of primary, middle and high schools for 
children, assist ing numerous clubs, and encouraging the setting up 
of cooperative s tores and societies for residents of the DVC colonies. 
These colonies were established by the DVC at almost all Project 
s i tes , and were inhabited mainly by DVC employees. The DVC also 
encouraged tourism by extending facilities of well-appointed Circuit 
Houses and Inspection Bungalows with reasonably modern amenities.°' 
The DVC ' s Public Relations Officer looked after this aspect 
enthusiastically. 
Although the operation and maintenance of the Barrage 
and Irrigation system of the DVC were transferred to the Govern­
ment of West Bengal, the DVC looked after commercial navigation. 
Their main canal was ready in October 1963 for commercial traffic, 
but there was no commercial operation. The reasons given in 1965 
were that no operating agency could be set up.92 Later , agreement 
with Hindusthan Shipping Company Ltd. , did not appear to bear any 
tangible re su l t s , because the canal was not opened for commercial 
traffic even in 1968: "More than Rs .9 lakhs (Rupees 900,000) is 
being spent every year on i ts maintenance without any cargo moving. -
(5) Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons:94 
(a) Original Plans : During discussions of the DVC Bill in the 
Constituent Assembly, great emphasis was placed on the importance 
of amicably resett l ing people who were to be uprooted from future 
r e s e r v o i r lands. Jaipal Singh, member of the Constituent Assembly 
from the area to be affected by DVC constructions, spoke at length 
on this i s s u e . N.V. Gadgil said: "I want to assure my friend Mr. 
89. D V C A n n u a l R e p o r t 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 , p p . 20-21 
90. Except in 1964-65, when the total catch of fish as well as receipts showed 
a decline over the figures of 1963-64 by 12,224 kgs. and Rs. 10,454.73, 
see the respective A n n u a l R e p o r t s of the DVC. For a yearly 
account from 1958-59 to 1962, however, see "Fifteen Years of DVC", 
о p.с i t. 
91. Tourists to the valley have included foreign dignitaries such as President 
Nasser, Messrs. Khruschev and Bulganin, Mr. Eugene Black, and so on. 
92. Τ h e D V C A n n u a l R e ρ о г t 1 9 6 4 - 6 5, p . 7 . 
93. S.R. Chose, "Irrigation and Navigation", in Y о j η a (New Delhi,July 
7, 1968), p.14. 
94. The Rehabilitation Scheme was not separately stipulated under the DVC Act, 
but seems to have been covered under section 12(f). Because of its distinct 
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Jaipal Singh that every person who will be uprooted from the soil . . . 
will exchange his hovel for a decent cottage, darkness for light and 
fanaticism for faith. I want to assure my friend that the resettlement 
of the expropriated people will be the first charge on the attention, 
the energy and the finances of the Corporation. I think a c learer a s -
surance than that i s not necessary and I do not think my Hon1 ble 
friend Mr. Jaipal Singh wants it e i t he r . " 95 Gadgil further added, 
"all attempts will be made as far as possible to see that those who 
are resett led do not feel themselves in some strange unknown world 
but that they will be reset t led in fairly familiar circumstances. " 96 
Such assurances having been given, the Central Government laid down 
the policy of rehabilitating displaced persons by providing land for 
land and house for house, with possibly better living amenities. The 
DVC was deeply sympathetic to the lot of the people who were shorn 
from their ancestral her i tage, and planned to follow this policy. 
The a rea to be submerged by re se rvo i r s fell in Bihar 
S ta te . The Bihar Government was therefore the most concerned in 
the matter of resettlement of its people. Close cooperation between 
the DVC and the Bihar Government was ensured by establishing the 
office of the Director of Rehabilitation and Land Acquisition at 
Hazaribagh (Bihar) to look after the DVC rehabilitation programme. ° ' 
(b) Difficulties: To follow the policy of land for land and 
house for house, meant not only acquiring the land and building 
s t ructures on i t , but also making the people move, occupy and 
utilize the new facil i t ies. The choice of the people also had to be 
taken into account. Under the Land Acquisition Act, displaced 
persons were to be given the choice of accepting cash or a new home 
and land in compensation. It became very difficult to obtain such 
consent from the people. People suspected that compensation in 
kind, particularly arable land, would be much below the quality of 
land they surrendered, and wanted the DVC to reclaim land of their 
choice. On the other hand, the DVC had to s tar t construction of houses 
and reclaim land fairly long in advance so that, as soon as the 
people were displaced, they could move on to the new a r e a s . Con-
sequently, the people's consent had to precede construction and 
reclamation. Since this was a long p roces s , part icularly in face of 
the people ' s re luctance, the DVC, in consultation with the Bihar 
Government,9° went ahead with reclaiming land and constructing 
houses . In the meantime, the DVC and the Bihar Government kept 
persuading the people to give their opinions as required under the 
Land Acquisition Act. From time to time the DVC reported that 
sufficient acreage of land had been reclaimed and houses construct-
nature, I have preferred to deal with it under a separate heading. 
95. C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , I , 
February 1948. 
96. I b i d . 
97. See organization chart , i n f r a . , p.79 
98. Bihar Government's letter No.B/L-20103/51 -5105R, of 24th October, 1951 . 
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e d , a t the same t ime ind ica t ing the unoccupied land and h o u s e s . ° ° 
The people p r e f e r r e d c a s h compensa t ion so that they 
could u t i l i ze the money a s they l iked ; on the o t h e r hand , h o w e v e r , 
the cos t of land acqu i s i t i on i n c r e a s e d . In 1953 , the cos t had i n c r e a s -
ed from R s . 3 8 0 p e r a c r e , a s o r ig ina l ly e s t i m a t e d , to R s . 6 0 0 p e r 
a c r e . 100 The whole e x p e n d i t u r e on r e s e t t l e m e n t was c h a r g e d to 
the DVC P r o j e c t . 1 0 1 In the face of t h e s e di f f icul t ies the DVC c o n -
t ac t ed i t s F i n a n c i a l A d v i s e r , who s u g g e s t e d : 1 0 2 
"(a) Displaced villagers who are willing to take cash compensation 
instead of land for land and house for house may be given cash 
value of their present houses and holdings; 
(b) In respect of others who insist on having land for land and house 
for house, they may be given lands and houses, not necessarily 
in the vicinity of their present villages but at other convenient 
places in the valley where lands could be reclaimed at a con-
siderably cheaper cost. (It is understood that at a distance 
ranging from 60 to 100 miles from the present villages, lands 
are available which can be reclaimed at a much cheaper cost); 
(c) Construction of houses and the provision of amenities should be 
on a more moderate scale not exceeding those which are at 
present enjoyed by the villagers. " 
Although the DVC followed t h i s a d v i c e , i t was 
r e j e c t e d by the Rau Commit tee , which s t a t ed tha t compensa t ion in 
c a s h in a l l c a s e s was n e i t h e r fa i r in i t se l f no r in consonance with 
the d e c l a r e d policy of the Governmen t . Even in p u r s u a n c e of the 
d e c l a r e d po l i cy , the Committee r e c o r d e d , the r e c l a m a t i o n of land 
some 60 o r 100 mi l les away w h e r e i t could be r e c l a i m e d a t l ower 
c o s t s was l ikely to c r e a t e jus t i f ied ag i ta t ion among d i s p l a c e d 
p e r s o n s . The Committee t h e r e f o r e recommended d r o p p i n g t h i s 
p o l i c y . 1 0 3 
The pol icy followed cont inued to be of a mixed n a t u r e : 
compensa t ion in c a s h a s well a s in k i n d . The c o s t s of r e s e t t l e m e n t 
and acqu i s i t i on of new land be ing r a t h e r h igh , the C o r p o r a t i o n was 
unable to cope up with the i n c r e a s i n g f inancia l l o a d . It i n s i s t e d that 
w h e r e mone ta ry compensa t ion was invo lved , t h i s be c h a r g e d to the 
p r o j e c t and the ba lance t r e a t e d a s a g r a n t to the C o r p o r a t i o n from 
the P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s . T h i s was not a c c e p t e d by the 
P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s . C e n t r a l Gove rnmen t , in p a r t i c u l a r , 
held tha t : f i r s t l y , the C o r p o r a t i o n was a commerc ia l body and any 
such g r a n t was tantamount to s u b s i d i s i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of the C o r p o r -
at ion and thus v i t ia t ing the commerc ia l r e s u l t s ; s e c o n d l y , the DVC 
Act did not p rov ide for any g r a n t s from P a r t i c i p a t i n g Gove rnmen t s 
99. Note submitted by the DVC for Participating Governments1 Conference 
held at New Delhi on 27th October 1953. 
100. See , N o t e s w i t h A g e n d a for Participating Governments' 
Conference held at New Delhi on 31st May 1952. 
101 . The decision was taken in an Inter-State Conference on 6th January 1947 
102. N o t es w i t h A g e n d a for Participating Governments' Conference 
held at New Delhi on 31st May 1952. 
103. D V C E n q u i r y C o m m t i t e e R e p o r t , Ch.III, para . 12 
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for reclamation of waste land and resettlement of displaced 
population. This was upheld in the Conference held on 27th October 
1953 at New Delhi. The DVC thus faced the dilemma of incurring 
the cçst of construction of houses and reclamation of land which 
would remain unoccupied. It therefore gave cash compensation 
whenever demanded. The Bihar Government partly agreed to 
shoulder the responsibility to undertake losses . 104 
(c) Achievements: The DVC's policy of reclaiming distant 
land at a cheaper cost and classifying it for compensation, was 
apparently defective. '0* A Committee appointed by the DVC on this 
i s sue , υ concluded that out of 3224.89 a c r e s of land reclaimed 
and accepted by the people, only a portion had the fertility of the 
class to which they were assigned, and that the classification was 
not appropriate. ' The people chose to get compensation in cash 
with which,in some c a s e s , they bought land and constructed houses 
of their own choice; in other cases , the cash was soon dissipated. 
This position continued. 
108 The DVC reported the following achievements: 
1 Total numer of persons: 
Displaced: 93,874 Rehabilitated: 93,874 
2 Total Acreage of land: 
Submerged: 64,476 Provided: 7,064 Utilized: 7,064 
3 Total number of houses: 
Constructed: 343 Occupied: 161 Unoccupied:182 1 0 9 
4 Total number of families given cash compensation: 18,029 
5 Total amount spent on acquisition of land 
and rehabilitation: Rupees 41 ,501,004. 
104. Minutes in the Inter-State Conference at the secretariat level, held at 
Calcutta, on 16th February 1954. 
105. The classification was based on the type of crop grown by the cultivators. 
The details of this classification are not relevant and are not given here. 
But see U.N. , op . c i t . , pp. 63-68 . 
106. A n n u a l R e p o r t 1 9 5 5 - 5 6, p . 23 
107. D V C A n n u a l R e p o r t 1 9 5 6 - 5 7 F pp. 22-23. The Conference 
held between the Ministry of Irrigation and Power, the DVC and the 
Government of Bihar on the 4th October 1955, also reached the same 
conclusion. It stated: "The plots selected by the DVC for reclamation 
were not "considered suitable by the Santhals (the tribal people who were 
uprooted). The Santhals had on the other hand indicated other plots 
acceptable to them, the reclamation of some of which the DVC considered 
as uneconomical." 
108. Figures provided by the DVC, February 1967. 
109. 118 houses were transferred to State of Bihar and the remaining 64 to 
other Departments of the DVC. 
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(6) Organizational A s p e c t s : ^ ^ 
Start ing with a few people to look after essential functions, the DVC 
has grown into a vast and complex organization within the last 
twenty y e a r s . It shows a four-tier system: 
Fi r s t : At the top, the Corporation with a Chairman and 
two Members, all of whom can be appointed fulltime or part-t ime. ''' 
Second: At the head of the second t i e r , the Secretary 
(later also designated as General Manager) of the DVC as Chief 
Executive Officer. The Secretar ia t represents the DVC in day-to­
day administration. Outside the DVC, the Financial Adviser is 
appointed by the Central Government under the DVC Act, and tenders 
advice either to the Corporation in its meetings or to the secre tar ia t . 
He does not tender advice to the heads of departments or agencies 
of the DVC. 
Third: The third t ier is formed by the twelve department­
al heads, viz. , Chief Electr ical Engineer, Additional Chief E lect r ic­
al Engineer (Operation and Maintenance), Chief Engineer (Civil) 
Directorate of Rehabilitation and Land Acquisition, Directorate of 
Soil Conservation, Commercial Eng ineer ' s Department, Department 
of Controller of Purchase and S t o r e s , Chief Medical Officer, Chief 
Accounts Officer, Information Department, Directorate of Personnel , 
and Deputy Chief Engineer (Barrage and Irr igat ion). 
The functions of some of these departments have been 
indicated above. The remaining departments have the following tasks: 
(a) Accounting Department: headed by the Chief Accounts 
Officer, with headquarters at Calcutta and branch offices at project 
s i tes , and field accounts officers. The Department follows govern­
ment r u l e s , including internal audit. 
(b) The Purchase Department: started soon after the in­
auguration of the DVC, at Calcutta. When it was realized that DVC's 
objectives could not be quickly implemented if it had to depend 
entirely upon the central purchasing agency of the Government of 
India, 112 the Purchase Department was expanded and improved. 
Purchase requisitions for s tores and equipment a r e passed by other 
departments to the Purchase Department which places o r d e r s , 
negotiates and attends to delivery. 
(c) Personnel Department: responsible for personnel 
management and administration of the DVC. It is headquartered at 
Calcutta, and looks after recruitment, transfer and promotion of 
110. Unless otherwise indicated, for information contained in this section, 
1 have largely drawn on a voluminous and reasonably objective study 
made recently by a Working Group appointed by the DVC in combination 
with the Department of Administrative Reforms of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, New Delhi, entitled: R e p o r t of t h e W o r k i n g G r o u p 
o n t h e R e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e S e c r e t a r i a t of 
t h e D a m o d a r V a l l e y C o r p o r a t i o n(Calcutta
r
 June 1966) 
Hereafter this study will be referred to as the W o r k i n g G r o u p 
R e p o r t . 
111. СГ. s u p r a . , p . 40 
112. Cf. s u p r a . , p . 51 
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of employees, conducts training programmes, promotes safety-
measures and sponsors welfare and social act ivi t ies . 
(d) Information Department: The Chief Information Officer 
functions from Calcutta. This Department disseminates information 
concerning activities through various media, such as p res s confer-
ences and films, photographs, cha r t s , models.periodicals and public 
meetings. A Public Relations Officer i s attached to the Information 
Department (also at Calcutta) with two Assistant Public Relations 
Officers at Maithon and Bokaro. The primary duty of the Public 
Relations personnel is to maintain healthy relations with DVC clients 
and to conduct tours of p res s part ies and other official vis i tors to 
the Valley. 
(e) Commercial Engineering Department: This Department 
is also in Calcutta, and i s primarily concerned with the design of a 
ra te s tructure for the sale of power to customers of the DVC. It 
also negotiates contracts for the sale and purchase of electr ic 
power, conducts market studies to determine future load growth, 
looks after functional control of power system operations, and 
makes budget estimates of anticipated revenues and plans for the 
effective utilization of generating capacity. 114 
Fourth: The fourth t ier comes under the respective heads 
of departments and is formed by the field officers managing the dams 
and r e s e r v o i r s , thermal and hydro power stat ions, hospitals and 
other miscellaneous field duties . 
The schematic diagram of these t i e r s i s as follows: 
113. For details, see U.N., op . c i t . , pp. 70-80 
114. I b i d., p. 86 
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FOUR T I E R S O F THE DVC ORGANIZATION 
CORPORATION IFINANCIAL ADVISER 
(Chai rman + 2 P a r t - t i m e Member^ 
II 
G e n e r a l M a n a g e r - c u m - S e c r e t a r y 
D y . G e n e r a l Manager -cum-Addi t iona l S e c r e t a r y 
2 Dy. S e c r e t a r i e s , 2 Under S e c r e t a r i e s , 
2 A s s t t . S e c r e t a r i e s , 2 Admin i s t r a t i eve O f f i c e r s , 
6 S u p e r i n t e n d e n t s , 54 A s s i s t a n t s , 76 C l a s s IV 
employees 
CALCUTTA MAITHON HAZARIBACH 
Chief E l e c t r i c a l E n g r . 
Commerc ia l E n g i n e e r 
C o n t r o l l e r of P u r c h a s e 
& S t o r e s , 
Chief Medical Off icer 
Chief Accounts Officer 
Chief Information Off icer 
D i r e c t o r of P e r s o n n e l 
Dy. Chief Engineer (B&l) 
IV 
Chief E n g i n e e r 
(Civil) 
Addi .Chie f E l e e 
E n g i n e e r 
D i r e c t o r of So i l 
C o n s e r v a t i o n . 
D i r e c t o r of 
Rehab i l i t a t ion and 
Land Acquis i t ion 
G e n e r a l Supe r in t enden t P o w e r S t a t i o n s 
P r o j e c t Managers 
S u p e r i n t e n d i n g E n g i n e e r (Dams & Co lon ies ) 
F i s h e r y Officer 
Medical Off icers 
Dy. D i r e c t o r of Publ ic Hea l th 
A s s t t . P u b l i c Re la t ions Off icer 
F ie ld Accoun t s Off icers 
Load S u r v e y o r s , e t c . e t c . e t c . 
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Organizations of various departments of the DVC came to form the 
following shape: 
ORGANIZATION CHART I 
Chief Engineeer (Civil) 
buperintending Engineer Panchet (Construction) 
Superintending Engineer Dam Circle (Operation) 
Superintending Engineer -Engineering Circle 
Work Shop Superintendent 
Deputy Controller of Stores (Disposal) 
Fishery Section 
Deputy Chief Engineer (B&l) 
KO 
Superintending Engineer 
Dam Circle (Operation) 
Konar Divisioni [Maithon Division Mechanised Earth 
Moving Division 
Konar Sub-Division(Civil) 
Bokaro Sub-Division 
Hazaribagh Sub-Division 
(With Sectional Office 
at Tilaiya). 
Dam Sub-Division 
Colony Sub-Division 
Electr ical & Mechanical 
Sub-Division 
1(2) 
Superintending Engineer 
Engineering Circle 
Design Division 
Hydraulic Data Division 
Central Testing Division 
Investigation Division 
I (3) 
Deputy Chief Engineer (Barrage and Irrigation) 
Л 
Barrage & Canals | Design 
Durgapur Barrage, Headworks Division, 
Canal Construction Division I 
Canal Construction Division II 
Canal Construction Division III, and 
Mechanical Division 
ORGANIZATION CHART II 
Chief Electrical Engineer 
(Operation & Maintenance) 
Power System 
Engineering 
(Engineering 
& Research) 
Power Genera-
tion 
Elect r ica l , 
Mechanical, and 
Communication 
Systems 
Power 
T r a n s -
Mission 
Bokaro Thermal 
Power Station 
Central 
Testing 
Circle 
Central 
Load 
Despatch 
Central 
Service 
Oragniza-
tion 
Testing lab. 
Division, 
Mobile Tes t -
ing Di'-ision 
Hydel 
Circle 
Tilaiya Hydel S t . 
Mython Hydel S t . 
Panchet Hydel St 
I 
Grid Operatior 
& Maintenance 
(Eastern 
Circle) 
Grid Operation 
& Maintenance 
(Western 
Circle) 
Grid Operation 
Div. I & II 
Communi-
cation 
Division 
Grid Operation 
Div.Il l , & IV 
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ORGANIZATION CHART III 
Additional Chief Electr ical 
Engineer 
Engineering and 
Planning 
Generation 
Fourth Unit B . T . P . S . 
Durgapur T . P . S . 
Chandrapura Τ . Ρ . S . 
Construction 
Transmission and Sub-
Station 
Transmission System 
Construction Circle 
Construction Division I 
Construction Division II 
Construction Division III 
Central Stores Division 
ORGANIZATION CHART IV 
Director of Personnel 
Recruitement 
Administration and Personnel Management 
Training 
Welfare and Employee Relations 
Industrial Relation 
Employment 
ORGANIZATION CHART V 
Controller of Purchase 
and Stores 
Purchase 
Clearing And Forwarding 
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ORGANIZATION CHART VI 
Chief Accounts Officer 
Headquarters 
Stock Verification 
Cash 
Provident Fund 
Compilation (Headquarters and 
Field Accounts) 
Work Audit 
Internal Audit 
Pay Audit 
Foreign Payment 
Field Accounts 
Offices 
Konar 
Bokaro 
Maithon 
Panchet 
В & I (BDN & DPR)Calcutta 
D. Τ . Ρ . S . (Durgapur Thermal) 
С . Τ . Ρ . S . (Chandrapura Thermal) 
Electr ical 
Hazaribagh 
ORGANIZATION CHART VII 
Soil Conservation 
Scientific 
Section 
Survey & Planning 
Engineering 
Soil Laboratory 
Deochanda Farm 
(Soil Conservation 
Research) 
Reservoir Foreshore 
Farming 
Extension 
Fores t ry Panagarh Agri­
cultural Farm 
ORGANIZATION CHART VIII 
Rehabilitation and 
Land Acquisition 
| Ri luibiht.iUon | | Land Acquibition | 
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ORGANIZATION CHART IX 
Commercial Engineer 
Power Economics and Contracts Division 
Load Survey and Load Development Division 
Plant Units Records and Costing Division 
ORGANIZATION CHART X 
Chief Medical Officer 
[Headquarters \ 
Field 
Med 
Tilaiya 
ical 
Konar 
Bokaro 
Maithon 
Panchet 
Bermo 
Oyaria 
Sonamukhi 
Kanainatsal 
Chandrapura 
Public Hea 
Malaria Cor 
Tilaiya 
th including 
trol 
Konar 
Bokaro 
Maithon 
Panchet 
Barrage and Irrigation Area 
Oyaria 
Public Health and Malaria 
Laboratories (at Maithon and 
Burdwan) 
The DVC employs thousands of people, classified under categories 
of: regular (permanent), workcharged (monthly rated) and muster 
roll (daily rated) chargeable to specific work. Regular employees 
are further categorized into Grade I (Officers), Grade II (bubordi-
nate - technical and non-technical), Grade III (Technical and non­
technical) and Grade IV (messengers). At the height of construction 
activit ies, the DVC payroll reached more than twenty-five^ thousand, 
while at other times the number has dropped very low , leaving the 
DVC with the problem of finding avenues for those laid off in projects 
in other a r e a s . 1 ^ ді the end of 1967, the DVC reported having 
115. For this the DVC ran into frequent difficulties with the TradeUnions of 
the Corporation, see i n f r a . , pp. 137-39. 
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8131 r e g u l a r employees a s aga ins t 13 ,245 on the 31th March 1966; 
the l abour ro l l was 14 ,112 on 31st March 1967. The l abour ro l l a l s o 
inc luded those engaged by c o n t r a c t o r s . ' '° 
The n a t u r a l r e s u l t of an expanding o rgan iza t ion was 
mul t iph ra t ion of work and d e l a y s . The DVC o rgan i za t i ona l s e t - u p 
grew "in a rn.mner p e c u l i a r only to a government s e t - u p " . 1 1 ' 
The S e c r e t a r i a t of the DVC cons i s t ed of s ix S e c t i o n s , of which 
t h r e e w e r e des igna ted a s "Works B r a n c h e s " and the o t h e r s a s : 
G e n e r a l , Budget and A c c o u n t s , and E s t a b l i s h m e n t . While the l a t t e r 
t h r e e handled work of more rou t ine n a t u r e , the t h r e e Works ' 
S e c t i o n s dea l t with a wide v a r i e t y of q u e s t i o n s mostly emanat ing 
from the field o f f i ces , such a s : 
(i) Administrative approval of the project 
(n) Financial sanctions to works, whether original, or operation and 
maintenance. 
(m) Award of contracts and acceptance of tenders . 
(iv) Purchase of s tores , machinery and materials for the construction, 
operation and maintenance of projects, including coal and middlings 
office equipment, furniture and publications. 
(v) Sanction to entertainment of additional work-charged establishment 
or continuance of the existing work-charged establishment. 
(vi) Disposal of obsolete or surplus s tores , write-off of losses , and 
waival of recoveries, whether from Government servants or 
contractors. 
(vu) Miscellaneous administrative and financial sanctions like allotment 
of accommodation, relaxation of Travelling Allowance ru les , 
fixation of stock limits, hiring of consultants, payment of disputed 
claims, payment of unrealized sales tax on disposals, payment of 
insurance premia, licence fees and royalties, repairs to vehicles, 
exemption of vehicles from toll charges. 
(vui) Miscellaneous questions like delegation of powers, audit objections. 
allocation of costs incurred between various projects, and 
miscellaneous queries from i'^ld offices. 
A to ta l of 245 c a s e s s tudied a t random by the Working 
Group r e v e a l s the d a y - t o - d a y working of the DVC: 
116. DVC A n n u a l R e p o r t , 1966-67, p.22 
117. The Working Group Report, o p . c i t . , p . 7 
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Table 3 
Essential Features of Processing of Cases 
S I . 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Description Works 
s. 
No. of cases 
No. of cases 
decided by: 
Corporation 
Chairman 
General Manager 
D . G . M . / D . S . 
U . S . / A . S . 
A . O . 
O . S . 
No.of cases referred 
to Financial Adviser 
No.of cases in which 
F . A . ' s opinion not 
accepted 
No.of cases disposed 
of by the Secre ta r ia t 
suo moto 
No. of cases in which 
back references had 
to be made: 
a . -by le t ters 
b . -on files 
c . -out of (a) 
to local 
heads 
ections 
114 
9 
1 
12 
45 
47 
0 
0 
108 
-
6 
42 
5 
6 
General 
Section 
61 
2 
2 
14 
21 
22 
0 
0 
44 
-
17 
3 
4 
2 
Budget 
and 
Account 
30 
0 
0 
7 
5 
25 
3 
0 
9 
-
21 
2 
0 
— 
Es ta -
bl ish-
ment 
section 
40 
1 
0 
3 
7 
27 
2 
0 
35 
-
7 
8 
0 
— 
Total 
245 
12 
3 
36 
78 
111 
5 
0 
194 
-
51 
55 
9 
8 
D.G.M. = Deputy General Manager; D . S . = Deputy Secre ta ry ; 
U . S . = Under Secre tary ; A . S . = Assistant Secre tary ; 
A .O . = Administrative Officer; O . S . = Officer on Special Duty; 
F . A . = Financial Adviser . 
In the established hierarchy, a new proposal had to pass 
through various layers of the organization, including back referen-
ces to the originating section. A new power project , for example, 
passed 36 s tages , to and fro, before it was ready for execution. In 
terms of time consumed, the study of Works Branches (114 cases) 
revealed that the average time taken in final disposal of a case was 
106 days . Of this nearly 17.7 $ was taken in non-contributory 
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stages like diarization, transit and i s sue . The Secretar ia t itself 
accounted for 38 .4^ of the time, the originating department 30.5%, 
Finance 7.5^-, and other departments 5.9 "¡o. 
Thus, while numerous difficulties hindered the achieve-
ments of the set goals, the internal organization was also quite un-
suitable for the discharge of development functions. However, the 
DVC claims to have some credi t . The overall picture delineated in 
preceding pages demonstrates i ts achievements: a network of canals 
for i rr igat ion, four huge dams and r e s e r v o i r s , a ba r rage , a num-
ber of thermal and hydro-electricity plants, a vast net of t r ans -
mission lines and a distribution system. In addition to these s t ruct -
u r e s , the DVC has trained hundreds of engineers in different 
spheres , who have helped to meet the increasing demand for 
engineering skil l . These achievements were possible only at 
tremendous financial cos t s , which far surpassed the original (rough) 
estimates of Rupees 550 million made by Voorduin. On 31st March 
1966, the DVC recorded a total figure of Rs . 2064.7 million, 
shared by the Participating Governments as follows: 
Central Government: R s . 541.1 million 
West Bengal Government: Rs.1049.5 million 
Bihar Government: R s . 474.1 million 
In the present form, the DVC programme tends to limit 
i t s dimensions to: fixing the targets and, having overcome some 
difficulties, achieving r e su l t s , whether satisfactory or unsatisfact-
ory . The DVC-complex, after a l l , formed part of a much wider 
political and administrative framework - that of the State Govern-
ments of West Bengal and Bihar. Beyond these two State Govern-
ments was the Central Government under whose legal charge the 
DVC functioned. In the Indian federal s t ruc ture , where s t rains in 
in ter-s ta te and Centre-States relations have presently become a 
common phenomenon, a DVC-type oragnization, with the financial 
stakes of different governments involved, occupies an important 
place, and needs looking into from other pertinent angles . How did 
the States concerned react towards each of the schemes? How did 
the States bargain with the Centre for more finance? How did the 
States fight for more say in, and more control over DVC-matters? 
What was the Cen t re ' s approach to various problems, not infre-
quently appearing in the operations process? And, more important-
ly, in these favourable or unfavourable (political and administrative) 
atmospheres, how did the DVC itself administer i ts affairs ? The 
next chapter will turn to these and other such questions, which had 
great significance on the health, success and/or failure of the DVC. 
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Chapter IV 
THE DVC AND OTHER POWER CENTRES 
The essential premise of the discussion that follows centres round 
the Central and two State Governments v is -à-v is the DVC. These 
governments formed the main power centres which affected the 
development of the DVC. At the outset, therefore, we should discuss 
the place of the DVC in the entire power s t ruc ture . 
The DVC was established by Central Parliament. It was 
therefore placed in the charge of a Central Ministry which, with some 
initial changes in nomenclature, came to be the Ministry of Irrigation 
and Power . The Minister of Irrigation and Power was answerable to 
Parliament on DVC matters , which were assumed to be policy matters. 
However, as the DVC formed part of the whole bureaucratic p rocess , 
in conjunction with changing role of the Planning Commission, it was 
difficult to clearly demarcate the a reas of policy and administration. 
The functions of the Ministry included regulation and development of 
in ter-s ta te r ive r s and r ive r valleys; examination of schemes 
formulated by the States for inclusion in the country 's five-year 
plans; provision of financial and technical assistance to state 
governments in the field of irrigation, power, flood control; 
watching the progress of execution of projects in the irrigation and 
power sec to r s ; and control over expenditures in relation to 
est imates. ' 
The area of operations of the DVC, however, fell in the two 
States of West Bengal and Bihar, which also had their respective 
bicameral legis la tures . Although the DVC was legally under the 
charge of Central Government, some kind of connection with 
governmental s t ructures at State-level was inevitable. Matters 
concerning the DVC were therefore put under the Ministries 
concerned with Agricul ture/Power/ l r r igat ion in both S ta tes . 
The State Legislatures and respective ministries were formal 
institutions, however. Other institutions, informal in charac ter , 
were also active. In a democratic se t -up, freedom of p res s is 
ensured; local politicians are free to bring their viewpoint home to 
the masses . In both S ta te s , the p r e s s , local politicians and the 
people were very sensitive towards whatever concerned their 
I . T h e A n n u a l R e p o r t of t h e M i n i s t r y of I r r i g a t i o n 
a n d P o w e r , 1964 - 65. In the whole organization of the Ministry, the 
DVC was placed under Development Wing IV (DW IV). 
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respective spheres or whatever happened within their t e r r i t o r i e s . 
In the face of this structural se t -up, the DVC Act presented 
a somewhat indefinite picture . Care was taken to correlate 
obligations towards the DVC Project with the anticipated benefits 
accruing to each Participating Government. However, seen in 
totality, this arrangement based on future benefits and sharing of 
burdens of the DVC Project was not quite in proportion. The 
inequality becomes all the more striking when the respective rights 
of control over the DVC are examined: the executive and legislative 
rights of control were with the Central Government; the States had 
little say apart from their right to be consulted on the Board ' s 
appointment and to receive Annual Reports and other financial 
statements. 
THE DVC AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Overall supervisory powers were vested in the Central Government. 
Under Section 48 of the DVC Act, the Corporation was to be guided 
by Central Government on matters of policy; whether a given 
question was a policy-question or not was to be decided by Central 
Government. The Act also gave powers to Central Government to 
prescr ibe rules for conduct of business. Under certain circumstances, 
the Central Government could remove members of the Board. Being 
a Central Government Agency, all asse ts of the DVC - a point not 
explicitly stated in the Act - belonged to Central Government. 
The broad legal framework described enables us to t race the 
scope and extent of the Central Government ' s ro le , which covers 
financial, administrative and technical facets of the DVC. It must 
be understood, however, that all three facets are intermixed: 
whatever is ' technical ' is closely connected with 'administrat ive ' 
and v ice-versa ; and both, in turn, cannot escape direct or indirect 
financial implications. The 'financial ' aspect , however, inevitably 
touches almost every other aspect . This can perhaps be explained 
by: allround paucity of funds, the complicated arrangements for 
financing the DVC in par t icular , and consequent tightening-up of 
controls . However, before elaborating upon these specific a r e a s , 
which have more to do with the executive (ministers and their 
ministr ies) , we may first see when and how Central Parliament 
felt concerned about DVC affairs. 
A. Parliamentary Probes : 
The DVC reported on the progress of work in its annual r epor t s , 
regularly submitted to the Participating Governments.-' These 
repor ts were formal documents and incorporated factual information 
2. See s u p r a . , pp. 36 ft. 
3. In addition, the DVC sent monthly progress reports to the three 
governments, which gave technical details; but this information tended to shed 
insufficient light on the actual process which resulted in eventual success 
or failure. 
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about the works completed, progress of the works undertaken and 
future plans for part icular items of work, if any. If some of the 
works undertaken did not show desired resu l t s , a simple statement 
of this fact - references to shortage of data and of the right type 
of personnel notwithstanding - was not sufficient for those who had 
to supply the necessary monies. It called for some enquiry as to 
how the work was actually being handled: whether the various 
contracts for designs and constructions were being considered on 
economic grounds or not; whether the bases for estimating and 
incurring expenditures were correc t , e tc . Such detailed probes 
were not welcome to a DVC which was perhaps overconscious of its 
autonomous charac te r . 
The ear l ies t criticisms came from the Advisory Committer, the 
Expert Committee of Engineers and Financial Officer (appointed by 
the Advisory Committee), and the Board of Consultants, who 
apparently felt unable to offer "constructive advice and crit icism, 
keep developments on the right t racks and prevent wasteful 
expenditure".4 Some even thought that the DVC held back information 
on the grounds that to provide details of its proceedings was 
unnecessary and might become a cause of interference. They charged 
that it was a secretive body. The representat ives of the Central 
Government felt that Advisory Committee is " rare ly taken into 
confidence or given advance information of what is under 
consideration".5 Fur the r , "the DVC has even gone to the length of 
keeping its proceedings a closely guarded secret so that neither the 
Central Government nor the Governments of Bengal and Bihar are 
aware of how exactly the proceedings are conducted and how the 
Corporation deals with recommendations made by responsible officers 
like the Financial Adviser and the various heads of the engineering 
organizations". ° 
The general charges against the DVC thus contained complaints 
about administrative, engineering and organizational weaknesses, 
and an inadequate flow of information. Such charges created 
uneasiness in the minds of some members of Parliament and set the 
scene for Parliamentary probes. Parliament, as is usual in 
parliamentary democracies elsewhere, generally relied on its 
4. Note on item 5 of the Agenda for Participating Governments Conference held 
at New Delhi, on 3rd March 1951 . The item read: "Adequacy or otherwise of 
administrative set-up of the Corporation and the arrangements for keeping the 
Participating Governments informed about the progress of work, estimates of 
cost and other important matters relating to the project and its component 
par t s , including a review of the working of the Advisory Committee which 
was appointed in pursuance of the decision taken at the Conference held at 
New Delhi on 9th May, 1949." 
5. I b i d . 
6. N o t e on I t e m 6 of the A g e n d a , i b i d . The item was: "Adequacy 
or otherwise of the D .V .C . Act." 
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various committees. ' In c a s e of the DVC, Parl iament general ly re l i ed 
on the Est imates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee.° 
The Est imates Committee, basing i ts conclus ion on information 
obtained through a "Factual Note" prepared for them by the Ministry 
concerned in 1950,9 and on the Annual and Audit Reports of the 
DVC a s wel l a s on var ious questions and answers in Parl iament, 
submitted a Report to Parl iament in 1952. This Fifth Report of the 
Est imates Committee, in i ts chapter on the Ministry of Irrigation and 
P o w e r , ' 0 d i s c u s s e d the DVC extens ive ly , concentrating particularly 
on financial i s s u e s . The Est imates Committee, inter al ia urged the 
Ministry of Irrigation and P o w e r to set up a committee to examine 
and report on the DVC with a view to achieving i ts most economical 
and expedit ious development. ' 
The DVC Enquiry Committee (Rau Committee) was appointed 
under Resolution N o . DW 10, dated 20th September 1952, of the 
Ministry of Irrigation and P o w e r . It was to enquire into: 
"1 . Land reclamation and rehabilitation works undertaken by the Damodar 
Valley Corporation. 
2. The changes in the design and construction features of the Konar and 
Tilaiya Dams; the award of contracts and the rates for various items 
of works. 
3. The planning and purchase of stores and equipment for works on Damodar 
Valley Corporation and the procedure thereof. 
4. The appointment of a Chief Engineer for the Damodar Valley Corporation 
and the procedure thereof. 
5. The adequacy of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948, and the 
organizational set-up of the Corporation."1 2 
7. The Standing Committees which had carried on since the British period were 
abolished after 1951-52 elections. Present committees are broadly categorized 
into: (l) general committees concerned primarily with the organization and 
powers of the House; (il) legislative committees; and (ill) finance commitees. 
See, W.H. Morris-Jones, P a r l i a m e n t i n I n d i a (Philadelphia, 
1957), p. 310; Norman D. Palmer, I n d i a n P o l i t i c a l S y s t e m 
(George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961), p. 1 21 . For a short sketch about 
each committee, however, see, M.V. Pylee, ο ρ . с i t . , pp. 396-404. 
Pylee indicates 11 committees existing in I960, but the number is changed 
from time to time. 
8. The DVC has not been studied at length by the recently established Committee 
on Public Sector Undertakings. 
9. Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, U.O. No. DW 10, November 1950, to 
Parliament, "Factual Note on the Damodar Valley Corporation". This is a 
very revealing document, but gives the impression of being more of a 
'Censure' than a 'Factual Note' . 
10. By 1952, when the Estimates Committee submitted its Fifth Report to 
Parliament, the Ministry of Irrigation and Power was constituted; ever since 
the DVC has been under its charge. 
11. Estimates Committee's F i f t h R e p o r t (1951-52) to Parliament. 
12. Government of India, Ministry of Irrigation and Power, Resolution No. DW 
10, dated the 20th September 1952. It may be pointed out, however, that 
item 4 in the list of enquiries was subsequently inserted by the Ministry 
under Resolution No. 30(1 )-Adm/52, dated 20th January 1953. Cf., 
i n f r a . , pp.99-101 
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Having examined various r e c o r d s , reports and some 40 
witnesses, the Rau Committee submitted its report to the Government 
of India in June 1953; the Government, in turn, communicated the 
Committee's recommendations to the State Governments and the DVC. 
The three governments and the DVC later offered their comments 
on such decisions and recommendations as were communicated to 
them. 13 Eleven chapters of the Rau Committee Report were devoted 
to a detailed probing into the first five years of DVC history. This 
Report is most significant inasmuch as the recommendations contained 
therein laid down the course of action the DVC was to follow in later 
years .14 
The Estimates Committee played this prominent role only 
once. In addition, the Public Accounts Committee, twin-sister of 
the Estimates Committee, played its regular role of examining 
accounts of Government in all its financial t ransact ions; DVC affairs, 
when relevant, formed just one of the many items on its agenda. The 
Public Accounts Committee mainly depended on report s by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Whenever i r regular i t ies 
were noticed, the Committee passed s t r ic tures or made recommen­
dations. 1 5As'stated e a r l i e r , financial aspects predominated on all 
other aspects of the DVC. How did day-to-day financial matters 
work out so far as the Central Government was concerned 7 
B. Regulating the Finances: 
(1 ) General: 
"Finance is the life-blood of government. Without it, administration 
is impossible. Every administrative act has its financial implications 
as inseparable as an object and its shadow. Finance is al l-pervasive, 
and affects as much the functions of the Cabinet as it does the 
operat ions. . . . "'•o The "life-blood" control of government was in 
the hands of the Ministry of Finance at New Delhi, whose powers 
were far ranging. '< The States had their own set-up to look after 
their financial functions; but they too did not escape Central 
intervention, m the wake of national development policies and 
Central Government's responsibility for supervision of all financial 
transactions between the States and the Centre, including loans, 
grants, e t c . The DVC, moreover, was a Central Agency; hence the 
Finance Ministry 's control was direct as well as indirect. The DVC 
\ct had provided that financial burdens be shared by the respective 
13. "Comments and Decisions", ο ρ . с ι t . 
14. Some of the observations of the Rau Committee have been mentioned ear l ier ; 
the remainder appear in the text below, passim. 
15. Such observations or criticisms made by the Public Accounts Committee, 
where relevant, appear in the text, passim. 
16. Thus starts the chapter on "Financial Administration" in Τ h e 
O r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f I n d i a , o p . 
с ι t ., p . 379. 
17. Note the functions of the Ministry of Finance, s u p r a . , p . 21 
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Participating Governments. But it proved difficult to meet the DVC's 
recur r ing and ever- increasing demands because the States were 
short of funds. Certain agreements existed between the States and 
Central Government by which the lat ter granted loans to the States 
for onward appropriations against DVC requirements . These loans 
were to be paid back to Central Government within 35 yea r s , with 
in teres t . ^ 8 
As the DVC's financial requirements increased continuously, 
itemized control was introduced. Not only that . The re turns on any 
amount spent had to be satisfactorily ensured. This led to the 
following official interpretat ion. The Central Government had 
"to fix priorities for various projects and for this purpose they have 
to take account of the total expenditure, the net revenue and benefits 
to be achieved. It is, therefore, essential that some uptodate estimate, 
which should be authentic and complete, should be put up for information 
of the Government. Unless this is done, it is impossible for the 
Government to provide funds as and when asked f or. " 19 
Thus, the DVC was required to prepare target estimates for each 
dam in order to acquaint the Participating Governments of their 
ultimate financial commitments. Mr. A.N. Khosla, one of the most 
famous engineers in the country, required the DVC to prepare an 
over-al l picture of the project after proper division into: financial 
r e tu rns , essential and non-essential works e t c . 0 Such warnings 
came again and again. The Central Government had assumed "the 
responsibility of finding funds for the DVC in the face of increasing 
difficulties and innumerable other claims thought to be equally 
essen t i a l , " said the Minister of Finance, C D . Deshmukh; he 
refused to finance the DVC unless the profitability aspect of each 
component scheme had been thoroughly investigated by the 
Corporation and accepted by the governments concerned. Deshmukh 
added, "I would place an embargo on the Corporation proceeding 
with any part of the project in anticipation of such acceptance. The 
Corporat ion 's budget of 1951-52 will be scrutinized by the Central 
Finance Ministry in this light. "^1 Unless proper and effective 
control was exercised from the very beginning the Government was 
"likely to be faced with insuperable difficulties", Deshmukh warned. 
These warnings make it eas ier to understand the tightness 
of Treasury pressure which the DVC came to suffer. To prepare 
18. These agreements were beyond the purview of the DVC Act. They were 
reached on the basis of an assurance given by Mr. Narhari Rao of the 
Finance Department, in an Inter-Provincial Conference held on 6th 
January 1947, that is , before the DVC Act was passed. 
19. Participating Governments Conference, 9th May 1949. 
20. I b i d . Mr. A.N. Khosla was then Chairman of the Central Waterpower, 
Irrigation and Navigation Commission. 
21. Participating Governments' Conference, 27th December 1950. 
90 
perfect budgets well ahead was difficult. Sometimes they amounted 
in pract ice only to projec t -es t imates , and often est imates were 
e i ther delayed o r , when ready , were soon r e v i s e d due to certain 
changes in d e s i g n s , or the arrival of new data. Budgets were often 
hast i ly prepared, in order to ensure at l eas t some appropriat ions . 
From time to t ime, the DVC suggested that financial s tr ingency 
made it difficult to formulate a budget "which could sat isfy al l the 
part ies concerned . "22 At the same t ime, such hurriedly prepared 
budgets did not give sufficient scope to eng ineers of the Part ic ipat ing 
Governments to study them. 
Some concrete examples of the ensuing dilemmas may be 
taken up here in order to appraise the nature of itemized financial 
control: 
(l) In case of Maithon and Panchet Hill Dams, and their Barrage and 
Irrigation canals, the Corporation was asked to suspend its work 
except for work of an exploratory nature and the construction of essen-
tial buildings to house the staff which was engaged on preliminary 
investigation.23 In case of Maithon Dam, it was suggested that the height 
of the Dam could be increased, thus eliminating the construction of 
another dam at Balpahari at a later stage.24 when the DVC was able to 
give estimates and budget, these were considerably cut down. In 1951-52, 
the Corporation needed Rs. 10.5 crores for carrying out work in hand 
in addition to the expected cost of Rs. 1.8 crores on Barrage and 
Rs. 0.8 crores for excavation of canals. They were allowed only Rs.9 
crores. When the DVC complained about this cut, the Finance Ministry 
expressed sympathy with its quandary and promised to re-examine the 
allotment. 25 But at the same time, Mr. A.N.Khosla, then Additional 
Secretary in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, 
suggested that since financial prospects on Barrage and canals were 
coupled with those of the Maithon and Panchet Hill Dams (on wihch the 
DVC had been ordered to suspend work), no liability on the Barrage 
and canals could be incurred in advance of technical and financial 
approval. 
II) Before such formal sanctions could be accorded, in some cases at 
least preliminary activities had to continue. This was not considered 
in order. In the case of Konar Dam the Technical Committee expressed 
that the estimates were prepared after a contract had been awarded 
and the work was in operation and that further changes in design of the 
dam had enhanced the original rates, "even though, in view of the 
22. DVC A n n u a l R e p o r t , 1 9 4 8 - 4 9, p . 4 3 . 
2 3 . P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 3rd 
March 1951. 
24 . N o t e on Item 1 of the A g e n d a for P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 31 st May 1952. 
25 . P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 5th 
May 1951. 
26 . I b i d . 
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increased quantities there was a case for reduction". ' 
Similarly, in case of Panchet Hill Dam, where the work had already 
been taken up on the advice of the Chief Engineer (Mr. Komora) and 
the Technical Committee, the Central Government was not inclined to 
sanction any funds because details of work were not available to them. 
They reduced the DVC budget for 1952-53 from Rs. 193.138 million 
to Rs.120 million, whereon any further work was considered un­
economical. 2° In a face-to-face confrontation, the DVC authorities 
got a chance to explain the position,29 for instance, in the case of 
the Panchet Hill Dam. The DVC insisted that neither a change in the 
site of construction nor completion of new designs would make any 
difference in estimated expenditure; wherever necessary, equipment 
could be shifted from one project to another to economise costs; orders 
for machinery had been placed before this particular scheme was 
sanctioned, because the Technical Expert Committee (of the three 
Participating Governments) had approved it and information to that 
effect could not be communicated because there was no meeting of the 
Participating Governments in the meantime. The situation must have 
been one of depressing embarrassment when the Minister of State for 
Finance (Mr. Mahavir Tyagi) called the action of the DVC a "grave 
irregularity", and the Minister-in-charge of the Corporation (Mr. 
G. L. Nanda) pointed out that approval of the Participating 
Governments should have been obtained "by exchange of letters or 
otherwise" before incurring any liability. At the same time, Mr.Nanda 
enquired, on the budget-question, if some items of work - power or 
irrigation - could be postponed.30 
Ш) The budgets of the Tilaiya Dam also showed signs of increase.·* 1 This 
increase, as explained by the DVC, was due to the fact that "some 
items such as cost of diversion roads, were not included in the 
original estimates" and cost of "land reclamation, deeper foundations, 
e t c . " had led to a r i s e . Then, a Member of the Central Water and 
27. N o t e on Item 2 of the A g e n d a for P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s 1 C o n f e r e n c e held on 31st May 1952. Konar 
Dam, as noticed above, was one of the items on Rau Committee's list of 
enquiries. It has been by far the most controversial issue in DVC history, 
and was the result of organizational weakness on the technical s ide. See 
more about this, in f г a . , p . 104 
28. N o t e on Item 7 of the A g e n d a , i b i d . 
29· The DVC's Chairman, Mr. Mazumdar, and Chief Engineer, Mr. Komora, 
explained the situation in details in the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e held on 31st May 1952. 
30. I b i d . 
31. Mr. Ratnam of the Finance Ministry pointed this out, i b i d . Tilaiya 
Dam was another item on Rau Committee's list of enquiries. Due to 
frequent changes in designs and construction patterns the costs had gone 
up and the completion of the Dam was considerably delayed. F o r further 
details, see, i n f r a . , p. 104 
32. Mr. Mazumdar gave this explanation in the Conference, i b i d . 
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Power Commission (Mr. Man Singh) sought an assurance from the 
Chief Engineer (Mr. Komora) that, like the Tilaiya Dam, cost of 
Maithon Dam would not go up. Such assurances were duly given by Mr. 
Komora.33 in face of the continuously changing conditions - fresh 
data, unforseen elements - the estimates for Maithon Dam, however, 
increased all the same within a period of three months. 34 
Thus, the D V C ' s financial relat ionship with Central 
Government (espec ia l ly s o with the Ministry of Finance) remained 
on the defens ive. "The upward rev is ion of the project est imates 
every time has become a recurr ing feature of the Damodar Valley 
Pro ject" , was a sweeping remark given at one time by the Ministry 
of F inance. 35 ц was true, but, as later explained by A . B . Ganguly, 
then Member of the DVC-Board, the complex nature of the Project 
and pract ical diff iculties were insufficiently taken into account when 
such cr i t ic i sms were made. Under ex is t ing c i rcumstances, the 
phenomenon of r i s ing est imates was not peculiar to the DVC; a s 
Ganguly wrote in reply, "it will be met with in every project in the 
country and abroad". ^° 
This a l l -pervas ive financial control did not end with 
d i s c u s s i o n s in c o n f e r e n c e s . There were , in addition, more detai led 
i s s u e s for which a different set of institutions e x i s t e d . F i r s t among 
which was the Financial Adviser of the DVC. 
(2) Financial Adviser: 
The Financial Adviser was a direct appointee of Central Government 
under the Act. Technical ly, his position was subordinate to the 
Board; he was there only to advise the DVC so that the t a x p a y e r ' s 
money could be safe guarded. ^° However, s ince he was the only link 
between the DVC and organs for financial control e l s e w h e r e , and 
s ince financial quest ions were the most important, his posit ion 
33. I b i d 
34. N o t e on Item 7 of the A g e n d a for P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e held in Calcutta, 13th July 
1954. 
35. Ministry of Finance Note on "Budget Estimates of the DVC for 1954-55 
with special reference to overhead charges", enclosed with Ministry of 
Irrigation and Power, New Delhi's letter No.40(8)-DVC/54, dated 8th/l1th 
June 1954, to the Damodar Valley Corporation. 
36. A.B. Ganguly, Member DVC, in his letter N0.I6FA (B)/54-5050 dated 23rd 
June 1954, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of 
Irrigation and Power, New Delhi. 
37. For his functions, see, s u ρ r a . , p. 45 
38. There had been long debates in the Constituent Assembly about the 
Financial Adviser. Mr. N.V.Gadgil, in answer to some objections, had 
then said: "It is not the idea... to create impediments or to give 
opportunities for red tapism or create scope for delay in the normal and 
day-to-day work... It is only fair to the taxpayer... that he should have 
some confidence that the finances of this Corporation are well looked 
after", Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates, 13th February 1948. 
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became of crucial importance. In the annals of DVC history, the 
i s s u e became a s important a s that of, say, the Chief Engineer . ^ 
Frequent budget rev i s ions and constantly r i s ing requests 
for additional finance soon led to a query regarding the role of the 
Financia l Adviser. The Minister of F inance, Mr. C D . Deshmukh, 
on 27th December 1952, e x p r e s s e d his unhappiness about the posit ion 
of the Financial Adviser: "unlike other Corporations where the 
financial representat ive i s a Member, the Financial Adviser of the 
DVC i s an officer of the Corporation, "40 he commented. The Finance 
M i n i s t e r ' s comments were supplemented by the Bihar Irrigation 
Minister, Mr. Ram Charittar Singh, who s t r e s s e d the importance of 
enhancing the Financial A d v i s e r ' s p o w e r s . Some suggested that he 
could perhaps be made a Member of the Board; if the DVC Act did 
not make such prov is ions, the Finance Minister was prepared to ask 
Parl iament to change the law so that the Financial Adviser could 
become more ef fect ive. But amending the Act was apparently a 
time-consuming s t e p . It was therefore cons idered that a convention be 
estab l i shed by which whenever there was a difference of opinion on 
any matter between the Financial Adviser and the DVC, the matter 
would be re ferred to the Central Government for d e c i s i o n . J 
On such i s s u e s , there was naturally a react ion from the DVC. 
The f irst Financial Adviser, Mr. Chakraborty, was apparently quite 
cooperat ive and worked with the requis i te team-spir i t . The then 
Chairman of the DVC, Mr. Mazumdar, said during the Conference, on 
the question of enhancing the power of the Financial Adviser: 
39. I n f r a . , pp. 99-101 
40. Participating Governments' Conference, 27th December 1950. 
41. I b i d . 
42. Mr. CD.Deshmukh actually did declare in Parliament in early 1951, see 
N o t e on Item 9of the A g e n d a , for Participating Governments' 
Conference, 3rd March 1951. 
43. N o t e on Item 1 of the A g e n d a for P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 5th May 1951 , ο ρ . с i t . 
The item read: (a) The status of the Financial Adviser of the DVC; (b) 
Setting up of a Convention whereby any matters on which there is a 
difference of opinion between the Financial Adviser and the DVC, should 
be forwarded to the Government of India for decision. 
44. People who at one time or other were connected with the DVC, generally 
agreed in interviews with the author that the first Financial Adviser of the 
Corporation was a real finance man, a broadminded reasonable person, 
who would attack all proposals initially, but would withdraw his objections 
and make constructive suggestions for improvement whenever the officer 
sponsoring the proposal had been able to withstand the initial onslaught. 
In this way, there was close cooperation between him and the Corporation 
and all matters were thrashed out in more or less personal, informal 
discussions. 
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"There have been no instances of any major or even minor issue in 
which the Financial Adviser has been overruled. In addition to these, 
forms in which accounts should be maintained have been statutorily 
prescribed. There is concurrent hundred percent audit. Again, by 
the convention of May 1949 , all contracts of which the final amount 
is not fixed have to be approved by the Ministry of Finance. This 
convention has been strictly followed. Before this convention was 
established there were two large contracts and since they involved 
foreign exchange, they too were examined by the Ministry of Finance 
before finalization. Since practically all major contracts fall under 
either one or the other category the Ministry of Finance had 
opportunity to examine and approve all these contracts. "4° 
Then, on the question of a convention, Mr. Mazumdar stated that if 
it was establ i shed it might embarrass the Corporation to a certain 
extent "because if the Government of India upheld the v iews of the 
Financial Adviser the Corporation would be compelled to carry out 
certa in orders against their wishes and this would make the 
Corporation respons ible for something with which they do not 
a g r e e " . * ' Such protes t s from the DVC were to no avai l , however . 
The proposed convention was e s tab l i shed . 
The question of the Financial Adviser was a l so investigated 
by the Rau Committee. It argued that f i r s t ly , the Financial Adviser 
enjoyed independent s ta tus ; he was appointed by the Central 
Government, and his sa lary and conditions of s e r v i c e a s well a s 
h is functions and duties were prescr ibed by the Central Government 
under r u l e s . He was thus in a position to tender independent and 
unprejudiced advice to the Corporation; secondly , no respons ib le 
statutory Corporation would lightly set as ide the advice of i ts 
financial expert , even if he was administratively or otherwise 
subordinate to it; thirdly, no instance of any ser ious difference of 
opinion between the DVC and the Financial Adviser had come to 
not ice . Agreeing with the Auditor and Comptroller General of 
India, who was interviewed by the Rau Committee, the Committee 
concluded that "any system of financial control which had the effect 
45. Two conventions were established in the P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e held on 9th May 1949 , as 
follows: "A convention will be established, under which the Damodar 
Valley Corporation will send to the Government of India, before con-
clusion, any contract or agreement which the Corporarion proposes to 
enter into other than contracts or agreements arising as a result of a 
public call for tenders or quotations or of which the value is definitely 
ascertainable at the time of placement of the contract or signing of 
agreement;" "A convention will be established under which the Damodar 
Valley Corporation will keep the Ministry of Finance of Government of 
India in close touch with negotiations involving the Government in the 
provision of foreign exchange. " 
46. P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 27 th 
December 1950. 
47. I d e m . , 5th May 1951. 
48. I b i d . 
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of removing financial responsib i l i ty of an execut ive authority and 
transferr ing it in the last r e s o r t to an extraneous body was unsound 
and inconsistent with the conception of the Corporation i tsel f . "49 
Thus, the Rau Committee held indirectly that the Ministry of 
F i n a n c e ' s ins i s tence on control l ing the Corporation through 
enhanced powers and status of the Financial Adviser, was not 
justi f ied. It recommended that no change in the status of the 
Financial Adviser be made. The convention estab l i shed was to be 
null and void, and should be "abrogated". 50 These recommendations 
of the Committee were not accepted by Central Government, which 
then decided a s fol lows: "When the Financial Adviser has any 
di f ferences with the Corporation, he should have the right to 
report to the Government of India and the Participating Governments 
but the work should not be held up. Where it was n e c e s s a r y to hold 
up the work the Financial Adviser should consult the Central 
Government in the quickest poss ib le manner by telephone or 
telegraph and seek instruct ions . 5' Such a dec is ion was obviously 
in l ine with Finance Minister, C D . Deshmukh's explanation given 
in Parliament: 
"When he (Financial Adviser) exercises his powers, although it is not 
said in so many words that everything shall be done with his concurrence, 
in practice that result is bound to follow. Because if he is overruled, 
well, then he can report the matter to the Ministry of Finance; and the 
Ministry of Finance can then take up the matter with the Corporation and 
move the Government to make the necessary changes which will ensure 
that financial advice is taken. That, Sir, is parallel to the position of 
the Finance Ministry in Government itself .52 
The Financial A d v i s e r ' s position could not be clarif ied in any 
better terms. 
During the course of time, with subsequent Financial 
Adv isers normally coming from the Indian Audit and Accounts 
S e r v i c e , " the ro le became practical ly routine. To avoid any 
eventual complications, the DVC sent more than 90% of i ts c a s e s 
to him: on these there was not one on which his opinion was not 
accepted by the Corporation. 34 
(3) Audit: 
The Comptroller and Auditor General of India i s responsib le for 
compiling and auditing government accounts and functions on behalf 
of the Central as well a s State governments. Under the DVC Act, 35 
ho was a l s o responsib le for auditing its accounts . The aurl'f was 
49. DVC E n q u i r y C o m m i t t e e R e p o r t , para. 41, Ch.VIH. 
50. I b i d . 
51. "Comments and Decisions", p. 34. 
52. Lok Sabba Debates, December 1953, Col. 1922. 
53. A decision on this was taken in P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s 
C o n f e r e n c e , 5th May 1951 . The first Financial Adviser, Mr. 
Chakraborty, was replaced by Mr. S.M. Banerjee in October 1952. 
54. Cf. s u ρ r a . p. 82 Table 3. 
55. Section 47 of the DVC Act, see Appendix A. 
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conducted concurrently by a res ident audit staff at the Headquarters 
of the DVC as well a s at the field of f ices. The usual procedure of 
audit was to send draft audit reports paragraph-wise to the 
organization; the organization had to answer on each paragraph; 
those for which sat is factory answers were given to the Audit 
Department were deleted and the remainder incorporated in the 
Annual Audit Report which was submitted, simultaneously with the 
Annual Report of the DVC, to the State Governments and the 
Central Government a s well a s to their respect i ve L e g i s l a t u r e s . 
Auditing covered a rather wide f ield. The fact that every 
i s s u e could be linked with money matters, made it e a s i e r for 
every aspect to be taken into account. The matters dealt with 
varied from pointing out financial waste in c a s e of various contracts , 
p u r c h a s e s , construct ions, rehabilitation schemes of the Corporation, 
to de lays in implementing programmes, bad planning, e t c . Some 
Audit objections, se lec ted at random from audit r e p o r t s , were: 
I) "Advances were sanctioned to employees for hiring houses, 
purchasing household goods, and even to an employees' association 
for the purchase of cloth for sale. The approval of the Government of 
India should have been obtained before making such advances."' 
II) On purchase of 'steel flats' for Maithon Dam, "Had the Corporation 
considered the recommendations of the Board of Consultants promptly 
after they were received in February 1954, it might have been possible 
to cancel the unwanted numbers of flats for which order had been placed 
in January 1954."57 
III) On traffic in the Irrigation-cum-Navigation canal, "In order to 
attract traffic on the canal, in January 1959, the Corporation decided 
not to levy tolls on the cargo handled by crafts which might come into 
use before 30th June I960, for a minimum period of five years from the 
date of opening of the canal. The construction of the Navigation section 
of the canal seems to have been undertaken without adequate study of the 
traffic prospects."58 
IV) "Out of 607,941 tonnes of coal procured for the Durgapur Thermal 
Power Station upto July 1962, 454,156 tonnes were transported by road 
between June 1961 and July 1962. Instead of providing a weighbridge of 
its own for the weighment of this coal the Corporation engaged a 
contractor in June 1961 , for getting the coal weighed in his weighbridge 
at the rate of 12 naye paise tonne. A total amount of Rs. 52,876 was 
paid towards weighment charges for 421 ,407 tonnes. It was only in 
February 1962 that the Corporation sanctioned the purchase of a 
weighbridge which was installed in the middle of July 1962 at a cost of 
Rs. 31 ,106. It has been stated by the Corporation that until May 1961 
56. A u d i t R e p о r t ο η DVC, 1948-49, para 8(b). 
57. I d e m , 1953-54, para. 9. 
58. Id e m , 1959-60, para. 11 . 
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when the Railway stopped the supply of wagons, the necessity for the 
transport of coal by road could not be foreseen. It is not, however, 
clear why the sanction for the road weighbridge was issued as late as 
February 1962."59 
Inclusion of such items in the audit-objection l i s t s fell in line 
with the important ro le which Audit came to play in the country 
genera l ly . With regard to Government e n t e r p r i s e s , Appleby has 
quoted a passage from instructions sent to the ministr ies in this 
connection, "This audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General 
will be general ly d irected towards a rev iew of the d e c i s i o n s taken 
by the Board of D i r e c t o r s to ascertain to what extent their powers 
have been e x e r c i s e d in the best interest of the undertakings to s e e 
whether the powers delegated to the Chief Execut ives have been 
e x e r c i s e d properly. "60 it was on such instructions that Appleby 
was rather harsh in his cr i t ic ism about the Comptroller and 
Auditor G e n e r a l ' s place in the Indian Administrative system: "What 
spec ia l competence for appraising object ives and apprais ing 
administrative performance in general has the Comptroller and 
Auditor General? What i s the Cabinet for, what i s the Prime Minister 
for, what i s Parliament for, what are the individual ministers for, 
what i s a S e c r e t a r i a t for, and what i s a bureaucracy for?""^ 
The p r o c e s s of auditing w a s , in addition, outmoded. The 
audit staff pinpointed every single detai l , sometimes even cover ing 
petty expenditure. It caused great de lays , waste of time and energy . 
Answers to objections covered s c o r e s of p a g e s . DVC officials agreed: 
audit tended to be unreal ist ic ; it was not fit to meet the needs of 
large s c a l e public e n t e r p r i s e s ; it bas ical ly started with the assumption 
that al l was not well with the accounts to be audited; the present 
ro le of audit worked a s a negative element, thereby, minimizing 
whatever initiative there was in the organization; audit should be 
a construct ive instrument to bring about improvements, which in 
pract ice it i s not . °2 
Notwithstanding such c r i t i c i s m s , Audit w a s , and will remain, 
an important institution. It signalled the weak points of the DVC. It 
offered important material to the Public Accounts Committee of 
Parl iament. 63 in general , it brought to light significant c a s e s of 
c a r e l e s s n e s s or waste in the DVC. 
59. I d e m . , 1961-62, para 19. 
60. Paul H. Appleby, ο ρ . с i t . , pp. 27-29. 
61. I b i d . 
62. Almost all officials interviewed by the author in the DVC invariably com­
mented on this issue. One of them, an Electrical Engineer, even said, 
audit hangs like a Sword of Damocles over our head. 
63. See, for instance, their reporting a whole list of deficiencies in the affairs 
of the DVC to Parliament on 22nd January 1963. The charges included: non-
completion of Calcutta-Durgapur navigational canal, and serious shortfall 
of crops due to failure of its irrigation schemes, as reported in 
S t a t e s m a n , Calcutta, 2nd February 1963. 
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С. Administrative Controls: 
(1) Day-to-day Work: 
Before the DVC was established, preliminary work had gone on for 
nearly two years under the Damodar Valley Administrator, who 
discharged his functions from New Delhi, from an office within the 
Ministry-in-charge. In dealing with other ministries or government 
agencies, at Central or State level, he was virtually a part of the 
ministerial secretar ia t and was so recognized by o t h e r s . When the 
DVC was established and its headquarters moved to Calcutta, some 
1000 miles away from New Delhi, habitual communication links, 
such as the telephone and Гасе-to-face meetings, were no longer 
possible. The Corporation tried to fill these gaps by frequent direct 
correspondence with several departments and agencies of the Central 
and State Governments. However, this meant removing the Ministry-
in-charge as a go-between. Consequently, the Secre tar ia t staff of 
the Minister no longer obtained all the information about affairs of 
the DVC which it needed in dealing with other departments/agencies 
whose assistance appeared necessary. The Minister who answered 
questions on DVC-matters in Parliament, was similarly handicapped 
by this decline in the role of his S e c r e t a r i a t . 
Under these circumstances at least three day-to-day 
administrative questions assumed importance. Two of these, namely, 
determining the channel of correspondence between the DVC and 
other ministries/organizations, and the purchasing of s t o r e s , have 
been discussed e a r l i e r . The third question of similar nature was 
about various standard forms and codes. The Corporation already 
had its hands full with preparing financial statements in prescribed 
forms: capital accounts, balance sheets , e t c . F o r the preparation 
of estimates and awarding contracts they had apparently devised 
their own format. The Central Government demanded that the DVC 
follow orthodox procedures laid down in the Public Works Department 
(P.W.D.) forms, according to which estimates on other projects 
in the country were framed.65 When the Corporation representat ives 
pointed out that they were already about to s tart construction on 
some of their projects (Maithon Dam and the Barrage), they were 
nevertheless required to prepare project estimates on standard 
lines prescribed in the P.W.D. Code and to "submit them to the 
Participating Governments at the ear l ies t possible date so that the 
three Governments concerned could examine them and be in a 
position to take a decision regarding the construction of the works 
within a period of three m o n t h s . " " " This naturally caused delay. 
64. S u ρ г a ., pp.50-51 .The purchasing of stores and equipment continued as 
an important item on agendas of joint conferences till the Rau Committee 
finally recommended on the issue. 
65. Mr. Ratnam of the Ministry of Finance desired this in P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e at New Delhi, 3rd March 1951 . 
66. I b i d . 
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(2) Important Appointments : 
The DVC Act had given C e n t r a l Government the p o w e r to appoint 
two i m p o r t a n t o f f i c e r s , the S e c r e t a r y and the F i n a n c i a l A d v i s e r , 
b e s i d e s B o a r d Members and the C h a i r m a n . F o r appointment and 
promotion of a l l o t h e r of f icers and s e r v a n t s and r e g u l a t i o n of t h e i r 
c o n d i t i o n s of s e r v i c e , the Act had e m p o w e r e d the C o r p o r a t i o n i t se l f . 
Yet a s igni f icant development took p l a c e in c a s e of appointment of 
a Chief E n g i n e e r . T h e Chief E n g i n e e r ' s p o s t , though not c o n s i d e r e d 
a s i m p o r t a n t a s the Chief E x e c u t i v e and the F i n a n c i a l e x p e r t , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s a t t r a c t e d g r e a t a t t e n t i o n . T h e f i r s t E n g i n e e r , with 
the d e s i g n a t i o n of the Chief E n g i n e e r , a l though for B a r r a g e and 
I r r i g a t i o n only , a s pointed out e a r l i e r , was M r . M . P . M a t h r a n i . 
His s e r v i c e s w e r e not r e n e w e d a f t e r 23rd S e p t e m b e r 1948. After 
that unt i l long a f t e r the appointment of M r . A . M . K o m o r a in 
D e c e m b e r 1950, e v e r y r e p o r t on t e c h n i c a l work by the DVC, was 
a c c o m p a n i e d by a kind of ' footnote ' : due to the n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
a Chief E n g i n e e r the work fell s h o r t of e x p e c t a t i o n s . . . .67 
Ef for t s to appoint a Chief E n g i n e e r w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d on 
t h e United S t a t e s . The s e a r c h was p r e f e r a b l y for a man with TVA-
b a c k g r o u n d , but A m e r i c a n e n g i n e e r s demanded high s a l a r i e s and 
n e g o t i a t i o n s became l e n g t h y . C o n s u l t a t i o n s and b a r g a i n i n g moved 
t h r o u g h the media of the C h a i r m a n and Chief E n g i n e e r of the TVA, 
the C o n s u l t i n g E n g i n e e r s , M e s s r s . H a r z a E n g i n e e r i n g Company of 
the U . S . , the Indian E m b a s s y in Washington, and the World Bank 
a u t h o r i t i e s . 6 8 At one t i m e , P r i m e M i n i s t e r N e h r u took i n t e r e s t in 
t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s when he v i s i ted the U . S . A . in 1949, but without 
much s u c c e s s . The C h a i r m a n and the F i n a n c i a l A d v i s e r of the DVC, 
v i s i t i n g the U . S . A . in e a r l y 1950, n e g o t i a t e d f u r t h e r , but a l s o 
could not r e a c h a s o l u t i o n . Ul t imate ly , h o w e v e r , a g r e e m e n t was 
r e a c h e d with M r . A . M . K o m o r a , who was appointed on 2nd 
D e c e m b e r 1950 by the C o r p o r a t i o n , on the following t e r m s and 
c o n d i t i o n s : 
"(1) Salary: $ 25,000 per annum subject to Indian income tax and payable 
in U . S . currency, plus reimbursement of excess, if any, of the 
Indian income tax over the U . S . tax. 
(2) Free passage either by air or sea for self and family both ways; 
(3) Corporation will provide free furnished house, transport, medical 
service, two peons and for travel on duty in India, travel and 
other allowances permissible to first class officers. 
(4) Period of appointment - 3 years."69 
Having appointed the Chief Engineer, the Corporation 
informed the Central Government. Though they were within their 
67. Annual Reports of the DVC and many other art ic les, publications on the 
DVC, at least in the beginning specifically mentioned this . 
68. "Factual Note", ο ρ . с i t . 
69. I b i d . ; Mr. Komora was Project Manager, Norris Dam, T.V.A. 
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r i g h t s to appoint one of t h e i r of f icers - not p r e s e r v e d for the 
C e n t r a l Government unde r the DVC Act - they had to a p p r o a c h the 
C e n t r a l Government for the r e l e a s e of n e c e s s a r y fore ign e x c h a n g e . 
On a fait accompl i l ike t h i s , the C e n t r a l Government s t a t e d that " the 
ques t ion was r e f e r r e d to the Government of India a t a l a t e s t a g e , 
mainly with r e f e r e n c e to the fore ign exchange invo lved . By th i s time, 
the appointment had been f inal ized and the Government of India had 
no option but to a l low Mr . A . M . Komora to take up the j o b . " ™ 
T h e n , h o w e v e r , the Economic Committee of the C e n t r a l 
Cabinet dec ided that to give a f ree hand to the DVC to appoint a 
p e r s o n involving a heavy amount of a l r e a d y s c a r c e fore ign 
e x c h a n g e , and on a s a l a r y f a r exceed ing the nat ive (even though not 
U . S . ) s t a n d a r d s , was going too f a r . The C e n t r a l Gove rnmen t , a t 
the i n s t ance of the Economic Commit tee , then p lanned i s s u i n g a 
d i r e c t i v e unde r S e c t i o n 48 of the DVC Act , tha t no appointment 
o v e r Rupees 2 0 0 0 / - p e r month s a l a r y could be made by the C o r p o r a t i o n . 
The Adv i so ry C o m m i t t e e ' s opinion was sought on such a s t e p , which 
c o n s i d e r e d it u l t r a v i r e s . The in tended d i r e c t i v e was then framed 
in somewhat d i f ferent form and communicated to the DVC: 
"I am directed to convey to the Corporation the following instructions 
from the Central Government on a question of policy. 'The Corporation 
should obtain the previous approval, in writing of the Government of 
India for (a) entering into any contract or agreement for works, 
supplies or services or (b) making any appointment of an officer or 
servant, if the terms of such contract or agreement or appointment 
involve, whether directly or indirectly, the remittance abroad by 
foreign exchange of any sum on account of earnings or concession in 
respect of Indian or foreign income tax. '"71 
T h i s d i r e c t i v e was not officially i s s u e d . It was thought that 
" i n s t e a d of tak ing r e c o u r s e to the l e t t e r of the law and i s s u i n g a 
d i r e c t i v e , the i n s t r u c t i o n s p r o p o s e d to be i s s u e d might form the 
sub jec t ma t t e r of a convent ion which should be se t up in the n e a r 
f u t u r e " . 7 2 Th i s was u l t imate ly d o n e . 
S i n c e the a b s e n c e of a Chief E n g i n e e r was s a i d to affect 
DVC p rog ramme o p e r a t i o n s , the Rau Committee was a s k e d to 
take th i s ma t t e r into c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The Committee t r a c e d the whole 
h i s t o r y of the i s s u e and dea l t with it e l a b o r a t e l y . They blamed the 
C o r p o r a t i o n for d i sp l ay ing a s p i r i t of "vac i l l a t i on and indec i s ion 
and b a r g a i n i n g . "73 While point ing out that the " p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
70. I b i d . 
71 . N o t e on item 8 of the A g e n d a for P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 3rd March 1951, o p . c i t . 
72. Minutes of the P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s C o n f e r e n c e 
held at New Delhi on 5th May 1951 . The suggestion was made by Mr. Sri 
Prakasa , the Minister for Natural Resources and Scientific Research 
under whose charge the Corporation briefly fell. 
73. DVC E n q u i r y C o m m i t t e e R e p o r t , para 14, Ch . VII. 
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of the Chairman Mr. S.N.Mazundar in the matter is by no means 
negligible", the Committee observed that the Chairman "did not 
during his three months' stay in America, secure a Chief Engineer, 
though public opinion was hardening against the Corporation on 
account of the absence of a Chief E n g i n e e r . " ' · * The Committee 
further charged the Corporation that "a first ra te Chief Engineer 
could have been appointed around April, 1949, had the Corporation 
been prepared to pay the same terms on which Mr. Komora was 
ultimately appointed. "75 The Central Government was also blamed 
for not cooperating and not giving adequate weight to the question, 
even though they were kept informed of developments in the 
Corporat ion ' s search, culminating in the appointment of Mr. A.M. 
Komora. "Though from the beginning it appears to have been taken 
for granted that an American Chief Engineer would have to be 
appointed", reported the Committee, "the Ministry of Works, Mines 
and Power without consulting the Corporation, advised the Finance 
Ministry that an American Chief Engineer was not indispensable." 
While the Central Government wound up the whole question 
with a general remark "noted" on each finding of the Rau Committee,77 
the Chairman of the DVC vide his note dated 20th June 1953,78 
justified the delay in the appointment, pointing out: (a) that the salary 
demanded by American Engineers was considered preposterous even 
by General Wheeler of the International Bank; (b) that efforts to 
find an Indian as Chief Engineer failed; (c) that, again and again, 
before finally according sanction for appointing an American Chief 
Engineer, the Ministry of Works, Mines and Power rejected the DVC's 
proposal and the Ministry of Finance refused the dollars ; and (d) 
that Mr. Komora agreed to reduce his demands and was finally appointed. 
(3) A Comment on Foreign Exchange Release: 
Another important i s sue, fringing both administrative and financial 
a r e a s was that of foreign exchange. Every enterpr ise in the country, 
in one way or the other, depends upon regular re lease of foreign 
exchange for importing heavy machinery and equipment. One of the 
most important functions of the Ministry of Finance at New Delhi is 
to regulate and control the inflow and outflow of foreign currency. 
The DVC needed foreign exchange re leases in more than one way: 
importing equipment and s t o r e s , awarding contracts to foreign firms, 
appointing consulting engineers or members of the Board of Consultants, 
and (for about nine years) even its Chief Engineer. From an 
administrative point of view, the procedure was quite complicated. 
Expressed in general terms, a request for re lease of foreign 
exchange had to move through various channels before it could be 
74. I b i d . , paras. 30, and 31, СЬ. П. 
75. I b i d . , para. 14., Ch. VII. 
76. Ibid., para. 22, Ch.VH, as abridged in "Comments and Decisions", 
Recommendation No. 58, p. 32. 
77. "Comments and Decisions", i b i d . , p. 32. 
78. I b i d . , pp. 75-76. 
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granted. To start with, there was the Financial Adviser, whose 
endorsement was essential for each request . The proposal, 
completed as far as possible, was then sent to the Ministry-in-
charge which, after due examination, forwarded it to the Ministry 
of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs). In the case of 
imports, after permission to spend foreign exchange was obtained, 
the Chief Controller of Imports had to be approached for a 
necessary import l icence, so that an order could be placed with 
the foreign supplier. Problems arose at every stage, resulting in 
correspondence from one level to the other, and often in back-
references . The whole process sometimes lasted more than a year .79 
An insufficient sense of urgency and the obsolete routines 
operating at every level, apparently made such a delay unavoidable. 
D. Technical ExpedientsSO 
(1 ) Internal Arrangement: 
Large-scale engineering activities undertaken by the DVC could 
not avoid attracting the attention of engineers all over the country. 
The Government s t ructure generally operated through various 
committees, commissions and such other ad hoc bodies as were 
established. At the top was the Central Water and Power Commission, 
which had previously had other t i t les , supplemented by other ad hoc 
Boards and Commissions. It was charged with the "general 
responsibility of initiating, coordinating and furthering, in consul-
tation with the State Governments concerned, schemes for control, 
conservation and utilization of water r esources throughout the 
country for purposes of irr igation, navigation, flood control, and 
water-power generation as well as integrated schemes of thermal-
power development and also schemes of transmission and utilization 
of electr ic energy throughout the country. "81 It was an organization 
to which every technical expert in the relevant field rushed so that, 
through the yea r s , it became a storehouse of technical expertise 
in the country. On all technical aspec ts , the Ministry of Irrigation 
and Power rel ied heavily on the Commission1 s advice. 
The DVC, as seen ea r l i e r , had suffered from acute shortage 
of technical skill (though more so initially than la te r ) . In addition to 
79. On the administrative handling of a foreign exchange case, A.H. Hanson 
cited a very interesting example in the Andhra Pradesh Mining Corporation 
when he states, "in such a case, the delay in obtaining the necessary 
permits may be one of years than of months", see A.H. Hanson, T h e 
P r o c e s s of P l a n n i n g : A S t u d y of I n d i a ' s F i v e 
Y e a r P l a n s 1950-64 (Oxford University Press, London, 1966),p.306. 
80. It is not intended here to go into technicalities like materials, heights, 
lengths, or nature of (earth or concrete) dams. The issues discussed 
reflect on elements of ' cooperation ' , ' coordination ' etc. and remain in 
broader confines. 
81. For general functions and organization of the Central Water and Power 
Commission, see A n n u a l R e p o r t of t h e M i n i s t r y of 
I r r i g a t i o n a n d P o w e r , (Government of India, New Delhi, 1964— 
65), pp. 5-27. 
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the necessity to look to such high-level bodies for advice and 
ass i s tance , the DVC had to establish more specific committees for 
on-the-spot consultations and advice. This gave birth to the 
Advisory Committee, the Technical Experts Committee, the 
Board of Consultants, the institution of Consulting Engineers and 
so forth. 
The Advisory Committee had its own Expert Committee of 
Engineers and Financial Officer. It was established in 1949. It 
met frequently, and reported directly to the Central Government 
and the State Governments. Its meetings were often attended by the 
Chief Ministers of the two Sta tes , the Central Finance Minister 
and some members of Parliament, and they covered a wide range 
of topics, including management i s sues . As we saw earl ier :82 
it disapproved the Central Government's action on the question of 
issuing a directive under section 48 of the DVC Act; it protested 
against inadequate information supplied to them by the Corporation 
and charged the Corporation with withholding vital facts . In 
prac t ice , it covered so many issues that it became advisory in name 
only: in fact it exercised influence not only over policy but also 
on day-to-day activities of the DVC. J However, the life of the 
Advisory Committee was short . It lasted only till 1953, when it was 
abolished on the recommendations of the Rau Committee, which 
observed that it was illegally constituted and should be abol ished." 4 
The Technical Experts Committee, unlike the Advisory 
Committee, had a changeable composition. It generally consisted of 
experts in relevant fields from the DVC and the S ta t e s . There were 
some other committees, like the Technical Sub-Committee of Exper ts , 
which were appointed on an ad hoc basis to study and advise on 
certain given subjects. The composition of such committees also 
var ied. 
What was the outcome of this plethora of committees and 
commissions? The plans were screened not by one committee, but 
by a number of them. In highly technical matters , the procedure so 
adopted ensured a wide range of opinion and advice but at the cost 
of plans moving from committee to committee, with consequent delays. 
If the general criticism against the DVC, that of changing designs 
and increasing cos ts , is kept in view, one is prompted to ask: Were 
82. Supra . , pp. 86 and 100 
83. See , for instance, DVC A n n u a l R e p o r t 1949-50, p . 3 . , where the 
Committee in their seven meetings held during a year, reported to have 
discussed: "progress of work in different spheres. . . ; the extent to which 
the Corporation could make use of organization of Director-General of 
Industry and Supply . . . ; possibility of irrigation in Bihar . . . ; 
rehabilitation programme . . . ; employment of foreign personnel; 
construction firms and consulting engineers; the DVC Chief Engineer; and 
location of Headquarters." See, also, P . Prasad, o p . c i t . , pp. 21-22. 
8 4 . DVC E n q u i r y C o m m i t t e e R e p o r t p a r a . 55 , Ch .VI I I . 
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there other elements than these committees /commiss ions which influenced 
or otherwise affected planning and des ign? Again, d i f ferences of 
opinion being l ikely whenever a scheme i s handled by different bodies 
or even individuals , did such factors have any impact on actual 
engineer ing? 
(2) Fore ign Collaboration: 
The acute shortage of technical know-how made it n e c e s s a r y for 
the DVC to seek foreign collaboration in most technical f i e lds . The 
f irst col laboration came from the American Technical Miss ion, and 
then from the Board of Consultants which a l so had mostly American 
e x p e r t s . In addition, there were consult ing eng ineers and cons truc -
tion firms from abroad. Whereas the Board of Consultants was e v e n -
tually completely Indianized and remained a permanent body, the 
consult ing eng ineers or construction firms were appointed on 
contract bases for part icular t a s k s . 
Fore ign experts were general ly accustomed to capi ta l -
in tens ive , machine-oriented s o c i e t i e s . They had to work with, and 
guide the schemes of a labour- intensive and non-machine-oriented 
country. It was probably this gap which caused acute controversy 
about the Konar and Tilaiya Dams, some detai l ing of which seems 
n e c e s s a r y h e r e . 
Ti laiya Dam was the first dam taken up by the Corporation 
and des igns for it were prepared by Mr. Voorduin. The work on this 
Dam took a very long time on account of frequent changes in des ign . 
Start ing from Mr. Voorduin, who submitted the original plan, the 
des igns went through the screen ing p r o c e s s of eng ineers from the 
American Technical Miss ion , the Board of Consultants , a s wel l a s 
the eng ineers of the Corporation. At one s tage , the changed des igns 
were re ferred back to Mr. Voorduin, who had by then returned to 
America . 85 There were continuous disagreements among the e n g i n e e r s . 
Even the three members of the Board of Consultants (2 fore igners 
and one Indian) were not unanimous on the question of d e s i g n s . The 
question was taken up by the Rau Committee, which held that the 
confusing situation was due to the absence of a Chief Engineer who 
could have given the Corporation authoritative a d v i c e . ""The Ti laiya 
Dam, despite the fact that i ts des igns and plans were ready as 
ear ly as 1946, was not completed until February 1953 , nearly two 
y e a r s behind schedule . 
A s imi lar , but not identical , problem ex i s ted in r e s p e c t of 
the Konar Dam. H e r e , the question was not of d e l a y s , but of o v e r -
expenditure . The r e a s o n s , a s found by the Rau Committee, were 
mainly changes in the des igns which shifted from one engineer to 
another and from one Construction and Consulting Eng ineers 1 firm 
to another . As a r e s u l t , there were agreements , d isagreements 
and supplementary agreements on des igns and construction features 
of the Konar Dam. The Rau Committee held the firm of Consulting 
65. Mr. Voorduin disagreed with any changes in his original plans and pointed 
out that they would be uneconomical and waste time, DVC E n q u i r y 
C o m m i t t e e R e p o r t , para. 8, Ch.IV. 
86. I b i d . para. 15, Ch IV. 
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Engineers responsible in failing to render proper and timely advice 
to the Corporation; found that the Corporation and their engineers 
acted in an unbusiness-like manner in signing the contract with the 
c o n t r a c t o r s ; " ' and maintained that the contract with the firm of 
construction engineers was not entirely on technical grounds and 
on the merits of the c a s e , because this action of the Corporation 
combined construction and desgning work within one firm, a 
combination which ЪзА been opposed by them and all other engineers 
from the beginning. These events not only caused casting and 
recast ing of estimates, but actually resulted in unnecessary 
expenditure, besides the obvious delays in work.°° 
One cannot with certainty say that delays or over-expenditure, 
as noted in the above two cases , were necessar i ly due to the 
dualistic situation result ing from foreign collaboration; such a 
situation could well have arisen with or without i t . Yet, it 
undoubtedly benefited those who worked towards the Indianization 
of various teams of exper t s . Why pay so much to consultants who 
came once or twice a year from a foreign country, some asked. 
Others added, why not seek whatever skill was available in the 
country itself if advice was needed on so few occasions? Or, since 
none of the Board members had any engineering qualifications to 
appreciate technical problems involved in the construction, or to 
judge the adequacy or otherwise of the advice tendered to them by 
their Chief Engineer, why not associate an eminent Indian engineer 
with the DVC, who "should attend all the meetings of the Board and 
advise the Corporation in regard to the opinions expressed by their 
Chief Engineer or their consultants and also check up whether the 
advice tendered by the Chief Engineer is in consonance with the 
conditions in the country?"™ While the last of the above three questions 
involved an amendement of the DVC Act and was not pursued, the 
first two were solved by changing the composition of the Board of 
87. Tnere was a mistake in supplying the schedule of basic prices and engineering 
estimates prepared by the construction engineers (M/S. S.C.B:) to the 
contractors, M/S. Hind-Patel, while inviting the tenders which was highly 
objected to by the Rau Committee. In addition, Hind-Patel had lodged claims 
on many extra items which were not covered under their agreement of contract-
These items were considered inadmissible by the Rau Committee. See i b i d. |" 
paras. 30, 40 ana 67, Ch.V. 
88. See extract froi.. A.li. Morgan's Report, and the Corporation's decision 
thereon, s u p r a . , p. 54 
89. "The Konar Dam - Changes in Designs and Construction", have been dealt 
with by the Rau Committee at some length. This was then the most 
controversial issue in DVC Project. For full details, see Ch.V., i b i d . 
Some events relating to this project are kept secret and are not made 
available in the Report. It is possible that this secrecy covers up some 
underhand deals, which adversely affected the DVC ' s reputation. 
90. N o t e on Item 4 of A g e n d a for P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e held on 5th May 1951. 
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Consultants. This subsequently included two Indian Engineers instead 
of one, result ing in a membership of four. This change eliminated the 
necessity of looking into the last question. ?' The position changed in 
later years when technical know-how in the country increased. Foreign 
experts a r e now no longer prominently associated with the DVC. Under 
increasing international cooperation, DVC'с engineers went abroad 
for training, especially with the TVA. 
(З) A Note on Professionals:92 
The DVC was a unique experiment of i ts kind in the early years of 
Independence, and it can safely be assumed that engineers in the 
country were interested in joining i t . Technical men were not in 
abundance in the country, but there was undoubtedly competition for 
key posts in the DVC - at least for that of the Chief Engineer whose 
post remained vacant for about two y e a r s . Presumably, for such 
important positions, good will, a push, or just "putting in a good 
word" counted to some e x t e n t . " J And, when for one reason or the 
other, such efforts did not bear desired fruits, there were many 
occasions during the DVC-infancy in which people felt called upon 
to seek to influence its course or to cr i t ic ize any course already 
chosen. This is not to say that those who criticized certain projects, 
or otherwise directed their course, did not have the qualifications to 
do so, but the probable undercurrents seem questionable. 
Previously, we have mentioned agreement or disagreement 
among the engineers ; postponement or suspension of some works ; 
and the strong insistence on financial control . To ascertain the role 
of professionals, other than those most directly concerned with 
the DVC, a brief repetition of events seems warranted h e r e . This 
will further indicate whether such decisions were influenced by 
factors other than purely technical. 
I ) A decision was taken that work on Maithon and Panchet Hill Dams 
was to be suspended. This was apparently influenced by Mr. M . P . 
Mathrani who, in 1951 , was Chief Engineer of Gandak Valley in 
Bihar and as such no longer directly connected with the DVC. But 
was he not the one whose services were dispensed with by the DVC 
91. P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 5th May, 
1951. 
92. In the absence of any authentic proof, the nature of this section remains 
largely conjectural. Its inclusion is necessary because some events had a 
great bearing on the whole DVC Project. For some inferences, however, I 
have largely relied on information gathered through interviews with former 
officers of the DVC. 
93. It is not implied that such factors are absolutely absent nowadays. 
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in1948?94 
II) The Chief Engineer, Mr. Komora, was asked to ensure 
that expenditure on Maithon would not increase as it did in the case 
of Tilaiya. This assurance was demanded by Mr. Man Singh who 
also appeared to have been a potential candidate for the Chief 
Eng ineer ' s post. 
III) The DVC was asked not to incur any liability on Barrage 
and irrigation because these were linked with the Maithon and 
Panchet Hill Dams on which work had to be suspended. This 
suggestion came from Mr. A.N. Khosla, who is said to have exerted 
p ressure for the appointment of Mr. Mathrani as the DVC's Chief 
Engineer. 9 « 
These a re but few instances which have come to light. However 
they partly explain some other discussions or even decisions, such 
as the Indianization of the Board of Consultants, or placing an eminent 
Indian Engineer on the DVC Board, e tc . 
Description thus far has been confined largely to procedural 
mat ters , whether financial, administrative or technical. Before 
concluding this section on the DVC and the Central Government, we 
should examine one DVC scheme il lustrative of the extent to which 
the Corporation could count on the Central Government ' s support 
in certain crucial programmes. 
94. Mr. Mathrani, in his note dated 29th December 1951 on the DVC Budget of 
1952-53, sent to the Government of India, gave some reasons for postponing 
work on Panchet Hill Dam, stating that plant and machinery should be used 
consecutively, and that completion of the Panchet Hill 3 years or so after 
Maithon will not make any difference in respect of power, irrigation or flood 
control schemes. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, 
on the basis of such notes and other such suggestions made by different 
engineers, later wrote to the DVC, vide letter No. DW10, dated 15th 
February 1952, that it would accept "no liability for works connected with 
Panchet Hill Dam except the preliminary investigation and the preparation 
of project est imates". 
95. Mr. Man Singh had been closely associated with the DVC in early yea rs . When 
the DVC was established there was a feeling in some circles that he should 
have been appointed as Chief Engineer instead of Mr. Mathrani, "a Chief 
Engineer from Sind, who had become spare after the Partit ion", see K.B.Ray, 
T h e D a m o d a r V a l l e y C o r p o r a t i o n - W i l l I t A c h i e v e 
I t s A i m s (Calcutta, 1949)p.v. 
96. Mr. A.N.Khosla, a top-ranking engineer in the country, was the chief 
architect of the Central Water and Power Commission. He later joined the 
Ministry-in-charge of the DVC as Additional Secretary, cf. , s u p r a . , 
p . 90. It is significant that the Estimates Committee of Parliament did not 
include the appointment of Chief Engineer in Rau Committee ' s Terms of 
Reference; it was later inserted by the Ministry concerned, cf. p . 87, 
f.n. 12 It would appear that Mr.N.V.Gadgil, during his term of office as 
Minister, highly valued Mr.Khosla 's advice on all minor or major r iver -
valley projects undertaken in the country, see N.V. Gadgil, 
G o v e r n m e n t f r o m I n s i d e (Meerut, 1968), passim. The 
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E . The PVC Schemes; 
The Central Government was directly committed to flood control 
measures and power production only. The DVC Act ' s provisions 
on expenditure for these schemes were straightforward. Whatever 
controversy these schemes caused, concerned the two States more 
than the DVC itself. On the rehabilitation scheme, however, the 
DVC approached the Central Government direct ly. 
In accordance with Government policy, the DVC had planned 
to provide a better life to displaced persons (whatever the weakness 
in implementation or reluctance of people to move to new p laces ) . This 
concern of the Corporation was re i tera ted by the Bihar Government.97 
Since the expenditure involved in following such a policy could not 
be met by the DVC, it appealed for monetary compensation to the 
people to be treated as an outright grant to the Corporation. This 
was ruled out both by the Finance Minister (Mr. C D . Deshmukh) 
and the Minister of Irrigation and Power (Mr. G .L . Nanda). The 
former wanted the question of Tightness or wrongness of the DVC's 
administering these schemes to be settled f irs t ;even then, he 
refused to consider any kind of grant, but instead demanded minimization 
of costs .98The la t ter said: "Whatever the increase in expenditure, 
there is no question of allocating it to any other source except the 
funds of the DVC. "99 The DVC was described as a "commercial body"; 
any grant which amounted to a kind of subsidy, was thus ruled out. 
That the DVC should be taken as a "commercial body" in 
a s t r ic t sense by the Central Government was perhaps not a very 
correc t position. Commercial functions were confined to power and 
irr igation only. Basically, it was conceived of as a multiple-purpose 
welfare agency, and its commercial aspects had a secondary place. 
97. 
fact that Mr. Khosla exerted any influence in matters of appointment. 
however understandable, is not officially acknowledged nor made public; 
only my interviewees referred to it. Notwithstanding, the sentence "The 
position that they the Corporation should appoint a chief engineer of their 
own choice, if the candidate suggested by the WMP Secretariat was not to 
their liking, had been accepted by the Prime Minister on the advice of the 
Additional Secretary WMP himself", DVC E n q u i r y C o m m i t t e e 
R e p o r t , p. 91, is not without some undertones. 
Mr. S.K. Sinha, Chief Minister of Bihar, specially stressed this point 
in the P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e 
held in New Delhi on 27th October 1953. 
98. I b i d 
99. I b i d . 
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But with the over-emphasis on the generation and sa le of e l e c t r i c 
power, to which al l other aspects were subordinated, the DVC could 
not avoid being defined as a "commercial b o d y O ^ O -p^g Central 
Government therefore did not accede to the D V C ' s demands for an 
outright grant, making Corporat ion 's resett lement schemes in 
Bihar even more vulnerable to agitation, disappointment and 
d issat i s fact ion. ' 01 
THE DVC AND THE S T A T E S 
The Central Government 's ro le in r e s p e c t of the DVC focused on 
bureaucratic problems in the New Delhi S e c r e t a r i a t ; confl icts 
concerned mainly matters of procedure and a l locat ion. The S t a t e s 
on the other hand, were concerned more with the substance of the 
programme: e . g . navigation, forestry, i rr igat ion, power and "the 
promotion of public health and agr iculture, industrial, economic and 
general wel l-being in the Damodar Val ley and i t s area of operat ion". * 02 
Such a vast arena of activ ity could not but become c l o s e l y intertwined 
with other act iv i t ies taking place in the S t a t e s ; al l DVC goals formed 
an integral part of the overal l economic development of the two 
individual S t a t e s . The overal l economic development, however, 
depended o« more than 5 0 $ a s s i s t a n c e from the Central Government 
which, for a l locat ions on respect i ve plan-outlays, r e l i e d on the 
advice of the Planning Commission. The Planning Commission, at 
i ts inception iff 1950, did not have sufficient data about needs or 
r e s o u r c e s to lay down p r i o r i t y - s c a l e s in different a r e a s of develop­
ment of individual S t a t e s to guide their c o u r s e ; nor, for that 
matter, did it have the powers which it gradually came to wield 
l a t e r . 03 From the Second Five Year Plan (1956-61) onwards, however, 
the Planning Commission made S t a t e - w i s e a l locat ions about how much 
100. Other authors have also named the DVC as "predominantly" commercial; see, 
for instance, V. V. Ramanadham, T h e F i n a n c e s o f P u b l i c 
E n t e r p r i s e s (Asia Publishing House, London, 1963), p. 49. On the 
Government side, however, the DVC is still categorized as a "multi-purpose 
river valley project". It is not included under Central Government public 
enterprises (which also means commercial); see the list of Central 
Government undertakings, in Lok Udyog (Bureau of Public Enterprises, 
Government of India, New Delhi, Sept. 1968), pp. 587-96. 
101 . As told in interview with officers of Bihar Secretariat. 
102. Section 1 2(Г) of the DVC Act, see Appendix A. 
103. The Planning Commission and the economic development plans in India, 
because of their repercussions on Centre-States relationship, became a 
target of severe criticism. For a brief analysis and present situation, 
see i n f r a . , pp. 1 81 ff. 
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to spend during the Five-year period and what to spend it on. The 
DVC irrigation, power and flood control schemes were covered in 
respective State development plans and clearly apportioned as 
such. C^K Any relationship between the DVC and the S ta tes , the re -
fore, percolated through a bigger network of Centre-States 
relat ionships. Seen in this light, any difference of opinion as to 
what the DVC could, or could not do at a given time within a State 
te r r i tory actually reappeared at Centre-State level. In this 
situation, how did the two adjacent States approach a common 
development measure? How, in the face of the existing federal 
s tructure of the Indian Union, did the federal units str ive to promote 
or demote the Central Government's efforts to galvanize the 
operations of an inter-s ta te development measure through a 
Central Government Agency? And, as a consequence, through what 
phases did the DVC's individual schemes pass before producing such 
resul ts as were achieved ?105 
Legal, Administrative, Financial and Technical Expedients; 
Perhaps the major flaw of the DVC Act was the improper balance 
between commitments of individual par tners and legal control over 
the agency. The obligations of the States greatly exceeded the narrow 
powers vested in them. Their responsibility to provide funds for the 
Corporation increased rapidly. With no legal control over the 
organization and its act ivi t ies, the States had to share more than 
th ree-quar te rs of the capital cost . 
The first opportunity to challenge the arrangement arr ived 
when Central Government demanded repayment of loans it was advanc-
ing to the States for appropriation against their commitments to 
the DVC. 07 The instigator was the West Bengal Government and 
the specific case concerned the irrigation programme. The States 
had to levy a betterment fee on land whose worth had been enhanced 
because of irrigation facilities provided by the DVC. According 
to the Central Government's decision, proceeds of such levies were 
to be adjusted against repayment of Central loans. ^08 But, due to 
104. In this connection, see, U.N. . P l a n n i n g f o r S o c i a l a n d 
E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t i n I n d i a t w i t h S p e c i a l 
R e f e r e n c e t o t h e D a m o d a r V a l l e y P r o j e c t 
A r e a : A C a s e S t u d y (Economic and Social Council, 1959), 
pp. 32-33. The Study has elaborately dealt with the Planning mechanism 
and the evolution of a machinery for development planning in the Damodar 
Valley. 
105. Cf. Ch.III, above. 
106. Cf. , s u p r a . , p . 83. 
107. Cf., s u p r a . , p . 89 . 
108. Ministry of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs) letter No. F.10(1)-
F /50 , dated 28th October 1950, forwarded to the DVC and State 
Governments vide Ministry of Works, Mines and Power D.O. letter No. 
DW.11-2(10), dated 3rd November 1950. 
I l l 
administrative difficulties and some contradictory State l a w s , the 
irrigation schemes were not being managed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . 1 0 " 
Moreover, any betterment fee on land formed part of the whole land 
revenue and agricultural tax system of the S t a t e s ; it represented 
then, as now, a major polit ical i s s u e . 0 At the same time, the 
DVC Act (Sect ion 37) barred adjustment of profits from one project 
against l o s s e s on the other. '' The performance of irr igation 
schemes till then, convinced Central Government that these might 
run into l o s s e s with adverse effect on the loan-repayment quest ion. 
However, when the posit ion was brought to the notice of the S t a t e s , 
West Bengal questioned the very n e c e s s i t y for repayment of loans 
and argued that there was no provision in the DVC Act for this 
repayment. Thus reminded that the Act a l s o did not provide for 
the advance of loans to the S t a t e s , and that the whole arrangement 
was based on agreements outside the Act, Dr. B . C . Roy, West 
Bengal Chief Minister, struck a heavy blow:112 
"All monies paid to the DVC were to be held as capital perpetually at 
charge and not repayable by the DVC and hence the Government of India 
could not ask for the return of the loan which had been advanced to the 
State Governments. If, on the other hand, the Government of India are 
disposed to considering the loan to State Governments as entirely 
independent of DVC finance and if the West Bengal Government are to 
be asked to repay this portion of the loan to the Government of India, 
West Bengal must claim the ownership of the corresponding assets in 
the Damodar Valley Corporation to enable them to raise a loan against 
their security to repay the earlier loan to the Government of India. This 
would necessarily imply that the overriding control over the Damodar 
Valley Corporation should be transferred from the Government of India 
to the Government of West Bengal as owning the major share of the DVC's 
assets and the existing DVC Act will have to be modified accordingly." 
(our emphasis). 
Even though the West Bengal Government 's argument was 
not accepted by Central Government, i ts strength seems to have 
109. See, s u p r a . , pp. 57-58. 
110. "Betterment fees" was an oft-discussed issue in relation to the DVC. The 
West Bengal Govt. Irrigation Act of 1958 makes no provision for the imposi­
tion of a betterment levy on lands that have increased in value as a result 
of assured irrigation from the Damodar Valley Canals. For a short note on 
"betterment levy", however, see, U . N . , C a s e S t u d y of t h e 
D a m o d a r V a l l e y C o r p o r a t i o n a n d I t s P r o j e c t s , 
ο ρ . с ι t . , pp. 74-75. With the transfer of canals' management to West 
Bengal (see, i n f r a , ,ρ.ι )6) the whole question appears to have been 
submerged in the wider sphere of individual state policies. 
111 . Mr. Ratnam of the Ministry of Finance, explained the situation: "To give 
an example, profits on electricity could not be set off against losses on 
irrigation and flood control", Minutes of P a r t i c i p a t i n g 
G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 3rd March 1951 . 
112. I b i d . 
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made some impact. The Central Government no longer asked for 
immediate repayment and only demanded "an assurance . . . from 
the State Governments concerned that they have made some adequate 
arrangement to set up a machinery for the time servicing of l o a n s . ' ' ^ ^ 
After these exchanges, there is no evidence to show that the 
question of repayment of loans was ever pursued by the Central 
Government. In the controversial , and so far unchanged, super­
structure of the DVC, however, this was the first instance which 
brought the States and the Central Government in direct confrontation. 
It occurred barely three years after the establishment of the DVC. 
With the DVC in the middle, the intergovernmental struggle for 
power subsequently increased, as seen from individual schemes 
detailed below. 
(1) Flood Control: 
Under the DVC Act, Central Government was to bear half the cost 
of flood control measures up to 70 million rupees , any excess being 
the responsibility of the West Bengal Government. But under section 
38 of the Act, the Corporation was required to pay interest on the 
amount of capital provided by each Participating Government "at 
such rate as may, from time to time, be fixed by the Central 
Government, and such expenditure shall be deemed to be part of the 
expenditure of the Corporation. "11 4 Again, section 37(2) laid down 
that "the net deficit in respect of flood control shall be made good 
entirely by the -Government of West Bengal and the Central Government 
shall have no share in such deficit. "115 The flood control aspect of 
the DVC Project was unproductive, at least in money terms, and 
interest charges on capital expenditure for this purpose represented 
a c lear deficit. The net resul t of these provisions was that the West 
Bengal Government had to meet the expenditure on interest charges 
on the capital contribution, both by themselves and by Central 
Government. 
The arrangement thus required some attention. The West 
Bengal Government demanded amendment af the Act and suggested 
that at the end of section 37(2) an addition be made: "except to the 
extent of the interest charges on the capital allocated to them. "11 6 
This suggestion was accepted by the Ministry of Finance. It was 
followed by another decision that the Central Government's share 
of the loan to the DVC for flood control should be interest f ree. This , 
according to Ministry of Finance, obviously needed amendment of 
section 38 of the Act. The Ministry of Irrigation η and Power, 
113. A g e n d a w i t h A g e n d a N o t e s , for the Meeting of May 5,1951 . 
114. Section 38, DVC Act, see Appendix A. 
115. Section 37(2), i b i d . 
116. P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' C o n f e r e n c e , 
27th October 1953, at New Delhi. 
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disagreeing with the Ministry of Finance, took the view that no 
amendment was necessary as the intentions and objections could be 
met within the framework of the Act by way of making r u l e s , setting 
up conventions and issuing direct ives . ''7 
But where actual legal instruments were involved, procedural 
difficulties were many. The matter was re ferred to the Ministry of 
Law for advice. This suggested that instead of amending the Act, the 
Government of India should real ize the interest on the capital provided 
for flood control from the DVC and subsequently re turn it to them 
as a subsidy. The Ministry of Finance could hardly be expected to 
agree to this suggestion in view of its opinion that subsidies could 
not be made to a "commercial agency". Refund of interest to the 
DVC, the Ministry of Finance argued, was a sort of hidden subsidy. 
The matter was discussed on 26th July 1955 between representat ives 
of the Ministries of Law, Finance, Irrigation and Power, and the 
DVC, and the whole case being later re ferred to the Comptroller 
and Auditor General of India. The Comptroller and Auditor General 
opined that instead of amending the Act, and in order to avoid the 
question of subsidies, the Central Government could give a grant-in-
aid to the West Bengal Government which could thus continue paying 
the interest charges . This solution, according to him, was not likely 
to infringe upon the provisions of the Act and would at the same time 
give relief to the Corporation. After due examination, his advice 
was accepted in April 1956.^ ' ** 
The general question of repayment of Central Government 
loans advanced to the West Bengal Government as their share of flood 
control, stil l waited settlement however. In December, 1963, M r . P . C . 
Sen, then Chief Minister of West Bengal, is reported to have 
approached the Central Government to t reat this loan as an outright 
grant. ^ 9 There is no evidence to show that such a demand has yet 
been met by the Central Government. 
The Goverment of Bihar, as already mentioned, ^20
 w a s no
t 
concerned with flood control measures, but at one point it did come 
in p ic ture . The DVC had been earmarking funds for Konar and Tilaiya 
under two headings, namely, irrigation and power, on a 40$ and a 
60$ b a s i s . The Bihar Government questioned the allocations and 
stated that some allocation was necessary for the flood control which 
the projects actually covered. Naturally, exclusion of flood control 
from the whole calculation was a loss for the Bihar Government, 
and a gain to that of West Bengal. Bihar therefore demanded reallocation 
under three separate heads in respect of these projects, at 4 2 . 7 $ 
(power), 4 2 . 7 $ (irrigation), 14.6$ (flood control) in respect of 
Konar Dam, and 3 8 . 5 $ (power), 38 .5$ (irrigation), 2 3 . 0 $ (flood 
117. I b i d . , 13th July 1954, at Calcutta. 
118. M i n u t e s o f P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' 
C o n f e r e n c e held at New Delhi, on 16th and 17th April, 1956. 
119. T h e S t a t e s m a n O v e r s e a s W e e k l y , Calcutta, 14th 
December, 1963. 
1 20. S u ρ г a . , pp. 37-38. 
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c o n t r o l ) in r e s p e c t of T i l a i y a Dam. 1 21 
T h e whole i s s u e w a s left in the h a n d s of the Audi tor and 
C o m p t r o l l e r G e n e r a l of I n d i a . But t h i s p e r h a p s was not e n o u g h . T o 
s e t t l e the d i s p u t e , a sub-commit tee w a s a p p o i n t e d in 1955-56 to 
s tudy the a l l o c a t i o n of the c o s t of the dams ; i t s r e p o r t w a s not 
submit ted unt i l 4th November 1958. T h e DVC, on the r e c o m m e n ­
d a t i o n s of t h i s s u b - c o m m i t t e e , d e c i d e d to a l l o c a t e t h e c o s t of e a c h 
dam s e p a r a t e l y . In 1958-59, the a m e n d s w e r e m a d e , m o r e o r l e s s 
a c c e p t i n g the p o i n t s r a i s e d by the B i h a r G o v e r n m e n t . 1 23 But 
a c c o r d i n g to the l a t e s t a c c o u n t s , e v e n t h i s p o s i t i o n h a s been c o n t e s t e d 
by t h e West Bengal G o v e r n m e n t which h a s a s k e d for a r b i t r a t i o n . 
T h e m a t t e r i s s t i l l p e n d i n g . 
(2) I r r i g a t i o n : 
T h e di f f icult ies in e x e c u t i n g the i r r i g a t i o n p r o g r a m m e of the DVC 
w e r e mainly a d m i n i s t r a t i v e : lack of p r o p e r c o o r d i n a t i o n and c l a s h i n g 
l o c a l l a w s , a l l supplemented by n a t u r a l c a u s e s and lack of c o o p e r a t i o n 
from the p e o p l e . T h e s e di f f icult ies led to D V C ' s B a r r a g e and 
I r r i g a t i o n c a n a l s be ing t r a n s f e r r e d to the West Benga l Government 
in 1964, s ix y e a r s a f t e r the time a c t u a l di f f icult ies w e r e n o t i c e d . Some 
f u r t h e r d e t a i l s e e m s n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to s e e how m a t t e r s w e r e a p p r o a c h e d 
and t a c k l e d by the p a r t i e s involved. 
S i n c e the B i h a r G o v e r n m e n t w a s not much involved in the 
DVC ' s s c h e m e s , ^ 24 West Bengal w a s p r o v i d i n g most of the c a p i t a l . 
1 21 . Bihax Government circulated a note for the Participating Governments ' 
Conference held on 16th February 1954. It contains a full history of these 
two dams, from the time Mr. Voorduin made allocations for particular 
objectives, and includes detailed technical aspects justifying the Bihax 
Government's calculations. It is interesting to note that the discrepancies 
in DVC calculations were discovered about six years after the inception of 
work. Such snags may have relevance to Bihar ' s complaint that the DVC was 
controlled by Bengalis. Cf. i n f r a . , pp.123,134 ff. 
122. The Audit Reports of 1955-56 and 1956-57 mention only the fact of this 
question still pending, see pp. 2 and 2 respectively of the said r e p o r t s . 
123. The new system of allocation for power, irrigation and flood control, i s : 
33$, 33$ and 34% (Tilaiya); 39%, 39% and 22% (Konar); 34%, 34% and 32% 
(Maithon); 28%, 28% and 44% (Panchet). For principles which led to this 
formula, see P . Prasad, ο ρ . с i t . , pp. 50-51 . 
124. At one time there was a move that Bihar Government should draw water 
supply from Tilaiya reservoir . It guaranteed off-take of water in March 
1957, but ultimately declined to take it due to rates being "prohibitive", 
see A u d i t R e p o r t 1960—61 , p.79. Also in this connection, see 
ear l ier negotations between the DVC and Bihar in 1955-56, included in 
N o t e s o n A g e n d a for P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' 
C o n f e r e n c e held on 16th/l7th April, 1956. 
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The transfer of canals was agreeable to West Bengal because it so lved 
many problems: of guaranteed off-take of water , of charging be t ter -
ment f e e s to the farmers direct ly and not via the DVC, a s laid down 
under sect ion 41 of the DVC Act , and of eventual repayment of loans to 
the Central Government. The DVC proposed the transfer of canals 
in 1959, but a number of adjustments had to be made before the 
actual transfer took p l a c e . 
The West Bengal Government said that if it was to e x c e r c i s e 
effect ive control over the irrigation sys tem, control over the Maithon 
and Panchet Hill Dams should a l so be handed over to them. ^ 25 
However , this meant effective control by the West Bengal Government 
over the ent ire power sys t em. The Bihar Government, indifferent 
to the question of irr igat ion schemes in genera l , cons idered this 
la tes t demand of West Bengal absolutely unacceptable , neither was 
it acceptable to the DVC or Central Government. Another obstacle 
was the transfer to State Governments of eng ineers working on the 
maintenance of c a n a l s . Though the DVC had no part icular objection 
in this r egard , the eng ineers were not inclined to go to the State 
Government. ' 26 
During the course of negotiations, floods occurred which 
breached and damaged canal embankments, great ly reducing the 
r e l e a s e of water in the c a n a l s . ^ 27 Moreover , D V C ' s claims for 
water charges were not being sett led regular ly by the West Bengal 
Government. Pending the final dec i s ion on the t rans fer , a tentative 
agreement was reached between the West Bengal Government and the 
DVC whereby (a) DVC was to repair the damaged canals before 
handing them over to the State Government (b) the DVC was to control 
the r e l e a s e of water for irr igat ion in consultation with the State 
Government, (c) the State Government was to maintain the canal 
system as an appointed agent of the DVC, and (d) the DVC was to 
provide capital for extens ion of the irr igat ion sys t em. This agreement 
could not be implemented because the question of payment of out-
standing dues to the DVC was not se t t l ed . The DVC refuted i ts ob l i -
gations about the maintenance and repa ir of cana l s ; it a l so refused 
to provide the capital for expansion of the irr igat ion system by opening 
up new c a n a l s . 
DVC was again trying to get the Act amended whereby charges 
for water supply for industrial , domestic and agricultural use could 
125. Konar Dam was ready in October 1955, Maithon Dam in September 1957, 
and Panchet Hill Dam in December 1959. 
126. Most of the engineers were on deputation to the DVC and drawing deputation 
allowance under rules. 
127. A n n u a l R e p o r t s o f t h e DVC for years 1960-61,p.6,and 
1961-62, p.6. 
1 28. See Audit objection in para. 2 of A u d i t R e p o r t 1960-61 , pp.77-79. 
This Audit Report inter alia reported that accumulated expenditure on 
irrigation which waited settlement amounted to 1 (0.73 million rupees. 
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be levied and collected by the State Government. In passing, it should 
be noted that industrial development in West Bengal was by this time 
making rapid p r o g r e s s . The proposal of the DVC to amend the Act 
was not acceptable to West Bengal because,,the Act being one under 
section 103 of the Government of India Act of 1935, Parliament was 
not considered competent to amend i t . Amendment, if any, was to 
be considered by the State Legislatures concerned and by fresh 
resolution of those legislatures authorizing Parliament to act in 
the matter under the Constitution. This legal aspect had ea r l i e r been 
refer red to the Attorney General, but before his advice could be 
obtained, the West Bengal Government wanted reference to be made 
to the Supreme Court. This did not materialize and the case was 
re fer red to the Central Ministry of Irrigation and Power for decision. 
During the negotiations, crit icisms in the Legislative 
Assembly of West Bengal and from the public were frequent. Mr .A.K. 
Mukherjee, then Irrigation Minister, West Bengal, announced in the 
Legislative Assembly that the DVC had supplied water for 
irrigation for about 200,000 acres of land against the target of 
650,000 a c r e s . It had now suspended supplying water on account of 
a breach in the embankment of the main canal . ^" The Public Accounts 
Committee of Parliament submitted i ts repor t to the Lok Sabha (House 
of the People); the report stated that as much as 30$ of DVC's i r r i -
gation potential could not be utilized for lack of proper planning. 130 
Then followed meetings and conferences: Mr. Alagesan, then Minister 
of Irrigation and Power at the Centre, and the Chief Minister of West 
Bengal met in January 1963; representat ives of the Central and 
West Bengal Governments and the DVC met in October, 1963. In the 
former meeting, Mr. Alagesan could not promise anything beyond 
consulting the Bihar Government in the matter and West Bengal 
feared that this would also prove a hurdle . ' 31 The lat ter conference 
did not reach any decision of importance. After all these consultations, 
the Central Government finally agreed to t rnasfer of the canal system 
to the West Bengal Government in December 1963; control of the Dams 
was handed over to the Central Water and Power Commission. This , 
the Centre thought, was the most sensible action under existing 
circumstances, although the manner of the State Government's take-
over was not altogether to their liking. '32 
1 29. H i n d u s t h a n S t a n d a r d , Calcutta, July 22, 1962. In view of the 
fact that the DVC was a Central Government agency and not of West Bengal, 
such a statement, indirectly putting the blame on Central Government, is 
conceivable in the context of existing Centre-States relationships. After 
defecting from the Congress Party, Mr. A.K. Mukherjee led the new 
Bengla Congress Party, and was the first non-Congress Chief Minister 
of West Bengal, in 1967-68, and from 1969. . . 
130. Public Accounts Committee Report to (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 
January 1963). 
1 31 . A m r i t B a z a r P a t r i k a , Calcutta, February 1 , 1963. 
132. T h e S t a t e s m a n O v e r s e a s W e e k l y , Calcutta, December 14, 
1963. 
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(3) Power: 
The distinctive nature of the DVC's power scheme, its demand and 
supply aspects inside and outside the valley, have been discussed 
previously; it has also been seen that the DVC made appreciable 
progress in this field. 133 д ц three governments were interested 
in this programme, the Central Government to a l e s s e r degree than 
the o t h e r s . However, the path towards the ends, to the degree that 
they were met, has not been very smooth. 
Until 1954, power was demanded mainly by Bihar; West 
Bengal asked for it only for Calcutta. The position changed when 
industrialization of the Durgapur-Asansol belt started in 1953-54. 
The Durgapur Steel Plant (with British collaboration) was to be 
established in this a r e a , and the West Bengal Government became 
more and more eagre to have its own power plant at Durgapur. 
To pay for a one-third share of DVC power plants and not to own 
any right to its a s s e t s , or any operational control, was not a 
profitable bargain for West Bengal. At the same time, the DVC was 
considering another thermal power plant at Durgapur to enable it 
to meet future demand. The DVC saw that if two power plants were 
established at the same place and managed by two different agencies, 
the natural consequence would be waste of money and lack of 
coordination. The DVC therefore insisted that, keeping in view all 
probable load development in the a r e a , it should be allowed to instai 
a bigger plant at Durgapur and that the West Bengal plans should 
be abandoned. Two meetings took place on August 4 and December 20, 
1955, between the West Bengal Chief Minister and the DVC authorit ies, 
in which the former maintained that since his Government had already 
placed orders for the plant, he could not agree to abandoning the 
plan. Another meeting took place between the Planning Commission, 
the DVC, Central Water and Power Commission, and the Governments 
of West Bengal and Bihar on November 3, 1955, at which it was 
agreed that both West Bengal and the DVC were to have a power plant. 
Both these plants were to be located near Durgapur inside the valley; 
one owned and managed by the West Bengal Government and the other 
by the DVC. 
The installations at Durgapur were to be made during the 
Second Five Year Plan period, 1959-61 . Besides these two specific 
plants, the DVC's power supply capacity was further supplemented 
by Maithon and Panchet hydel stations during the plan period. But 
this was hardly sufficient to meet future demand.The load development 
inside as well as outside the valley had to be calculated sufficiently 
in advance. According to these calculations, demand on the DVC 
power system in 1966 was expected to be much more than they had 
133. Cf., s u ρ г a . , pp. 59-64. 
134. A n n u a l R e p o r t s of t h e DVC 1954-55 and 1955-56. 
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under their supply ta rge t . Remuneration, and perhaps proof of 
efficiency through profits, being a main consideration, the DVC 
wanted to meet this demand. It therefore proposed that another 
thermal power plant be erected at Chandrapura. J ' This proposal 
was sanctioned in April 1959, by an inter-State Conference. At 
this Conference, the West Bengal Government was allowed to 
augment the generating capacity of i ts Durgapur power plant on 
the condition that, if it should set up an extra unit at Durgapur, 
the power from Chandrapura plant of the DVC would be made 
available to Bihar . 
During the formulation of the Third Five Year Plan, some 
facts were pointed out by the West Bengal Government. F i r s t ly , 
the power generated by the DVC was being mainly utilized by Bihar 
for purposes outside the valley. ' 36 Secondly, the West Bengal 
Government was industrializing the area very near the valley; 
apart from the existing agreements with the DVC for supply of power 
to these industr ies , the West Bengal Electrici ty Board and the 
Calcutta Electr ici ty Supply Corporation, it was not interested in 
further augmentation of the DVC power system. 
Later years saw developments in frequent succession. When 
the Planning Commission took up allocations for States on power 
development, the West Bengal Government's stand became more and 
more s t r i c t . In July 1960, it pointed out to the DVC that the lat ter 
should wait to augment its generating capacity beyond that already 
sanctioned until such time as the approved schemes in the Third 
Plan of both West Bengal and Bihar were definitely known. In 
October 1960, Dr . B . C . Roy discussed the matter with the Planning 
Commission and made it clear that he would not agree to the DVC 
supplying power outside the DVC area except when approved by the 
West Bengal Government. ' 37 At the same time, Dr . Roy stated that 
since his State was investing about 500 million rupees during the 
Third Five Year Plan period for development of power in the State 
as a whole, he was not prepared to include in the S t a t e ' s Plan any 
power project conducted by the DVC. However, if the DVC wanted 
to go ahead with its power expansion programme, and supply within 
the valley a rea , Dr. Roy would have no objection if the Central 
Government were to give it a loan outside West Bengal ' s Plan. 
S t ress ing the same point in December I960, the West Bengal 
Government argued that if West Bengal and Bihar equally shared 
the costs of DVC power extension programme each state should have 
its demands met on a more or less equal bas i s . When both Bihar and 
West Bengal had a shortage of power, it was unrealistic to expect 
135. DVC letter No. Com.7/9/1-201 2 dated October 7, 1958. 
136. In addition to some major industries, Indian Iron and Steel Co., and Bihar 
State Electricity Board were taking power from the DVC. 
137. Under Section 18(iii), the DVC was required to obtain concurrence of the 
State Government concerned for extending the transmission system outside 
the valley-area. 
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one State to make sacrifices to help the development of another. 
In April 1961 , Dr . Roy met the Minister of Planning, Mr. 
G . L . Nanda, and the Minister of Irrigation and Power, Mr. Hafiz 
M. Ibrahim, in New Delhi to discuss the Third Five Year Plan 
allocations for West Bengal. Then too, Dr . Roy held the same view 
on the DVC and repeatedly disagreed with any furtherance of 
DVC power programme. Returning to Calcutta he confirmed his 
viewpoint in an elaborate le t ter , stating that in the case of the DVC 
although the State Government took the loan from the Central 
Government and passed it on to the Corporation, the State Government 
did not possess any a s s e t s . Describing section 3 of the DVC Act, 138 
Dr. Roy argued that the DVC had a distinct individuality but not under 
control of his Government. In fact, the only point mentioned in the 
Act regarding the relationship between the State Government and the 
DVC was in sub-sections of Section 37, • " arrangements which to -
gether, Dr. Roy pointed out, were absolutely iniquitous and required 
very careful examination. 
Again, protesting against the eagerness of the DVC for more 
power production, Dr . Roy, this time addressing the Planning 
Commission, said that the DVC was never conceived purely as a 
power generating body. Its functions of generating power were 
only incidental, the main programme being dam construction for 
flood control and i r r igat ion. Power production should be left to 
States concerned. The West Bengal Government was not prepared 
to allow the DVC to generate or supply power outside the valley a r e a . 
In spite of West Bengal 's refusal , the new plant at Chandrapura 
was apparently included in the Plan, and the DVC seems to have 
undertaken the work. 140 Dr . B.C.Roy then adre s sed the Minister of 
Irrigation and Power at New Delhi, s t ress ing that he had already 
stated over and over again that he was not willing to let his State 
contribute a third of any further expenditure which the DVC might make 
during the Third Five Year Plan period for generating power, apart from 
the provision already included for the continuing scheme. If there 
was any deficit of power in Bengal, it was West Bengal Government 's 
business and not the DVC' s . Dr . Roy cited the example of Neyvelli 
Projec t , 141 and said that if the DVC wanted to generate power, the 
Central Government should pay for i t . 
138. See A p p e n d i x A. 
139. I b i d . 
140. A n n u a l R e p o r t s of t h e DVC 1959-60,1960-61 and 1961-62. 
141. The Neyvelli Project in Madras in which the Central Government had made 
a special grant to the State of Madras, was often cited in the DVC context 
by West Bengal. 
120 
The West Bengal Government made such protes t s continuously, 
arguing that while it was thinking of developing i t s own power r e s o u r c e s , 
it did not want the DVC to infiltrate outside the v a l l e y . Neither did it 
want i t s meagre r e s o u r c e s burdened any longer with expenditure 
for DVC power e f for t s . During the course of these arguments , West 
Bengal challenged the e s s e n c e of the DVC Act . The State Government 
did not want interference by Central Government and i t s Planning 
Commission, and argued that if Central Government wanted the DVC 
to develop i ts power r e s o u r c e s in order to supply regional 
indus tr i e s , then it should choose from three a l ternat ives : (1) it 
should develop an extra power centre , a s in the c a s e of Neyvel l i 
in Madras; (2) the DVC should go to the market and borrow, as they 
had the right to do under the Act; (3) the extra power centre should 
be provided by private industry . S o far a s the West Bengal 
Government was concerned , it was not able to share the burden of 
capital cos t for the DVC. 
In one l e t t e r , D r . Roy was even more emphatic regarding 
the Planning C o m i s s i o n ' s a l locat ions for his S t a t e . When he noticed 
that the Planning Commission had made a total provis ion of 2500 million 
rupees for h is S t a t e , indicating how it should be distributed under 
different heads , he a s s e r t e d that West Bengal must adhere to i ts 
own intended P l a n . The Planning Commission had increased the 
prov i s ions for irr igat ion and power which were obviously intended 
for the DVC. To this he strongly objected, a s s e r t i n g that West 
Bengal would continue to object . Having given more to the DVC 
under Irrigation and P o w e r , the Planning Commission had in fact 
reduced West B e n g a l ' s al location under Roads ,Educat ion , Transport , 
e t c . After a l l , who was respons ib le for the administration of the 
S t a t e , D r . Roy a s k e d . His Government had certain obligations under 
the Constitution which the Planning Commission had not. The Planning 
Commission was an ad hoc body; the S t a t e s , on the other hand, had 
permanent r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , not merely under the Constitution, but 
to the people through their L e g i s l a t u r e s . Thus continued the tus s l e 
between West Bengal and the Central Government. 
From 1958 onward, the Central Government assumed a more 
immediate interes t in DVC-power supply in connection with the Eas tern 
Rai lways and the probbble s t ee l plant at Bokaro which the Central 
Government then had under ser ious cons iderat ion . Technical sanct ions 
for extension of power were given under the Second F ive Year P lan . 
The DVC went ahead with the Chandrapura niant, but no agreement 
was reached about West B e n g a l ' s s h a r e . Writing in 1962, the 
I n d i a n N a t i o n reported from Patna: 
142. In fact, the West Bengal Government has not paid its share for Chandrapura 
plant. A great portion of investment for this project came from U.S.AID and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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"The installation of the two new units at a cost of 110 million rupees is 
envisaged under the Third Plan power development programme of the 
DVC which were approved by the Union Government. West Bengal has 
to contribute one-third of the total cost. The West Bengal Government 
is reported to have expressed its inability to meet the commitment on 
the ground of financial stringency. This has created a serious situatuon 
for the State of Bihar because the power generated by the two new units 
would be utilized in Bihar and is included in its Third Plan power 
target . 1 4 3 
Under the Third F i v e Year P lan, the West Bengal Government 
included a power plant to be instal led at Patratu, a city within the 
DVC area of operat ion. In view of the acute power shortage, the 
DVC s e e m s to have readi ly agreed to this proposal . 
While such t u s s l e s went on at different l e v e l s , the public 
showed discontent. P o w e r supply, in Calcutta part icularly, repeatedly 
fel l short of demand, and there were frequent power c u t s . Industry 
was a l s o unhappy. The consumers complained that DVC power was 
comparatively expens ive : reta i l power distribution took place through 
the l i c e n s e e s who fixed the r a t e s after making due prov is ions for 
State taxes and their own profits. 144 The DVC itse l f became a frequent 
target of cr i t ic i sm. 145 In 1961, when the power shortage reached 
i t s cl imax, the Government of India appointed a Committee, headed 
by Mr. M . R . S a c h d e v , 1 4 6 S e c r e t a r y of Irrigation and P o w e r , Central 
Government, which submitted i ts report in September-October 1961 . 4 7 
The Sachdev Committee anticipated continuously increas ing demand 
in the a r e a , and recommended that D V C ' s power programme needed 
constant expansion so that the 1 961 situation might not occur during 
the Fourth F ive Year P l a n . The DVC was cr i t ic i zed by the Committee 
for delay in commissioning generating units, which had occurred 
because the equipment was unusual; the supply and use of untried 
equipment and machinery caused unnecessary di f f icult ies. 
All in a l l , the DVC has n e v e r t h e l e s s been fairly success fu l 
with regard to power supply. To quote an e x p e r t ' s opinion: "In 
143. I n d i a n N a t i o n , Patna, September 27, 1962. 
144. The comparison was made between State Electricity Boards (DVC s 
formidable competitors) which were subsidized by the State Governments 
and could offer cheaper power, and the DVC which, because of restrictions 
imposed by lending agencies (such as I.B.R.D.) had to be run strictly on a 
profit-and-loss basis. 
143. H i n d u s t h a n S t a n d a r d , Calcutta, December 7, 1961 ; Τ h e 
H i n d u , Madras, July 29, 1962. 
146. Mr. M.R.Sachdev later became Chairman, DVC, for less than a year. 
147. Sachdev Committee Report, Government of India, 1961 . See also a brief 
review of the Report, B h a g i r a t h , Publications Division, Delhi, 
December 1961 . 
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most respects, the DVC is one of the most sophisticated power systems 
in India with its design and operations personnel having been 
seasoned on the construction of power plants, which at times have 
been the largest in India, and a transmission system which has an 
extent at least equal to that of the Madras system . . ."148 
(4) Development Schemes: 
When read in the light of the powers given to the States under the 
Constitution of India (1950), Section 12(f) of the DVC Act, 1948, 
did not fit. The DVC was a Central Government agency established 
by Parliament, and defined as such. Building a steel plant in a State 
territory, whether with'foreign collaboration or with Central Government 
funds, was entirely different from the conception of entrusting 
welfare tasks to an agency such as the DVC. Moreover, the clauses 
of the Act regulating financial backing for such activities were very 
vague. In view of the interpretation and reinterpretation of various 
clauses of the Act, 149 the scope of these functions looked "somewhat 
Utopian."! 50 
Behind these interpretations were cool-headed calculations 
of liabilities or benefits by the two States, suitably disguised in 
quasi-objective argument. ' 5' The West Bengal Government wanted 
"common expenditure" to be categorized into: (a) soil conservation, 
forestry and navigation as necessary to further the three main 
objectives, the costs to be allocated between these objectives; 
(b) malaria control measures and small-scale industries to be considered 
as beneficial to respective governments and charged in proportion to 
such benefits. Now, if the conservation of soil, afforestation and 
navigation were necessary to further the main objectives, which 
mostly benefited West Bengal but were to be shared proportionately 
by the three governments, were not control of malaria and small-scale 
industries necessary for a happy community and a healthy labour force 
for construction work in furtherance of these objectives? But malaria 
was to be controlled near the reservoirs, which were all in Bihar; 
small-scale industries, to whatever degree they got started, were 
also in Bihar. Bihar, on the other hand, argued that navigation 
was closely linked with only two of the three objectives, namely, 
irrigation and flood control - both benefiting an mainly financed by 
148. Walter D. Lawrence, "The Damodar Valley Corporation", A 
M e m o r a n d u m prepared for the U .S . AID Mission, New Delhi, 
September 27, 1965, p. 3 . 
149. S u p r a . , pp. 67-68. 
150. So was it described by a top official of the Bihar Government when I asked: 
"Do you think it can work?" 
151 . I have covered these arguments briefly, s u p r a . , pp. 67-68. 
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West Bengal . 
To obtain a proper interpretation was in i tself a long-drawn 
out p r o c e s s . Clause 12(f) and c l a u s e s (d) and (e) of Sec t ion 12 had 
a lready been nipped in the bud when the Rau Committee recommended 
that any activity undertaken within the scope of these sec t ions 
needed Central Government's approval . It was too much to 
expect that such approval could be accorded without the consent of 
the State Governments, who simultaneously attempted to narrow down 
the D V C ' s area of a c t i v i t i e s . 
The d i s cus s ion on the DVC and the S ta te s may be concluded 
with a short note on the much debated resett lement p r o g r a m m e . 1 ' · ' 
Most of the people affected by the DVC construction were tribal 
("adibasis" or abor ig ines , a s they were ca l l ed ) . They were poor 
and i l l i t era te , and traditionally regarded the River Damodar as 
holy . In previous d e c a d e s , many of their kin had gone a s labour 
to the tea plantations of Assam and to metropolitan Calcutta. Yet 
they retained strong roots in Bihar: physical ly symbolized by a 
p iece of ances tra l land, a family nuc leus , and a hut as s h e l t e r . All 
this was to be submerged in DVC r e s e r v o i r s and dams, creat ing 
the need for reset t lement . The extent to which people adapted to 
changing conditions needs no repetit ion h e r e . It was s een that D V C ' s 
efforts in this regard faced numerous problems: contradictory 
local l a w s , e v e r - r i s i n g financial l iabil i ty and, from a more 
humanitarian ang le , a somewhat unsympathetic approach of the 
Central Government and indifferenc« on the part of West Bengal . 
D V C ' s efforts were thus confined to compensation in kind or in c a s h , 
to which the Bihar Government grudgingly extended cooperat ion. 
Bihar officials pointed out th it displaced persons did not move to 
the new houses and did not r-ccupy new lands , apparently because 
they suspected the fairnePá of the dea l . • 54 Even though the DVC 
may have justif ied land reclamation and cheaper housing 
construct ions on financial grounds , popular suspic ion was based 
on grounds more pertinent: the people claimed that the highez 
eche lons of the DVC, which actually made dec i s ions on such 
ques t ions , were in the hands of B e n g a l i s ; 1 55 compensation in kind 
152. I b i d . 
153. In the Constituent Assembly, there were long discussions between the 
Minister, Mr. N.V. Gadgil, and Mr. Jaipal Singh, the leader of the tribal 
people affected in the area. For Minister's assurances about the future of 
these people, to Mr. Jaipal Singh, see s u p r a . , p.69. For interesting 
exchanges between the Minister and Mr. Jaipal Singh, see C o n s t i t u e n t 
A s s e m b l y D e b a t e s , 12th December 1947 and 16th February, 1948. 
154. Bihar Government officials invariably underlined this point. 
155. For a short discussion on the DVC's personnel policies, see i n f r a . , 
pp. 134ff. 
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was accordingly not free of provincial bias. At any rate, arable land 
classification was incorrect.^ 56 "p^ g Report of the Estimates Committee 
to Parliament recorded that "the houses that had been constructed 
for the displaced persons had given way before they had been occupied 
by persons concerned" . •'7 s
u c
h findings only substantiated the 
persisting suspicions. True or not, circumstantial evidence made 
it easier for people to opt for cash compensation. Having no choice, 
the DVC put up with this solution which, in consequence, meant 
scrapping another welfare effort. 
The overall picture of the DVC-States relationship presented 
above demonstrates a continual inter-governmental tangle, changing 
kaleidoscopically according to the particular programme of the DVC. 
In retrospect, we see the DVC plodding along a bureaucratic path 
set by Central Government, constantly threatened by stifling 
provincialism. While these processes closely followed the general 
shifts of political balance between the Centre and the States (to 
which we shall turn presently), their net effect was marked reduction 
of the content, value and principal substance of the DVC. 
THE EFFECTS ON INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF THE DVC 
The inter-state and Centre-States tug-of-war affected all primary 
and secondary schemes of the DVC. The influence of the States had 
gradually became so great that no minor or major problem could 
escape its impact. These factors, ipso facto, had their bearing on 
the DVC organization. 
A. The Board of Directors; 
The success of any organization depends on the men at the top. 
Speaking of the proposed DVC Board, N.V. Gadgil, almost echoing 
the statement made about TVA Board in the American House of 
Representatives, 58 declared in the Constituent Assembly: "Upon 
these three people depends the success of the whole scheme There 
are plenty of practical, efficient administrators in the Secretariat. 
They are good in noting, they are good in many other things, but 
here is a job in which the vision of a poet and practical knowledge 
of an engineer are expected It will not be relevant to urge that 
they must be necessarily from Bihar and Bengal or one must be 
from Bihar and another man must be from Bengal, although that 
156. Cf. s u ρ г a . , p. 72. 
157. Estimates Committee, Fifth Report, p. 28. According to one informant, 
some of the houses in Hazaribagh area were used as stables for cows and 
buffaloes. 
158. Cf. s u ρ г а . , p. 6 , f.η.20. 
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aspect cannot be altogether brushed as ide, but let us agree that 
naturally these men must be of a very high character and capacity 
(and) that all appointments must be made on merit . "159 
In appointing the first Board of Directors , the essence of 
this statement appears to have been translated into action. Gadgil 
la ter wrote: " Nehru suggested that I should select the members. 
I suggested that it was not proper that the selection of officers 
for such an important project should be made by a single Minister. 
Instead, it should be made by the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, 
and the Minister of the Department concerned. The Cabinet should 
then consider it formally. This would also be a good precedent for 
similar selection. Nehru approved of the idea and we considered 
a few names for the Chairman and selected Mr. Mazumdar, I . C . S . 
There was unanimity for the other two n a m e s . " ' " 0 The other two 
names were those of Mr. P . P . Varma and Professor B . C . Guha. 
The selection of the first Board of Directors of the DVC thus 
touched wider horizons - a generalist, a public figure (lawyer-poli­
tician) and a university professor. Irrespective of their backgrounds, 
the fact cannot be ignored that due care was taken to select one 
person from each centre : the Central Government (Mr. Mazumdar), 
Bihar (Mr. Varma), and West Bengal (Mr. Guha). 
The first Board members evidently worked together to give 
the DVC effective status as a public corporation. On occasion 
they s t ressed the need for speeding up operations. They pointed 
out that matters should not be allowed to take on the routine of a 
Department. In one of the ear l iest meetings of the Participating 
Governments, Mr. Mazumdar and Mr. P . P . Varma emphatically said: 
"The work of the Corporation is wholly governmental and this 
agency had been created in face of existing Government Departments. 
In giving the Corporation freedom of action the Legislature has 
even gone so far as to curb its own p o w e r s . " And again, on being 
advised as to what channel the Corporat ion 's correspondence should 
adopt, Mr. Mazumdar stated: "I am out to avoid red-tapism and 
multiplicity of checks. There is no reason why the other ministries 
cannot deal directly with the Corporation . . , " 1 0 1 
The Board, however, did not always remember that the Corpo­
ration was not financially self-sufficient. The Participating 
Governments demanded minute details about transactions with the 
money they advanced to the Corporation, ο ώ and the DVC considered 
159. C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , 
12th December 1947. 
160. N.V. Gadgil, G o v e r n m e n t f r o m I n s i d e , pp. 102-103. 
161. M i n u t e s of P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' 
C o n f e r e n c e , 9th May 1949. 
162. At first, they not only formally asked for information, but informal 
pressures were equally active. As one of the informants said: "Such 
pressures varied from appointment of certain personnel to giving contracts 
to certain firms. And there were countless telephone calls." 
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some of this as undue interference. Moreover, the early difficulties 
may have influenced the DVC to hold back information until it judged 
the time ripe for r e l e a s e . In the initial s tages , the Board held itself 
responsible to the Central Government only. The State Governments 
considered the DVC's activities veiled in mystery and felt them-
selves ignored. Their respective ministers were not able to answer 
in their Legislative Assemblies on matters pertaining to the 
Corporation. ^ Some accused the DVC of being over-conscious 
of its autonomy. 164 xhe DVC was legally a Central Government 
agency, but its operation as something like a State within States 
did not find easy acceptance by the State Governments. 
The fight to uphold autonomy appears to have continued until 
the Rau Committee conclusively decided a number of questions. 
Until 1950-51 , the DVC made decisions more or less independent of 
outside p r e s su re s : e . g . , in determining the functions of the 
Financial Adviser, in appointing the Chief Engineer, and in taking 
up construction work on Tilaiya and Konar Dams. ' 65 But obstacles 
became too many and p ressu res too s trong. The Corporation, after 
a l l , demonstrated certain weaknesses on its organizational and 
engineering s ides . Also, DVC expenditures rose beyond tolerable 
levels , according to the financial p roviders . The sequence of 
circumstances necessar i ly resulted in a decline of whatever sympathy 
the DVC may have counted on. "You do not fully rea l i se the position 
h e r e " , wrote Mr. Mazumdar to the Secre tary of the Corporation who 
was away in America. "There are wide crit icisms all round that 
we a re not getting a move on in the matter of construction of dams 
and we seem to have lost many friends in Delhi and Bengal on this 
account."! 66 
163. As pointed out by Mr. Jyoti Basu (Opposition Leader in West Bengal 
Legislative Assembly until March 1967; later Minister, and then Deputy 
Chief Minister in non-Cong^ress Government). The Minister concerned and 
the Chief Minister, according to Basu, wound up the question with a general 
remark: "The Corporation is autonomous". In the case of public corporations 
such an answer by a Minister would not be uncommon if he chose not to give 
information on matters which he considered unimportant and took shelter 
under the 'autonomous' character of the organization; see , in the case of 
Britain, s u p r a . , pp. 1 5-16. 
164. Mr. Rohit M. Dave ( P . S . P . ) Member of Parliament, once member of the 
Public Accounts Committee, was among those who told the present author 
this in 1962. 
165. Almost every one of the oldtimers interviewed in the DVC spoke of the 
courage and determination of the first Board Members, especially its 
Chairman, to maintain DVC autonomy and guard against outside p ressure . 
Some added regretfully, "that was why they fell from favour and became 
unpopular with the three governments". 
166. S .N. Mazumdar's letter No. PL/43/21 (S)-77, dated the 2nd May 1949, to 
Dr. Sudhir Sen, Secre tary , DVC, quoted in DVC E n q u i r y 
C o m m i t t e e R e p o r t , p. 43. 
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The appointment of the Rau Committee was the resul t of a l l -
round criticism about the way things were handled. This committee, 
though quite thorough in dealing with certain crucial questions 
objectively, did not spare the top-most layer , especially the 
Chairman, Mr. Mazumdar. ' 
(1 ) Disintegration of the Board: 
By 1952-53, the Central Government had firmly established that 
autonomy, as conceived by the Corporation, was not quite in line 
with administrative pract ices prevailing in the country. Yet the 
first Board car r ied on for the full term of five years stipulated under 
the DVC Act. °8 La te r , with most of the work under way and certain 
important questions sett led, the position of the DVC Board changed both in 
i ts selection and its effective functioning . The Chairman was increasingly 
appointed from amongst re t i red I. C.S .-officials, while the other 
two Members were virtual nominees of the two State Governments -
though also chosen from the Indian Civil Serv ice , or i ts successor , 
the Indian Administrativo Serv ice . They were drawn from many 
backgrounds. ' " 9 Although continuity of the Board appears to have 
167· S e e the s t r i c t u r e s passed by the Committee on Mr. Mazumdar, s u p r a . , p . 1 0 1 . 
168 . Mr. P . P . Varma, taking over a s Interim Chairman, remained with the 
DVC for about 9 y e a r s (from 1 . 9 . 4 8 t i l l his death on 2nd June 1977) . 
1 6 9 . Some combinations between 1954 and 1963 were a s fo l lows: 
Designation 
Chairmen 
P . S . Rau, (Retd . ) 
I . C S . 
J . P . L . Shenoy , 
(Retd . ) I . C S . 
T . S ivasankara , 
I . C S . 
S . Lal l , (Retd. ) 
I . C S . 
T . S ivasankara , 
(Retd. ) I . C S . 
Prev ious assignment 
Chairman DVC Enquiry 
Committee 
General Manager, 
Bombay E l e e . Supply 
and Tramways . 
S e c r e t a r y , Ministry of 
I rr . and Power 
Assoc ia ted with Air 
Transport Corporation 
Formerly S e c r e t a r y , 
Min.of Irrigation & 
P o w e r : before joining 
DVC, Lt .Governor of 
Goa, Daman, Diu. 
Duration with the DVC 
12th Apri l 1954 to 
12th April 1958 
12tli April 1958 to 
12th April 1959 
12th April 1959 to 
12th October 1959 
12th October 1959 to 
31st March 1963 
September 1963 to 
October 1966 
Members 
A . B . Ganguli, I . C S . Administrator, Mayu-
rakhshi Pro jec t ; then 
Administrator, Durga* 
pur P r o j e c t . 
Commissioner, Chota-
nagpur, Bihar 
K. Raman, I . C S . 
S . P . S ingh , I . A . S . 
A . D . Khan, I . C S . 
R . S . Misra, I . A . S . 
Inspector General of 
P r i s o n s , Bihar 
S e c r e t a r y to the Govt . 
of W . B . , Min. of I r r . 
and Waterways. 
Chairman, State E l e e . 
Board, Bihar 
Between July 1953 and 
December 1957; then 
from April 1958 to 
April 1961 
23rd August 1957 to 
31st October 1957 
14th December 1957 to 
12th April 1958 . 
12 April 1961 to 1965. 
5th September 1960 to 
1966 . 
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been maintained , ^  70 new Board members "tended", as one Bihar 
Government official put i t, "to have different outlooks and approaches" . 
In spite of the fact that they belonged to the All-India s e r v i c e s , some 
were mainly in terested in serv ing the in teres t s of the governments 
which had nominated them. Clearly, therefore, the s e n s e of 
co l lect ive respons ib i l i ty was greatly diminished. 
From 1948 to 1957 members of the DVC Board worked fulltime. 
In 1957 it was felt that DVC construction work was virtually over ; 
only maintenance and a l i tt le subsidiary development would remain 
after completion of the Panchet Hill Dam. To those who regarded 
the DVC ' s ro le a s being mainly to produce and s e l l e l e c t r i c i t y and 
water for irr igat ion (all other aims being Utopian in character ) , this 
did not seem to require a fulltime Board. ' Sub-sect ion (1) of S e c t i o n 
5 of the DVC Act, "every member shal l be a whole time servant of the 
Corporation", 1 72
 w a s
 therefore amended in 1957: "In Sect ion 5 of 
the Damodar Val ley Corporation Act, 1948, sub-sect ion (1) shal l 
be omitted."173 This amendment did not impose convers ion of the 
Board from fulltime to part-time. It was left to Central Government 
to decide this matter, in consultation with the State Governments. 
But from 1957 to 1963 al l three Board members became part-t imers. 
S i n c e 1963-64 the Chairman has worked fulltime, and the other two 
members part-time. 
This change further weakened whatever independence of action 
was enjoyed by the DVC. A s fulltime employees, members of the 
Board were stationed at one place (Calcutta) and, a s a DVC-official 
sa id, "the organization breathed l i f e" . From 1957 onward members 
w e r e moved hundreds of mi les from each other, and came together 
on an average of once a month at Board meet ings . It would appear 
that the degree of what they could decide at these monthly meetings 
waxed and waned with alternations in the appointment p r o c e s s and 
their r e s p e c t i v e headquarters . At these meetings they attended to 
170. Although some members (like Mr. K. Raman, Mr. S . P . Singh) and 
Chairmen (like Mr. J . P . L . Shenoy and Mr. M.R.Sachdev) stayed with the 
DVC for a year or less, at least one of the three kept the continuity from 
one term to the next. Cf. f .η. 169. 
171. T i m e s o f I n d i a , New Delhi, 13th December 1957; and S t a t e s ­
m a n , New Delhi, 19th December 1957. 
172. See A p p e n d i x A. 
173. The Damodar Valley Corporation (Amendment) Act of 1957 - No. 59 of 1957. 
174. In New Delhi, Calcutta or Fatna. When the Chairman became fulltime, he 
apparently remained in New Delhi, equidistant from Calcutta. The 
organization charts of the Ministry of Irrigation and Power showed Mr. T. 
Sivasankara (Chairman 1963-66) as Officer on Special Duty (DVC) in the 
Ministry. 
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relatively minor matters;^75 important i s sues , such as the progress 
of construction, power generation, i r r igat ion, rehabilitation and 
other activities of the Corporation, usually did not appear on Board 
meeting agendas. Having decided whatever they could, Board members 
were not able to ensure compliance, there being no follow-up, even 
after the fulltime appointment of the Chairman. Minutes of the 
Board meetings were sent to the officers concerned for further 
action on the lines of directives given by the Corporation. But there 
was no arrangement to see that these were complied with; no repor ts 
were sent to the Corporation. ' 
This gradual decrease of the Boa rd ' s (Corporation's) powers 
resul ted from circumstances beyond i ts control . Given the competence 
and willingness to decide upon more vital (policy) i s sues , was the 
Corporation able to do so? Legally, the answer is probably in 
affirmative, for the DVC Act empowered it to "do anything which 
may be necessary or expedient for the purposes of carrying out its 
functions under this Act. "177 In pract ice , however, it was difficult 
to "do anything" when isolated from major cen t res . This has already 
been amply illustrated in connection with both minor and major 
decis ions . Some of these were of marginal importance and resulted 
from mere bureaucratic conflict. 178 Others were of a technical 
nature: e. g. dividing the whole programme into two phases when 
necessitated by meagre (financial and technical) r e s o u r c e s , 
and spreading the entire scheme over a longer span of time. Yet 
others were matters of engineering organization, for instance, the 
separation of construction from planning and design, e t c . But major 
conflict arose from the impact of competing power p ressure by Centre 
and S ta t e s . Since almost every aspect of the project involved 
financial liability of some magnitude, the most important decisions 
175. A sample study of Corporation's meetings· between July and December 
1965, conducted by the Working Group, showed that: (1) on the average 
each meeting had 16 items on its agenda; (2) of 98 cases in 6 months, 83 
were referred to the Corporation for definite decisions, 7 for opinion and 
8 to resolve differences of opinion between Financial Adviser and the 
Secretar ia t ; and (3) of the total cases referred, about half were "not 
important enough for Corporation's decisions". See W o r k i n g G r o u p 
R e p o r t , pp. 12-13. For a glossary of items, their nature and detailed 
analysis, see Vol. II of the Report. 
176. The Working Group recommended maintaining a register for follow-up action 
with columns: Meeting No . , Date,Subject of directive, Date of communica-
tion to the authority concerned, Date of compliance, Remarks, e t c . , see 
i b i d . , p . 18. 
177. Section 22 (1); see also Section 58. A p p e n d i x A. 
178. To decide upon how the DVC should purchase its stores and equipment, or 
how the Central Government was to be kept abreast with dealings between 
the DVC and other agencies, were routine bureaucratic procedures. 
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were affected by financial shortage. 179 State financial resources 
were meagre, and the whole arrangement of project finance was 
tied to grants or loans from Central Government. Decisions which 
real ly mattered, and which could make or break the DVC's main 
activities therefore tended to be political ra ther than administrative 
in nature . And this virtually removed them from the Corporation ' s 
authority. 
(2) Who Made the Decisions? 
The main decisions were taken in conferences of the Part icipating 
Governments, which were organized to ensure cooperation and 
coordination. 1 80 These conferences were generally held once 
yea r ly . 1 ' ' 1 Composition depended on the subjects on the Agenda 
which was circulated in advance by the Central Government to 
the concerned departments and concerned governments and to the 
DVC.182 Each item on the Agenda was accompanied by a "Note" 
from the Central Government summarizing the par t icular i s sue ; 
this summary apparently included the viewpoints of the authorities 
directly concerned. ° J Selecting policy and non-policy issues 
somewhat indiscriminately, items discussed ranged fromj 
the adequacy or otherwise of the DVC Act,economics of irrigation and 
augmentation oi e lectr ic power, to individuai appointments, the DVC 
organizational se t -up, personnel policies, engaging contractors or 
construction firms, and shifting of Headquarters . 
These conferences reflected conflicting views and in te res t s . 
The States kept their individual economic and political interests in 
the forefront, the Central Government gave full scope to centralist ic 
concerns . DVC members and officers attended to reply to questions, 
to present information and, finally, to hear the decisions. Personal i t ies 
undoubtedly played a role in part icular decisions. The strong influence 
179. Including interpretation of the Act, scrapping of development schemes, 
transfer of irrigation canals, scaling-down of dam construction from eight 
to four, installation of new power plants, rehabilitation of displaced 
persons. 
180. Cf. s u p r a . , p . 49. 
181 . Except in 1950-61 , when three meetings were held in one year . 
182. In addition to 3-4 ministers, the Central Government delegation included 
representatives of various ministries (Natural Resources/irrigation and 
Power, Law, Finance, Industry and Supply, Food and Agriculture, 
Production and Supply, e tc . ) , Planning Commission, Central Water and 
Power Commission, Geological Survey of India, Central Waterpowei-, 
Irrigation and Navigation Commission, Central Electricity Commission. 
The West Bengal Government and Bihar Government were invariably 
represented by their Chief Ministers and Ministers of Irrigation, who were 
aided by one or two Secretar ies and engineers. DVC representatives almost 
always included the Chairman, two Members, Secretary, Financial Adviser, 
and two to three Heads of Departments and the Chief Engineer. 
183. These 'Notes ' on various Agenda items somtetimes read like charge-sheets 
against the DVC. 
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of C D . Deshmukh ensured a tightening of financial control, whereas 
the presence of prominent engineers powerfully affected decisions 
of a technical na ture . In later per iods, State minis ters , 
especially D r . B.C.Roy of West Bengal, succeeded in extracting 
all they possibly could from the DVC.^°5 Part ic ipants in these 
conferences seem to have shown little concern about the original 
aims or the autonomous status of the Ό\Ό.'°° 
Whatever their original purpose, the Participating Governments' 
Conferences became in practice a forum to disparage the DVC. The 
sheer force of procedural, economic and political p r e s s u r e s thus 
overcame the promises originally given in the Constituent Assembly. 
"The general principles on which this Corporation will have to work", 
N.V.Gadgil had declared, " a r e that for all purposes it is going to 
be an autonomous body, that it will be free - within the framework as 
contemplated in the provisions of this Bill - to manage the affairs 
of the Corporation. There is only one limitation - and the House 
will agree that it is a very good limitation - that in matters of 
policy the Central Government will have the final vo ice . " ° ' Once 
the process of decision-making shifted from the DVC B o a r d ' s table 
to the Participating Governments' Conferences, however, a c lear 
distinction between what fell in whose sphere, or what was policy 
and what was administration, could not easily be drawn. But then, 
as one DVC official put it candidly, "when three autonomous bodies 
endeavour to create a fourth autonomous body, to expect something 
different is deceiving onself." The situation apparently depressed 
P . P . Varma, Board Member of long standing, who wrote that the 
DVC "was not only entrusted with the responsibility . . . but also 
with power to discharge i t . But this concept has been practically 
given the coup de grace . This has been unfortunate. " ' " To Board 
184. The Central Finance Minister, Mr. CD.Deshmukh, with his undeniable 
experience and standing in financial administration was the most important 
attendant at ear l ier conferences, as were celebrated engineers Mr. A.N. 
Khosla and Mr. Man Singh. 
185. Between 1954-1962, Dr . B.C.Roy's personality certainly towered above 
the others. He was a senior member of the ruling party and at times was 
able to obtain favourable decisions for West Bengal. Because of his seniority 
and the fact that he was a strong head of a very important State, the whole 
Central Cabinet, including Nehru, thought twice before refusing his proposals. 
186. It was surprising to note that the DVC Enquiry Committee which criticized 
the Advisory Committee as a Controlling Committee, did not mention these 
Participating Governments ' Conferences, which were more effective in 
eroding DVC-autonomy. 
187. C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , 
13th February, 1948. This statement looks ironic when one remembers that 
Mr. Gadgil acted as chairman of some of the early Conferences in DVC 
history. 
188. P . P . Varma, "Some Thoughts on the DVC", I n d i a n J o u r n a l of 
P o w e r a n d R i v e r V a l l e y D e v e l o p m e n t , V, 6, June 
1955, p . 4 . 
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Members, DVC's status as an autonomous public corporation must 
have appeared a misnomer. S . Lall (Chairman, 1963), reflecting 
r a t h e r satirically on the whole position, hinted that "the Chairman 
and Members become entirely superfluous" and may as well 
"gracefully bow themselves out of the D V C " . 1 8 ^ 
B. Internal Administration; 
The s tructural aspects of the organization have been dealt with 
above. " Present discussion will be limited to administrative 
pract ices prevailing within the DVC. Whoever took the decisions 
(the Board, Central Government, or Participating Governments), 
they had to be executed. Who was administratively responsible? How 
was execution to be handled? To what extent did it reflect the political, 
administrative and financial p r e s s u r e s around the DVC? Or, to 
what extent did it conform to effective administrative norms? We 
shall not deal with engineering technicalities, but only with aspects 
which are immediately relevant to this general administartive 
problem. 
(1 ) The Executive Head: 
"The Secre tary shall be the chief executive officer of the Corporation", 
reads Section 6(2) of the DVC Act. He was a Central Government 
appointee and his sa lary, allowance and other conditions of service 
were determined by the government. The Secre tary was a fulltime 
servant of the Corporation and, subject to reappointment, his 
tenure was limited to five y e a r s . The Central Government could 
dispense with his services with three months' notice and without 
giving any reason; he could resign his office, with the same duration 
of notice. 
189. Lall, in an interesting article related a nightmare in which he saw a U.N. 
General standing in front of him. The U.N. forces at the General's 
command surrounded Lall's abode. The General then commanded Lall to 
hurriedly summon the General Manager and the Deputy General Manager by 
telephone. The U.N. General apparently demanded explanation of DVC's 
lost prestige. In a conversation between the General and these officers of 
the DVC, they discussed the pressures the DVC found itsLf under and the 
helplessness of the Board as well as management: DVC objectives, Board's 
status, Participating Governments, Central Government, Financial 
Adviser,decision-making, internal administration, etc. The U.N. General 
expressed great disappointment over the state of affairs and ordered that 
thenceforth everything would be on military lines. Then he added: "All 
policy matters will now be decided by me. To adapt a famous saying of 
Louis ХГ , Le D.V.C, c'est moi " To that, Lall remembered uttering 
last words in the nightmare: "I can assure you, General, there will be no 
difficulty about that", S.Lall, "Chairman's Nightmare", DVC S a m a c h a r , 
June 14, 1962. 
190. See Ch. III. 
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The f i r s t S e c r e t a r y of the DVC was D r . S u d h i r S e n , and it 
i s g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d that he fitted admirab ly wel l into the o rgan iza t ion 
a s it was then conce ived . ' 91 D r . S e n s tayed with the DVC well 
o v e r five y e a r s - from Ju ly 1948 t i l l June 1954 .^92 p j e w a s f 0 i i o w e c i 
by men from Al l - Ind ia S e r v i c e s ( l . C . S . / l . A . S . ) s econded to the 
DVC from the r e g u l a r c a d r e s of the S t a t e s . ^"3 o n r e c e i v i n g a 
" r e p o r t back" no t ice from t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c a d r e s , they left D V C -
s e r v i c e . E a c h of those who followed D r . S e n s e r v e d for a much 
s h o r t e r p e r i o d . " 4 
The S e c r e t a r y ' s t a sk was to implement the d e c i s i o n s made 
by the B o a r d within the scope of the DVC Act , which n e c e s s i t a t e d 
bu i ld ing-up a v a s t s e c r e t a r i a t . At f i r s t , the B o a r d worked without 
luc id d e m a r c a t i o n of d u t i e s : Cha i rman , Members and the S e c r e t a r y 
worked c l o s e l y to each o t h e r , and it was not unusua l for Boa rd Members 
to dec ide on admin i s t r a t i ve m a t t e r s , o r for the S e c r e t a r y to commit 
the C o r p o r a t i o n to a major i s s u e which needed the B o a r d ' s a p p r o v a l . 
It would a p p e a r that t h i s s i tua t ion changed a c c o r d i n g to the changing 
scope of the DVC Act and the r o l e of the DVC B o a r d . Whereas the 
formal s t r u c t u r e of the S e c r e t a r i a t r ema ined more o r l e s s the s a m e , 
i t s p o w e r s v a r i e d . In 1 9 5 7 - 5 8 , when a l l B o a r d members w e r e 
appoin ted on a p a r t - t i m e b a s i s , the S e c r e t a r y of the DVC w a s 
r e d e s i g n a t e d S e c r e t a r y - c u m - G e n e r a l M a n a g e r . His f inancia l and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r s w e r e enhanced and formal ly r e c o r d e d in the 
C o r p o r a t i o n ' s Memorandum of March 14 , 1960 ,^96 unde r which a l l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and f inancia l p o w e r s of the C o r p o r a t i o n , excep t 
t h i r t e e n i t ems spec i f i ca l ly l i s t e d , w e r e de l eg a t ed to h im. But how 
191 . This is not to say that his successors , under the changed circumstances, 
did not fit well. 
192. Mr. Mazumdar, Mr. Guha (both from the DVC Board) and Dr. Sen left the 
DVC almost consecutively, after the DVC Enquiry Committee Report was 
submitted to Parliament. Dr. Sen went as Adviser to Ghana. 
193. Men selected in the All-India Services are placed on different State-cadres 
for purposes of their service in the country. The State Government, on 
demand, seconds the individual to take up an assignment elsewhere -
including Central Government agencies. 
194. Of those who followed Dr. Sen, Mr. U.K. Ghoshal, I . C . S . , stayed for the 
longest period (February 1958 to September 1961), and Mr. B.N. Sinha, 
I . A . S . , for the shortest period (August 1956 to November 1956). 
195. This position existed during the terms of the first Board and the first 
Secretary . "There was a good collaboration and joint effort seemed to be 
bearing fruits", said one DVC official. However, it is possible that this 
collaboration may have resulted in some marginal waste which apparently 
cast a doubtful shadow on the Corporation, e . g . in such matters as 
appointment of contractors, combining construction with design by the 
same firm, e tc . 
196. See A p p e n d i x B. 
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effective was this delegation in pract ice? In view of the stringent 
financial control - and 905^ or more of the dec i s ions involved some 
sort of financial transaction - the S e c r e t a r y / G e n e r a l Manager had 
to seek the advice of the Financial Advi ser , whom he could not 
overru le . 197 in c a s e of disagreement , therefore , the Secretary-
had to put the c a s e up to the Corporation. This meant that "the 
secre tar ia t and i t s off icers do not enjoy any inherent financial 
power whatsoever". 1 98 Petty detai ls thus went to the Board for final 
d e c i s i o n . 
The development of the Secre tary -cum-Genera l Manager's 
posit ion i s best summed up by an officer formerly c l o s e l y connected 
with the DVC: 
"Theoretically, the nature of the functions and duties. . . . has undergone 
little change. The financial and administrative powers.. . . have been 
enhanced, but their character has remained the same. The important 
change has been that on really vital issues the General Manager has not 
been able to make commitments or assurances, either to the staff of the 
DVC, or to contractors, local people, consumers of DVC power, or any 
department or individual officer of any of the Participating Governments 
The efficient working of any large organization depends on the capacity 
of the man on the spot to anticipate the views and reactions of those in 
whom the ultimate power vests Where such intelligent anticipation 
becomes impossible because the Board has no continuous and effective 
existence, there is bound to be indecision, confusion, and frustration."^ 
(2) Outer Reflect ions Within: 
The two top t i e r s of the DVC organization have been examined above . 
What administrative p r o c e s s prevai led at the lower l e v e l s ? In order 
to answer this question and to see if it indicates the same trends 
prevai l ing in the upper t i e r s , we now analyse the personnel po l i c i e s 
and administrative p r o c e s s e s . 
(a) Personne l P o l i c i e s : "The Corporation may appoint such 
other off icers and servants as it cons iders n e c e s s a r y for the efficient 
performance of i ts functions", reads Sec t ion 6(3) of the DVC Act . 
These powers of the Corporation were apparently in l ine with the 
general pract ice of giving a public corporation freedom to frame 
i ts own ru le s regarding recruitment, promotion and other conditions 
197. The DVC (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1951 , as amended by DVC 
Notification No. 13, dated 20th May 1959, were very clear: "No final 
decision on any matter involving revenue and expenditure shall be taken 
without the advice of the Financial Adviser." 
198. W o r k i n g G r o u p R e p o r t , p. 11. The Working Group lists scores 
of cases in which the money involved was rather petty, yet these went up to 
the Board; one case related to the reimbursement of a medical claim of 
Rs.lOO/- by an employee. I b i d . Vol.11, para. 7 .2 . 
199. From a note answering my question: "What functions are vested in the 
Secretary and General Manager . . . ? " 
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of service of i ts employees. But at the same time, another section of 
the Act almost eclipsed this administrative freedom: "(1) The 
Corporation may, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, 
by notification in the Gazette of India, make regulations for carrying 
out its functions under this Act. (2) In part icular and without 
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, in such regulation 
the Corporation may make provisions for (a) making of appointments 
and promotions of its officers and servants ; (b) specifying other 
conditions of service of its officers and servants . . ."200 (our 
emphasis). Notwithstanding the powers given under section 6(3), 
DVC personnel policies were actually heavily civil service-oriented. 
The Corporation had two sets of Regulations: DVC Service Regulations 
governing the recruitment, conditions of service, pay, allowances, 
discipline, retirement benefits of employees ; and DVC Service 
(Conduct) Regulations which, in general, incorporated various " D o ' s " 
and " D o n ' t s " purportedly necessary for an individual 's conduct as 
employee of the Corporation. Both these sets of Regulations were 
framed with the pr ior approval of the Government of India. Sanction 
was r a r e l y held back, because these regulations closely followed 
the Central Civil Service Rules and Fundamental Rules of the 
Government of India. If any regulations were not in line with these 
Rules, the Government of India directed the corporation to amend 
t h e m > 1 
While service conditions of DVC personnel followed Central 
Government pract ice, the actual manning of various departments 
had to take at least two factors into consideration: the paucity of 
skilled workers , and employment of people belonging to two States -
West Bengal and Bihar. Regulation 9 of the DVC Service Regulations 
stipulated that recruitment to the services should be by (a) direct 
appointment, or (b) promotion of persons already in the service of 
the Corporation, or (c) borrowing from Governments. Due to the 
paucity of trained people, however, the DVC was forced to rely on 
200. Section 60 of the DVC Act, see A p p e n d i x A. 
201 . The DVC issued Office Circulars or Memoranda incorporating such 
directives. For instance, see Ministry of Finance O.M. No.F .5(1 ЭО)Е /53, 
of 7.12.54, about general conditions of service; Ministry of Irrigation and 
Power's letter No. t3(2)-DW-IV/54, January 1957, about compensatory 
allowance to Calcutta-based employees; and Ministry of Helath O.M. No. 
F.28-16/59-HI, dated 26th June 1959 about application of Central Services/ 
Medical Attendance Rules - all included in the C o m p i l a t i o n of 
R e g u l a t i o n s a n d R u l e s (DVC, Calcutta, 1960). 
The general routine, as explained by a DVC official, was: the Ministry of 
Home Affairs in New Delhi sent service instructions to all Ministries and 
Departments of the Government of India which, in tum, were passed on to 
the DVC by the Ministry of Irrigation and Power. 
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"borrowing from Governments", at l e a s t in fi l l ing the majority of 
higher p o s t s . Numerous eng ineers and administrative off icers came 
to the DVC on secondment from State and Central Governments, 
mostly from the former, and retained their permanent t i e s with 
these governments. The loyalty of such off icers was consequently 
divided. The increas ing demand for trained men, the chances of a 
"report back" notice from their parent organization, or a lucrative 
offer from an organization e l s e w h e r e , caused such people to be only 
temporarily interested in the DVC, which had become a good training 
ground for technical s k i l l s . 202 jf they continued with the DVC, their 
backgrounds of differing traditions demanded considerable energy 
and time for adaptation. 
The second feature in recruitment of personnel was giving 
employment to sons of the so i l - Bengal is and B i h a r i s . This was 
not laid down in the regulat ions, but seems to have resu l ted from 
local pol i t ical p r e s s u r e s : the DVC after al l was located in Bengal 
and Bihar, and there w a s a reasonable demand for priority in 
employing local people . Although such pract ices did not follow the 
principle of open competition on an all-India b a s i s , it was perhaps 
a fair ly r e a l i s t i c arrangement, cons ider ing the lack of sufficient 
inducements to lure competent men from war away. 
What i s more striking, however, i s a pecul iar feature of the 
arrangement: it became an unwritten understanding that DVC 
operat ions be regulated from Calcutta. West Bengal had more trained 
and competent people avai lable than Bihar, and had more money 
invested in DVC operat ions; the net outcome of these cons iderat ions 
s e e m s to have been a top-heavy hierarchy with B e n g a l i s and Bihar is 
at the bottom.203 This i s not to say that matters of balance between 
the two S t a t e s were ignored. In fact, this was c l e a r l y v is ib le in the 
appointment of the Secretary-cum-Genera l Manager and Additional 
Secretary-cum-Deputy General Manager.204 ц
 w a s
 understood that 
if the former was from West Bengal, the latter was to be from 
Bihar, and v ice v e r s a . From B i h a r ' s point of v iew, the posit ion 
remained far from sat i s factory, however, and this had i t s e f fects 
202. This applied equally in case of Board Members and the Executive Head. On 
the position of engineers and other officers, a senior Bihar Government 
official responded: "When these persons see everything that the DVC stood 
for being undermined, naturally they consider it an insecure organization." 
203. Following figures, albeit variable, were supplied by the DVC: 
a) Grade I 
b) Grade II 
c) Grade 11 
d) Grade III 
e) Grade III 
(Officers): 
(Subordinate Technical): 
(Subordinate non-
Technical): 
(Technical): 
(Non-technical): 
Bengal 
Bengal 
Bengal 
Bengal 
Bengal 
333; 
1094; 
1491; 
133; 
321; 
Bihar 
Bihar 
Bihar 
Bihar 
Bihar 
120. 
698. 
438. 
566. 
526. 
204. The necessity for an Additional Secretary-cum-Deputy General Manager 
was felt when the Board was composed of part-time members and the 
Secretary's powers and functions increased. 
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on DVC objectives.^05 ц
 w a s
 argued that all top officials of the DVC 
were from West Bengal and that, despite the fact that most construction 
was in Bihar t e r r i t o r y and was dislocating the life and property of 
thousands of their people, anything benefiting Bihar was begrudged. 
In such c a s e s , "since the costs on a project a r e to be shared" , one 
Bihar Government official pointed out, "figures and estimates a r e 
so mischievously presented that the whole scheme appears 
prohibitive and on that ground only Bengal can say that they are not 
prepared to share" .206 
Thus, we see that personnel policies reflected the same 
major under-currents as other features of the Corporation: formal 
regulation of services under Central Government direct ions, but 
actual implementation based on local considerat ions. The lat ter 
resulted in a polarization of DVC-staff into two groups - Bengalis 
and Bihar i s . This was clearly demonstrated in the formation of two 
trade unions, a short note on which seems necessary before concluding 
our discussion of personnel policies. 
"Nowhere is the conflict between the productive requirements 
of the state and the consumption requirements of organized groups", 
wri tes Weiner, "seen more clearly than in the relations between government 
and trade unions. "207 χ^β relations between the DVC and its trade 
unions exhibited this conflict to a menacing extent. To s tar t with, 
there were two trade unions - one having Bengali membership and 
the other Bihari . Informally, both were supported by their 
respective government. If the unions had been united in their demands 
for higher wages, improvements in working conditions, protection 
against retrenchment, this arrangement might have caused no 
problems. But when the interests themselves were in conflict, the 
chances of joining hands against management on such issues were 
remote. F i r s t l y , the unions contained two different linguistic and 
provincial groups. Secondly, the grievance of one union (for instance, 
205. I have relied for the following on interviews with different officials in 
Calcutta, New Delhi and Patna. 
206. This particular informant was neither Bengali nor Bihari, a point he 
emphasized with great strength. Another informant, a research officer in 
an educational institute in New Delhi, put it with academic objectivity: "A 
proposal moves downward with a slight feeling of favouritism for one state. 
It falls into the hands of the same category of officers who make it further 
favourable to their provincial ends. By the time it reaches the top level -
again through the initiator - what you have is a distorted document wherein 
favouritism is very clearly exhibited." 
207. M. Weiner, T h e P o l i t i c s of S c a r c i t y - P u b l i c 
P r e s s u r e a n d P o l i t i c a l R e s p o n s e i n I n d i a (The 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 73. 
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r e t r e n c h m e n t of staff) did not n e c e s s a r i l y affect the o t h e r . T h i r d l y , 
and more impor t an t ly , the po l i t i ca l aff i l iat ion of t h e s e unions was 
not n e c e s s a r i l y the s a m e : West Benga l i s a s t rongho ld of Communist 
and Lef t i s t p a r t i e s ; B i h a r i s full of c a s t e - b a s e d p a r t i e s . The 
two unions t h e r e f o r e had h a r d l y any common p l a t fo rm . S t r i k e s w e r e 
f requen t in the DVC, and some of the e a r l y s t r i k e s c a u s e d 
c o n s i d e r a b l e de lay in the w o r k . The w o r k e r s went on s t r i k e 
for v a r i e d r e a s o n s : r e t r e n c h m e n t of s u r p l u s p e r s o n n e l , even when 
t h e i r c o n t r a c t s had e l a p s e d ; t r a n s f e r of people from one p l ace to 
a n o t h e r , e t c , in addi t ion to demands for h i g h e r w a g e s o r i n c r e a s e d 
a l l o w a n c e s . Management , on the o t h e r hand , faced the difficulty 
of sa t i s fy ing both un ions s imu l t aneous ly , even when impor tan t staff 
benef i t s w e r e implemented . 21 ^  "No p r o g r e s s i v e m e a s u r e " , a s one 
of the DVC management put i t , " l ike au tomat ion , t r a i n i n g , e t c . can 
be i n t roduced b e c a u s e of the stiff oppos i t ion of the u n i o n s . V e r y 
often the C h a i r m a n ' s o r G e n e r a l M a n a g e r ' s office i s s t o rmed by 
people and t h e r e i s no d i s c i p l i n e . "^ 
The DVC w a s an example of an o r g a n i z a t i o n t o r n by two 
oppos ing f o r c e s , not only a t the of f ice rs l eve l but a l s o among 
w o r k e r s . As one of the Working Group m e m b e r s somewhat peev i sh ly 
208. In Bihax the tribal people who were affected by the DVC formed a major 
political force. Myron Weiner remarks on this charactereistic of trade 
unionism in India: "Rival unionism is rampant, unions are led by outsiders, 
and control of unions is often in the hands of political parties seeking to 
use them for their own ends, " i b i d . , p . 93. 
209. While justifying some of the over-expenditure, DVC authorities pointed 
specifically to this factor. 
210. Recently, the DVC appointed the Banerjee Committee to review the staffing 
pattern of the Corporation, to make recommendations for the improvement 
of efficiency consistent with economy, and to streamline existing 
departmental procedure. The fear that the recommendations might result in 
making some staff/workers redundant, was sufficient to send the unions on 
strike and raise the slogan "Boycott the Banerjee Committee", information 
sent by a staff member of the DVC, 1966. 
211 . A simple measure like machinery for grievances of workers could not be 
introduced for many years because the two unions did not agree upon its 
principles. 
212. "Progressive measures" from the management side look somewhat pale in 
the light of rampant traditional practices. Automation, training, e tc . are 
development techniques of administration. There was little attempt to 
inculcate a sense of participation. Between management and staff/workers 
a wide social gap was maintained - largely rooted in status consciousness 
and further strengthened by colonial traditions. It was striking to see 
DVC lavatories and escalators distinctly marked "for officers only". 
Similarly, recreation clubs established in various DVC establishments were 
virtually open to officers only. It was even more striking to note that the 
Trade Unions, by nature agitational, never protested against continuation 
of such practices which, at least in Calcutta, seemed near abnormality. 
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summarized the whole position of trade unions: "they seldom agree with 
each other and almost never agree with management. "21 3 
(b) The Administrative P r o c e s s : Theoretically, the actual 
handling of work within a public corporation should differ as much 
from normal government departmental work as its organizational 
s t r u c t u r e . In analysing the administrative pract ices prevailing in 
the DVC, one should constantly keep in mind the various administrative 
and financial controls - in addition to policy direction - on which 
Central Government insisted. The DVC administration was an offshoot 
of general administrative trends in the country. Powerful centralizing 
tendencies can be observed throughout Indian government, and the 
DVC-administration did not escape this t rend. 
Internal administration became highly central ized. Some 
delegation of powers to lower lelvels of the hierarchy was attempted, 2' 4 
but in most cases discharge of a part icular duty involved financial 
res t r ic t ions or almost insurmountable administrative boundaries. 
Cases emanating from various offices, therefore, invariably reached 
the Secre tar ia t to be decided by an Under S e c r e t a r y , a Deputy 
S e c r e t a r y , the Deputy General Manager, the General Manager or 
even the Board. The Working Group pictured the general pattern 
prevailing in the "General Section" of the DVC, which largely conformed 
to other Sections studied by the Group. Their conclusion, based on 
61 case studies shows the pattern:^ 1 5 
" . . That there is tendency on the part of the Secretariat to consult 
Finance in every case involving financial implications irrespective of the 
quantum of expenditure involved and in some cases even on matters which 
are essentially administrative in character. 
" . . That a large proportion of references emanating from heads of 
departments and dealt with in the Secretariat relates to matters in which 
the heads of departments could be trusted to take decisions by appropriate 
delegation of authority . . 
"That even the departments luce Personnel Department, Information 
Department or Law Office located in the Anderson House (Calcutta), do 
not make direct references to Finance but route them through the 
Secretariat, perhaps because they are not considered as part of the 
management. " 
213. V.V. Moharir, one-time member of the Working Group, in a note prepared 
for the author. 
214. The Director of Personnel had the authority to appoint Grade II posts, and 
the Medical Officer and Information Officer to spend some money from annual 
allocations, for instance. 
215. Working Group Report, ο ρ . с i t . , Vol. II, "A Case Study Report on the 
General Section of the DVC Secretariat", p. 4. 
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Some of the salient features revealed by case studies, were that 
"on an average, a case passed through 3.8 levels in the hierarchy 
involving 7.7 stages of handling", and of the 61 cases studied, "2 
cases were disposed of at the Corporation level, 2 at the Chairman's 
level, 14 at General Manager ' s level, 1 4 at Deputy Secre tary/ 
Deputy General Manager ' s level, and the remaining 29 at Assistant/ 
Under S e c r e t a r y ' s level" .^^" 
The average time taken in handling administrative cases by the 
S e c r e t a r i a t has been discussed e a r l i e r . The workload on six levels 
of administration between Assistants and General Manager: 
Superintendents, Administrative Officers, Assistant S e c r e t a r y , 
Under S e c r e t a r y , Deputy Secretary and Deputy General Manager-
cum-Additional S e c r e t a r y , could have been considerably reduced 
by effective delegation of powers, both administrative and financial. 
But the absence of these elements in the DVC administration was a 
direct resul t of i ts general malais, the position of the two upper 
t i e r s of the Corporation and, above a l l , the traditions of the 
S e c r e t a r i a t s in Central and State Governments. As a resul t the 
Secre tar ia t of the Corporation was overburdened with paper work, 
causing a heavy burden on the Secre tary/ General Manager, who 
mostly remained in Calcutta to attend to desk-work. 
Personnel policies and the administrative pract ices thus 
reflected the whole political and administrative atmosphere 
surrounding the DVC. This is further i l lustrated by two other 
problems. 
(З) Transfer of Headquarters : 
DVC Headquarters were set up in Calcutta (Anderson House) in 1948. 
This offered the initial advantage of better communications and other 
facilities available in a big commercial c e n t r e . On the other hand, 
Calcutta was far distant from operational s i tes ; office rent was high; 
employees had to be paid compensatory and house-rent allowances, 
because living in Calcutta was more expensive; and it necessitated 
expensive travel between Calcutta and operational s i t e s . Concern for 
economy made the Corporation decide to shift i ts Headquarters to 
some central place in the valley after the take off s tage. In 1949, 
Ranchi (Bihar) was selected as a suitable place because it was r e ­
latively near to the centres of work and also provided other facil i t ies. 
Some officers moved to Ranchi, as their Camp office, wmie the 
design of the new Headquarters was s tar ted. 
However, these plans were suddenly abandoned in 1951-52 
under financial stringency and could not be taken up again until 1958 
in view of the cost of other important work.21 8 i
n
 the meantime, as 
216. Ibid ., ρ . 3. 
217. DVC A n n u a l R e p o r t 1948-49, p.4. 
218. At the time of Second Five Year Plan formulation in the early 1950s, West 
Bengal requested that in view of some urgent schemes, this expenditure 
be postponed until the Third Five Year Plan. 
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we have s e e n , DVC ran into considerable d i f f icul t ies . The Est imates 
Committee of Parliament recommended that "the headquarters office 
of the project organization should be located nearabout the s i te to 
enable the Board to watch the p r o g r e s s of work. "219 The Rau 
Committee cons idered Ranchi too far away from the area of 
operations and suggested that Headquarters be located at 
Maithon,220
 a Biliari border town adjoining West Bengal . Later , 
the Government of India decided to leave the matter to the DVC. ^ 
In i ts Third F ive Year Plan proposals in 1958, the DVC 
included the transfer of Headquarters to Maithon. By this t ime, 
operat ions were in full swing and the Corporation had expanded 
enormously . Bengali employees , by then wel l organized , had become 
a powerful p r e s s u r e group in influencing dec i s ions of this s o r t . 
Many employees were re fugees from East Bengal or Burma and 
resented another displacement of their home and hearth. The i s s u e 
assumed greater importance as the various governments , the P r e s s 
and employees joined the fight with opposing arguments . 
The Corporation looked at the problem mainly from a 
pract ica l angle: it wanted to be near the centre of ac t iv i t i es and at 
the same time to reduce i t s financial burden. After r e v i s i n g i t s 
es t imates a number of t imes , it sett led on 1 6 . 8 million rupees as 
the total cos t of moving Headquarters ; according to a l locat ions arr ived 
at on the bas i s of capital provided by each government towards 
var ious s c h e m e s , this meant 9 .17 million as West B e n g a l ' s s h a r e , 
the r e s t to be proportionately shared by Bihar and the Central 
Government. The Bihar Government, while having some r e s e r v a t i o n s 
on the es t imate , 222 shared the Corporat ion's v iews on the advantages 
of change . It added that the ex is t ing situation posed considerable 
difficulty in maintaining effect ive suppl ies of e n e r g y , with great 
hardship for industrial e n t e r p r i s e s . It sanctioned i ts share of 
expenditure . The West Bengal Government, f irst agreed with the 
proposal on pr inc iple , but two considerat ions soon out'veighed 
this provis ional agreement . F i r s t , in a situation of pe ipetual 
agitation and violence in Calcutta, 223 agreement to dis locate the 
l i v e s of hundreds of employees meant adding fuel to an already 
troubled a r e a ; providing an amount of 9 . 1 7 million r u p e e s , in the 
h a r d - p r e s s e d State economy of West Bengal , meant having l e s s for 
219. Estimates Committee, Fifth Report, para. 114, under "General". 
220. DVC E n q u i r y C o m m i t t e e R e p o r t , Ch.IX, para.38. 
221. The decision was taken i n P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s ' 
C o n f e r e n c e held on 26/27th October 1953. Also, see 
"Comments and Decisions", p. 38. 
222. "The figures were exaggerated", said one Bihar Government Official. 
223. The frequency at which violence breaks out in Calcutta is common knowledge. 
However, I have briefly included this point further on, i n f r a . , pp.1 89-90. 
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developments in other d irec t ions . Secondly , and more important, the 
transfer was to benefit one State over another. The Central 
Government cons idered the i s s u e a purely administrative and large ly 
agreed with the DVC · s proposa l s . The equation therefore came down 
to: the DVC, Bihar and the Central Government agree ing with the 
move, and West Bengal increas ingly opposing i t . In 1959, the DVC 
Chairman pointed out that, subject to availabil ity of funds for the 
construction of bui ldings, he "expected that the move of al l the 
major off ices to the new Headquarters would be completed within 
about two y e a r s " . 2 2 4 
"Subject to availabil i ty of funds "proved a vital qualif ication. 
The West Bengal Government could not find the money in the Third 
F i v e Year Plan a l locat ions , and made it c l e a r that al l r e s o u r c e s 
had to be uti l ized for productive schemes in the S t a t e . The DVC 
could as wel l go to the open market, West Bengal axgued, s ince the 
Act made due provis ion for such p u r p o s e s . ' S i n c e the supply of 
funds from Bihar and Central Government did not pose much problem, 
the work of moving Headquarters continued s lowly; and the Central 
Deputy Minister of Irrigation and P o w e r made a statement to this 
effect in the Lok Sabha in December 1961 . 2 2 6 
The question became more explos ive in 1962. The workers 
threatened to s t r i k e , and in the West Bengal Legis la t ive Assembly 
many protes t s were made against the move .227 The Irrigation 
Minister , Mr. A.K.Mukherjee , gave a s s u r a n c e s in July 1962 that 
West Bengal would not be respons ib le for any amount spent by the 
DVC on this account .228 The Bihar Government, on the other hand, 
kept ins i s t ing on the matter and put p r e s s u r e upon Central Government 
to help implement the d e c i s i o n . The Central Government, however , 
des i red to consult the West Bengal Government before actual transfer 
took p l a c e . T h i s , in turn, made the Deputy Minister of Irrigation 
(Bihar) , Mr. L . N . J h a , announce in the Leg i s la t ive Assembly that 
s ince there was no cause warranting any rev i s ion of the dec i s ion , 
224. P r o c e e d i n g s o f P a r t i c i p a t i n g G o v e r n m e n t s 1 
C o n f e r e n c e , held at New Delhi, on 6th April, 1959. 
225. Dr. B.C. Roy happened to meet the Minister of Irrigation and Power in 
New Delhi, in April 1961 , and discussed the matter with him. 
226. This statement was severely criticized by the Calcutta Press . See, 
H i n d u s t h a n S t a n d a r d , 6th December 1961 , which wrote: 
"information is false being incomplete in material particulars insofar as it 
relates to the consent of the West Bengal Government". 
227. Mr. Bhattacharjee (Forward Bloc) called Bihar's insistence narrow 
provincialism and said that it would make about 2000 Bengali employees 
greatly suffer in various ways, see H i n d u s t h a n S t a n d a r d , 
22nd July 1962. 
228. I b i d . , 23rd July 1962. 
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there was no question of further consultation. 229 He apparently ignored 
the fact that for West Bengal rea l i s s u e s were at stake which did 
warrant consultations and rev i s ion of the d e c i s i o n . And where rea l 
i s s u e s are at stake consultation does not general ly bear des i red 
r e s u l t s . The West Bengal Government stood firm and did not agree 
to share the c o s t s of transfer of DVC Headquarters. This was 
checkmate. The administrative convenience of DVC was thus 
subordinated once again to considerat ions beyond i ts control . 
(4) The DVC and Public Opinion: 
The people for whose benefits the DVC was created were of widely 
d i verse nature: r ich and poor, l i terate and i l l i terate , informed and 
ignorant. Public opinion on the DVC was large ly formed by two informal 
channels : the pol i t ic ians and the P r e s s who reacted to these different 
s o c i a l groupings. 
Great material in teres t s were at s take, providing ample 
material for pol i t ic ians to mobilize the m a s s e s in protest.^ЭО j
n 
Bihar, hundreds of thousands of tribal people were being uprooted; 
this was sufficient cause for tribal l e a d e r s to r a i s e their vo ice 
against DVC projects in order to win popularity and then Assembly 
s e a t s . 2 3 1 Alongside administrative and financial di f f icult ies, the 
229. I b i d . , 4th January 1963. S e e , a l s o , A m r i t B a z a r P a t r i k a , 
7th January 1963. The Minister further pointed out that actual dis location 
would affect only 790 persons and not 1 300 or 2000 as said by Calcutta papers 
and spokesmen in the West Bengal Legis lat ive Assembly. 
230. "With respect to domestic problems", writes S h i l s , demagogy's "chief 
function and i ts frequent intent are to divide a people by ral lying those who 
respond to it against some presumed internal enemy. Thus in the new s t a t e s , 
where traditionally rece ived identifications already work to separate rather 
than unite the people, the hunger of the demagogue for approbation leads 
him to exploit loyalt ies of division",Edward S h i l s , "Demagogues and Cadres 
in the Pol i t ical Development of the New S t a t e s " , in Lucian W. P y e (ed. ) , 
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d P o l i t i c a l D e v e l o p m e n t 
(Princeton University P r e s s , Princeton, 1963), p . 6 6 . 
231 . Weiner ca l l s the Jharkhand Party in Bihar "India 's best tribal party" under 
the leadership of Jaipal Singh, an Oxford-trained son of a landowner. A 
strong advocate of a separate tribal state within the Indian Union, Jaipal 
Singh and other leaders of this party claimed to "have forced the Bihar 
Government to pay more attention to the development of Chotanagpur region, 
in particular, to support new educational fac i l i t i es" , Myron )Veiner, ο ρ . 
с i t . , pp. 4 1 - 4 3 . 
Jaipal S i n g h ' s reference has appeared e a r l i e r . The mass appeal of his 
arguments to his people i s best seen in his statement in the Constituent 
Assembly: "Something l ike 300 v i l lages will have to be submerged. The 
Adibasi i s the child of the soi l of that particular terr i tory. It i s he who has 
to be uprooted and not the big businessman, maybe from Bombay, or Madras, 
or Calcutta . . My Hon'ble friend Mr. Gadgil has indirectly . . . made 
reference to the misbehavior of the River Damodar . . . The River Damodar 
i s a sacred r iver , i s very well behaved. It has had no intention of drowning 
the Bengal is but it i s the people of Bengal who have been misbehaving 
144 
polit icians' role in Bihax was no less important a factor in rehabil i­
tation schemes, or in incitement of the labour force. In West Bengal , 
on the other hand, there was no part icular focal issue except, of 
course, the Headquarters issue on which politicians of both states 
tr ied to make political capital. F o r West Bengal, more general 
questions were involved: of Central Government predominance, of 
that Government's tendency to sacrifice Bengal ' s interes ts for the 
benefit of Bihar. Moreover, there were frequent black-outs in 
Calcutta for which the DVC was often blamed. In the general leftist 
political climate of West Bengal, every government weakness was 
exploited, and the DVC stood as a symbol of this weakness.^32 Thus, 
with different approaches in each Sta te , the polit icians' role has 
been important in both. 
The second organ of opinion formation is the p r e s s . The 
Indian P r e s s , according to Tinker, "as a public watch-dog - or 
even in providing a reliable flow of information, is limited to a few 
exceptional p a p e r s " . " 3 Before Independence, the p r e s s played the 
role of rousing public opinion against the British Government and 
many leading intel lectuals, including leaders of the national struggle, 
used it as an effective forum. Though this missionary zeal did not 
altogether disappear, p r e s s coverage has since tended to become 
less cr i t ical of government. Newspapers find it convenient to condemn 
bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, lack of realism in plans, 
the failure of peoples ' participation or student indiscipline, but in 
a general way without offending any one. "If a cr i t ical editorial 
appears on any day", wri tes Aiyer, "it is carefully balanced by ful­
some praise on another occasion. "234 If any cr i t ical information 
appears , he adds, "it is invariably from the latest repor t of the 
Estimates or Public Accounts Committee. Undoubtedly the la t ter has 
i ts own value but it indicates nevertheless the ' negative ' attitude 
of the Indian r e p o r t e r . " " · ' Such an analysis seems pertinent in 
relation to the national daily newspapers which largely depend on 
Government advertisements for their survival. 3° fhe weekly 
themselves in regard to Damodar and the gods of the Adi basis have inflicted 
punishment on them". C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y 
( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , 12th December 1947. 
232. As one informant said: "Countless questions are asked from Ministers in the 
Legislative Assembly on development plans, and, more often than not, the 
DVC reference comes." A Central Government official almost prophesied 
DVC's doom when he said, "but for the Central Government's hold you 
wouldn't see the DVC". 
233. Hugh Tinker, I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n - A P o l i t i c a l 
A n a l y s i s (Praeger, New York, 1963), p . 184. 
234. S . P . Aiyer, "Public Opinion and Mass Communication", O p i n i o n , 
Bombay, June 30, 1964, pp. 28-29. 
235. I b i d . 
236. This is largely due to commercial reasons. The P r e s s depends heavily on 
Government advertisement, and crossing certain limits can result in 
withdrawal of this favour, almost ruining a paper. For a short but lucid 
commentary, see Hugh Tinker, ο ρ . с i t ., pp. 178 et . seq. 
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newsmagazines, which depend on private patronage rather than 
government, tend to be different. Gadgil had one such newsmagazine 
in view when he wrote: "But the irresponsible habit of publishing 
allegations without sufficient investigation, so characteristic of our 
press after independence shows no sign of abating despite the 
responsibilities of freedom."^-'' 
On inter-state matters, however, the position tended to be 
different. Most leading newspapers were based in State capitals. 
From a commercial viewpoint, harsh criticism of another State 
appears to have been fairly safe practice. The columns of the 
newspapers published in Calcutta and Patna made this trend rather 
clear. Some examples are given below: 
"The West Bengal Government i s reported to have e x p r e s s e d i ts i n -
ability to meet the commitment on the ground of financial s tr ingency . This 
has created a s e r i o u s situation for the State of Bihar because the power 
generated by the two new units would be uti l ized in Bihar and i s included 
in i t s Third Plan power target . "238 
"Will this trouble e v e r end? Nobody seems to know. What i s known i s that 
Bihar got an additional 3 7 , 7 0 0 kw, in October. In July this State West 
Bengal was given 2 , 3 3 3 , 3 3 5 kil iwatts more than B ihar . S o far no 
interference with supply to West B e n g a l ' s neighbouring state has been 
reported - a performance which certainly d e s e r v e s p r a i s e . " 2 · ' ' 
"As Bihar has contributed a part of the heavy Bil l of the DVC without 
gaining much advantage, this State has been a victim of the Corporat ion ' s 
scant regard for the sanctity of public funds. 
The undue sof tness exhibited towards corrupt and guilty off ic ials has 
only helped to demonstrate that a portion of the funds of the Corporation 
has been misused with impunity." 
"It i s because of the crucia l needs for power and irrigation that the 
West Bengal Government has requested for the management of DVC 
irrigat ion schemes in West Bengal and asked for additional generation of 
power . If the Central Government finds it hard to accede to the f irst 
request it must immediately set right the operation of the DVC so thai 
i t s irr igat ion fac i l i t i es work at full capaci ty . And so far the request for 
additional power capacity , West Bengal Government must work fast with 
the blueprint and urge New Delhi to p r o c e s s it quickly so that the work 
on the power plants can be undertaken without de lay . "241 
These extracts substantiate some of the charac ter i s t i c s of the 
Indian P r e s s mentioned above . It was a potential factor in turning 
public opinion against the DVC, whose achievements went unapplauded, 
237 . This remark was in connection with the f i r s t Chairman of the DVC Board , 
Mr. S . N . Mazumdar, whose appointment, BLITZ of Bombay reported , was 
made because he was a cousin of Mrs . Sucheta Kriplani(wife of then top 
Congres s l eader Mr. J . B . K r i p l a n i , one of the few leading women in the 
country and later Chief Minister of a S t a t e ) . The fact of Mr. Mazundar's 
relat ionship was t r u e , but his se lec t ion p r o c e s s ( c f . p . 125) was conveyed 
to the Editor by Gadgil whereupon Blitz apo log ized . S e e , N . V . Gadgil , 
G o v e r n m e n t f r o m I n s i d e , p . 103 . 
238 . I n d i a n N a t i o n , Patna, 27th September 1962 . 
239 . Report in connection with power failure in Calcutta, H i n d u s t h a n 
S t a n d a r d , Calcutta, 7th December 1961 . 
240 . Commenting on report of the Public Accounts Committee to Parl iament, 
S e a r c h l i g h t , Patna, 8th December, 1961 . 
2 4 1 . In connection with transfer of r ights and ownership of DVC barrage and 
canal system to West Bengal , A m r i t B a z a r P a t r i k a , Calcutta, 
1st February , 1963. 
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and failures were magnified. Under this situation the establishment 
of professional public relations within the DVC might have been expected 
to counter such adverse publicity: by explaining, even individually, 
to politicians what the DVC stood for, what the difficulties were and 
where cooperation was needed; by arranging p r e s s conferences, to 
acquaint the p r e s s with the facts and to urge it to present things in 
the right perspective.242 i
n
 fact, only one Assistant Information 
Officer was appointed at f i rst . After a lapse of two y e a r s , a Chief 
Information Officer was added who, in 1953, was given the assistance 
of a Public Relations Officer. With some interim changes, this 
organizational s tructure continued. The Information Department has 
issued occasional p r e s s re leases and has arranged some visits of 
V . l . P . ' s ; it has engaged in documentary film production and display, 
in printing brochures, in issuing a monthly periodical, DVC S amachar, 
-published in English, Hindi and Bengali, and an occasional talk. In 
substance, however, these functions meant chiefly for the public at 
l a r g e . They had little effect on the centres from which most adverse 
crit icism flowed. 
The Information Department worked within the same limitations 
as every other aspect of the DVC. It could spend approximately 3 to 
400,000 rupees annually on publicity, of which not more than 50 rupees 
could be spent on a single item at a time.243 т^е Information Department 
thus did not have authority to incur expenditure even on such minor 
matters as printing a DVC-Agenda and Calendar, or New Year greeting 
c a r d s . Decision on such matters were made, if not by the Board, by 
the Secretary-cum-General Manager.244 The Administration's approach 
to this important aspect was one of routine. "The publicity work is of 
technical nature in a sense" , explained one official from the said 
Department, "and a lot of initiative is needed. When a proposal is sent 
to the Administration, which under ru les we have to do, it is 
mutilated to the extent that the whole idea becomes a flop. After that, 
there is no initiative left ." Another official added, "no attempts were 
made to meet the criticism either from politicians or from the p r e s s " . 
The focus of our attention in this chapter has been on the 
242. The following account, unless specified, is based upon interviews conducted 
by the author in the DVC. 
243. This covered salaries of staff (including Public Relations Officer), 
entertainment of guests, film production, salaries of guides, daily and 
travelling allowances of officials for film shows, e tc . In 1966-67, the total 
amount spent by Information Branch was Rs.217,598; see DVC A n η u a 1 
R e p o r t 1966-67, p . 136. 
244. S e e W o r k i n g G r o u p R e p o r t , Vol. II, pp. 7-8. The Working 
Group also included a case in its study where the Information Department 
sought sanction for Rs.24/- for subscribing to a periodical. 
245. Casual " let ter to the editor" from the Information Department did appear in 
the newspapers; see Assistant Information Officer's letters in A m r i t 
B a z a r P a t r i k a , 20th Janauary 1963 and 4th February 1963. How­
ever, the draft of such letters had to be approved by the Administration. 
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queries posed earlier. In addition to throwing light on some funda-
mental issues - autonomy, for instance - what further emerges from 
the above discussion is that, with some overlapping, the entire 
period can be divided into three stage s :246 
(i) From 1948 to 1950, the DVC worked as a fairly autonomous 
body. This is not to say that Central Government did not 
question some minor matters. In handling business with 
other government agencies within the area, or administering 
affairs such as engaging contractors, seeking foreign 
collaboration, and scheduling construction, the Corporation 
showed some freedom of action. 
ii) From 1950 to 1954 the Central Government dominated the scene. 
During the first two years, many reasons had piled up to 
"take stock" of things; this stock-taking included policy as 
well as organizational matters, which finally culminated in 
the appointment of the Enquiry Committee. This Committee's 
report and the decisions thereon by Central Government 
were a landmark which not only settled many controversial 
i ssues , but also set the subsequent mode of operations. 
(iii) The period from 1954 to the present shows the DVC over-
ruled by inter-state rivalries and inter-governmeatal 
conflicts. Although such influences were not absolutely 
absent in the earlier period, they became more noticeable 
after 1954. Simultaneously, the force of pressure from 
the Central Government diminished. Though its routine 
checks and controls upon the DVC continued, on vital issues 
it mostly vacillated and no clear indication was available. 
Development of the DVC on these lines becomes clearer when 
seen in the light of ecological factors. In the next and final chapter, 
we shall attempt an analysis of these ecological factors which are 
themselves rapidly changing while simultaneously affecting schemes 
such as the DVC. This analysis will be accompanied by the 
conclusions which this study has caused us to draw. 
246. These three s tages of the DVC history run roughly parallel to the Union-
States relationship in general . Cf. , i n f r a . , pp. 174-76.Laporte J r . 
seems to have ignored the first stage in his ana ly s i s , although it was 
actually the main cause of the other two. S e e Robert Laporte J r . , "Inter-
governmental Change in India: Po l i t i cs and Administration of the 
Damodar Valley Scheme," A s i a n S u r v e y , VIII, 9 , September 1968. 
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Chapter V 
A N A L Y S E S A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
The DVC was 2 0 - y e a r s old in July 1968. It ce lebrated this anniversa-
ry by inaugurating the third unit of thermal power station at 
Chandrapura which had the highest capacity in the country. The 
development in these two decades - both of the deployment of the 
programme and of internal administration - were e leborated in the 
prev ious two chapters . The narrat ive , albeit large ly descr ip t ive , 
provides a broad base for assessment and a n a l y s i s . 
THE BASIC I S S U E S - AN A S S E S S M E N T 
The premise from which the DVC started w a s : a public corporat ion, 
based on the TVA model, responsible for multipurpose development 
of the Damodar Val ley . The bas ic i s s u e s involved in this proposition 
were developed in e a r l i e r portions of this study (Chs . I & I l ) .They 
may now be summarized for our a s s e s s m e n t . 
(1) Is it a Multi-purpose Organization? 
The DVC was not to confine itself to promoting and operating schemes 
for flood control , irr igat ion and power; it was a l s o to promote 
public health and the agricultural and industrial welfare of the 
v a l l e y . So it was conce ived , and so it was planned, by Indian and 
foreign experts in the heyday of Indian independence. 
Of the aims stipulated in the Act , power production 
remains today the D V C ' s main and perhaps only occupation. 
Development schemes were taken away from it in 1954; navigation 
shows no s igns of getting underway because of diff icult ies in finding 
an operative agency; soil conservat ion and afforestation work has 
been stunted due to lack of funds, and r e s e r v o i r s are gradually 
s i l t ing up ¡rehabilitation work i s virtual ly neutral ized. The primary 
aim was "flood control", but owing to the non-construction of more 
than four dams (out of eight originally planned) and the s c a l i n g -
down of flood-moderating capacity , the occurence of f loods in the 
val ley i s almost a s frequent a s before DVC was es tab l i shed . How-
e v e r , their devastation has been significantly reduced - with the 
exception of the 1959 flood which, but for the aftermath of famine, 
was a s devastating a s that of 1943. The second objective was 
i rr igat ion . After long time consuming negot iat ions , the management 
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and operation of irrigation canals were taken over by the West 
Bengal Government. The intervening period has been one of 
great confusion, leaving no one responsible for maintaining of the 
irrigation system. After eighteen years of DVC work, adjacent 
a reas of Bihar were in near-famine condition in 1966 and 1967. The 
reasons may have been two years of drought; but it was primarly 
to neutralize these vagaries of nature that the DVC was entrusted 
with irrigation as one of its important t asks . However, the DVC 
has excelled in its third main objective. The DVC power generating 
capacity, the cheap rate at which it is made available to the public, 
the revenue it brings to the Corporation, and the assis tance which 
the Corporat ion 's engineers render by way of advice or services, 
both to the concerned States and elsewhere in the country, have 
been unique. 
However, huge dams, r e s e r v o i r s , power plants and 
canals , or the availability of trained engineering skill , a re 
insufficient to define the organization as a "multi-purpose" r iver 
valley project . Its concentration on power production at best makes 
it a "single-purpose" project. 
(2) Did DVC Qualify as an "Autonomous" body? 
On the basis of the idea that the administration of certain special 
services should be separated from the ordinary activities of 
government, the DVC was to be an autonomous public corporation. 
Brian Chapman has correctly insisted that a c lear 
definition of what constitutes "autonomy" is difficult in federal and 
quasi-federal countr ies . He proposes "to regard as an autonomous 
institution a body which has been created by a formal legal ins t ru-
ment which is not changeable at will by the executive authority; an 
institution with i ts own legal personality, and with effective 
independence in managing its own administrative and financial 
affa i rs" . 1 The DVC's case as an autonomous body, however, was 
sui gener i s . It was created by a formal legal instrument, but all 
further conditions were lacking from the s ta r t . Its main weakness 
was s t ructural : it suffered from a heavy financial dependence on 
the three governments and, largely as a consequence, became 
highly vulnerable to political p r e s s u r e . This , in turn , made it 
difficult to escape bureaucratic supervision.^ The decision to 
maintain or to undermine the autonomy of the Corporation therefore 
fell into the hands of more powerful cen t res . Since the needs and 
scope of one organization differ from another, questions like the 
number of Board members, their emoluments or qualifications are 
of marginal importance and do not require more attention he re . 
1. Brian Chapman, G e n e r a l R e p o r t on "Devolution of Powers to 
Autonomous Institutions", Xlth International Congress of Administrative 
Sciences, HAS, Brussels , 1959, p p . 4 - 5. 
2. In Britain, it was to escape from political pressure and bureaucratic 
mechanism that this type of organization was devised, cf. s u p r a . , p.11 
150 
Significant in assessing the autonomous character of the DVC is to 
see the p ressures operating behind every decision, and the position 
to which the Board was reduced in actual pract ice . In the decision 
making process , there was a constant three-way pull: not only the 
annual budget had to be passed by three legis la tures , but each p ro -
ject had to be approved by the three governments. Major appointments 
(e .g . the Chief Engineer and all persons with salar ies above 
Rs . 2000/- per month) were screened by the three governments; 
other appointments were made by a selection committee having 
State-wise representat ion. Most decisions were made in in ter -
governmental conferences, which took away powers entrusted to 
the Corporation by Parliament (for instance, development schemes): 
ministerial guidance to the Corporation was evidently non-existant.-^ 
The DVC thus ran into frequent difficulties v is -à-v is the S ta tes . 
When it mismanaged basic functions, there were equally frequent 
Parliamentary probes into DVC affairs. Largely as a resul t of these 
unforeseen developments, the DVC Board was rendered almost im-
potent; the DVC Board thus became neither a policy, nor a function-
a l , nor a policy-cum-functional Board. The pivotal force of the 
"autonomous" DVC became virtually an inspecting t r io . 
Being created by a formal legal instrument therefore did 
not necessari ly mean that the DVC had an autonomous personality 
of i ts own. Complicated financial arrangements prevented the "effect-
ive indepence in managing its own administrative and financial 
affairs" . As we have seen, regulating, accounting, auditing, object-
ions and interference by the Finance Ministry plagued the DVC. 
Thus, the main character is t ics which distinguish a public corpo-
ration from anormal government department,such as less t reasury 
control and a commercial audit, were non-existent in the DVC. The 
DVC may have had a great deal to i ts credit as a single-purpose 
project, but it did not qualify as an autonomous agency. 
(3) Is the TVA i ts prototype? 
Established in a foreign land and functioning efficiently, the TVA 
had inspired the establishment of the DVC. "India 's TVA", as it 
was announced at i ts inception and as it is still proudly called. 
President Roosevelt called the TVA an organization 
which "combined the authority and prestige of Government with the 
elasticity and freedom of private enterprise". '^ A bas ic difference 
between the TVA and the DVC may be seen in this ra ther broad 
definition. The DVC was given the responsibility but not the effect-
ive authority to discharge certain t a sks . It resembled the TVA in 
being formally a Federal Government en te rpr i se , but more so than 
by the TVA, effective authority was legally vested in Central 
3. Central Government ministers came to these conferences more as 
hostile supervisors than as sponsors or sympathetic counsellors. 
4. President Roosevelt's message to Congress, 10th April 1933, 
available in almost every study on TVA. 
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Government. The real bottleneck was located in the fact that 
Central Government never considered itself to be functioning under 
the name of DVC. Since authority was not there , prestige could 
not follow. Absence of both meant that the organization actually 
came to function more as a subordinate department of the Ministry 
at the Centre ,6 than as a public corporation with "the elasticity 
and freedom of a private en te rpr i se" . 
Other features of TVA included: (^ ) the paramount im-
portance of the Board; (b) the lack of detailed instructions to the 
Board, which came to enjoy considerable independence in taking 
administrative decisions ; (c) decentralization of functions through 
local and state agencies ; (d) effective implementation of decisions 
once taken; and, most important, (e) accountability to the nation 
only through President and Congress . ' Could similar organiza-
tional and administrative features be found in the DVC? 
With the possible exception of the first Board members, 
no minister "searched the nation over" to man the Board; 
appointments soon fell to habitual c i rc les of government or semi-
government agencies . Even such routine selection was further 
qualified by virtual representation of three governements on the 
Board. Under this arrangement, Board members cared more for 
their respective states than for the DVC. In addition, detailed 
instructions flowed equally regularly from the Central Government 
to the Corporation - ranging from policy to administrative matters . 
The Board 's position therefore became more of a state of confusion 
than of "paramount importance". Fur thermore, the DVC appears to 
have overburdened itself: with the exception of afforestation, it did 
not delegate any function to local or State agencies. This p rac t i se , 
so much unlike that of TVA, may well have resulted in West Bengal' s 
almost forcibly taking over the irrigation system; in B i h a r ' s 
reluctant cooperation in rehabilitation schemes; and in the enforced 
scrapping of all "secondary" objectives. Again, as the process in-
dicated, fundamental decision making was not the domain of the 
Corporation. Hence, implementation of such decisions, taken more 
under jurisdictional p ressure than on rational grounds or consulta-
tive commitment, did not call for administrative determination by 
DVC. Then too, DVC ' s accountability, unlike that of the TVA, was 
ra ther confusing. Legally it was a Central Agency, accountable to 
the Central Minister and through him to Parliament. In actual fact, 
however, all i ts actions were simultaneously questioned by three 
5. Note all the items included in various agendas, the questions raised about 
purchases, appointments e tc . which would not have arisen if the DVC was 
considered as Central Government functioning in the valley. 
6. Refer to the discussion in preceding sub-section. The control and official-
dom did not leave much scope for flexibility. Instead, the common trai ts of 
government administration were part of the DVC: rigidity, delays and red-
tapism. 
7. See , for details, s u p r a . , pp. 6-7. 
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masters . Its achievements and failures, as well as its annual budgets 
(after the preliminary stage of inter-governmental conferences) 
were debated in three legis latures. Legally unable to account to 
their respective legislatures for what the DVC did or did not do, the 
State ministers again reverted to the Conference table; thus the 
DVC's freedom of action became ever more circumscribed. 
Taking all these factors into account, it will be seen that 
the DVC is far removed from the TVA-prototype. From the 
beginning, TVA was inclined to a grass-roots approach, essential 
for acquiring a political backing. It gained a reputation of leader­
ship in seven states of America. The DVC never acquired such 
political prest ige . It was often looked down upon with contempt by 
the people (Bengalis) from whose benefit it was presumably created. 
Therefore, although originally modelled on the TVA, the DVC actual­
ly became a highly distorted copy. 
(4) The DVC a Regional Body seeking to unite the States : 
Hardly one of India ' s r i v e r s lies wholly within the t e r r i t o r i e s of 
one State in the Union. To harness such r iver s and make abundant 
water resources available for the development of bordering States 
thus requires a coordinating authority. The DVC was established 
soon after Independence with the expectation that it would generate 
a sense of unity among the people of West Bengal and Bihar, other­
wise not given to strong signs of cooperation.° Experience thus 
gained in comprehensive r iver development, with its ensuing benefits 
in the Damodar a r e a , was expected to facilitate water planning in 
other a r e a s . The DVC was therefore intended to change the attitudes 
of two States and, at the same time, to serve as a hopeful example 
to the country as a whole. 
To as ses the DVC's contribution to this basic i s sue, we 
must see it in its historical context. Af f irst, from 1943 to 1946, the 
States were reluctant to part with any of their own resources but 
wanted Central Government to bear the whole burden. Resolute 
guidance from the Centre was necessary before the States finally 
agreed to share the commitments in early 1947.Ю The Central 
Governments leadership, however, did not stop at the creation of 
8. This sentiment was expressed by A.C.Guha and shared by all Bihari and 
Bengali Members of the Constituent Assembly, including the Minister, see 
C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) D e b a t e s , 
December 1947, and February 1948, ο ρ . с i t . 
9. See s u p r a . , pp.33-34.India was not yet partitioned, and floods hardly 
affected the Muslim majority regions of East Bengal (now Pakistan); 
Bengal was then under a Muslim (Awami League) Ministry. Bihar wanted 
bengal to bear all expenditure for flood control measures. These factors 
appear to have been very significant. See the evidence by N.V.Gadgxl 
in G o v e r n m e n t f r o m I n s i d e , p . 102. 
10. "The picture was different in 1947", writes Gadgil, "Bengal was divided 
and the Damodar Valley Project was going to benefit only Indian Bengal", 
i b i d . 
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the DVC . It p rov ided i n i t i a l funds and t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e , and put 
the s e r v i c e s of e s t a b l i s h e d a g e n c i e s at the C o r p o r a t i o n ' s d i s p o s a l . 
H o w e v e r , two new f a c t o r s w e r e i n t r o d u c e d : C e n t r a l Government 
c o n t r o l s and the commitments of the S t a t e s both i n c r e a s e d at an 
a lmost equal p a c e . S i n c e the n e c e s s i t y of c o r r e l a t i o n between 
commitments and c o n t r o l s was not e a s i l y p e r c e i v e d , a c h a i n r e a c t i o n 
from the S t a t e s s t a r t e d - mostly from West Bengal which had the 
h e a v i e s t c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e DVC was legal ly a C e n t r a l Agency, and 
the C e n t r e was predominant in r e g u l a t i n g the economic development 
of e a c h r e g i o n / S t a t e of I n d i a . The two S t a t e s t h e r e f o r e focused on 
DVC to s e e which could get the most at the l e a s t s a c r i f i c e . T h e 
r e l e v a n c e of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t becomes m o r e i m p o r t a n t when 
the d i s p a r i t i e s of the two S t a t e s a r e c o n s i d e r e d and the fact that the 
C e n t r e wanted them to benefit e q u a l l y . 
It might have been compet i t ion, envy, j e a l o u s y o r r i v a l r y 
b e t w e e n the two S t a t e s ; the d e s c r i p t i o n of v a r i o u s p r o g r a m m e s and 
even of the i n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of DVC i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t r i g h t s , 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , o w n e r s h i p , p h y s i c a l c o n t r o l became the " o v e r - r i d i n g 
p a s s i o n of the two S t a t e s " . In c o n s e q u e n c e , DVC p r o g r a m m e s w e r e 
e i t h e r t a k e n o v e r one by one (development and i r r i g a t i o n ) o r s a b o t a g e d 
(flood c o n t r o l , p o w e r ) . In the p r o c e s s , the DVC became v i r t u a l l y 
d i smant led ; i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n a s a unit ing force w a s not v e r y c l e a r . 
(5) Did the e x p e r i m e n t p r o v e worthy of r e p e t i t i o n 9 
T h e DVC was the f i r s t major at tempt a t an i n t e r - s t a t e development 
of Indian r i v e r s . O v e r r i d i n g c o n t r o l by the C e n t r e combined with 
a s imul taneous effort to push the P r o j e c t t h r o u g h u n d e r m i n e d the 
C o r p o r a t i o n ' s autonomy; the S t a t e s sought to d e r i v e benef i t s from 
the C e n t r e witnout r e l a t i n g the C e n t r e and the D V C , to which they 
too had c o n t r i b u t e d ; C e n t r e - S t a t e s conf l ic t s r e d u c e d the DVC to a 
l imited a r e a of a c t i v i t i e s ; f inal ly, i n t e r - s t a t e r i v a l r i e s b r o u g h t 
DVC a lmost to a s t a t e of i n s i g n i f i c a n c e ; . C o n v e r s e l y : i n t e r - S t a t e 
r i v a l r i e s w a r r a n t e d the C e n t r e ' s p r e d o m i n a n c e , r e d u c i n g DVC ' s 
autonomy; c la ims by the S t a t e s s imul taneous ly c a l l e d for a d j u s t m e n t s 
in D V C ' s a c t i v i t i e s ; f inal ly, a d j u s t m e n t s r e a c h e d such a point that 
the DVC became v i r t u a l l y i n v i a b l e , while i t s r e d u c e d a c t i v i t i e s 
s t i l l did not quite fit in the two S t a t e s . 
The i n t e n s e n a t u r e of the conf l ict ing r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n 
the u n i t s and the Union, a l though v i s ib le e l s e w h e r e , became p a r t i ­
c u l a r l y exp l ic i t in r i v e r r e s o u r c e d e v e l o p m e n t . After the d i s c o u r a g ­
ing d e v e l o p m e n t s of the D V C , a u t h o r i t i e s l a t e r e s t a b l i s h e d w e r e 
named " C o n t r o l B o a r d s " . In c a s e of r i v e r s whose deve lopment l a r g e ­
ly af fected one S t a t e , t h e s e C o n t r o l B o a r d s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d by 
r e s o l u t i o n of that S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t , in o t h e r s by r e s o l u t i o n of the 
C e n t r a l Government . G e n e r a l l y , they w e r e not c r e a t e d by s t a t u t e 
11 . See K.K. Sinha, "The DVC - Is It a Succes · " ' , Τ h о u g t , XX, 27 July 6, 
1968. For somewhat harsh judgement on these points, West Bengal as main 
target, however, see Gopal Krishna, "More Authoritative Centre", 
S e m i n a r 1 1 1 (The Centre and The States), November 1968. 
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but by the executive authority of the particular government. Their 
composition developed along a general pattern: representa t ives of 
the S ta te s concerned and of the Central Government, usually joined 
by financial experts and chief eng ineers of the p r o j e c t s . Board 
membership roughly fol lows the l ines of the in ter - s ta te conferences 
of the DVC: Central Minister , State Chief Minister/Minister 
concerned (even Governer) and their S e c r e t a r i e s plus the Central 
and the State Finance min i s tr i e s , e t c . 12 These Boards have 
advisory powers only . Their dec i s ions are communicated to the 
State governments concerned who "must i s s u e the formal orders 
before they can be executed . However , being a h igh- leve l body, i t s 
dec i s ions are normally endorsed by the state governments concerned. ' 1 3 
S ince these are non-statutory bodies and have only advisory r o l e s , 
they are not legally accountable to Parliament ."Herein l i e s the weak-
n e s s of this arrangement", observed Khera, and suggested that they 
be "formally made autonomous ent i t i e s" . The Study Group on 
Control B o a r d s , however , concluded that, "so-long as the state 
governments allow the boards to function with the maximum poss ible 
freedom and take prompt action and i s s u e orders on the l ines of the 
dec i s ions of the Control Boards there was no n e c e s s i t y to go in for 
leg i s la t ive measures"! ^The advantages of this arrangement seem 
to be d irect and greater participation of re spec t ive governments 
which, re lat ive ly speaking, e n s u r e s quick dec is ion-making , while 
"securing superior overa l l direct ion and control over the p r o j e c t s " . ^ 
In highly sens i t ive in ter - s ta te re la t ionsh ips , however , it does not 
mean that r iver disputes have altogether d i sappeared . 17 
12 . For functions, advantages and defects of the organizational pattern, see 
a brief analys is made by S . S . Khera, G o v e r n m e n t i n B u s i n e s 
(Asia Publishing House, London 1963) pp. 105-114 . 
13 . S . S . Khera, M a n a g e m e n t a n d C o n t r o l i n P u b l i c 
E n t e r p r i s e s (Asia Publishing House, 1964), p . 91 . Khera points 
out that development of certain pract ices tended to vitiate this advisory 
ro le: "It was found that the proposals of the project authorities were 
screened by the concerned department of the state government before they 
came up for consideration before the boards", i b i d . 
14 . I b i d . , p . 92 · 
15 . R e p o r t o f t h e S t u d y G r o u p o n C o n t r o l B o a r d s , 
April 1960, Ministry of Irrigation and P o w e r , New Delhi , p . 4 3 . 
16. S . S . Khera . M a n a g e m e n t a n d C o n t r o l i n P u b l i c 
E n t e r p r i s e s , p . 9 1 · 
17. In 1967, dispute arose between Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Mysore 
over the Nagarjunasagar Dam: "All the s tates concerned are convinced of 
the jus tness of their c la ims . But their vis ion rare ly extends beyond their 
b o r d e r s . And almost all seem to forget that these r iver s flow within the 
country and wherever the waters are util ized the nation a s a whole stands 
to benefit", S t a t e s m a n , August 15, 1967. S e e a l s o , Shiva Rao, "The 
Background", in S e m i n a r 1 1 1 , o p . c i t . , p . 16, who,referr ing 
to r iver d isputes , w r i t e s , " How far the present pol it ical leadership in 
the different States understands the spirit of 'good neighbourliness and 
accomodation' st i l l remains a question mark on vital i s s u e s of national 
development and national we l l -be ing . " 
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N o n e t h e l e s s , the c o n t r o l boa rd a p p e a r s to have worked more s a t i s -
f ac to r i ly than the autonomous public c o r p o r a t i o n exper iment with 
the D V C . The c a u s e s seem to lie mainly in d i f f e r e n c e s of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n and c o n t r o l . As it happened , DVC was not only the 
f i r s t expe r imen t of i t s kind but a l so the l a s t in the c o u n t r y . 
"Although o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and l e a d e r s h i p " , conc ludes 
L a P o r t e , "con t r ibu te to the achievement of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s , 
o t h e r f a c t o r s such a s economic s u p p o r t , po l i t i ca l env i ronmen t , and 
admin i s t r a t i ve t r a d i t i o n s and va lues tend to condi t ion the a c h i e v e -
ment of c o r p o r a t i o n o b j e c t i v e s " . F u r t h e r , "the employment of 
publ ic c o r p o r a t i o n s h a s not r e s u l t e d in l a r g e - s c a l e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
innovat ion o r change in o the r government a g e n c i e s . "'° 
In i t s a c h i e v e m e n t s , D V C ' s s u c c e s was l a r g e l y in 
p rov id ing abundant e l e c t r i c i t y power in the val ley which e s s e n t i a l l y 
con t r ibu ted to the development of the S t a t e s c o n c e r n e d . In a l l o t h e r 
f i e l d s , s u c c e s was e i t h e r n o n - e x i s t e n t o r sma l l . " T u r n i n g the 
va l ley of dea th and d e s t r u c t i o n into a va l ley of p r o s p e r i t y and 
h a p p i n e s s " by means of a mu l t i - pu rpose autonomous c o r p o r a t i o n , on 
the p a t t e r n of TVA, remained r h e t o r i c . It was n e i t h e r mul t ipurpose 
no r au tonomous , and the TVA p a t t e r n had only symbolic v a l u e . In 
p r a c t i c e , i t may have fo s t e r ed e s t r a n g e m e n t : the S t a t e s found in the 
DVC r e a s o n to e x p r e s s t h e i r r e s e n t m e n t at the C e n t r e ' s dominant 
au tho r i ty and t o w a r d s the o t h e r S t a t e ' s a s sumed p a r o c h i a l i n t e r e s t s ; 
the DVC, on the o t h e r hand , became a symbol of the C e n t r e ' s a u t h o r -
i t y , which f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e d th i s r e s e n t m e n t and p a r o c h i a l i s m . 
S i n c e the s i tua t ion was e s s e n t i a l l y one of po l i t i ca l ma la i s e - not 
uncommon in o the r s t a t e s in Indian F e d e r a t i o n - the exper iment 
r e s u l t e d in abandonment of the idea of e s t a b l i s h i n g o t h e r DVC- type 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the c o u n t r y . If t echn ica l ly the DVC succeeded to 
some d e g r e e , admin i s t r a t i ve ly i t s p roved a f a i l u r e . 
Was th i s development inev i tab le ' 7 If s o , what w e r e it 
r o o t s 9 If no t , what could have checked in s t i t u t iona l e r o s i o n 9 The 
p r e v i o u s text h a s l a r g e l y shown "how" va r ious d e v e l o p m e n t s took 
p l a c e . Be low, we sha l l c o n c e n t r a t e on "why" th ings shaped a s they did 
Any minute and de ta i l ed examinat ion be ing p r e c l u d e d , the d i s c u s s i o n 
r e v o l v e s round the eco log ioa l s e t t i ngs in which a d m i m s t r a t i v t 
i n s t i t u t i ons o p e r a t e d . It will move from the a l l - I nd i a s c e n e to that of 
the two S t a t e s . 
18. From the "Abstract" of R. La Porte J r . ' s unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation 
on P u b l i c C o r p o r a t i o n s a n d R e s o u r c e D e v e l o o -
m p n t i n S o u t h A s i a : A C o m p a r a t i v e A n a l y s i s 
(Graduate School of Syracuse University, June 1967), sent to me by the 
author with his letter dated June 5, 1968. LaPorte has made a study of 
three multipurpose public corporations, one each in Pakistan, India (DVC) 
and Ceylon, and their contribution to administrative, economic and political 
development in the three nations. For somewhat less comprenhensive 
treatment of the DVC, in comparison to RVDB (Ceylon), see i d e m . , "An 
Analysis of a Development Strategy: Public Corporations and Resource 
Development in South Asia", I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e v i e w o f 
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ECOLOGICAL FACTORS 
A. All-India Perspec t ive : 
S o far , the general emphasis has been on the DVC in the context 
of the init ial intent ions . We have seen how far it fell short of 
original normative expectat ions . The key to this appraisal was 
provided by an enquiry into the development of the DVC-concept , 
in technical and institutional r e s p e c t s , at the hands of "other power 
centres" (Chs.III & IV). To some d e g r e e , we have i so lated these 
developments from the larger soc ia l , economic, polit ical and 
administrative context which primarily determined the mutual re la t ion-
ship of these power c e n t r e s . A change in focus may provide an a n s -
wer to the question of inevitability posed above . 19 
,(l) Soc ia l Milieu: 
Indian society presents some typical soc ia l features which, in their 
intent and extent , render it non-comparable to other s o c i e t i e s . 
F ir s t of a l l , a character i s t i c which at tracts the attention of numerous 
s cho lars : the c a s t e - s y s t e m , ^0 wich has four major strata: Brahmin , 
Kshatr iya , Vaishya , and Sudra . This stratif ication was histori -
cal ly further divided into s u b - c a s t e s and s u b - s u b - c a s t e s . 22 Each 
has a name and a body of customs and traditions which are pecul iai 
to i t se l f in any local a r e a , and no other cas te i s able to take i t s 
name. "To the bulk of the people l iving in the rural a r e a s " , wrote 
S r i n i v a s , "caste i s nothing more than a col lect ion of kin groups -
agnates and affines - l iving in a few neighbouring v i l l a g e s . " 23 
The nature of the system becomes a l l - p e r v a s i v e when seen in the 
light of the number of Indian v i l lages (566 ,878 ) , in which the bulk 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S c i e n c e s , No. 4. ,1967, pp. 319-28. 
19. The analys is c r o s s e s from pre-independence to post- independence, the 
latter almost running parallel to DVC's evolution in the last two decades . 
Discuss ion of social and economic aspects does not go beyond presenting 
them a s contributory factors in the development of political and adminis-
trative patterns which are more pertinent to our enquiry and therefore 
will rece ive particular emphasis . 
20 . Among others s ee W.H.Morris-Jones, G o v e r n m e n t a n d P o l i t i c s 
o f I n d i a (Hutchinson & Co. L t d . , London, 1967). pp. 48 ff; and A . H . 
Hanson, T h e P r o c e s s o f P l a n n i n g , pp. 245 -53 , both of 
whom consider this social feature of Indian society one of the important 
determinants in post-independence political development. 
21 . The system evolved on a professional /occupational bas i s : Brahmins being 
pr i e s t s and inte l lectuals , Kshatriyas ru lers and w a r r i o r s , Vaishya s 
largely traders and merchants, and S udrà s labourers , servants and 
peasants . Sect ions of society which rendered unclean jobs were considered 
untouchable, outside this caste s trata . 
22 . These are known by different variations such as gotra, Jati , Biradari and 
so on, and in each major caste may run into hundreds. For a brief analys is 
of caste in India, s ee Hugh Tinker, I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n : 
A P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , pp. 123-50, . 
23 . M.N. S r i n i v a s , o p . c i t . , p . 70 
157 
of the population lives (82%). The greater majority of this 
population adheres to the caste system and would probably find it 
impossible to envisage a social system without it.2-> 
The second social feature of significance is religion. 
Without counting various sects in each religion, there a re six major 
religious groups in India: Hindus, Muslims, Chr is t ians , Sikhs, 
Buddhists and Ja ins . They are unequally distributed all over India 
and form 83.50%, 10.70%, 2.44%, 1.79%, 0.74% and 0.46% 
respectively of the total population of 439,234,771 . 2 6 
Thirdly, 15 main languages a re recognized under the 
Constitution of India (with more than 380 dialects grouped under 
them). Though in origin not entirely unconnected, they developed 
independently; with varying degrees , each has a l i tarary r ichness 
of i ts own. The largest single group speaks Hindi (133,435,360) 
followed by Telugu (37,668,132) and Bengali (33,888,939). These 
linguistic groups, unlike caste and religious groups, live within 
geographically defined regions which by and large form the States 
of Indian Union . 27 
Finally, a characteris t ic common to developing countries 
is found m the significant extent of i l l i teracy. The 1961 Census 
recorded a literacy rate of 24% (34.5% males and 13% females). The 
spread of education (particularly before independence) has been 
urban-oriented. Only recently, under Community Development p r o g -
grammes, was attention paid to rura l eduction. A special feature is 
that denominational educational institutions, largely offshoots of 
various religious affiliations in the country, have flourished almost 
equally with municipal and State institutions , 28 resulting in varying 
24. Data appearing in this sub-section are based on 1961 Census; until further 
authentic statistics come to hand (1971 Census), they are reproduced by 
Government of India in its Reference Annuals, see, for instance, I n d i a 
19 6 6 (Publications Division, Delhi). 
25. With an insignificant minority, the situation will also be true in urban 
a r e a s . Even among these exceptional cases , caste considerations cannot 
be ruled out on fundamental issues like marriage. In respect of Indian 
intellectuals, Shils has analysed the caste situation in depth, see Edward 
S h i l s , T h e I n t e l l e c t u a l B e t w e e n T r a d i t i o n a n d 
M o d e r n i t y . T h e I n d i a n S i t u a t i o n (Mouton & Co. , The 
Hague, 1961) especially Ch.V. on "The Culture of the Indian Intellectual". 
26. For State-wise distribution of these religious communities, see I n d i a 
1 9 6 6, p . 18. 
27. The number of recognized languages (15) does not compare with the number 
of States (17) because Hindi is spoken in four States: Uttar Pradesh,Bihar , 
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. 
28. The Presidency Colleges of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and Government 
colleges in other towns went side by side with Christian Missionary, Sikh, 
Muslim and Hindu (including separate sects of Hinduism) colleges. These 
were further supplemented by private interests in education, such as Tata 
institutions in Bombay, Birla institutions in Rajasthan, and Maharaja 
colleges in erstwhile princely s tates . 
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29 Standards of education. Againjthe rate of l iteracy differs, 
depending on the duration that a part icular area has been exposed 
to educational efforts. Thus 46.8 % l i teracy in Kerala is found 
alongside 15.2$ of Rajasthan.30 The spread of l iteracy therefore 
not only differentiated r u r a l from urban a r e a s , but even one State 
from the other . 
The social context gives some idea of the extent of diversi 
ty in Indian society. It has been presented here as a problem 
which determines the behavioural moulds of people in a r e a s 
considered below. The general social milieu becomes even more 
conspicuous if attention is paid to offshoots of these basic features. 
The vastness of the country, with its climatic variants and geo­
graphic situations, numerous sects of different religions (though 
Hinduism surpasses all others), dialects of main languages, and 
limitations of the caste-system, necessari ly determine the day-to­
day life of the people, including its customs, r i tuals and food-
habits . With the spread of education, the outlook on national i ssues 
is funneled through narrow regional confines, often subordinating 
the former to the latter in the p r o c e s s . Except for the educational 
aspect, these social features are more or less constant.-*1 They 
existed before independence and they have existed since then, at 
times with intense expressiveness 
(2) Economic Development: 
Independence posed i ts initial and greatest challenge in the shape 
of economic development. Heavily dependent on agr icul ture, which 
was exposed to the vagaries of climate and rainfall, India was 
chiefly a subsistence economy. Future hopes were therefore based 
on rapid industrialization. The basis for this p r o c e s s , however 
limited, was available in the country: texti le, paper, jute, coal, 
sugar, iron and steel industries e tc . were already fairly developed 
by 1947. However, the general picture was one of ' industrial centres 
growing in a few areas-* as opposed to miserable poverty persist ing 
29. "In some cases, though not in all, the old universities have developed 
higher standards", H a n d b o o k of Indian Univ e r s i t i e s , 
compiled by U . S . Educational Foundation (Allied Publishers, Bombay, 
1963), p . 20. 
30. For figures on literacy in different States, see I n d i a 1 9 6 6, p.67. 
The difference of these particular States may be explained by the fact that 
in Kerala education was largely due to Christian missionaries, whereas 
Rajasthan (an erstwhile princely s tates ' area) remained unprogressive. 
31 · Srinivas holds that on a long-term basis, "adult franchise, the industrial 
revolution which our Five-Year Plans are helping to bring about, the 
spread of literacy and higher education among the lower castes, the legal 
rights given to Harijans, the privileges given to backward castes , and the 
greater Sanskritization of the way of life of the lat ter , should gradually 
remove the more obnoxious features of the caste system".see M.N. Srinivas 
ο ρ . с i t . , p . 76. 
32. Textile in Bombay and Gujerat, Sugar in Western Uttar Pradesh, Coal and 
iron in Bihar, and Jute around Calcutta (the partition of Bengal left indus-
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in much larger r e g i o n s . To develop a coherent economy, efforts in 
all d irect ions were neces sary : industrial , agr icul tural , infra-
structural act iv i t ies such as extending rai l and road l inks , commun-
icat ion, transport , power , education. •" "The very p r o c e s s of 
independence," wrote Malenbaum, "had engendered v i s ions - c e r -
tainly on the part of the educated and of l eaders of groups of 
people , if not on the part of the general public - of a better society 
and a more prosperous s ta te ; but this meant a new growth. 
Efforts towards new growth necess i tated central d irect ion , the 
foundations of which were already establ i shed during the struggle 
for freedom. The chief architect was Nehru. 35 After independence 
the main object ives for the guidance of such an effort were laid 
down in "Directive Pr inc ip le s of State Pol icy"36
 a nd translated 
establishment of the Planning Commission in 1950. 
It i s beyond the scope of this analys i s to go into the 
targets of economic development in different f ie lds or the measure 
of achievements . The general impression ranges from neglect of 
agriculture to ambitious industrial programmes, from moderate 
performance to inability to de l iver the goods . ^' Relevant to this 
study a r e : the pattern of development; the impact of central planning 
on Centre -Sta te re la t ions ; and actual implementation of p o l i c i e s . 
The latter are e s sent ia l ly political and administrative a spec t s which 
will be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . Here we shall examine the pattern of 
economic development 
The prevai l ing d ispari t ies in the country ruled out the 
development of an economy exc lus ive ly on a capita l i s t ic pattern. 
tries in Indian Bengal and raw jute in Pakistani Bengal, which needed an 
extra effort to rebuild the Jute industry). 
3 3 . Rail links existed on the main routes to the ports and between principal 
c i t i e s , but there were large gaps in road sys tems , see T h e P l a n n i n g 
P r o c e s s , p . 6 . 
34 . Wilfred Malenbaum, "Leadership Tasks in India's Economy", in Ralph 
Braibanti and Joseph J . Spengler ( e a s . ) , A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d 
E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t i n I n d i a (Duke University P r e s s , 
Durham, 1963), p . 155. 
35 . In 1938,The National Planning Committee was set up by the Indian National 
Congress under the Chairmanship of Jawahar I .al Nehru. For further 
detai ls of efforts in planned development from the Brit ish period to the 
establishment of the Planning Commission in 1950, s ec A .H. Hanson, 
T h e P r o c e s s o f P l a n n i n g , especial ly Ch.II, "The P r e c u r s e r s " 
36. Part IV. , Article 39, C o n s t i t u t i o n o f I n d i a . 
37. Literature on India's efforts at economic development i s abundant. For 
official vers ions on different phases , see the F i r s t , S e c o n d and 
T h i r d F i v e Y e a r P l a n s , (Planning Commission, New Delhi). A 
comprehensive analys is i s available in A . H . Hanson, T h e P r o c e s s 
o f P l a n i n g , e spec ia l ly , Part I which deals with the three plans 
consecut ive ly . For a brief ana lys i s , see M.K. Mathulla, "Delivering of 
Goods ",in S e m i n a r 8 5 (The Administrative Jungle), February 1968; 
a l s o , Max F . Millikan, "The Economic Development: Performance and 
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At the .same time, in view of the potential private enterpr ise 
available in the country, l ines of exc lus ive socia l ism a l s o could 
not be followed. Yet, s ince the pro-soc ia l i s t element in the country 
was rather strong,-'" a compromise pattern was dev ised entitled 
a "soc ia l i s t i c pattern of s o c i e t y " ; not a dogma but, a s Paranjape 
c a l l s i t , "the basical ly compromising and pragmatic attitude in 
policy formulation in India". ^9 The objectives of this soc ia l i s t i c 
pattern of soc iety were put by Nehru before the National Development 
Council in 1954. They were endorsed by the NDC, the Cabinet, 
Parliament and la ter , in January 1955, reso lved in the Avadi 
(Madras) S e s s i o n of the Congress P a r t y . The Second Five Year 
Plan explained th is 'pattern ' a s fol lows: 
"Essentially, this means that the basic criterion for determining 
lines of advance must not be private profit, but social gain, and 
that the pattern of development and the structure of socio-economic 
relations should be so planned that they result not only in 
appreciable increases in national income and employment but also 
in greater equality in incomes and wealth.. . The benefits of economic 
development must accrue more and more to the relatively less 
privileged classes of society... The socialist pattern of society 
is not to be regarded as some fixed or rigid pattern. It is not rooted 
in anv doctrine or dogma. Each country has to develop according to 
its own genius and traditions. Economic and social policy has to be 
shaped from time to time in the light of historical circumstances. It 
is neither necessary nor desirable that the economy should become 
a monolithic type of organization offering '.ittle play for experimenta­
tion either as to forms or as to modes of functioning " 40 
The economic development of India has taken place 
e s s e n t i a l l y along these l i n e s , with public and private s e c t o r s growing 
side by side with varying emphasis depending on c i rcumstances . This 
pattern was large ly necess i ta ted by polit ical e x i g e n c i e s . 
(З) Po l i t ica l Patterns : 
When Independence dawned on India, she was in a re lat ive ly favour­
able posit ion in having inherited art iculate polit ical instruments. 
F i r s t , there was a government which, with gradual changes in the 
Prospects", India Investment Centre, New Delhi, a reprint from F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s : An American Quarterly Review, April 1968. 
38. One of the important exponents was Nehru. In March 1931 , the Indian 
National Congress' Resolution included that "the State shall own or control 
key industries and services, mineral resources, railways, waterways, 
shipping and other means of transport". The resolution was drafted by 
Nehru in consultation with Gandhi and later described by him as "a step, a 
very short step, in a socialist direction", N e h r u , An A u t o b i o ­
g r a p h у (New Delhi, 1962), p.266. For the important role played by 
Nehru in planning activities, see a brief study made by H.K.Paranjape, 
J a w a h a r L a i N e h r u a n d T h e P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n 
(Indian Institute of Public Administration,New Delhi, 1964). 
39. H.K. Paranjape, "Political and Administrative Problems of Implementing 
the Indian Plans", O.E.CD.(Paris,1964),p.70. For a rather formal 
presentation of the "socialistic pattern", see H.M. Patel, A S o c i a l ­
i s t i c P a t t e r n (Publications Division, Delhi, 1957) . 
40. T h e S e c o n d F i v e Y e a r P l a n (New Delhi, 1956), pp. 22-23. 
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immediate past , had established definite links with the Provinces 
and dis t r ic ts - the whole being managed by the so-called steel-frame 
of the Indian Civil Serv ice . Second, there were Legislative Councils 
and assemblies, "the qua si-parliament s of Imperial India", as 
Morris-Jones names them, coupled with a legal system and the 
judiciary. Thirdly, and more importantly, there was the offshoot 
of national movements: a political consiousness with varying 
degrees of maturity at rura l and urban levels . This was articulated, 
with equally varying degrees of maturity, by the political pa r t i es ; 
the Congress Par ty , being the oldest party and most experienced 
and having a majority following, carr ied over these political 
instruments into independent India. 
On the domestic political scene, after independence, a 
problem of immediate importance was the integration of five hundred 
odd princely states into the new body pol i t ic ,^ 2 and the framing of 
the Constitution. Both of these tasks were achieved by November 
1949, and on 26th January 1950 India was constituted into a 
"sovereign democratic Republic". The country was given a federal 
s t ruc ture , which car r ied forward the Goverrment of India Act of 
1935. The Preamble of the Constitution secured to all Indian citizens 
social , economic and political just ice; liberty of thought, expression , 
belief, faith and worship; and equality of status and of opportunity. 
With this brief introduction, we shall now attempt to see how Indian 
Federalism developed under a democratic political pat tern. To gain 
true perspect ive, we must give some attention to the developing 
political pat tern. 
Politics was no longer a fight for freedom. The common 
cause in which all had joined hands, albeit adopting differing roads 
at t imes,^3 had now disappeared and was rapidly replaced by so 
far hidden political forces . During British ru le , the political field 
was limited and "effective competition was confined to small stratum 
Also, see Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956, which classified industries 
in specific categories having regard to the part which the state would play 
in each of them - with some overlapping. 
41 . W.H. Morris-Jones, G o v e r n m e n t a n d P o l i t i c s of I n d i a , 
p. 39. 
42. Cf. s u p r a . , p. 13.The man whose efforts brought these states 
around to join the newly created Federation was Sardar Vallabbhai Patel 
whose skill and tact in this spectacular achievement earned him praise 
inside and outside the country. A fascinating account of this territorial 
integration is available in V.P. Menon, op . c i t . , who as Secretary in 
Patel's Ministry, played an important role in this achievement. See also 
Allen Campbell-Johnson, M i s s i o n W i t h M o u n t b a t t e n 
(London, 1955). 
43. The Communist Party of India adopted different methods to the Congress 
Party, even cooperating with British war efforts (after Russia joined in 
the Peoples'War). However, it remained part of the national movement, just 
as some revolutionary and communal parties headed towards the same goal. 
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of soc ie ty" . 4 4 It was this small stratum of society which launched 
the government in 1947. The Congress Par ty had a certain leverage 
over the o thers ; in the 1952 General Elections it came out with an 
overwhelming majority to form governments both at the Centre and 
in all the Sta tes .45 The task of building a new nation, in Weiner 's 
words,began with "the firm conviction that the State not only must 
plan and develop from above . . .but also ^hat it must stimulate en-
thusiasm from below, encourage belief in the new values of science, 
social equality, political democracy and national unity, and above 
a l l , encourage participation in development programmes. " 4 ° 
Exaltation of the freedom movement maintained a sense of purpose 
and the paths thus set did not initially pose a political challenge to 
Congress . But given the social cleavages and economic d ispar i t ies , 
combined with democratization and the enthusiasm for popular 
participation in development programmes, it could not be long before 
dissidence appeared on the surface. To s tar t with, the Congress 
Party,which had ea r l i e r worked with relative harmony, experienced 
a c lear split in its top leadership. A traditional cautious approach 
which, in Morr is -Jones ' words, "permitted the P a r t y ' s internal 
struggle to be presented in simplified form as a tension between 
secular socialism and communal conservatism", 47 did not hold 
ground when one member of the Congress duumvirate left the s t a g e . 4 ° 
Dissident groups, wich originally had sheltered under Congress . 
started consolidating themselves before and after the 1952 General 
Elect ions. The leaders of these groups had a national standing in 
their own right, and it required little extra effort for them to 
break from Congress and build a rival political force. Thus, the 
socialist element, already somewhat active from 1934 onwards, 
formed a Socialist Party (1948); the protagonists of a peasant-
labour combine formed the Kisan Mazdoor Party (1951); yet other 
left-wing elements joined in the formation of the United Socialist 
Pa r ty . To become a viable and powerful rival political force 
44. Andre Beteille, "The Problem", S e m i n a r 1 0 7 (Politics and Society), 
July 1968. 
45. The first government (1947-52) was not dominantly party-government. 
Though the Congress Party predominated, individuals' standing in particu-
lar fields and non-Congress political leanings were not absolutely ignored; 
for instance, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Ambedkar, John Mathai, were not 
Congressmen, but held major portfolios in the first Cabinet. 
46. Myron Weiner, P o l i t i c s o f S c a r c i t y , pp. 2-3 
47. W.H. Morris-Jones, "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relation in the 
Indian Party System", G o v e r n m e n t a n d O p p o s i t i o n , 1 , 4 , 
July-Sept. 1966, p . 462. 
48. Sardar Patel , Deputy Prime Minister and strong man of Congress, died in 
1950, leaving Nehru as the sole arbiter of Congress politics. The uneasy 
balance that held Congress together from 1947 to 1951 under the Nehru-
Patel leadership was a gentleman's agreement to leave each other alone 
in his respective responsibilities. A very interesting picture of this 
situation is drawn by Michael Brecher, N e h r u : A Po l i t i c a i 
B i o g r a p h y (London, 1959). 
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necessitated compromises, and the Socialist Party and KMPP merged 
to form the Praja Socialist Party (1953). The rightist element broke 
from Congress and formed the Swatantra Party (1959) 4 9 . Besides these 
political part ies which emerged in the post-independence period, 
there already existed a fairly well-organized Communist Party of 
India. Largely due to ideological rifts beyond Indian front iers , and 
also due to India ' s own strained relations with one of the major 
Communist powers (China), this party also split (1963) into a 
Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist). 
Another political party of some note in pre-indepence days was the 
Hindu Mahasabha. L a t e r , the emergence of Bhartiya Jan Sangh 
(1951) a rightist party with a heavy Hindu nationalist element, 
rendered Hindu Mahasabha almost negligible after some of i ts top 
leaders went over the new movement. 
These political part ies were fully established as national 
part ies by the second General Election (1957). It may be pointed out 
here that welfare and development activities were spreading, and 
that government power was reaching down to the village level via 
state-owned industr ies , planning agencies, co-operat ives, 
Panchayati Raj , Community Development and government-aided 
voluntary agencies. The a r e a s of active polit ics, therefore, rapidly 
shifted from the national to State and local levels . Those who sought 
to acquire political power - and their range became ever wider -
had a fertile field. The politics of trade unionism, c a s t e , language, 
religion, peasantry, organized business, and former ru le r s of 
princely states flourished simultaneously. 50 While the number of 
49. The actors on the scene were Jjyprakash Narayan (once widely recognized 
a s s u c c e s s o r to Nehru and now leader of barvodaya movement);J . B . 
Knpa lam, one time General bee rotary and then President of Congrebb; 
Sarat Chandra B o s e , once a senior Congress leader and later head of 
Forward Bloc; C. Kajagopalachan, the last and the only Indian Governor 
General of India. These breakaways from Congress and emergence of 
rightist and leftist political parties have been treated by all authors 
attracted to the dynamics of Indian pol i t ics . For a comprehensive account 
see Stanley A. Kochanok, T h e C o n g r e s s P a r t y o f I n d i a -
T h e D y n a m i c s o f C) n o - 1' a r t y D o mo с г а с y (Print eton 
University P r e s s , Princeton, 1968).Each of these newly emerged political 
part ies has been dealt with at some length by Myron Werner in h is , by 
now somewhat outdated . P a r t y P o l i t i c s i n I n d i a (I'rmc eton 
U n i v . P r e s s , Princeton, 1957). 
50. Some examples: Sikhs combined to form Akali Dal in Punjab; non-Brahmins 
joined to form Dravida Munnetra Kazhgham (DMK) in Madras; e x - r u l e r s 
became active and formed Ganatantra Party in O n s s a and Janata Party 
in Bihar; Communists found a fertile field in workers and labourers in 
Kerala and discontented West Bengal. These are but few c a s e s ; the 
situation throughout the country i s one of multiplication. Daalder almost 
seems to be describing the Indian scene: "Rival iserende politieke le iders 
zoeken politieke steun in bepaalde sociale groepen en 'pol i t iseren ' daar­
om hun tegenstel l ingen. Met het stijgend belang van bestuur en onderwijs 
nemen taalproblemen in betekenis toe. Onderscheidene groepen /-.oeken, op 
plaatselijk en nationaal niveau, hun deel van de ambten te verkrijgen en 
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national pol it ical part ies remained limited, at State leve l their 
growth was haphazard and the e l e c t i o n s sometimes fielded more than 
twenty pol it ical p a r t i e s . But then, while these organized groups 
rapidly pol i t ic ized the m a s s e s , day-to-day pol i t ics became more of 
a multi-sided competition at the hands of the polit ical e l i te rather 
than c l e a r polarization around any i d e o l o g i e s . 52 i
n a
 pol it ical 
contes t , even the national polit ical part ies sought support from 
sect ions which they had hitherto denounced or were supposed to 
ideological ly oppose. 53 
These s t r i d e s taken by Indian polit ical part ies which 
were mobilizing the m a s s e s nonethe less , had their bearing on the 
ruling Congress P a r t y . Rajni Kothari d e s c r i b e s the Congress 
sytem a s firmly estab l i shed on consensus po l i t ics : "Although a 
number of opposition part ies came into e x i s t e n c e , it was recognized 
that the Congress was the chief party, represent ing a h is tor ica l 
c o n s e n s u s and enjoying a continuing b a s i s of support and t rust . "54 
tegelijk aanhangers van andere sociale groepen daaruit te weren 
. . . Conflicten groeien over de richting en de prioriteiten in de nationale 
ontwikkelingsplannen. Tegenover de stedelijke 'modernisatoren' ontstaat 
veelal een traditioneel protest, dikwijls geleid door bepaalde godsdienstige 
kringen. In de stad, daarentegen, ontwikkelt zich kritiek van links' ", 
See Hans Daalder, "De Democratie, in De Nieuwe Staten", O o s t -W e s t 
4,2, February 1965, p.3. For an exhaustive treatment of pressurizing and 
pressurized politics of particular Indian context, see Myron Weiner, 
P o l i t i c s o f S c a r c i t y , "In a society where respect for democra­
tic institutions and orderly processes had not yet been incalculated, where 
men lived close to the economic margins, and where loyalties to caste, 
religion, tribe, and language were powerful, the politicians were working 
in fertile field," p.4. 
51 . In February 1969 by-Elections, for instance, 27 political parties contested 
in West Bengal alone, see I n d i a N e w s , January 18, 1969. 
52. An excellent account of this now almost established political pattern is 
given by Weiner, as "mass political culture" and "elite political culture" -
perhaps the only possible distinction which can encompass all India; see 
Myron Weiner, "India: Two Political Cultures", in Lucian W. Pye and 
Sydney Verba (eds), P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e a n d P o l i t i c a l 
D e v e l o p m e n t (Princeton Univ.Press. Princeton, 1965),pp.199-244. 
Also, see W.H. Morris-Jones' 'India's Political Idioms", in C.H.Philips 
(ed.), P o l i t i c s a n d S o c i e t y i n I n d i a (George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1963). Morris-Jones' views are not far removed from Myron 
Weiner's when he distinguishes three main languages in which political life 
in India is conducted: "modern", "traditional" and "saintly". For the 
political role and strength of various groups organized around different 
political sources, however, see Myron Weiner, P o l i t i c s o f S ca г с i t у. 
53. Thus, the Congress Party gradually drew upon caste, religion and ethnic 
groups which it had considered as essentially social evils; the Communists 
unhesitatingly wooed local landlords who continued to wield power in 
tradition-bound rural India. 
54. Kothari labels the opposition parties as "parties of pressure" as distinct 
from "party of consensus" - the Congress.See Rajni Kothari, "The Congress 
'System' in India", A s i a n S u r v e y , IV, 12, December 1964, pt>. 
1161-73. Morris-Jones elaborates on this basic characteristic of the 
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Yet despite this basic pliable character i s t ic , the Congress system 
could not for long contain ever-growing political competition. It 
would seem that some of the features of Congress - "a positive and 
overwhelming role of government and politics in the development of 
society power of the central authority the chief condition of 
national survival. . . . mobilization and public cooperation a function 
of political participation ra ther than of bureaucratic control and 
police surveillance"55 - demanded a heavy p r i c e . The organizational 
legacy and leadership which helped the Congress to maintain the 
position of trust was broken up when opposition and faction within 
the party grew; The process of adaptation and absorption became 
increasingly difficult. The Union-State and inter-state relationships 
should be seen in this light. 
(a) Stra ins of the Federation: With the dispersal of 
government and political activit ies, the basis of party strength 
came to res ide with the S t a t e s . It was at this level that p r e s s u r e s 
became formidable. New leadership came up not only within the 
Congress Par ty but on multi-party f ronts . Capable of nurturing 
parochial loyalties "to satisfy their urge for political power", 
particularly on non-Congress fronts, new leadership claimants did 
not hesitate to subordinate national i n t e r e s t s . The result was a loss 
of Congress hegemony and the promises it claimed to be standing 
for: national unity and harmonious development. Through the 
politicization of social cleavages, under democratic party competi­
tion and a federal Constitutional s t ruc ture , power shifted from the 
Centre to the States and to competing r ivalry between them. This 
is elaborated below. 
(i) The Problems of Multi-Linguism: The heterogeneity of 
India in the post-independence period found its most vigorous, even 
wild, political expression in the language i s s u e . While other ready 
ingredients (caste, religion), with their ra ther scattered currents and 
Congress Party, and calls it the "open-umbrella" ьуьіет, ьее W.U. Morris-
Joneb, "Dominance and Dissent", (Their inter-relations in the Indian 
Party system), G o v e r n m e n t a n d O p p o s i t i o n . The 'Conbensus-
pohtics of Congress came to find glaring examples in Nehru's succession 
by Lai Bahadui Shastn and bhastn 's by Indira Ghandi. For a lyrical 
account of behind-the-scene-manoevnng, competition, pressures, and 
ultimate decision on succession, see Michael Brecher, S u c c e s s i o n 
i n I n d i a r A S t u d y i n D e c i s i o n M a k i n g (Oxford Univ. Press. 
1966) especially, pp. 32-70. 
55. Rajni Kothan, o p . c i t . , p. 1167 
56. It was a centralized organization. The nomination of candidates for State 
Assemblies, even District Councils, needed High Command approval. 
Selecting five districts (in different regions) of India, Werner has made an 
excellent study of the Congress Party of India, underscoring the features 
which caused its disintegration; see Myron Werner, P a r t y B u i l d i n g 
i n a N e w N a t i o n : T h e I n d i a n N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s 
(The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967) especially, Conclusions, pp.459-96. 
Also, see S.A. Kochanek, o p . c i t . , especially Part III: The Leader­
ship of the Congress Party". 
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c r o s s - c u r r e n t s , tended to c r i s s - c r o s s any apriori d irec t ion , the 
language i s s u e enc losed people in a defined terr i tory and became 
the most vital determinant in federal po l i t i c s . The Constitution had 
made Hindi Che official language of the Union, providing for 
continuation of Engl ish for official purposes for a period of fifteen 
y e a r s from the adoption of the Constitution, and al lowing the States 
to use: a) their own language for transacting their b u s i n e s s ; b) 
Hindi for conducting bus iness among themse lves ; and c) communicat-
ing with the Central Government in Engl ish for fifteen y e a r s and in 
Hindi thereafter (1965) . 57 The adoption of this compromise formula 
had not been e a s y . 58 Neither was it easy to implement i t . Hindi may 
have been the language of the largest group, 59
 a nd to make it the 
official language in contrast to English may have been necess i ta ted 
in the name of polit ical independence, but i t s status was e s sent ia l ly 
that of one of 1 5 languages , not n e c e s s a r i l y superior to others in 
development and r i chness .6® Sens i t ive a s the language i s s u e tends 
to be e v e r y w h e r e , in india, i t s pol it ical value and the sheer number 
of l inguistic groups made i ts intensity s e v e r e . Agitations were 
double-edged: by non Hindists against the "Hindi-imperialism", and 
non-Hindists against each other . Linguistic conflict f irst flared in 
the Telugu-Tamil speaking State of Madras in 1953 , resul t ing in: 
the fast unto death of Potti Sriramulu - preceded by orderly protes ts 
and followed by wild r i o t s ; the immediate creat ion of Telugu-speaking 
Andhra P r a d e s h ; and finally, the appointment of the S ta te s 
Reorganization Commission ( S R C ) . 6 1 Having cons idered the recom-
57. Articles 343-51 , Part XVII of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a . The 
Constitutional provisions are elaborate, providing, inter alia, for the 
appointment of a Commission by the President of India to examine the 
language issue again alter 5 years, and giving due place to regional 
languages. 
58. The Constituent Assembly "witoessed some of the most agitated scenes, 
surcharged with emotion riding on the crest of linguistic fanaticism". The 
discussion that followed one of the Draft Amandments, "contrary to earliei 
hopes and expédions, was acrimonious, agitated and, at timçs, undignified": 
see M.V. Pylee, o p . с i t, pp. 664-68. 
59. The percentage of population which speaks Hindi is controversial. The 
Census has liberally included Urdu (with different script and spoken largely 
by Muslims) and Punjabi (with different script) in the Hindi group. The 
case may well be, in Weiner's words, one of "genocide by census 
redefinition", see Myron Weiner, P o l i t i c s o f S c a r c i t y , Ch.III, 
on "Community Associations". See also Clifford Geertz, "Primordial 
Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Clifford Geertz (ed). , 
O l d S o c i e t i e s a n d N e w S t a t e s (The Free Press of Glencoe, 
London, 1963), p. 126. 
60. Hindi has a relatively new history as compared with languages south of 
Narbada and even Bengali. Between Hindists and non-Hindists this remains 
a controversial issue. For a brief, but lucid survey of Indian languages, 
see Hugh Tinker, I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n , pp. 123-28. 
61. Though Congress circles felt strongly for the reorganization of states on a 
linguistic basis - administrative provincial units made by the British were 
167 
mendations of this Commission, Parliament passed the States 
Reorganization Act in 1956, and all States, except Bombay and 
Punjab, were reorganized on a linguistic basis. Bombay and Punjab 
were made bilingual, composed respectively of mainly Marathi-
Gujerati groups and Punjabi-Hindi groups. Neither of these groups 
were pleased with this arrangement, whatever its background. 
"The Congressite Gujeratis backed the central government: but at 
the pi-ice of bitter unpopularity. The Maratha Congress leaders 
demanded separation: they had no choice, the opposition was 
capturing municipal and local power under their noses by noisily 
banging the linguistic drum. At length in 1960, the Central Govern­
ment acquiesced in the inevitable ",63
 an(j Bombay was bifurcated 
into Maharashtra and Gujerat States. With respect to Punjab, how­
ever, the Central Government adopted a tough line. Proclaimed 
fasts unto death by Sikh leaders, mass-arrests and riots continued 
until the Congress position visibly weakened in the State as a whole. ^ 
Finally, in 1966, the Punjab was divided into Haryana and Punjab 
States. Then, to conciliate the tribal people of the far Northeast 
frontier "a small non-viable state of Nagaland" was created in 1963. ' 
Further, to "provide adequate scope for the political aspirations of 
the hill people and the well-being of the people inhabiting the other 
parts of Assam", an autonomous state within the State of Assam was 
created in 1968. D In t h i s w a y , s t a r t i n g from s o m e 26 S t a t e s u n d e r 
thought to be 'divide and ru le ' pol it ics and the first Resolution 
on linguistic division was passed in Nagpur Congress S e s s i o n ot 1920 -
mature consideration of the i s s u e by some top leaders (including Nehru 
and Sardar Patel) reported against i t . The events of 1953 gave "a strong 
fillip to somnolescent l inguistic urges e l s e w h e r e " and appointment of the 
SRC could no longer be held back, s e e Asok Chanda, F e d e r a l i s m 
i n I n d i a (George Allen and Unwin, 1965), pp. 4 8 - 4 9 . The SRC was 
to keep in view the following considerations: "The language and culture of 
an area have an undoubted importance as they respresent a pattern of living 
which i s common in that a r e a . In considering a reorganization of the S t a t e s , 
however, there are other important factors which have a l so to be borne in 
mind. The first esstent ia l consideration i s the preservation and strengthen­
ing of the unity and security of India. Financial, economic and administrative 
considerations are almost equally important, not only from the point of view 
of each state, but for the whole nation", Government of India Resolution 
dated 29th December 1953, quoted in S R С R e ρ о r t, p. 2 6 6 . 
6 2 . In Bombay the crucia l question was of the city of Bombay; in Rinjab the 
question was to contain the pol i t ico-rel ig ious group of Sikh Akali Dal. For 
deta i l s , s e e Hugh Tinker, I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n , pp. 137-3». 
6 3 . I b ι d . , p. 137 
6 4 . Under Nehru, compromises had not gone beyond meetings and promises for 
the future. Under S h a s t n the question cropped up but no decis ion was taken. 
The unpopularity of Congress was seen in the growing instability of the 
Punjab Government after strong man Partap Singh Kairon res igned in 
June 1964»and was later assass inated in 1965. 
6 5 . Asok Chanda 
66. This State does not yet have a name, but appears to be a working arrange­
ment under which part of the execut ive, leg is lat ive and concurrent powers 
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the Constitution in 1950, with a transitional reduction to 14 under 
the State Reorganization Act of 1956, the number reached 17(plus 
the "state within the State of Assam"). With the ever-growing sense 
of linguistic affiliation with marginal агеаь of adjacent s tates , the 
arrangement has not reached a definite so lut ion." ' 
In a wider context, the language problem reached major 
proport ions. Hindi ' s place as an official language was confirmed 
from time to time, "° and a concerted effort to spread it deeper into 
the States continued. Under gradual fear of Hindi domination, and 
with even more vigorous effort than "Hindi chauvinists" (as non-
Hindists prefer to call them) to develop their own language and 
culture, the States became increasingly hostile to the dictum of Hindi 
as official language. Moreover, having been educated via regional-
language media, it was disadvantageous to non-Hindi groups to have 
to compete via the official language for the All-India and the Central 
Government S e r v i c e s . If English had been continued indefinitely as 
biofficial language, as strongly advocated by Nehru,69 the chaos 
may have been averted. But political p r e s s u r e , coming mainly from 
Hindi heartland, did not allow the target date (l 5 years were to end 
on 26th January 1965) to be postponed. Moreover, government 
machinery moved in a routine way, almost unhindered by political 
controversy over this i s s u e . In October 1964, the Union Home 
Ministry asked all Union ministries to report on progress being made 
in the use of Hindi and to indicate "what steps they proposed to take 
to use Hindi after the appointed day". "To mark the change", the 
directive added, "a few printed forms in Hindi should be introduced 
even before 26th January - in order to create the 'necessary 
psychological atmosphere ' . " ' υ 
Thus/iespite all the agitation and assurances^things appeared to be 
moving almost unhindered - a situation hardly acceptable to the 
Tamil heartland, Madras. Shastr i as Prime Minister faced the 
language problem in i ts acutest form. The initial protests were 
dramatic: two stalwarts of anti-Hindi organization Dra vida Munnetra 
is given to three autonomous districts of Garo Hills, Khari Hills and Jowai, 
under overall control of the Assam Government. See the "Official State­
ment on Reorganization of Assam State", I n d i a N e w s , Sept.21 ,1968. 
67. For example, Maharashtrians would like to have some 800 and odd villages 
of Mysore State which are Marathi-speaking. See the recent account of 
Bombay riots given in Τ i m e, February 21 , 1969. 
68. For instance, see O f f i c i a l L a n g u a g e C o m m i s s i o n 
R e p o r t 1 9 5 6 and R e p o r t o f t h e C o m m i t t e e on 
E m o t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n 1962. 
69. " . . .essentially the overriding reason for it retention of English is the 
necessity of not encouraging any disruptive tendencies in India", 
unpublished Nehru letters, February 1963, quoted in Mie hal Brecher, 
S u c c e s s i o n i n I n d i a , p. 154. In fact, the Official Language 
Act of 1963 in some way provided for English to continue as link 
language, see i b i d . 
70. I b i d . , p.155. 
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Kazhagbain ( D M K ) , "burned themse lves to dea th in the s t r e e t s of Madra s 
ci ty on 2 i and 26 J a n u a r y " , ^ a lmost s imul taneous ly followed by the 
c l o s u r e of u n i v e r s i t i e s and c o l l e g e s , and v io lence in a lmos t e v e r y 
town of Madra s S t a t e . Mass a r r e s t s and pol ice f i r ings fol lowed; the 
i s s u e (¿mporar i ly s u b s i d e d , only to explode a g a i n . F i n a l l y , a f t e r 
a s s u r a n c e s from the C e n t r a l Government to think out the language 
policy a f r e s h , some calm r e t u r n e d . 
Being a mul t i - l ingua l s o c i e t y , if l anguage i s anywhere 
equa ted with a na t ion , India must of n e c e s s i t y be r e g a r d e d a s a 
mul t i -na t iona l s o c i e t y . In the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , hopes of a s ingle language 
dominat ing o v e r the o t h e r s n e c e s s a r i l y look b l eak . C . R a j g o p a l a c h a r i 
(Raja j i ) , the e l d e r s t a t e s m a n of Ind ia , w r o t e on the i s s u e a s fo l lows: 
"the people speaking other languages than Hindi are never going 
to adopt Hindi in place of their own mother-tongues. If the move-
ment for making Hindi the Union official language is based on a 
vague feeling that Hindi will one day become the national language 
of all India, it is based on a foundation that is not t rue, on a hope 
that cinnot be fulfilled and which would be resisted and opposed 
if expressed. There cannot be ever a single national language for 
India ." 7 2 
Not a s o l i t a r y v o i c e , R a j a j i ' s view was s h a r e d by many who advoca ted 
a long t i m e - s p a n and cont inuat ion of Eng l i sh a s l i n k - l a n g u a g e . ' ^ In 
the meantime the government gave full r e cogn i t i on to o t h e r l a n g u a g e s , 
b r ing ing them at p a r with Hindi : e v e r y b u s i n e s s , inc luding d e b a t e s in 
C e n t r a l P a r l i a m e n t , c o r r e s p o n d e n c e be tween S t a t e s and be tween 
S t a t e s and the C e n t r e , and examina t ions for c iv i l s e r v i c e s could be 
conducted in any l a n g u a g e . But some have felt tha t t h i s solut ion 
firmly sowed the s e e d s of d i sun i ty , affect ing even the Civ i l S e r v i c e . ' ^ 
The l ingu is t i c f e r v o u r coupled with a w i d e s p r e a d u r g e for economic 
development n a r r o w e d h o r i z o n s down to S t a t e b o u n d a r i e s . · ' Th i s 
pattern of po l i t i cs gave b i r t h to the new phenomenon c a l l e d " r e g i o n a l i s m " . ' 
7 1 . I b i d . , p . 156 
72. S w a r a j y a , February 20,1965. 
73 . S e m i n a r devoted two issues exclusively to the language problem, giving 
an analytical survey and possible solutions by a number of authors/journal-
ists/academics/politicians. See S e m i n a r 68: Language, April 1965; 
and S e m i n a r 76: The Politics of Language, December 1965. 
74. See A.D. Gorwala's editorials in Ο ρ i η i ο η , July 1967, and O p i n i o n 
August 1967. 
75. Every now and then riots break out in one State or the other. As recently 
as February 1969, 52 lay dead, more than 650 were injured and about 3,500 
arrested in Bombay as a result of violent agitations for "Maharashtra for 
Maharashtrians" - wherein Maharashtrians wanted all white-collar jobs to 
go to them instead of non—Maharashtrians who abundantly man them in 
Metroplitan Bombay, see T i m e , February 21, 1969. Ear l ie r , a similar 
situation had reached its worst dimensions in Assam, between Bengalis 
(minority) and Assamese, in 1960, see Hugh Tinker, ο ρ . с i t . , p.139. 
76. The term has a different meaning from "provincialism" which pre-dates 
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(ii) Growing Regional Approach to Development: The roots 
of regionalism seemed to be firmly established under Central planning. 
It found i ts greatest expression in a regionally res t r ic ted , as against 
the C e n t r e ' s nationally coordinated, approach to economic develop-
ment. 
Ea r l i e r , we saw that under the Constitution the Centre 
was overwhelmingly powerful v is-à-vis the S ta tes . Also, that central 
planning had further strengthened i ts hands. The real s tr ings of this 
arrangement became noticeable when the States undertook development 
tasks and found no funds available to them. Under the Constitution, 
the major elastic taxes , such as customs, income and excise were all 
central t axes . These were supplemented by: railway, post and te le-
graph, and foreign aid. As against th i s , State taxes were inelastic 
and limited, such as land revenue, agricultural income, excise duties 
on alcohol, opium and other narcotic d rugs , e lectr ic i ty , adver t ise-
ments other than those published in newspapers, e tc . ' ' Some taxes 
which may have yielded considerable revenue (land revenue, ag r i -
cultural income and electr ici ty, for instance) were neither easily levied 
nor real izable , due to fear of the already politically fluid situation in the 
States becoming even more vulnerable.78 But then, the vital a reas 
of development such as public health, education, land, agricul ture , 
i r r igat ion, e lectr ic i ty , local government and a wide range of 
activities under industries and transport belonged to the S ta tes . 
Where were the funds to come from to meet these responsibil i t ies? 
As we have seen, the Constitution made provision for discretionary 
grants and aids to the S ta tes . Their amount and re laese were settled 
after much bargaining between the State governments, the Planning 
Commission and the appropriate departments of Central Government. 
The guiding principle for the Centre , however, was to give matching 
grants: it required States to show a proportionate percentage 
expansion of their own re sources . Then, decisions on pr ior i t ies 
were in the hands of the Centre and grants were tied separately to 
independence and is related to administrative units created by British. A 
clear distinction of these terms is drwan in R e p o r t of t h e 
C o m m i t t e e on E m o t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n , pp. 22-26. 
77. See , Entries 22,23,32, 35, 36-50 and 82-92 of the Union List and Entries 
45 to 63 and 66 of the State List of the C o n s t i t u t i o n o f I n d i a , 
Seventh Schedule, for details . 
78. With respect to agricultural taxes, Deshmukh recently wrote, "This sector 
of the national income, it can be demonstrated without great difficulty, 
contributed much less than its expected share for financing national 
development. This is so both because of the historical irrationality of the 
system of land tenure. . . also because of political resistance to any thought 
of rectification. The recent abolition of land revenue from the small man 
has a great deal in i ts favour, but fiscally the measure only led to revenue 
losses while good taxation theory required recompense for losses in the 
shape of sharply progressive levies from the bigger farmers. This last has 
been studiously avoided by the States out of political timidity", C D . 
Deshmukh, "Financial Implications", in S e m i n a r 1 1 1 , pp. 19-20· 
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individual s c h e m e s . In Centre-State re lat ionsh ips, this was a some­
what tricky arrangement and had a two-sided effect. F i r s t , in order 
to get matching grants from the Centre, the S t a t e s tended to show 
larger est imates of contributions than they could effectively make. 
A l s o , they tried to inflate both the s i z e of their plan a s well a s their 
own expected r e s o u r c e s in order to get financial a s s i s t a n c e from 
the Centre. This p r o c e s s virtually d istorted the system of matching 
grants . Secondly, the S t a t e s protested against pr ior i t ies being set 
by the Central Government. Asok Chanda e x p r e s s e d West B e n g a l ' s 
v iews on the question: 
"It was improper that the pattern of central assistance should be 
utilized by the Union government and by the Planning Commission 
to influence priorities in the state sector or should attempt to 
superimpose a system of priorities which may have no relevance 
to the conditions prevailing in the various states. The state 
governments are responsible to their own legislatures and it 
would be a divorce of power from responsibility if the Planning 
Commission and the Union ministries were to determine their 
system of matching grants and their financial incentives to the 
actual schemes that were to be implemented in each state. "°0 
Yet, u n l e s s some changes in the whole system were 
brought about,81 the dependence of the S t a t e s on the Centre remained 
bas ical ly the same. "In the p r o c e s s " , wrote Kumar, 
"The states barter away theii autonomy for funds, and emerge in 
vertical relationship with the Centre, even in matters within their 
exclusive legislative competence. The process is intensified with 
the passage of years, as, incidental to these grants, the financial 
liability of the States increases, without a matching increase in 
their resources. A big part of grants is given in the form of loans 
which have to be repaid with interest. 
And, then, the grants are given for the duration of a plan; there­
after they merge with the committed expenditure of the State govern­
ments . The lure of grants thus drives the States into a position 
where the only answer to their dependence is more dependence. "82 
Yet another aspect of central planning has been that the 
S t a t e s "sought to a s s e r t themselves in mutual competition , which 
79. For a detailed survey of the whole situation since the inception of planning 
see A.H. Hanson, P r o c e s s of P l a n n i n g , pp. 311-48. Also, see 
S . P . Jagota, "Some Constitutional Aspects of Planning", in Ralph Braibanti 
and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), ο ρ . с i t. pp. 173-201. 
80. Asok Chanda, F e d e r a l i s m I n I n d i a , p. 284. 
81 . The criteria for central aid have been debated in almost every meeting of 
the National Development Council. In July 1968, the NDC appointed a 
Committee to find an acceptable solution - some formula for the equitable 
distribution of Central assistance to the States during the Fourth Plan 
(1969-74). For a brief review of the existing system and some possible 
suggestions (for instance, the criteria of a per capita income of the States, 
checking the population growth, etc.), see T h o u g h t , XX, 28, July 13, 
1968, pp. 4-5-
82. Sushil Kumar, "The Problem", S e m i n a r 1 1 1 , o p . c i t . , p.11. 
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seemed to confirm their separate ident i t i e s , and a l so offered a 
channel for their e x p r e s s i o n . They competed with one another in 
bargaining with the Centre . "^3 These trends in recent y e a r s have 
been best demonstrated in putting p r e s s u r e on the Central Govern-
ment: to locate a s tee l plant in Andhra;^^ and to have an oil ref inery 
in Assam.85 In both c a s e s , Central Government had to partial ly y ie ld 
to regional demands. 
The foregoing analys i s leads to the conclusion that w h e r e -
a s the general polit ical pattern has tended to develop on democratic 
l ines in the country a s a whole , eventually result ing in the multiparty 
sys tem, linguism and the planning of economic development have 
polarized the S ta tes - eventually resul t ing in jea lous competition 
with each other and e scape and even defiance of central control . From 
wichever ang le , and at whatever l eve l it i s examined, it was competi-
tive pol i t ics al l o v e r , which could hardly sustain the monolithic control 
of government at the Centre a s well a s at State l e v e l . 
(b) L o s s of Hegemony: Under the charismatic leadership 
of Nehru, the consensus pol i t ics of C o n g r e s s , although vis ibly 
decl ining, s t i l l surv ived . After his death, conflict erupted further, 
a s evidenced in the factional strife over his s u c c e s s i o n and that of 
S h a s t r i . ° " The effect of his absence was demonstrated more c o n c r e t e -
ly in the 1967 General E l e c t i o n s , which aroused tremendous interest 
8 3 . I b i d. 
84 . This example g lares in Sushil Kumar's ana ly s i s , i b i d . An informal 
announcement by the Central Government on the location of a fifth s tee l 
plant outside the coal belt led to much speculation about the s i t e . Madras, 
Mysore and Andhra Pradesh showed their keen in teres t , but in Andhra 
pres sure reached i t s cl imax. People became violent and indulged in arson 
and lo 3ting "Its location within a state was of considerable economic ad-
vantage to that state and it was a gigantic symbol of status in the comity of 
s i s t e r s ta tes" , wrote Kumar, and added, "The Central Government got 
confused, and saying it would not yield to p r e s s u r e , y i e lded ." 
85 . When the poss ible s i t e s for public sec tor ref iner ies were under cons ider -
ation, Assam put pres sure on the Central Government to build it in Assam 
where favourable s tr ikes promised availability of o i l . "A Commission 
appointed by the Central Government had recommended Bihar or Calcutta a s 
more sat isfactory s i t e s , given considerations of transports , c o s t s and so 
o n . " Moreover, A s s a m ' s geographical situation (at the borders of Burma 
and Pakistan) posed special problems. For de ta i l s , s ee Myron Weiner, 
P o l i t i c s o f S c a r c i t y , pp. 33 -34 . In this particular c a s e , both 
Congress and opposition party polit icians put pres sure on the Central 
Government and made it partially y ie ld . Aiyar c i tes a report appearing in 
T h e T i m e s o f I n d i a , June 27, 1960, which quoted an anonymous 
Congressman: "Every drop of oil in Assam i s a s sacred a s a drop of blood 
of every A s s a m e s e , and we cannot allow it to be sucked by others", s ee 
S . P . Aiyar , "Union-State Relations in India: A Post -Elec t ion View", 
U n i t e d A s i a , 1 9 , 2 , (March-April 1967), p . 8 3 . 
86 . For de ta i l s , see Michael Brecher , S u c c e s s i o n i n I n d i a , p . 226 
ff . , in which he compares the two s u c c e s s i o n s . 
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at home and abroad. The r e s u l t s marked a point of departure in the 
evolution of Indian democracy, the central fact of which was an end 
to one-party dominance. Congress lost power in eight of 17 s t a t e s ; 
in the Central Parl iament, a s compared to three e a r l i e r e l e c t i o n s , 
i t s majority was reduced to a very low margin.87 While Congress 
retained power at the Centre, in the S t a t e s , non-Congress govern­
ments (with the s ingle exception of Madras) were formed by coal i t ions 
of severa l p a r t i e s . Many of these proved "uneasy marr iages of 
convenience under varying d e g r e e s of strain of incompatibility: 
such s tra ins are least in Kerala and O r i s s a because of the p r e s e n c e 
of a dominant partner, left ist in orientation in Kerala and rightist in 
O r i s s a " . 8 8 E lsewhere it proved a virtual pol it ical chaos "by the 
intrigue and machinations n e c e s s a r y to the survival of loosely-knit 
coal i t ions cl inging to power with small major i t ies. C o n g r e s s , tempted 
into the fray, must share much of the blame. There have been 314 
defections a c r o s s state assembly f loors s ince last March. Pol i t ica l 
loya l t ies are discarded for the sake of office and democracy i s reduced 
to a mockery." " F l o o r - c r o s s i n g (sometimes i n large groups of 25 
to 30) was al l too frequent and overnight power-imbalance caused 
shifts of governments. These almost continuous shake-ups in more 
than half the S t a t e s which toppled the Congress Government told 
dearly upon whatever stabil ity was hoped for by non-Congress 
governments. These S t a t e s faced students turmoil (Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar) , encirclement of industrial management by workers (West 
Bengal ) , and put to test even the Constitutional propriety of the 
Governor (in Punjab).°0 The situation was one of l a w l e s s n e s s and 
Constitutional breakdown - sufficient r e a s o n s for the Pres ident to 
take over the State Governments and, at a later date, for bye-
8 7 . Comparative figures show: 364 out of 489 in 1952, 371 out of 494 in 1957, 
361 out of 494 in 1962, and 281 out of 510 in 1967. For an authentic survey, 
s e e N . S . Jagannathan, "India's Fourth General E lect ions" , in A f r i с a 
Q u a r t e r l y , New Delhi, VII, 1 , April-June, 1967, pp .57-69. 
88 . I b i d . , p. 61· 
89 . P e t e r Hazelhurst, "Coalition Magic F a i l s " , T h e T i m e s , January 26, 
1968. Hazelhurst reviewed the position in eight States during one year start­
ing March 1967; a l s o , see V.V. Ramana Murti, "Fourth Geneneral E lect­
ions: A Review", U n i t e d A s i a , o p . c i t . : "Even in s tates where it 
has not obtained a c l e a r majority, the Congress direct ive i s , intriguingly 
enough, to adopt alternative course of coming to power. And the situation 
i s no better s ince the opposition part ies too are in a haste to get into power", 
p. 9 7 . 
90 . In 1967-68, student r iots were quite common in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar 
University towns; in West Bengal the encirclement became popularly known 
a s Gherao whereby management could neither get in nor get out of their 
place of work; in Punjab the position of the Governor, who compulsorily 
summoned the House (adjourned by the Speaker belonging to other political 
party) for Budget presentation and approval, was challenged, and the 
government, through the Speaker, sought for indefinite adjournment of the 
House. 
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e l e c t i o n s in these four S t a t e s . 9 1 These e l e c t i o n s were held in 
February 1969, re-estab l i sh ing Congress in Uttar Pradesh and partly 
in Bihar, and keeping it ousted in Punjab and West B e n g a l . 9 2 
This brief survey of party-polit ic s and the break-up of 
the C o n g r e s s monolith s e e m s to be bringing Center-State re lat ion­
ships into a new perspect ive : an added emphasis on the need for 
greater state autonomy, n e c e s s a r i l y implying the distribution of 
powers under the Constitution. "The United Front will s tr ive to 
acquire more powers and rights for the State Government", said the 
West Bengal Chief Minister A.K.Mukherjee, "and in part icular p r e s s 
the Centre for meeting the legitimate share of West Bengal to larger 
a l locat ions from the Central revenue. "93 Another Chief Minister, 
R . N . Singh Deo of O r i s s a , appeared to be going a step further: 
"Had there been no dictation from the Centre, precedence would have 
been given by the s ta tes to projects which would have yie lded quick 
r e s u l t s . . .The Centre should have powers only in r e s p e c t of defence, 
external affairs and for such purposes a s safe-guarding the 
sovereignty and terr i tor ia l integrity of the country. ' ^ The S t a t e s 
which had comparatively stable non-Congress governments (Madras 
and Kerala) viewed the problem, at l eas t to start with, with some 
doubt, but e s s e n t i a l l y with l e s s host i l i ty . °5 
To conclude: the whole question of Centre-State and in ter-
State re la t ionsh ips , a s evolved during two decades of independence, 
may be divided into dist inct per iods .96 p
u
t in chronological order, 
91 . See Emergency Powers of the President under the Constitution of India, 
Pt. Х Ш, Articles 352-60. 
9 2 . In West Bengal, again there were some 20 leftist part ies which formed the 
United Front Government. It i s hoped that the government will behave 
somewhat better in order to prevent the reimposition of P r e s i d e n t ' s rule: 
"that may be overly optimistic", remarked T i m e , February 21 , 1969. 
9 3 . F r e e P r e s s J o u r n a l , March 2, 1967. 
9 * . T h e I n d i a n Ex p r e s s , March 9, 1967. 
9 5 . Note Madras Chief Minister C . N . Annadorai 's approach, "We take up the 
responsibi l ity of running the administration of the State with the fervent 
hope of getting the maximum co-operation from the Centre. On our part we 
would see that no occasion a r i s e s from our side for a c lash with the Centre. " 
F r e e P r e s s J o u r n a l , February 27, 1967. Fear of repetition of 
T959 experience (when government was terminated and P r e s i d e n t ' s rule 
established) seemed to have made communists w i ser . Chief Minister 
Namboodiripad ' s statements varied between: "If the Centre cannot give us 
r ice let them give us the money that our people have earned and we shall buy 
r ice anywhere", T h e I n d i a n E x p r e s s (Bombay), March 7 , 1 9 6 7 , 
and almost withdrawal from his position when he said that neither the non-
Congress State Governments nor the Centre "could deal with any problem 
ignoring the other", F r e e P r e s s J o u r n a l , March 11 , 1967. 
96. For this distinction of per iods, I have relied on S . P . Aiyar, "Union-
State Relations in Jndia: A post Elect ion View", o p . c i t . This division of 
relationship into separate phases runs roughly parallel to the s tages of 
evolution in the DVC, cf. s u p r a . , p. 147 
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the f irst period may be s e e n from inauguration of the Constitution 
(1950) to the midfifties. It was during this period that the centra l i za­
tion provided under the Constitution, i tse l f conspicuous when seen 
in the light of latter-day S a t e s e n s i t i v i t i e s , 9 7 "was strengthened by 
one party dominance under the C o n g r e s s ru le" ; "some saw a strong 
Centre a s indispensable for planning and development and for main­
taining stabil ity in the country" ."" The second period begins roughly 
with the reorganization of S t a t e s on l inguist ic b a s i s from 1956,until 
Prime Minister N e h r u ' s death in 1964. During this period, there 
was simultaneous growth of: d iv is ive, centrifugal f o r c e s on the one 
hand,99
 a
n d centra l i s t ic factors through the machinery of the Planning 
Commission on the other. 100 The posit ion was best put by Vijayalaksmi 
Pandit: "It i s a feeling of shame that after seventeen y e a r s of indepen­
dence , the strong united nation we dreamt of i s a checker board of 
d is integrat ing s ta tes host i le to one another. "101 After the death of 
Nehru came the third per iod. Congres factions had "an opportunity 
to break out more forcefu l ly . . .Confl icts became open and sharp. " 102 
The end of the third period and beginning of the last saw disturbing 
9 7 . Though there were some stray vo ices in the Constituent Assembly, like 
K . T . S h a h who strongly pleaded for more power for the S t a t e s , the reader 
of Constituent Assembly debates i s amazed by almost unanimous feeling, 
perhaps accountable to "general spirit of nationalism generated by 
Independence", in favour of a strong centre . Among numerous authors who 
have elaborately dealt with the Indian federation, s e e K.R. Bombwall, ο ρ . 
с i t . pp. 252-95. 
9 8 . S . P . Aiyar, "Union-State Relations in India: A Post-Elect ion View", ο ρ 
с i t . p. 8 2 . 
9 9 . Centrifugal forces found their express ion in various ways, some examples 
of which were given above. Sharma c i t e s the observations of Y . B . Chavan 
(then Chief Minister of Bombay, presently Home Minister of India) in 
connection with these trends: "If Andhra wanted surplus water from deve­
loping Krishna Penner Project, he would not agree to i t . He would rather 
divert the water towards the Arabian sea after developing the power he 
needed", P . D . Sharma, "Linguism and Regionalism-Challenges to 
Democracy", in S . P . Aiyar and R. Srinivasan ( e d s . ) , S t u d i e s i n 
I n d i a n D e m o c r a c y (Allied Publ i shers , Bombay, 1965), pp.437-
38. Aiyar observes that the most powerful express ion of centrifugal forces 
was found "in inter-state conflicts ar is ing out of the location of power 
projects and disputes relating to the sharing of r iver waters" , in "Union-
State Relations in India: A Post-Elect ion View", p. 8 2 . 
100. From re ferences to Planning Commission appearing in the text above it 
may be seen that i t s increas ing influence and strength virtually brought 
the country in line with ce lebr i t i es such as former Chief Just ice of India, 
Mahajan, who strongly pleaded for a unitary form of Government. For his 
v iews on the i s s u e , see Mehr Chand Mahajabn, L o o k i n g B a c k (Asia 
Publishing House, 1963) Appendix I - "Preserv ing Unity of India", 
pp.237-48 
101. Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit (then Governor of Maharashtra) in her 
Independence Day (15th August) 1964, a d r e s s , cited by S . P . Aiyar, 
"Union-State Relations in India: A Post-Elect ion View", p. 8 2 . 
102. I b i d . 
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developments: failure of the Third Five Year Plan, rupee-devaluation 
(1966), spiralling prices and threat of famine. This was the proper 
stage for opposition parties to gear their forces for anti-Congressism, 
the results of which we saw above. 
The present period which set in after the 1967 Elections 
is not easily predictable. Some see it with despair and others with 
hope. Before the Elections, Neville Maxwell presented a grim 
picture of the Indian political scene and wrote that states "which in 
some instances are already beginning to act like sub-nations, will 
not respond to the rhetoric-without-political-power that is all a 
democratic Centre will henceforth be able to muster. "ЮЗ Soon 
after the Elections, however, Hanson noted: "One has to accept that, 
as a result of the elections, India's political life has acquired a new 
fluidity. It is in this sense, if in any sense, that there has indeed 
been a 'revolution by ballot box'." Ю4 Morris-Jone s appeared to be 
more positive when he observed: "The inertia which kept in 
existence the appearance of centralized modernity has come to an 
end; India comes of age as a federal state in the full sense of that 
term and with all the difficulties that entails. " He, then concluded, 
"Indian politics is rehabilitated in the eyes of its own people and is 
ready for further development. "105 
The mixture of hope and despair notwithstanding, certain 
basic assumptions underlying Indian polity are being challenged. The 
first such assumption is the democratic way of settling disputes, be 
they between different States, or between States and the Centre. 
The second is the sense of belongingness to one single nation, 
demanding "primary allegiance to it". Both these basic assumptions 
now show evident signs of crumbling. Instead of bargaining at 
negotiating tables, fasts unto death,threats of self-immolation, and 
ventilation of grievances through street violence are often resorted 
to and openly encouraged. This not only threatens "the government 
of the day, but the very structure of the state itself". υ More often 
than not, the issues involved range one State against the neighbour­
ing State, or a State against the Centre. The federal power structure 
103. Neville Maxwell, "India's Disintegrating Democracy-I: Powerof the States 
Threatens to Wreck Authority", T h e T i m e s , January 26, 1967. This 
is essentially a journalist's view which is joined, somewhat less pessi­
mistically, by Robert Stephens, "Can India Take the Strain? " T h e 
O b s e r v e r , February 26,1967: "India has a good chance of muddling 
through the next few years of political uncertainty and of proving that the 
present elections were part of birth pangs rather than the death throes 
of democracy here. " 
104. A.H. Hanson, "India After the Elections", W o r l d T o d a y , May 1967, 
pp. 188-97. Also, see i d e m . , "Why India's Democracy Can Survive", 
T h e Y o r k s h i r e Ρ о s t, March 4,1967. 
105. W.H. Morris-Jones, "India: Will the Shock Treatment Work?" T h e 
S u n d a y T i m e s , March 19,1967. 
106. M.N. Srinivas draws attention to these fast disappearing assumptions 
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t e n d s to become a q u a g m i r e when s e e n in the l ight of c h a n g i n g p o l i t ­
i c a l p a r t y i m b a l a n c e s : the n o n - C o n g r e s s g o v e r n m e n t s c a n n o t afford 
to r u n the r i s k of becoming u n p o p u l a r a n d , t h e r e f o r e , i n s t e a d of 
put t ing t h e i r ^ h o u s e in o r d e r , p r e s s u r e the C e n t r e to y i e l d to d e m a n d s 
h o w e v e r i r r a t i o n a l ; the C e n t r e , on the o t h e r h a n d , fully a w a r e of 
the d i v i s i v e t e n d e n c i e s in the c o u n t r y , may become o v e r - a s s e r t i v e 
in wie ld ing i t s C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o w e r s . F o r a t i m e , " c o n s e n s u s 
p o l i t i c s " may s t i l l a v e r t the e n s u i n g d a n g e r of S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s 
openly r e v o l t i n g a g a i n s t the C e n t r e , and t h e r e b y fal l ing p r e y to the 
P r e s i d e n t s ' e m e r g e n c y p o w e r s u n d e r the C o n s t i t u t i o n . But the 
s i t u a t i o n wil l become p r e c a r i o u s when t h e r e wil l no l o n g e r be a 
s ing le major i ty ( h o w e v e r s l e n d e r ) at the C e n t r e . 107 Will i t l e a d , 
one may a s k , to t h e f l o o r - c r o s s i n g s c e n e s of the L e g i s l a t i v e A s s e m ­
b l i e s be ing r e p e a t e d in Lok S a b b a t o o ? And will t h i s r e s u l t in a 
f u r t h e r l o s s of the C e n t r e ' s hegemony, p o s s i b l y put t ing t h e whole 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e a t s t a k e ? While s t a l w a r t s of s t a t e autonomy 
p u s h on for t h e i r r i g h t s and s t r i v e for m o r e and m o r e p o w e r , some 
c o n s i d e r the p r e s e n t s t r a i n s a s t r a n s i t o r y , in the hope that a r a p i d 
r a t e of economic deve lopment will i n c r e a s e the i n t e r - d e p e n d e n c e of 
the S t a t e s . 08 At t h e same t i m e , the p a t t e r n of f e d e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
(which s e e m s to be p lay ing a damaging r o l e in r e t a r d i n g economic 
deve lopment) m a k e s c e n t r a l i s t s hold on to the final s t r i n g s a t New 
D e l h i . 109 But a f t e r a l l , c o - e x i s t e n c e of an overwhelmingly powerful 
C e n t r a l Government with highly s e n s i t i v e and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y autonomous 
s t a t e u n i t s , coupled with " f r e e d o m s " u n d e r d e m o c r a c y , p r e s e n t s a 
p a r a d o x i c a l s i t u a t i o n ; ^ 0
 a n
y s u g g e s t i o n s for ge t t ing out of t h i s 
which threaten the stability of the State. See "Is The Sun Setting: 
S e m i n a r 90 (Our Union), February 1967, pp. 12-16. 
107. Those who have closely observed the Indian political scene in recent 
years rule out the eventuality that any one, or even two non-Congress 
part ies will have enough strength and common denominational factors to 
form a coalition government at the Centre. Among others, see A.H. 
Hanson, who considers two possibilities of Leftists or Rightists coming 
to power and, in case of utter chaos, the Military taking over, but rules 
either possibility out. "Why India 's Democracy Can Survive?" ο ρ . с i t . 
Also, see Peter Hazelhurst, ο ρ . с i t . 
108. Dr . V.К.R.V.Rao (at present Central Cabinet Minister) wrote: "Fortu­
nately, for us in India, the economic unity of the country is accompanied 
by its political unity, and it is this identity that forms the sure foundation for 
the rapid and accelerated economic development of the country and raising 
of the standard of living of all the people inhabiting it, irrespective of the 
constituent states to which they might individually belong", T h e H i n d u -
s t a n T i m e s, December 28,1964. See also, Sushil Kumar o p . c i t . , 
who makes the same point by saying that "the need of the hour is not to 
confuse the trivial and the transitory with the permanent. . . . " 
109. Not long ago, then Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai was reported to 
have said that the idea of attaching greater importance to planning at 
State level wes erroneous because it went contrary to the welfare of the 
whole country, see H i n d u s t h a n S t a n d a r d , May 20, 1968. 
110. Paul H. Appleby showed profound understanding of the Indian polity when 
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quandery tend to be highly decept ive. Yet the events of the last two 
decades tempt us to point out that the situation need not n e c e s s a r i l y 
be governed by perpetual uncertainty. We might therefore enquire 
whether the time has not already been reached to re-open, re-think 
and re-dec ide the whole question of Constitutional distribution of 
powers between the Centre and the S t a t e s , thereby restructur ing 
the whole federal sys tem. Ш 
In the light of the centrifugal t e n d e n c i e s , due credit 
should be given to the administrative machinery which has undoubt­
edly played a significant role in making the government a going 
concern . Affected by federal arrangements and in turn affecting them, 
the administrative system c a l l s for some brief notice in order to 
understand the eco log ica l sett ing more fully. 
(4) Some Ramifications of the Administrative Complex: 
At the beginning of this study we re ferred to some a s p e c t s of the 
administration of India in a most general s e n s e . A summary of 
central points now may give a proper p e r s p e c t i v e . ^ 2 
Almost any account of Indian administration s t a r t s with 
the order estab l i shed by the Br i t i sh . This was a structural legacy 
which, opposition from some members of the Constituent Assembly 
notwithstanding,Indian l e a d e r s determinedly c h o s e to hold on t o . ^ - * 
he wrote: "Two parliamentary systems operating concurrently, one in the 
States capable of coining under the control of different political parties -
A great and growing sentiment and practice favouring'autonomous States' 
along with - almost complete dependence of the Centre on the States for 
adminstration of social-action programmes. . . considerable diversity 
among the States in degrees of political and administrative development, 
experience,maturity, structures and performances... the prospective 
disappearance of one-party situation... the probable weakening of 
national leadership", cited by S . P . Aiyar, "Union-State Relations in 
India: A Post-Election View", o p . c i t . 
111. The choice may be hard, but had better be made before prophecies of the 
"most dangerous decades" come true. India's leading industrialist, 
J.R.D. Tata would like India to be structured, mutatis mutandis, on the 
American federal structure; see his article "The Political Scene: Our 
System An Anachronism?", B h a v a n ' s J o u r n a l , XtV, 18, April 
7, 1968. 
112. The discussion is limited to aspects relevant to our study. Features like 
personnel, training, corruption and many more which are often discussed 
in works on public administration are therefore excluded. 
113. Sardar Patel came out with a bold and forceful statement in the Constituent 
Assembly in support of the Civil Service: "I wish to assure you that I 
have worked with them during this difficult period... and I must confess 
that in point of patriotism, in point of loyalty, in point of sincerity and in 
point of ability, you cannot have a substitute... The Union will go - you 
will not have a united India, if you have not a good All India Service -
. . . . This Constitution is meant to be worked by a ring of service which 
will keep the country intact.... Remove them and I see nothing but a 
picture of chaos all over the country", Constituent Assembly Debates, 
X.p.48, quoted in M.V. Pylee, ο ρ . с i t. p. 638. 
179 
Tinker indicates continuing features of this structural legacy: open 
entry based on academic achievement; e laborate training arrange­
ments; permanency of tenure; respons ib le , general is t posts at 
Central, provincial, and distr ict l e v e l s r e s e r v e d for members of 
these s e r v i c e s a lone; a regular graduated sca le of pay with pension 
and other benef its; and a system of promotion and frequent transfers 
based predominantly on seniority and partly on m e r i t . 1 1 4 In a general 
structural s e n s e , the Civi l S e r v i c e s can be devided into three 
c a t e g o r i e s : f i rst , there are the All-India S e r v i c e s ; 1 '^ of t h e s e , the 
Indian Administrative S e r v i c e (IAS) members, like their p r e d e c e s s o r s 
Indian Civi l S e r v i c e (ICS) members, enjoy exceptional standing; 
second, there are more than twenty Central Government s e r v i c e s , 
like the Fore ign S e r v i c e , Audit and Accounts, e t c ; third, each 
State government c o n s i s t s of dozens of separate s e r v i c e s , of which 
Provincia l Civil S e r v i c e (PCS) members carry re lat ive ly more 
importance. ' ' " 
While the switch-over from the Bri t i sh Raj and the 
n e c e s s a r y expansion occured with apparent smoothness, adaptation 
to new tasks represented a rea l breakaway from the traditional role 
of administration. The principal tasks of the administration in pre-
independent India were limited:"maintaining law and order " 
"dispensation of j u s t i c e " , "col lect ion of revenue and maintenance of 
r e c o r d s " , and casual rel ief-administration in c a s e of emergency. 
"The fundamental unit of administration was the Dis t r ic t headed by 
a Dis t r ic t Commissioner the Col lector . . . who was representat ive 
of the Raj and i t s very embodiment to the people. "117 Within a 
d i s tr ic t , the Col lector wielded absolute power. The whole set-up 
was fundamentally a unitary o n e . ' 1 ° Post-independence y e a r s 
opened up with stupendous tasks ahead: "harness ing st i l l largely 
unexplored natural r e s o u r c e s " , " increas ing food production", 
"meeting the stagger ing problem of unemployment" and everything 
e l s e a s s o c i a t e d with economic development. These tasks were "often 
aggravated and overlaid with clamorous i s s u e s inevitably thrown 
114. Hugh Tinker, "Structure of the British Imperial Heritage", in 
Ralph Braibanti (ed.) A s i a n B u r e a u c r a t i c S y s t e m s 
E m e r g e n t f r o m t h e B r i t i s h I m p e r i a l T r a d i t i o n 
(Duke Univ. P r e s s , Durham, 1966),pp.23-86. 
115. For our purpose, d iscuss ion concentrates on the Indian Administrative 
S e r v i c e (IAS). 
116. For elaborate Treatment of the present Civil S e r v i c e set-up, s e e 
David C. Pot ter , Bureaucratic Change in India", in Ralph Braibanti (ed . ) , 
ο ρ . с i t . , pp. 141-208 
117. Prem Shanker Jha , "Indian Administration: Can an All-India S e r v i c e 
S u r v i v e ? " , W e e k e n d R e v i e w , May 18, 1968. 
118. T i n k e r ' s scattered comments suggest the e s s e n c e of the Indian Civil 
S e r v i c e a s : "The governor-general in Council was the Government of India" : 
"Centralization of power"; emphasis on "negative power to check abuses , 
not positive power to stimulate act ion"; "loyalty to o n e ' s chief", "self-
confidence", s e e Hugh Tinker, in Ralph Braibanti (ed.) ο ρ . с i t . 
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up from day to day by massive upheavals in an involved and 
stratified c o m m u n i t y " . ^ " They apparently demanded re-orientation 
of the whole administration, quite different from that of British 
India. How did this come about 9 With gradual expansion, the 
administrative complex in India at present embraces the Union 
Government, State Governments, the various local authorities 
(including town and rura l administration - Distr icts and Blocks), 
municipalities, panchayati raj institutions, public corporations and 
government uti l i t ies. The deployment of Civil Service c a d r e s , 
while largely making its impact down to the vil lages, partly resembled 
pre-independence tradit ion. Its most striking aspect was 
centralization of power. 
If attention is paid to the federal political s t r u c t u r e , 
administrative tasks were dispersed according to the division of 
powers under the Constitution. Accordingly, strictly State and 
Central subjects were administered by State and Central Services 
respectively. ^ As compared to this c lear division, the position 
of All-India Services was different. F i r s t ly , the Distr icts were 
still headed by IAS officers; secondly, since former ICS members 
had not all suddenly ret i red on independence, they occupied all 
senior key posts (Chief Secretary for instance) in the S t a t e s ; 
thirdly, the C e n t r e ' s strength gradually increased through the 
spread of key industr ies , inter-state development projects , e tc . 
which, with r a r e exceptions, were put under the charge of members 
of the All-India Serv ices ; finally, key positions at New Delhi 
( S e c r e t a r i e s , Joint-Sec r e t a r l e s , Deputy Secretar ies) were all 
manned by senior members of the All-India Serv ices . This network 
of All-India Services came to resemble the old "steel-frame" by i ts 
spread all over the country, making the C e n t r e ' s administrative 
control omnipresent. Its members were "recruited by the Centre, 
but alloted to the States on the basis of a quota system decided by 
the C e n t r e " ; they were "paid a uniform remuneration throughout the 
country, but the payment would be made by the S t a t e s . All powers 
of appointment, dismissal or removal were vested in the President 
of India" who acted on the advice of the Union Public Service 
Commission, "but powers of punishment, demotion, suspension or 
censure would remain in the hands of the State, subject to the officer 's 
right to appeal to the President of India". Then, "the state government was 
entirely free to decide on the internal deployment of i ts quota, no addition or 
subtraction could be made to their total number without a two-thirds 
majority decision in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House). "121 Possibly 
119. "The Problem" prebented i n b c m i n a r 8 5 (The Administrative Jungle), 
September 1966, p. 11. 
120. Central subjects under the Constitution (such as Intorno Tax, Customs, 
Audit and Accounts), were administered exclusivelj bv the Central 
Services, whose network was thus spread all over the country 
121 . This arrangement was stipulated in the All-India Services Act, 1957. 
See Prem Shankar Jha, o p . с ι t . 
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an act of compromise, which the federal se t -up demanded at every 
turn, this arrangement indicated dual control: terr i tor ia l j u r i s -
diction placing a l leg iance to the S ta te , and at the same time being 
protected by the securi ty ensured under the Constitution, thereby 
giving the Centre a degree of direct control . Devised with apparant 
sat i s fact ion , how did this administrative machinery function? The 
problems of central ly guided economic planning, the federal s e t - u p , 
and the varied confl icts of party and State pol i t ics w e r e , after a l l , 
formidable obstac les to the functioning of administration. 
In any considerat ion of Indian administration, the 
Planning Commission automatically becomes a focus of d i s c u s s i o n , 
a s the greates t e x p r e s s i o n of the central izat ion facet of government. 
In a general s e n s e , the Planning Commission was created to a s s e s s 
the r e s o u r c e s on hand, advise the government on their effect ive 
uti l ization and formulate f ive -year plans to guide action throughout 
the country. Another important function of the Planning Commission 
was "to appraise from time to time the p r o g r e s s achieved in the 
execution of each stage of the Plan and to recommend the adjustments 
of policy and measures that such appraisal may show to be n e c e s s a r y " . 
All in al l the r e fore , the Planning Commission was not only an 
advisory body, but was a l so responsible for the proper implementation 
of planned p r o g r a m m e s . 1 2 2 Through the y e a r s , it became more and 
more involved in day- to-day d e c i s i o n s . ' ^  It dealt not only with the 
Central subjec t s , but a l s o with State subjects such a s agr icu l ture , 
land reform, Community Development, soc ia l welfare and so forth. 
The Five Year Plans were further divided into annual plans in the 
in teres t of f lexibi l i ty , adjustment to changing situation and more 
effect ive management. From an administrative point of v i ew , 
122. The original Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t ' s Resolution, March 15, 1950, did not 
require the Planning Commission to look after implementation: "the 
Planning Commission will make recommandations to the Cabinet. In framing 
i t s recommendations, the Commission will act in c l o s e understanding and 
consultation with the Ministries of the Central Government and the 
Governments of the S t a t e s . The responsibil ity for taking and implementing 
dec is ions will res t with the Central and the State Governments." cited 
in "Planning Commission: Time to Mind Its Own B u s i n e s s " , C o m m e r c e , 
CXIV, 2921, Bombay, 6th May 1967. 
123 . On the Planning Commission's involvement, Arthagnani wri tes : "The 
Planning Commission, perhaps impatient of wielding power, started to 
participate in the day-to-day decision-making p r o c e s s of the Government, 
i ts representat ives securing seats on Government committees, cal l ing for 
f i les on administrative dec i s i ons , and sometimes getting involved in 
controvers ies over particular decis ions of the Government - for instance , 
over whether to make a small car or not", "Future of the Planning 
Commission", in D e v e l o p m e n t D i g e s t , VI, 1 , Washington, 
January 1968, pp. 3 0 - 3 2 . 
124. As a consequence, the States "look upon it Planning Commission a s a 
shrine they have to visit for money once in five y e a r s for five year plan, 
and once a year for the annual plan", M.Y. Ghorpade, "A Question of 
Relationship", S e m i n a r 9 0 , p . 19. 
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however, the first effect of large-scale economic activities was an 
increasing load which resulted in expansion of administrative 
cadres and "bureaucratic tendencies" in the Planning Commission. ' 25 
The implementation of plans, through a centralized apparatus, 
became complex. In connection with the public sector, Tata 
observed:' ! believe that the greatest obstacle to efficiency, drive 
and high morale which is one of the most important and most 
neglected factors in industry lies in the over-centralization of 
decision-making power in New Delhi . " 126 
It may be pointed out here that the centralizing effect of 
the Planning Commission appeared to fit well into the overall 
administrative s t r u c t u r e . E a r l i e r , we mentioned the Ministry of 
Finanpe and Audit which were but two wings of financial control of 
the C e n t r e . This i s not to suggest that, in face of ever-increasing 
demands and shortage of financial r e s o u r c e s , some kind of control 
on expenditure was not warranted. But, "there i s a significant 
difference between the exercise of financial control in the 'law and 
o r d e r ' state and in a welfare state engaged in the process of total 
national planning. "127 A rigid financial control, compounded by 
centralized planning, has tended to diffuse the whole administrative 
set-up. "The machinery of implementation is only through the 
Central Department", wrote Santhanam, "and, as a consequence, 
each Central Department has become a sort of empire. A spirit 
of comradeship has been growing between similar Departments in 
the States and the Centre against other Departments and the 
Government as a whole. "128 xhe process of diffusion could not be 
said to have stopped at departments of Planning; it had its effects 
on other ministries at the Centre in their tendency to become 
"strong in the will to become s t ronger" , wrote Venkatappiah, 
" . . .Ministries a re constantly engaged in carving out for themselves 
an almost self-sufficient autonomy, an empire within an empire, 
which through attached and allied officers, extends in sub-regal 
ramification throughout the country. "129 Eventually, the bureau­
cracy became an apparatus of multiplex controls, all ultimately 
winding up at New Delhi. Long ago, Appleby deprecated "too much 
control of detai l s , too much pre-occupation with saving rupees and 
too little with larger effectiveness", and felt concerned that 
125. In October 1963, Prime Minister Nehru is reported to have remarked: 
"The Planning Commission which was established as a small body of 
serious thinkers had turned into a Government Department, complete 
with a crowd of Secretar ies , Directors, and, of course, a big building", 
T h e S t a t e s m a n , October 8, 1963. 
126. J . R . D . T a t a ' s illuminating art icle, "The Implementation of Plans: With 
Emphasis on Private Sector Industry", T h e E c o n o m i c T i m e s , 
February 5, 1967. 
127. "The Problem", S e m i n a r 8 5 , o p . c i t . 
128. К. Santhanam, U n i o n - S t a t e R e l a t i o n s i n I η d i a, p . 58 
129. B. Venkatappiah, "Light and Shade", in S e m i n a r 8 5 , p.16._ 
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"review was too much in the hands of p e r s o n s remote from action 
and pragmatic r e a l i t i e s " . 1 30 There have been s e v e r a l attempts to" 
remedy t h e s e apparent defects of the system (before and after 
Appleby), to decentra l i ze respons ib i l i ty , de legate p o w e r s , and 
re lax the r igours of financial control .^31 Yet the sty le and speed 
of governmental functioning has not noticeably changed: 
"Effected simplifications tend to disappear; as fast as one 
complexity is removed, another takes its place; simplified pro­
cedures and liberalized provisions acquire accretions of inter­
pretations, rulings, decisions, etc. and become as complex and 
unintelligible as the ones replaced. Powers delegated in principe 
are either not exercised or are found to be not exercisable or 
turn out to be insubstantial as the constraints and difficulties 
shift to a different stage in the process. "' -^ 
There fore, un less a complete overhaul i s attempted, half-way 
measures stand the danger of being continuously neutral ized by more 
powerful forces .133 
These features of central ized administration lead us 
further to s e e their ef fects on performance. 
F i r s t l y , the pol it ical atmosphere - highly sens i t i ve 
federal relat ionship and pressur i zed governments at every level -
via frequently postponed d e c i s i o n , finally brings in compromise 
so lut ions . In matters of bas ic importance, however, compromises 
seldom prove succes fu l ; hence the administrative h ierarchy, in the 
intervening period of postponement, i s ca l led upon to find a way to 
tackle a given s ituation. A straight solution from c iv i l servants 
acting in an advisory capacity, evidently occurred in exceptional 
c a s e s only; 1 ^ 4 the normal course was to give due regard to r u l e s , 
130. Paul H. Appleby, R e p o r t of a S u r v e y o f P u b l i c 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n I n d i a (Government of India, New Delhi, 
1953). 
131 . For a detailed survey of all Commissions and Committees for reforms and 
trends in India, see B.B. Lai, F i n a n c i a l C o n t r o l i n a 
W e l f a r e S t a t e (Publications Di vision,Delhi, 1965). 
132. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, "Understanding Our Bureaucracy", I n d i a n 
J o u r n a l o f P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , XII^(October-
December 1966, p. 701. 
133. A better effort is being made at present by the Administrative Reforms 
Commission, cf. s u ρ г a., p. 2, f .η. 5. As a result of its recommendations 
the Planning Commission has undergone re-organization. For a switch­
over from an ambitious to a more realistic plan, see "approach to the 
Fourth Five Year Plan", full text published in Yojna, May 26, 1968. The 
Fourth Plan was launched, after a lapse of three years, in 1969. With 
decentralized responsibility to plan and implement planning, without any 
uniform, coordinated approach and ensured fulfilment, however, some see 
the danger of Indian planning on its way out. See A.H. Hanson, who points 
out some opinions in the country, in "Fate of Planning", T h e T i m e s , 
January 26, 1968. 
1 34. Which appeared possible in the presence of a strong political patronage/ 
backing, and that from old guards(lCS). See, for instance, references 
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regulations and precedents . In abundantly devised control 
procedures (control of correspondence, financial control at all 
levels, procedures for the issue of documents, such as permits to 
the public atid licences to industry, e t c . ) , "elaborate systems of 
checks and balances" , administrative action tended to be "an attempt 
to plug every loop-hole and obviate every possible e r r o r " . Correct 
administrative action thus came "to mean not finding a way of tackling 
a given situation with the objective of producing certain re su l t s , but 
the location of the answers to a question in a book of rules or inter­
pretation of dec i s ions . " 135 Over-centralization, thus,seems to be 
leading to over adherence to rules and regulations which, eventually 
runs the risk of administrative indecision. 
Secondly, over-adherence to rules and procedures 
routinized the administrative work through elaborate paper work. It 
may be again due to the tradition of total record maintenance, but 
in the Indian administrative complex where a single issue involves 
a number of different government departments, ' 3° i ts dimensions 
tended to overs t re tch. As soon as a new proposal is received in 
any branch of administration, it makes its way higher up, in 
hierarchical o r d e r , with elaborate "noting" at each stage; by the 
time it is received back (in most cases as a back reference), it runs 
the danger of, if not loss of value, enormous delays . It is in this 
context that the Indian administration often earns the appendage of 
being slow, inefficient and devoted to dilatory methods. And perhaps 
justifiably, it i s this character is t ic which is equated with " red-
tapism", eventually frustrating the common citizen, ^ 37
a n n
oying the 
made by Michael Brecher about L.K. Jha, I .C.S. , (then Private Secretary 
to the'Ρ rime Minister Shastri), in S u c c e s s i o n i n I n d i a,p.168. 
135. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ο ρ . с i t . , p . 706. 
136. A proposal for a new fertilizer project, for instance, will involve the 
Ministries of Food and Agriculture, Finance at State and Central level, 
Controller of Imports, Reserve Bank of India e tc . 
137. H.M. Patel, a former member of the ICS, wrote: "If an average Indian 
were asked to name what he disliked most about his government, nine 
times out of ten, he is likely to say "red tape" . If he is asked to be more 
precise and to explain what exactly he understands by the term "red tape", 
he will almost certainly fumble. In fact it will be found that he uses the 
term loosely to indicate avoidable and irritating delays of the government 
machinery". See H.M. Patel, "Rules and Regulations", in S e m i n a r 
22 (Administration), June 1961, p . 19. Also, see L.K. J h a ' s (ICS, 
presently Governor of the Reserve Bank of India) interesting art ic le, 
"Mr. Red Tape", I n d i a n J o u r n a l of P u b l i c A d m i n i s ­
t r a t i o n , XI,4, October-December, 1965, pp.680-82. 
B . C . Verghese, an independent observer, appeared completely distressed 
when he wrote: "The audit system; the perambulating file; the proliferating 
t iers in the hierarchy ; . . .the slow, ritual formalities of procedure; a t t r i ­
tion through sub-committees; centralization; Parkinson's disease ¡useless, 
overlapping controls ; form-filling; delays; indecision; . . . and undue 
attachment to precedents - all these are in need of a sea -change . . . ", 
T i m e s of I n d i a , November 4, 1965. 
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politicians who may be motivated (under public p r e s s u r e or not) and, 
finally, disturbing the whole civil service system. 
Where could the steel frame qualities be placed within 
this unchanged (unchangeable?) mode of administrative performance? 
Again, the political pattern comes to the fore. Intelligent young men 
being trained from a relatively early age in the kind of leadership 
role they are expected to fulfil - to init iate, encourage and lead a 
variety of projects and enterpr i ses - appeared to lose part of their 
grip on what they were expected to perform. '™ Khosla, himself 
from the IAS rank and file, analysed the p o s i t i o n : ^ 9 "Regard for 
precedent becomes uncrit ical veneration of all e a r l i e r decis ions"; 
"the careful marshalling of all facts which have a bearing on the 
situation all too often becomes a means of deferring the decision 
indefinitely"; "financial control tends to become a means not of 
ensuring that what is spent is spent as usefully and productively as 
possible but of ensuring that as little is spent as possible, quite regard­
less of the purpose sought to be achieved" ; "a pattern of formal 
inter-relationship evolved primarily for the purpose of preventing 
the overlapping of jurisdiction is misused to deny jurisdiction 
altogether. " The consequence of these features i s the attitude of the 
bureaucrats to the exercise of the power they posses s , which, 
perhaps, i s the result of the closely-knit administrative s t r u c t u r e . 
"This quality wich ideally is an important factor in its independence", 
wrote Khosla, "very easily degenerates into indifference to 
legitimate p r e s s u r e . The bureaucracy becomes wooden and un­
responsive and once it loses its ability to respond to social needs 
it can no longer function as an efficient tool for the attainment of 
social e n d s . " 140 immediate simultaneous change in both the 
administrative system and the outlook of the bureaucrat s , could 
perhaps not easily be conceived. After a i l , in face of the social 
cleavages and dispar i t ies , an urge to maintain the unity of India had 
necessitated the continuation, even the strengthening, of the whole 
apparatus . But then, the changing economic and political dimensions 
kept out-pacing the administration's efforts at reorientat ion. 
Members of the All India Services "enjoyed a degree of immunity 
from local p r e s s u r e s , political or otherwise, which was absolutely 
138. For recruitment, training e tc . of All-India Services, see David C.Potter, 
ο ρ . с i t . About the present elite cadre of civil servants. Potter suggests 
that "while maintenance of law and order is still the first priority, the 
members of the elite cadre are responsible to others as well as to them­
selves", as against the imperial bureaucratic tradition "(l) that in 
exercising imperial authority the maintenance of law and order enjoyed 
absolute priority attention, and (2) that the members of the ICS were 
responsible, and considered themselves responsible to themselves", with 
some undermining of this latter orientation toward the end of imperial 
rule, p . 143. 
139. R . P . Khosla, "Bureaucrats - The Loss of Vision", I n d i a n J o u r n a l 
o f P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , XI, 1, January-March 1965, 
pp. 35-41. 
140. I b i d . 
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necessary for the execution of their function". In a federal 
political context, this was what the Centre aimed a t , and the State 
governments came to chafe a t . As the states increased their powers 
at the expense of the Centre , they constantly exerted pressure to 
increase their control of the administration. This has been done "by 
increasing the number of recrui t s for the IAS from the provincial 
s e r v i c e s . . . by prevailing on the Centre to keep the S t a t e ' s quotas 
of IAS and I P S recrui t s low and filling the gap with upgraded PCS 
officers. The process has gone so far that in some states 50% or 
more of the District Collectors a r e upgraded PCS officers. 
Although among them there have been some outstanding officers, in 
general the effect of this policy has been to reduce the quality of 
distr ict administration and part icularly, to make it much more 
vulnerable to political p r e s s u r e . "142 Moreover, with new political 
institutions growing up, e .g . Distr ict , Block and Village Councils, 
the responsibil it ies of the IAS underwent change. The situation 
became anachronistic when this change did not follow the effective 
authority which, through the State S e c r e t a r i a t , res ted in the last 
instance with New Delhi. These intricate arrangements consequently 
turned into disillusionment: over-elaborate economic regulations and 
lack of any code of ethics on the part of p r e s s u r e groups frustrated 
the administrators . However, solutions a r e difficult to suggest in 
view of the intricacy of the problem. The whole business of 
administrative reform pre-supposes changes of political climate 
which, a s we saw, itself awaits some kind of streamlining. Until 
this precondition is fulfilled, the All-India Services network, 
however weakened, appears to be the only established machinery 
on hand by which to keep the country united. Frank Moraes seemed 
to strike a similar note with some emphasis: 
"Nehru with Vallabhbhai Patel ' s strong-arm methods was able to 
contrive the unification of India. What still remains to be achieved 
is the unity of India. This cannot be conjured into being inane 
slogans such as 'emotional integration' . It can only be done by 
strengthening, consolidating and building up a powerful administrative 
framework manned by handpickcd officials of the calibre of the old 
Indian Civil Service, a steel frame such as the British raj deployed 
succosfully to encase the country and hold it together. "143 
The overall ecological setting il lustrated in the foregoing 
pages may be summed up thus: older social cleavages, (of cas te , 
religion, t r ibe, language) a r e accompanied by a widespread urge for 
141. Premshankar Jha, ο ρ . с i t. 
142. I b i d . It may be pointed out that members of the IAS, besides being 
recruited by the Central Government, did not necessarily hail from the 
State on whose cadre they were assigned, while the PCS officers 
were sons of the soil - hence their vulnerability to local pressures, and 
States' inisistence on upgrading PCS to IAS positions. 
143. Frank Moraes (a leading journalist, Editor of the Indian Express), "The 
Heart of the Matter", T h e I n d i a n E x p r e s s , November 9, 1964. 
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economie betterment, providing a fert i le field for act ive po l i t i c ians . 
The outcome was an unpolarized multi-party sys t em. The unsettled 
combination of these factors imposed a strain on the formal federal 
structure devised under the Constitution. The administrative complex, 
caught between the z igzag of traditional p r o c e s s e s , new respons ib i l i t i e s 
to meet soc ia l and economic needs and the polit ical c l imate , faces 
an uneasy and uncertain pos i t ion. The overal l situation may be 
trans i tory , but these continuous s t r e s s e s tend to blur almost al l 
economic objec t ives . 
In the context of this study, this All-India perspect ive 
now needs to be supplemented by an ana lyse s of the posit ion in the 
two S ta te s which, with the Centre , were r ival partners in the DVC. 
B . T h e Part icular S t a t e s : 1 4 4 
( l ) His tor ica l Contex t : 1 4 5 
"For al l the temples and tradit ions", wrote Harr i son , "the fact 
remains that there e x i s t s no one his tor ica l golden age cher ished 
in common by al l or even most c i t i zens of the Union. "146 H a r r i s o n ' s 
conclus ions may be applicable to Bihar and West Bengal . Bihar i s 
proud of the Magadh Empire which drove the Greeks out of India 
some two mi l ie nia ago; it has been the seat of Buddhism which 
spread from Bihar to neighbouring lands ; 1 4 ' and it was under the 
f lourishing age of Mauryas and Guptas that great achievements in 
the realm of art and learning were made. Bengal , however , 
reminds one not of Mauryas and Guptas, but of the P a l a s , who in 
their heyday dominated much of the old Maurya and Gupta t err i tory . 
In the 18th century, the Br i t i sh started building their 
Empire from the Pres idency of Calcutta. Being the seat of the 
Br i t i sh Indian Empire, it had the init ial advantage of some infra-
structural a spec t s and education (Calcutta Univers i ty , for ins tance , 
i s now over one hundred y e a r s old). F o r over a hundred y e a r s , 
Bihar was a part of Bengal , rece iv ing the separate status of province 
only in 1911 . Bihar was a rich land, and being c l o s e to the seat of 
Br i t i sh power , it soon became the s c e n e of trade explorat ions and 
IM. The two States of West Bengal and Bihar, like all other States in India, 
have been very much part of the social, economic and political picture 
presented in preceding pages. The analysis which follows is only an 
attempt at indicating the differences in approaches and attitudes towards 
development tasks. 
145. Lengthy details of history are not of great relevance here. This sub-
section will therefore give only an outline.For details, see R.C. Mazumdar, 
T h e H i s t o r y a n d C u l t u r e o f t h e I n d i a n P e o p l e 
(London, 195 ^ . 
146. Selig S. Harrison, o p . c i t . , p. 13. For a similar view, see K.M. 
Panikkar, T h e S t a t e a n d T h e C i t i z e n (Asia Publishing 
House, 1956): "I am the last to decry local patriotism and an honourable 
pride in the greatness of our ancenstors, but all over India I have noted 
with regret a deplorable tendency to create, from the vagueness of our 
past history, political myths of each being the chosen people in India, 
with unrivalled traditions and outstanding achievements", pp.51—52 . 
147. Buddha gained enlightenment under the "Bodhi Tree" in Gaya, Bihar. 
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1 AA 
explo i tat ions. When the general national awakening occurred, 
sons of Bengal were the first to come forward: in the realm of 
soc ia l reform (Raja Ram Mohan Roy), l i terature (Bankim Chandra 
Chatter jee and Rabindra Nath Tagore) ,149
 arMj national movement 
(Aurbindo Ghosh, Bipin Chandra P a l , C . R . D a s , B o s e brothers) . ^ ' " 
Bihar had l e s s glamorous achievements to show. But the f irst 
Pres ident of India (Dr Rajendra Prasad) and the well-known 
revolutionary turned pol it ical thinker Jayaprakash Narayan, both 
hailed from Bihar. 
(2) The Di f ferences : S o c i a l and Geographical: 
Bengal c l ings to i t s past a s well a s i t s p r e s e n t . It i s pol it ical ly 
more c o n s c i o u s , c la ims to be more advanced cultural ly, and a s a 
whole i s more indiv idual ist ic. While tied by the r i ver to the main 
Gangetic plain and thus intr ins ical ly exposed to i t s power, it enjoys 
at the same time a definite measure of geographical separat ion tnat 
has throughout history a s s u r e d a separate regional identity. Bengali 
regional c o n s c i o u s n e s s gains i ts immediate inspirat ion from the 
vitality of Bengali l i terary achievements, notable both in quantity 
and quality among Indian regional l i terature. Bengal i s are influenced 
by a s e n s e of their past and present when they look suspic ious ly 
upon the Hindis. Bihar i s a H indi-speaking a r e a . F o r l inguist ical ly 
proud Bengal , th is i s sufficient: it looks upon Bihar a s a different 
cultural unit. 151 The people of both S t a t e s are a l s o different in 
their s o c i a l orientation: (i) the impact of the West and western 
institutions influenced the Bengal is more than B i h a r i s ; 1 5 2 (ц) the 
c a s t e c l e a v a g e s are l e s s predominant in West Bengal than in Bihar. " 
148. Gandhi started attracting adherents as early as 1917 during his Champaran 
campaign (the first of many) to alleviate peasant oppression on the indigo 
plantations in Bihar, see Stanley A. Kochanek, ο ρ . с i t . , p. 330. 
149. India's National Song (Bande Mataram) is by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, 
and National Anthem (Jan-Gana-Man) is by Tagore. 
150. "Bengalis were among the leading moderates who led the Indian National 
Congress in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and they were also 
among the leading terrorists who threw bombs at the British in the first 
decade of the twentieth century"; Myron Weiner, P o l i t i c a l C h a n g e 
i n S o u t h A s i a (Calcutta, 1963), p. 178. 
151 . To this may be added some differences in habits, customs and rituals: The 
Bengalis eat fish and rice as their main food, most of Bihar is vegetarian; 
"Oamad Day" (son-in-law day, something like Father's Day and Mother's 
Day in the West) of Bengal is unknown to most Biharis; Bengalis worship 
"Kali-Ma"(Black goddess, or goddess of destruction), the Biharis 
worship "Kali-Ma", but also a number of others. 
152. The rate of literacy even at present indicates a wide gap between the two 
States: 29.37& in West Bengal as against 18.4 #> in Bihar, based on 1961 
census, see I n d i a 1966, o p . c i t . , p.67. 
153. The "Bhadra log" (gentleman) concept in West Bengal is indicative more 
of rural-urban distinction rather than of lower and higher caste. As 
against this, Bihar's social structure, based on a rigid caste system 
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Geographical ly, Bengal i s smal ler than Bihar. Moreover 
Bengal suffered a great setback after Ind ia ' s partition whereby 
nearly half of i t s r ich (mainly jute producing) area became East 
Pakis tan. This div is ion entailed the problem of reset t l ing some 4 
million r e f u g e e s . Bihar faced no such problem. Furthermore, 
the redistribution of t e r r i t o r i e s by the S t a t e s Reorganization 
Commission in 1956 i s cons idered arbitrary by both S t a t e s . - ^ 
(З) Economic and Pol i t ica l A s p e c t s : 
Bihar i s r i cher in r e s o u r c e s than Bengal . ^55on account of this 
fact, industrial development f irst started in Bihar before independence 
- the Tata Industrial complex (including a S t e e l Plant) i s of long 
standing and i s often compared with some of the Western industrial 
empires . The Central Government has recent ly located another 
s tee l plant at Bokaro in Bihar. Despite the comparative r i chness 
in r e s o u r c e s , however, Bihar i s economical ly poor. The r e a s o n s 
for this l ie in the heavy dependence on agriculture which i s 
conditioned by monsoon v a g a r i e s . "The ent ire economic structure 
i s marked by stagnation and i s inadequate to sat isfy the r is ing 
expectation of the people and their aspirat ions for s o c i a l mobility. "^ 56 
As compared to th i s , West Bengal, even though it took some time to 
rev ive the traditional jute industry after partition, was quick to 
develop i t s industry. The situation changed materially with the 
addition of Durgapur S t e e l Plant which became a pet project of West 
Bengal . As Mukerjee holds, West Bengal i s "at the top of the economic 
league with only 8 percent of Ind ia ' s total population it accounts for 
one-fifth of the total for factory labour, and for about the same 
proportion of the total factory output."^ " 
"differentiates the whole society into seperate compartments on the basis 
of gradations of ritual purity and occupational specialization", Ramashray 
Roy, "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance in an Indian State", A s i a n 
S u r v e y , Ш, 7, July 1968, p.556. Clearer and subtle social 
distinctions in different regions are drawn byKusum Nair, B l o s s o m s 
i n t h e D u s t : T h e H u m a n F a c t o r i n I n d i a n 
D e v e l o p m e n t (Praeger, 1965). For Bihar and West Bengal, see 
especially pp.88-99 and pp. 145-55. In Bihar, rigidity of caste affects 
every aspect of life. Its dire effects are felt in educational institutions 
and Universities. Prasad highlights the caste conflicts between 
Kayasthas-Bhumihar-Brahmins and Rajputs, see R.C. Prasad, 
"Educational Development", in S e m i n a r 1 0 7 (Politics and Society), 
o p . c i t . , pp. 26-31· 
154. Both States claimed some areas which were disputable and were considered 
"bilingual", S t a t e s R e o r g a n i z a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n 
R e p o r t , pp. 172 et seq. and pp.168 ff. There was, however, an attempt 
to join both Bihar and Bengal and make a larger unit. The agreement 
between the Chief Ministers was applauded all over the country, but the 
plan had to be abandoned under public pressure in Bengal. For references 
about this brief phase see, among others, Stanley A. Kochanek, ο ρ . с i t. 
p. 153-
155. For comparative figures, see Chapter on Mineral Resources, I n d i a 
1 9 6 8, (Publications Division, New Delhi. 
156. Ramashray Roy, ο ρ . с i t. pp. 555-56 · 
157. Dilip Mukerjee, "The Unquiet City", T h e T i m e s , January 26,1968. 
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Different soc ia l and economic developments a l s o moulded 
polit ical patterns. People of West Bengal tend to chal lenge authority 
of whatever kind. "The h e r o e s of Bengal have large ly been d e s t r o y e r s , 
not bu i lders", observed Weiner,'"Modernity ' i s a s s o c i a t e d with 
those who destroyed the ' superst i t ious · e lements of re l ig ious and 
soc ia l p r a c t i c e s and those who fought and often died to destroy 
Bri t i sh power. "158 F o r e v e r active in organizing anti-authority 
a s s o c i a t i o n s , the Bengal polit icians mobilized the minorit ies -
Muslims, t r iba ls , non-Bengal i s . The field widened when peasants , 
labour in industrial ly expanding a r e a s , and re fugees pouring out 
of East Pakistan came to the fold. Occasional economic r e c e s s i o n s 
i n c r e a s e d the already large number of educated unemployed; this 
added another element to socia l d iscontent. Po l i t ica l p a r t i e s , 
mostly of left ist l ean ings, grew like mushrooms, but for long were 
unable to match C o n g r e s s . Bengal p o l i t i c s , a s a consequence, 
developed into a r e s t l e s s s ta te , uneasi ly held together under 
C o n g r e s s . The discontented m a s s e s often became tools in the hands 
of po l i t ic ians, and West Bengal, part icularly metropolitan Calcutta, 
fell into virtual anarchy. Congress was overthrown in the 1967 
General E l e c t i o n s , 159 but the instabi l ity of the government which 
succeeded it only disenchanted the people further. Anarchy pers i s ted 
until the February 1969 b y - e l e c t i o n s . 160 
In the neighbouring State of Bihar, the picture was 
strikingly different. While the multiparty system grew at an almost 
equal rate a s in West Bengal , ultimately showing a common outcome 
in C o n g r e s s l o s s of power, the pol i t ical orientation was significantly 
different. West Bengal, however complex i t s different p a r t i e s , went 
decidedly Left is t . B i h a r ' s cas te-based po l i t i cs , on the other hand, 
led to fragmentation. 1"1 Congress which succeeded in "accommodating 
158. Myron Weiner, P o l i t i c a l C h a n g e i n S o u t h A s i a,p. 248. 
Weiner discusses the Bengali attitude to challenge any kind of authority 
to the dynamics of enormous changes, political or otherwise, which have 
occurred in Bengal during the 1 50 years. 
159. For a district/area-wise survey of platforms, losses and gains of 
different parties in Bengal, see A s hok Mitra, "Bengal", in S e m i n a r 
95 (Power Pattern), July 1967, pp.50-53-
160. Dilip Mukerjee, o p . c i t . , justifies this lawlessness in West Bengal, 
apparently attributing it to the power-hungry Congress Party. Nirad C. 
Chaudhury describes the West Bengal situation as: "Everywhere the bonds 
of social organization and discipline are loosening, and there is universal 
tendency to take the law in one ' s own hands not only to assert one ' s 
personal claims, but even to inflict punishment for public offences by 
supplanting the Government...". See "Anarchy in Bengal", H i n d u s t h a n 
S t a n d a r d , 10th July 1967. 
161 . This is not to suggest that Leftist parties were weak in Bihar. 1967 
General Elections showed a combination of four leftist parties only next 
to Congress on Legislative Assembly seats. See, for election figures, 
N . S . Jagannathan, ο ρ . с i t . , p.69 
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dissimilar and at times discordant elements" for years, could no 
longer cope with ever-increasing "aspirations for status mobility". 
Largely interacting on each other, minority castes formed alliances 
to keep out the majority caste ; personal ambitions motivated the 
capture of power, and factions within the Party grew. Roy describes 
the divisional caste-based politics as follows: "With the growing 
intensity in political rivalry, the leaders of the upper castes were 
compelled to co-opt supporters from the lower and other under­
privileged caste groups. In due course, the co-opted leaders 
terminated their political apprenticeship by forming their own 
groups taking support mainly from their own caste groups. As a 
result, factions proliferated and in a period of about the last fifteen 
years, seven or eight caste factions emerged."1"2 д 8 Congress 
proved no longer able to sustain these factions, new political parties 
emerged in Bihar, which were largely those of Congress defectors. 
The position of one-party dominance became minimal in 1967 
General Elections. When Congress proved unable to form a 
government, anti-Congressism gave birth to incompatible coalitions 
of Rightists and Leftists parties, united only by their desire to 
keep Congress ousted. But again, this did not ensure the requisite 
stability and the Biharis were equally disillusioned with anti-
Congressism. The February 1969 by-elections indicated some change 
in ¿he Congress position, but government formation was only 
possible in coalition with four Rightist parties and Independents, on 
the understanding that portfolios be distributed to dominant caste-
groups . 
Thus, the process of politicization and political 
orientation in the two States was essentially different. If interaction 
of socio-economic and socio-political factors are deemed to have a 
bearing on inter-governmental relationships, then approaches to 
different problems (economic or otherwise) may supposedly be at 
variance, even though nominally the same political party holds 
power in both States. The governments of the States looked first 
and foremost to the interests of their own people; this almost always 
made them vulnerable to specific political pressure. As we have 
seen, the general situation prevailing in the country was highly 
competitive. We also noticed that each State strove to accelerate 
development. In the light of acute shortage of financial resources, 
this increased their dependence on the Centre's purse. Near-
explosive Centre-State relations undermined centrally planned 
efforts for balanced economic growth. 
Both general all-India and particular regional ecological 
162. Roy has made an excellent analyses of the Bihar political scene. See 
Ramashray Roy, "Bihar", in S e m i n a r 9 5 , pp. 35-41. Also see 
i d e m . , "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress", A s i a n 
S u r v e y , VI, 12, December 1966, pp.706-715; i de т . , "Dynamics 
of One-Party Dominance in an Indian State", ο ρ . с i t. 
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factors therefore lie at the bottom of our study of the DVC. 
Undefined cliches of "mutual cooperation", "constructive approach" 
and "positive outlook" tend to become difficult when applied to 
concrete situations which involve formal or informal confrontation 
of interests. This i s not to suggest that all progress i s always 
blocked: force of circumstances may result in a temporary reduction 
of parochial motivations. But it does not take long before new 
conflicts emerge. DVC's failures and successes should be seen in 
this context. 
T H E I N E V I T A B I L I T Y OF T H E D V C 
P R E D I C A M E N T 
We began our analyses of the DVC by enquiring into some basic 
issues which formed the background of its establishment. Its 
activities proved successful in the technical field, but on more 
fundamental i s sues , our questioning provided by and large a more 
negative picture. Briefly stated, the original structural arrange-
ments clashed with the realities of the Indian federal set-up, and 
of highly centralized, rigid administrative procedures. Political 
malaise developed simultaneously, posing further burdens. These 
economic, political and administrative factors largely existed 
beyond the DVC but theyprofoundly affected its internal functioning. 
Failure to live up to its original expectations was therefore 
inevitable. We may substantiate this general point by the following 
more detailed observations: 
(1) The financial resources of the States were meagre. 
It was thus not unreasonable for West Bengal to ask the Centre to 
reconsider the Centre's share towards flood control measures, or 
to release West Bengal from the burden of its loans. These loans 
were piling up not only in respect of the DVC, but in respect of 
every other development effort. But Central Government resources 
were also not over-abundant, and to agree to such demand would 
perhaps have been a bad precedent - West Bengal was not the only 
State in India. West Bengal's reaction was not to agree to further 
Dam construction, but rather to face the danger of further floods. 
(2) State-politics were very much determined by local 
socio-economic factors ; and each State developed independently 
of the others. Every State in India felt that it was being treated un-
fairly by the Centre - hence the competition to squeeze more and 
more out of the Centre's funds. As the DVC operated between West 
Bengal and Bihar, benefits bestowed by the DVC upon each State 
were closely watched. We saw this trend clearly develop, for instance, 
in the DVC's power distribution programmes: West Bengal argued 
that Bihar got a better deal at Bengali expense. We also noticed that 
West Bengal, despite frequent protests by the Centre, gradually with-
drew from its commitments towards this programme (cf.pp.117-1 22)· 
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The outcome of any future negotiated settlement is not possible to 
foresee;the present position is clearly one of stalemate. The basic 
cause of this situation lies not in any special incompetence in 
planning or undertaking on the part of the DVC (Whatever i ts one-
sided emphasis on power schemes), but in the inherent conflicts 
between regional in t e res t s , compounded by formal federal 
arrangements. 
(3) The administrative handling of development schemes 
is difficult even in normal, uncomplicated situations. It becomes 
even grea ter when projects involve more than one formal set of 
government machinery. Perhaps it i s under such circumstances, if 
at a l l , that long premeditation, negotiations and elaborate preparations 
are called for. It is here that the political and economic aspects of the 
Indian ecological setting underscore the "perfectionism" of the 
administrative complex. Illustrated by our references to the i r r iga -
tion schemes of the DVC were: lack of coordination between the DVC 
and the West Bengal administration; lack of pre-settlement about 
maintenance and maintenance-expenditure between West Bengal and 
the DVC ; absence of any re-attendance and redefinition of relevant 
provisions of the DVC Act v is-à-vis new laws of the Sta te , which 
changing situations continuously demanded. The outcome was 
inevitable: final settlement was virtually an enforced solution when, 
after intricate and long-drawn-out administrative processing, the 
irr igation system was handed over to West Bengal. 
(4) The welfare functions of a Centrally controlled in te r -
State agency and the constitutional powers of the States involved a re 
fundamentally contradictory. The DVC ' s efforts to implement 
development schemes may be seen in this light. Its industrial 
programme (which obviously meant small-scale industrial ventures) , 
agricultural farm experimentation and many other such activities 
as health and economic welfare measures , were an encroachment 
upon the S t a t e ' s r igh t s . Even when some cooperation came forth in 
the initial enthusiasm of novel experiment, the problem eventually 
tended to become one of reaping benefits at each o t h e r ' s cost , 
especially when resources were acutely short . Drawing a line 
between States and the Central Agency became practically impossible. 
In arr iving at a consensual solution, in the case of development 
schemes, the more powerful instrument appeared to have prevailed 
upon the DVC Act: with the inevitable result that part of the scheme 
was scrapped. What remained with the DVC - afforestation and soil 
conservation - virtually made it a Bihari and not a Central Agency. 
(5) The DVC was technically part of the Central Govern-
ment, and its inspiration came from New Delhi. P r e s s u r e s about how 
the DVC should determine its ro le , how it should communicate with 
o thers , whom it should appoint and on what t e rms , not to speak of the 
three financial h ierarchies needed to sanction expenditures or the 
enormous checks and balances at every s tep, virtually moulded the 
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DVC into a centralized government organization. But at the same 
time, it was exposed to rising inter-state and Centre-State 
rivalries. This prevented it from fulfilling its tasks. Coupled with 
many 'practical difficulties' (cf .pp.51 -53) , this was a decisive factor 
in putting the work behind schedule: none of its projects were com-
pleted on target date. 
The basic factors underlying the DVC ' s unfavourable 
image, however, i s the constitutional division of powers between 
the States and the Centre. This induced a feverish competition for 
independent (rather than inter- dependent) economic policies and 
exacerbated inter-state and Centre-State relationships. We saw 
that, even on better-defined administrative matters, the States 
resisted Centrally-guided efforts (the DVC.). Isolationist Bengalis, 
in particular, may have seen in the DVC an attempt to silently 
integrate Bihar and Bengal after the failure of an earlier, more 
official attempt (cf .p . 1 89 ,f .n.1 54). 
The DVC has shrunk to the extent that, as one top official 
put i t , "its continuous existence is in serious peril". Once they 
have obtained the advantages of a cooperative effort, the States 
prefer to directly own and exploit the facilities already developed. 
An intermediary and transitional organization is seen to have served 
its purpose and is therefore felt to be no longer necessary. Could 
this near-peril situation have been avoided? In view of the ecological 
setting, an answer seems deceptively easy: at best, it is along the 
lines of should-have-been-done, necessarily prescriptive in 
character and thus not within our scope. Broadly speaking, the 
alternatives might have been: (a) If the ambitiously planned DVC 
Project was to have been carried through in its entirety, its finances 
should have come entirely from the Centre's purse. If not feasible, 
under the co-existing governmental structures, then (2) it should 
have started its efforts on a much smaller scale, gradually involving 
the States more closely and making thpm depend on each other, and 
together on the DVC. The latter alternative would have automatically 
involved Central Government in making available financial supplies 
to the State Governments, which even otherwise, it has been doing. 
In addition, the know-how at the Centre's disposal would still have 
been available to the DVC. In fact, these stages have long passed. 
The present position of the DVC leads us to an inescapable 
conclusion: it has essentially lost its purpose. 
As a consequence, the DVC Act has virtually become 
obsolete. The provisions which invite our immediate attention are those 
included in section 12 (see Appendix A). With the irrigation network 
passed on to West Bengal; further construction of dams stopped; 
West Bengal's decision not to share expenditure on power production; 
promotion and control of navigation not getting underway ; promotion 
of industrial, economic and general well-being in the area was 
restricted; in short this section of the Act has almost lost its value. 
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Connected with these functions, moreover, are a number of other 
provisions such as "provision for irrigation and water supply" 
(section 13); "rates for supply of water for irrigation" (sec. 14); 
"supply and generation of electrical energy" (sec. 18); "charges 
for supply of electric energy" (sec.20) . These provisions have 
either changed their context (the transfer of responsibility for 
irrigation to West Bengal nullified sections 13 and 14) or have 
been sabotaged (both governments, though with the DVC's consent 
as provided under the Act, now generate energy within the valley 
area; and charges for electric energy, even when DVC-supplied, 
are determined by wholesale buyers). 
During the course of implementation, many of the Act's 
provisions were subjected to interpretation and re-interpretation. 
This may be normal practice in the case of legal documents, but if 
the primary and secondary functions are almost withdrawn, the 
remaining clauses have only marginal significance. Also, in the 
same context, sections 22 and 23, giving general powers to the 
Corporation to construct dams, to acquire and hold land, to close 
roads and open spaces, now that activities have virtually halted, 
have become almost meaningless. 
Only on the administrative routines have the Act's 
provisions seen some measure of effective implementation. They 
are contained in Part II (sections 3 to 10) and Part IV (sections 27 
to 47). Part II stipulates the "Establishment of the Corporation", 
but even here the "appointment of officers and servants" (section 6), 
and the "Conditions of service of officers and servants" (section 7) 
belie the spirit of a public corporation. The "appointment of an 
Advisory Committee" (sec.lO) has become obsolete. Part IV 
stipulates the "Finance, Accounts and Audit": it provides elaborate 
regulations to enable the organization to fit into the overall financial 
system and, at the cost of increasing bureaucratic mechanism, was 
perfectly implemented. Also, possibly fitting into the centralized 
administrative complex, may be included section 2(5) which explains 
the meaning of the word "prescribe" appearing at various places 
in the main body of the Act, meaning the rules laid down by Central 
Government under section 59. On a number of controversial 
occasions, this section was resorted to. It reduced occasional 
attempts to amend the Act but, at the same time, tended each time to 
involve central authority; under State pressure this tended towards 
ambiguous 'conventions'. Establishing conventions may be a healthy 
practise, but not when the true will to make them work is lacking. 
In view of the erosion caused to the effective clauses of 
the DVC Act, it might be asked whether circumstances have not 
already led to the stage when the Act should be drastically amended, 
if not repealed. A suggestion of this nature is easier made than 
carried through. The DVC Act, after the two States had resolved to 
authorize Central Government, was passed under Section 103 of the 
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Government of India Act, 1935 by the Central Government. 
Apparently, it cannot be amended without a joint resolution by the 
two States. Such consent by the States would be difficult to forego 
in a matter of the Government of India Act 1935. Admittedly, the 
present Constitution empowers the Central Government under the 
Union List to engage in "Regulation and development of inter-state 
rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation and 
development under the control of the Union is declared by 
Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest" (item 56). 
But an attempt to make Parliament declare accordingly, would imply 
a loss of influence in Bihar and West Bengal for longer than the 
Central Government wishes to accept. Unless the political and 
administrative elites in the two States realize, with the Centre's 
cooperation, that the policies they are pursuing are not only uneco-
nomic but even catastrophic, and that there i s still a chance to 
rebuild te DVC's lost prestige by restructuring it de novo under 
the now known trends, the present set-up will presumably continue 
its uninspiring and mutilated existence. 
* 
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Appendix A 
DAMODAR VALLEY CORPORATION ACT 
Act No. XIV of 19481 
An Act to provide for the establishment and regulation of a 
Corporation for the development of the Damodax Valley in the 
Provinces of Bihar and West Bengal. 
WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the establishment and 
regulation of a Corporation for the development of the Damodar 
Valley in the Provinces of Bihar and West Bengal; 
And WHEREAS in pursuance of section 103 of the Government of 
India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5, с 2), resolutions have been passed by 
all the Chambers of the Provincial Legislatures of the said Provinces 
to the effect that certain matters dealt with in this Act which are 
enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List should be regulated 
in those Provinces by Act of the Dominion Legislature ; 
It is hereby enacted as follows:-
PART I 
Introductory 
1 . Short t i t le, extent and commencement; (1 ) This Act may be called 
the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948. 
(2) It extends to the Provinces of Bihar and West Bengal. 
(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government 
may, be notification in the official Gazette, appoint in this behalf. 
2. Interpretation: In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant 
in the subject or context,-
(l ) "Corporation" means the Damodar Valley Corporation; 
(2) "Damodar Valley" includes the basin of the Damodar r iver and 
its t r ibutar ies ; 
(3) "member" means a member of the Corporation and includes the 
Chairman ; 
(4) "Participating Governments" means the Central Government, the 
Provincial Government of Bihar and the Provincial Government of 
West Bengal; 
(5) "prescr ibed" means prescribed by rules under section 59; 
(6) "Provincial Government" means the Government of Bihar or as 
the case may be of West Bengal, and "Provincial Governments" 
means the Governments of Bihar and of West Bengal; 
(7) "regulations" means the regulations made by the Corporation under 
section 60. 
1 The Act received the assent of the Governor General on the 27th 
of March, 1948. 
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PART И 
Establishment of the Corporation 
3 . Incorporation; (1 ) With effect from such date a s the Central 
Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint in 
this behalf, there shal l be establ ished a Corporation by the name 
of the Damodar Valley Corporation. 
(2) The said Corporation shall be a body corporate having perpetual 
s u c c e s s i o n and a common s e a l , and shall by the said name sue and 
be sued. 
4 . Constitution of the Corporation; (1 ) The Corporation shall cons is t 
of a Chairman and two other members appointed by the Central 
Government after consultation with the Prov inc ia l Governments. 
(2) A person shal l be disqualified for being appointed, or for 
continuing a s , a member of the Corporation-
(a) if he i s a member of the Central or any Provincia l Leg is la ture; or 
(b) if he has , d irect ly or indirectly, any in terest in a subsist ing 
contract made with, or in any work being done for, the Corporation 
except a s a shareholder (other than a director) in an incorporated 
company provided that where he i s a shareholder, he shal l d i s c l o s e 
to the Government the nature and extent of s h a r e s held by him in 
such company. 
(3) No act or proceeding of the Corporation shal l be invalid by 
r e a s o n only of the e x i s t e n c e of any vacancy amongst i t s members 
or any defect in the appointment of a member thereof. 
5. Conditions of s e r v i c e of members; (1 ) Omitted by the Damodar 
Val ley Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1957 (No. 59 of 1957). 
(2) The remuneration and other conditions of s e r v i c e of the members 
shal l be such a s may be prescr ibed . 
6. Appointment of of f icers and servants ; (1 ) The s e c r e t a r y and the 
financial adv iser of the Corporation shal l be appointed by the 
Central Government. 
(2) The s e c r e t a r y shal l be the chief execut ive off icer of the 
Corporation. 
(3) The Corporation may appoint such other off icers and servants a s 
it c o n s i d e r s n e c e s s a r y for the efficient performance of i t s functions. 
7 . Conditions of s e r v i c e of off icers and servants ; The pay and other 
conditions of s e r v i c e of the off icers and servants of the Corporation 
sha l l -
(a) a s r e s p e c t s the s e c r e t a r y and financial adv i ser , be such a s may 
be prescr ibed; and 
(b) a s r e s p e c t s the other off icers and s e r v a n t s , be such a s many 
be determined by regulat ions. 
8 . Functions and duties of the financial adv iser; The functions and 
dut ies of the financial adv iser shal l be such a s may be prescr ibed . 
9 . General disqualif ication of all of f icers and s e r v a n t s ; No person 
who has direct ly or indirect ly, by himself or his partner or agent, 
any share or in terest in any contract, by or on behalf of the 
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Corporation, or any appointment under, by or on behalf of the 
Corporation otherwise than as an officer or servant thereof, shall 
become or remain an officer or servant of the Corporation. 
10. Appointment of Advisory Committee: Subject to any rules made 
under section 59 the Corporation may from time to time appoint one 
or more Advisory Committees for the purpose of securing the 
efficient discharge of the functions of the Corporation, and in · 
part icular for the purpose of securing that those functions are 
exercised with due regard to the circumstances and requirements of 
part icular local a r e a s . 
PART III 
Functions and powers of the Corporation 
General 
11 . Limits of Damodar Valley and area of operation; (1 ) The Central 
Government shall , by notification in the official Gazette, specify the 
limits of the Damodar Valley. 
(2) The Corporation shall carry out all or any of its functions and 
exercise all or any of its powers within the Damodar Valley. 
(3) The Central Government may, after consultation with the 
Provincial Governments, by notification in the official Gazette, 
direct that the Corporation shall car ry out such function and exercise 
such power in such other area as may be specified therein and the 
a rea so specified shall be called the "area of operation" of the 
Corporation. 
12. Functions of the Corporation; The functions of the Corporation 
shall be-
(a) the promotion and operation of schemes for i rr igat ion, water supply 
and drainage, 
(b) the promotion and operation of schemes for the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electrical energy, both hydro-electric 
and thermal, 
(c) the promotion and operation of schemes for flood control in the 
Damodar r iver and its t r ibutaries and th'; channels, if any, excavated 
by the Corporation in connection with the scheme and for the 
improvement of flow conditions in the Hooghly r i ve r , 
(d) the promotion and control of navigation in the Damodar r iver and 
its t r ibutaries and channels, if any, 
(e) the promotion of afforestation and control of soil erosion in the 
Damodar Valley, and 
(f) the promotion of public health and the agricultural , industrial , 
economic and general well-being in the Damodar Valley and its a rea 
of operation. 
Irrigation and water-supply 
13. Provision for irrigation and water-supply; The Corporation 
may, with the approval of the Provincial Government concerned which 
shall not be unreasonably withheld, construct canals and distr ibutaries 
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and maintain and operate them: 
Provided that the Provincial Governirtent may, after giving notice and 
subject to the payment of fair compensation, take over the maintenance 
and operation of any such canal or distributary» 
14. Rates for supply of water for irrigation: (l) The Corporation may, 
after consultation with the Provincial Governmexit concerned, determine 
and levy rates for .the bulk supply of water to that Government for 
irrigation, and fix the minimum quantity of water which shall be made 
available for such purpose. . 
(2) The rates at which such water shall be supplied by the Provincial 
Government to the cultivators and other consumers shall be fixed by 
that Government after consultation -with the Corporation. 
15. Rates for supply of water for industrial and domestic purposes: 
The Corporation may determine and levy rates for bulk supply and 
retail distribution of water for industrial and domestic purposes and 
specify the manner of recovery of such rates. 
16. Supply of water to those whose supply has been stopped or reduced: 
If, with a view to operating its schemes, the Corporation has stopped 
or reduced the pupply of water to any person for agricultural, industrial 
or domestic purposes which such person was, prior to such stoppage 
or reductiou, enjoying by virtue of any prescriptive right the 
Corporation shall arrange such supply of water on the same termß 
as before.
 ( 
17. Construction of dam, etc. , prohibited except with approval of the 
Corporation: Save as otherwise prescribed, no person shall construct, 
operate or maintain in the Damodar Valley any dam or other work 
or any installation for the extraction of water without the consent -
of the Corporation. 
Supply and generation of electrical energy 
18. Supply and generation of electrical energy: Notwithstanding any-
thing contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (iX of 1910) or 
any licence granted thereunder- , 
(i) No person shall without the permission of the Corporation-
(a) sell electrical energy to any consumer in the Damodar Valley 
where the energy is taken by the consumer at a pressure of 30,000 volts 
or more ; 
(b) transmit electrical energy in the Damodar Valley at a pressure of 
30,000 volts or more; 
(c) generate any electrical energy at an installation having an 
aggregate capacity of more than 10,000 kilowatts in any part of the 
Damodar Valley lying to the north of a straight line drawn east to 
west passing through a point at latitude twenty-two degrees, fourteen 
minutes and forty-seven seconds and longitude eighty-seven degrees, 
fifty-one minutes and forty-two seconds except such portion of the 
municipal area of Burdwan as may liei to the north of such straight, 
line: " 
Provided that nothing in sub-clause (c) shall apply to any person who 
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was, at the commencement of this Act, generating electr ical energy 
at an installation having an aggregate capacity of more than 10,000 
kilowatts, so long as the capacity of such installation is not 
increased: 
Provided further that nothing in sub-clause (c) shall apply to the power 
station installation of the fert i l iser factory at Sindri having an 
aggregate capacity of 80,000 kilowatts so long as the capacity of such 
installation is not increased beyond 80,000 kilowatts. 
(ii) The Corporation may sell electrical energy to any consumer in the 
Damodar Valley but no such sale shall, except with the permission 
of the Provincial Government concerned, be made to any consumer 
requiring supply at a p ressure of less than 30,000 volts . 
(iii) The Corporation may, with the permission of the Provincial 
Government concerned, extend its transmission system to any a rea 
beyond the Damodar Valley and sell electrical energy in such a rea . 
19. Effect on existing licences: (1 ) Where any licence granted under 
the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (IX of 1910), becomes inoperative 
wholly or partly by virtue of the provisions of section 18, the licence 
shall be deemed to have been revoked or modified so as to be 
consistent with those provisions . 
(2) Where a licence is deemed to have been revoked under subsection 
(1), the Corporation shall purchase the undertaking of the licensee, and 
where a licence is modified under that subsection, the Corporation 
shall , at the option of the licensee, either purchase the undertaking or 
pay fair compensation to the l icensee. 
(3) The purchase price or the amount of compensation payable by the 
Corporation under sub-section (2) shall be such as may be agreed 
to between the Corporation and the licensee or , in the event of 
disagreement, as may be determined by arbitrat ion. 
20. Charges for supply of electrical energy; The Corporation shall 
fix the schedule of charges for the supply of electr ical energy, 
including the ra tes for bulk supply and retai l distribution, and 
specify the manner of recovery of such charges: 
Provided that the Corporation may in any contract for bulk supply of 
electr ical energy impose such terms and conditions including a retai l 
ra te schedule as it may deem necessary or desirable to encourage the 
use of electrical energy. 
Other activities 
21 . Other activities of the Corporation: (1 ) The Corporation may 
establish, maintain and operate laboratories , experimental and 
research stations and farms for conducting experiments and research 
for-
(a) utilising the water, electrical energy and other resources in 
the most econimical manner for the development of the Damodar Valley. 
(b) determining the effect of its operations on the flow conditions in 
the Hooghly r ive r , 
(c) making improvements in navigation conditions in the port of 
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Calcutta, and 
(d) carrying out any other function specified under section 12 . 
(2) The Corporation may set up its own planning, designing, 
construction and operating agencies, or make arrangements there-
for with the Participating Governments, local authorities, educational 
and research institutions ar any person carrying on the business of 
an architect, an engineer or a contractor. 
Powers 
22. General powers of the Corporation: (1 ) The Corporation shall 
have the power to do anything which may be necessary or expedient 
for the purposes of carrying out its functions under this Act. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, 
such power shall include the power-
(i) to acquire and hold such movable and immovable property as it 
may deem necessary and to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any 
such property; 
(ii) to construct or cause to be constructed such dams, barrages, 
reservoirs , power houses, power structures, electrical trans-
mission lines and sub-stations, navigation works, irrigation, 
navigation and drainage canals and such other works and structures 
as may be required;· 
(iii) to prevent pollution of any water under its control and to take 
all measures to prevent discharges into such water effluents which 
are harmful to -water supply, irrigation, public health or fish life; 
(iv) to stock its reservoirs or water courses with fish and to regulate 
or prohibit taking out fish from the water under its control; 
(v) to undertake resettlement of the population displaced by the dams, 
acquisition of land fot· reservoirs and protection of watersheds; 
(vi) to aid in the establishment of co-operative societies and other 
organisations for the better use of facilities made available by the 
Corporation; 
(vii) to undertake measures for the prevention of malaria. 
23. Power to close roads and open spaces: (1) The Corporation may, 
after giving notice to the persons concerned or to the public generally,-
(a) turn, divert or discontinue the public use of, or permanently 
close, any road or any part thereof, or 
(b) discontinue the public use of, or permanently close, any open 
space or any part thereof. 
(2) Whenever the Corporation discontinues the public use of, or 
permanently c loses , any road or open space, the Corporation shall 
pay reasonable compensation to every person-
(a) who was entitled, otherwise than as a licensee, to use such road 
or open space or part thereof as a means of access , or 
(b) whose immovable property was receiving air and light on account 
of such open space or part, 
and who has suffered damage-
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(i) in any case falling under clause (a) from such discontinuance or 
closure and 
(ii) in any case falling under clause (b) from the use to which the 
Corporation has put such open space or par t . 
(3) In determining the compensation payable to any person under 
sub-section (2), the Corporation may take into consideration any 
benefit accruing to such person from the construction, provision 
or improvement of any other road, or open space at or about the 
same time that the road or open space or part thereof, on account 
of which the compensation is to be paid, is discontinued or closed. 
(4) When any road or open space or any part thereof, is permanently 
closed under sub-section (1), the Corporation may sell or lease such 
part of it as is not required for its purposes. 
24 Powers under certain other enactments: (1 ) Notwithstanding anything 
contained in the Acts specified in column one of Part I of the 
Schedule, the Corporation may car ry out all or any of the functions 
and exercise all or any of the powers of a Provincial Government 
in the Damodar Valley under the provisions of such Acts specified 
in column two thereof against each item of column one. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Acts specified in 
column one of Par t II of the Schedule, any officer authorised by the 
Corporation may car ry out all or any of the functions and exercise 
all or any of the powers of a Canal Officer-collector, or Fores t 
Officer, as the case may be, in the Damodar Valley under the 
provisions of such Acts specified in column two thereof against 
each item of column one. 
Co-operation and avoidance of submersion 
25. Co-operation with other authorities to minimise inconvenience 
caused by submersion: The Corporation shall co-operate with the 
Participating Governments, railway authorities and local authorities 
and bodies, with a view to minimising the inconvenience likely to be 
caused by the submersion of roads and communications and shall 
bear the cost of any realignment thereof or resettlement of any 
population rendered necessary by such submersion. 
26. Submersion of coal mines to be avoided by the Corporation: The 
Corporation shall make every endeavour to avoid submersion of 
coal or mineral deposits and shall co-operate with the coal mining 
industry and the bodies set up by the Participating Governments to 
ensure the maintenance of supplies of sand for stowing purposes in 
coal mines and in other ways to minimise the inconvenience to the 
coal mining industry. 
PART IV 
Finance, accounts and audit 
27. Expenditure till the Corporation is established: All expenditure 
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incurred by the Central Government for and in connection with the 
establishment of the Corporation up to the date of i ts establishment 
shal l be treated as the capital provided by the Central Government 
to the Corporation and such capital shal l be adjusted between the 
Part ic ipat ing Governments in accordance with the provis ions of 
sec t ions 30 to 36 . 
28 . Vest ing of property in the Corporation; All property acquired and 
works constructed for the purposes of the Damodar Val ley scheme 
before the establishment of the Corporation shal l v e s t in the 
Corporation and all income derived and e x p e n s e s in this behalf shal l 
be brought into the books of the Corporation. 
29 . Fund of the Corporation; (l) The Corporation shal l have i t s own 
fund and all r ece ip t s of the Corporation shal l be carr ied thereto and 
all payments by the Corporation shall be made therefrom. 
(2) Except as otherwise directed by the Central Government, al l 
moneys belonging to that fund shall be deposited in the R e s e r v e Bank 
of India or the Agents of the R e s e r v e Bank of India or invested in 
such s e c u r i t i e s a s may be approved by the Central Government. 
30 . Liabi l i t ies of Participating Governments to provide capital to 
the Corporation; The Partic ipating Governments sha l l , a s 
hereinafter spec i f ied , provide the ent ire capital required by the 
Corporation for the completion of any project undertaken by i t . 
31 . Payment by Part ic ipat ing Government on specif ied date; Each 
Part ic ipat ing Government shall provide its share of the capital on 
the dates specif ied by the Corporation and if any Government fai ls 
to provide such share on such dates the Corporation may r a i s e loan 
to make up the deficit at the cost of the Government concerned. 
3 2 . Expenditure on objects other than i rr iga t ion , power and flood 
control; The. Corporation shall have power to spend such sums as it 
thinks fit on objects authorised under this Act other than irr igat ion , 
power and flood control and suoh sums shall be treated a s common 
expenditure payable out of the Fund of the Corporation before 
al location under Sect ion 3 3 . 
3 3 . Allocation of expenditure chargeable to project on main objects; 
The total capital expenditure chargeable to a project shall be 
al located between the. three main objec t s , namely, i rr igat ion , power 
and flood control a s fo l l ows , namelyi-
(1 ) expenditure so l e ly attributable to any of these objec t s , including 
a proportionate share of overhead and general c h a r g e s , shall be 
charged to that object , and 
(2) expenditure common to two or more <jf the sa id ob jec t s , including 
a proportionate share of overhead and general c h a r g e s , shall be 
al located to each of such objects in proportion to the expenditure 
which, according to the estimate of the Corporation would have been 
incurred in constructing a separate structure so l e ly for that object , 
l e s s any amount determined under c lause ( l ) in r e s p e c t of that object . < 
3 4 . Capital al located to irrigation; The total amount of óapital 
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allocated to irrigation shall be shared between the Provincial 
Governments as follows, namely:-
(1) the Government concerned shall be responsible for the capital 
cost of the works constructed exclusively for irr igation in its 
Province ; and 
(2) the balance of capital cost under irrigation for both the 
Provinces of Bihar and West Bengal shall be shared by the 
Provincial Governments in the proportion to their guaranteed 
annual off-takes of water for agricultural purposes: 
Provided that the divisible capital cost under this clause shall be 
provisionally shared between them in accordance with their 
previously declared intentions regarding their respective guaranteed 
off-takes and any payments made accordingly shall be adjusted after 
the determination of the guaranteed off-takes. 
35. Capital allocated to power: The total amount of capital allocated 
to power shall be shared equally between the three Participating 
Governments. 
36. Capital allocated to flood control: The total amount of capital up 
to fourteen c r o r e s of rupees allocated to flood control shall be shared 
equally between the Central Government and the Government of 
West Bengal and any amount in excess thereof shall be the liability 
of the Government of West Bengal. 
37. Disposal of profits and deficits: (I ) Subject to the provisions of 
sub-section (2) of section 40, the net profit, if any, attributable to 
each of the three main objects, namely,irrigation, power and flood 
control, shall be credited to the Participating Governments in 
proportion to their respective shares in the total capital cost 
attributed to that object. 
(2) The net deficit, if any, in respect of any of the objects shall be 
made good by the Governments concerned in the proportion specified 
in sub-section (1): 
Provided that the net deficit in respect of flood control shall be made 
good entirely by the Government of West Bengal and the Central 
Government shall have no share in such deficit. 
38. Payment of interest : The Corporation shall pay interest on the 
amount of capital provided by each Participating Government at such 
ra te as may, from time to time, be fixed by the Central Government 
and such interest shall be deemed to be part of the expenditure of the 
Corporation. 
39. Interest charges and other expenses to be added to and receipts 
taken for reduction of capital cost: F o r a period, not exceeding 
fifteen y e a r s , from the establishment of the Corporation, if the 
Corporation runs in deficit, the interest charges and all other 
expenditure shall be added to the capital cost and all receipts shall 
be taken in reduction of such capital cost . 
40. Provision for depreciation and reserve and other funds: (I ) The 
Corporation shall make provision for reserve and other funds at such 
r a t e s and on such terms as may be specified Ъу the Auditor General 
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of India in consultation with the Central Government. 
(2) The net profit for the purposes of section 37 shall be determined 
after such provision has been made. 
41 . Corporat ion 's share in betterment levy by Provincial Governments; 
In the event of any betterment levy being imposed by a Provincial 
Government, the proportionate proceeds thereof in so far as they are 
attributable to the operations of the Corporation shall be credited 
to the Corporation. 
42. Borrowing of money: The Corporation may, with the approval 
of the Central Government, borrow money in the open market or 
otherwise for the purposes of carrying out its functions under this 
Act. 
43 . Liability to pay Central taxes: (1 ) The Corporation shall be 
liable to pay any taxes on income levied by the Central Government 
in the same manner and to the same extent as a company. 
(2) The Provincial Governments shall not be entitled to any refund 
of any such taxes paid by the Corporation. 
44. Budget: (1 )The Corporation, in consultation with the financial 
adviser , shall in October each year prepare in such form as may 
be prescr ibed a budget for the next financial year showing the 
estimated receipts and expenditure and the amounts which would 
be required from each of the three Participating Governments during 
that financial year . 
(2) Printed copies of the budget shall be made available to each of the 
three Participating Governments by the 1 5th day of November each 
year . 
(3) The budget shall be laid before the Central and the Provincial 
Legislatures concerned as soon as may be after it is prepared. 
45. Annual Report: (1 ) The Corporation shall p repa re , in such form 
as may be prescr ibed, an annual report within six months after the 
end of each financial year giving a true and faithful account of its 
activities during the previous financial year , with part icular 
reference to -
il) i rr igat ion; 
(ii) water supply; 
(iii) e lectr ical energy; 
(iv) flood control; 
(v) navigation; 
(vi) afforestation; 
(vii) soil erosion; 
(viii) use of lands ; 
(ix) resettlement of displaced population; 
(x) sanitation and public health measures; and 
(xi) economic and social welfare of the people. 
(2) The annual repor t shall also give a true and faithful account of 
the income and expenditure during the previous financial year , the 
net amounts attributable to each of the three main objects and the 
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distribution of the capital cost between the three Participating 
Governments and show the progressive totals from the inception of 
the Corporation and the up to date financial r e s u l t s . 
(3) The payments provisionally made by each of the three Participating 
Governments on the basis of the budget estimates shall be adjusted 
as soon as possible in accordance with the allocation made in the 
annual repor t . 
(4) Printed copies of the annual report shall be made available to 
each of the three Participating Governments by the 1 5th day of 
October each year . 
(5) The annual report shall be laid before the Central and the 
Provincial Legislatures concerned as soon as may be after it is 
prepared . 
46. Other annual financial statements: (1 ) The Corporation shall 
also prepare such other annual financial statements in such form 
and by such dates as may be prescr ibed. 
47. Accounts and Audit; The accounts of the Corporation shall be 
maintained and audited in such manner as may, in consultation with 
the Auditor General of India, be prescr ibed. 
(2) Printed copies of each such annual financial statement shall be 
made available to each of the three Participating Governments by 
such date as may be prescr ibed. 
PART V 
Miscellaneous 
48. Directions by the Central Government; (1 ) In discharge of its 
functions the Corporation shall be guided by such instructions on 
questions of policy as may be given to it by the Central Government. 
(2) If any dispute a r i se s between the Central Government and the 
Corporation as to whether a question is or is not a question of policy, 
the decision of the Central Government shall be final. 
49. Disputes between the Corporation and Governments: (1 ) Save 
as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, any dispute between the 
Corporation and any Participating Government regarding any matter 
covered by this Act or touching or arising out of it shall be referred 
to an arbi t ra tor who shall be appointed by the Chief Justice of India. 
(2) The decision of arbi t ra tor shall be final and binding on the pa r t i e s . 
50. Compulsory acquisition of land for the Corporation: Any land 
required by the Corporation for carrying out its functions under this 
Act shall be deemed to be needed for a public purpose and such land 
shall be acquired for the Corporation as if the provisions of Par t VII 
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (l of 1894) were applicable to it 
and the Corporation were a company within the meaning of clause (e) 
of section 3 of the said Act. 
51 . Control of Central Government: (I ) The Central Government may 
remove from the Corporation any member who in i ts opinion-
(a) refuses to act , 
(b) has become incapable of acting, 
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(c) has so abused his position as a member as to render his 
continuance on the Corporation detrimental to the interest of the 
public, or 
(d) is otherwise unsuitable to continue as member. 
(2) The Central Government may suspend any member pending an 
enquiry against him. 
(3) No order of removal under this section shall be made unless 
the member concerned has been given an opportunity to submit his 
explanation to the Central Government, and when such order is 
passed the seat of the member removed shall be declared vacant 
and another member may be appointed under section 4 to fill up 
the vacancy. 
(4) A member who has been removed shall not be eligible for 
reappointment as member or in any other capacity to the Corporation. 
(5) The Central Government may declare void any transaction in 
connection with which a member has been removed under sub-
section ( l ) . 
(6) If the Corporation fails to ca r ry out its functions, or follow the 
directions issued by the Central Government under this Act, the 
Central Government shall have the power to remove the Chairman 
and the members of the Corporation and appoint a Chairman and 
members in their p laces . 
52. Application of certain provisions of the Indian Fores t Act, 1927, 
to the forests of the Corporation: All acts prohibited in respect of 
a reserved forest under section 26 of the Indian Fores t Act, 1927 
(XVI of I927) shall be deemed to be prohibited in respect of any forest 
owned by or under the supervision or control of the Corporation and 
all offences in respect of such forest shall be punishable under the 
said Act as if they were committed in respect of a reserved forest . 
53. Penalty; Whoever contravenes the provisions of Sections 17 
and 1 8 of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or 
with fine or with both. 
54. Procedure for prosecution: No Court shall take cognisance 
of an offence under this Act except on the complaint of an office 
of the Corporation authorised by it in this behalf. 
55. Power of entry: Any officer or servant of the Corporation 
generally or specially authorised by the Corporation at all 
reasonable times enter upon any land or premises and there do 
such things as may be reasonably necessary for the purpose of 
lawfully carrying out any of its works or of making any survey, 
examination or investigation preliminary or incidental to the exercise 
of powers or the performance of functions by the Corporation under 
this Act. 
56. Members, officers and servants of the Corporation to be public 
servants : All members, officers and servants of the Corporation, 
whether appointed by the Central Government or the Corporation, 
shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of 
any of the provisions of this Act to be public servants within the 
meaning of section 21 of the Indian Ftenal Code (XLV of 1860). 
57. Protection of action taken under the Act: (1) No suit, 
prosecution, or legal proceeding shall lie against any person in 
the employment of the Corporation for anything which is in good 
faith done or purported to be done under this Act. 
(2) Save as otherwise provided in the Act no suit or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against the Corporation for any damage 
caused or likely to be caused by anything in good faith done or 
porported to be done under this Act. 
58. Effect of other laws: The provisions of this Act or any rule 
made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained 
in any enactment other than this Act or any instrument having 
effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act. 
59. Power to make ru les : The Central Government may, by 
notification in the official Gazette, make rules to provide for all 
or any of the following mat ters , namely:-
(1 ) the sa lar ies and allowances and conditions of service of 
members, the secre tary and the financial adviser ; 
(2) the functions and duties of the financial adviser; 
(3) the dams or other works or the installations which may be 
constructed without the approval of the Corporation; 
(4) the forms of the budget, the annual report and the annual 
financial statements and the dates by which copies of the annual 
financial statements shall be made available to the Participating 
Governments ; 
(5) the manner in which the accounts of the Corporation shall be 
maintained and audited; 
(6) the appointment of an Advisory Committee; and 
(?) the punishment for breach of any rule made under this Act. 
60. Power to make regulations: (l) The Corporation may, with 
the previous sanction of the Central Government, by notification 
in the Gazette of India, make regulations for carrying out its 
functions under this Act. 
(2) In part icular and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, in such regulation the Corporation may take 
provision for-
(a) making of appointments and promotions of its officers and 
servants ; 
(b) specifying other conditions of service of its officers and 
servants ; 
(c) specifying the manner in which water ra tes and charges for 
electrical energy shall be recovered; 
(d) preventing the pollution of water under its control; 
(e) regulating the taking out of fish from the water under its 
control; 
(f) regulating its proceedings and business; 
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(g) prescribing punishment for breach of any regulation. 
(З) All regulations made under sub-sections (I) and (2) shall, as 
soon as possible, be published also in the official Gazettes of the 
Provincial Governments. 
THE SCHEDULE 
(See section 24) 
P a r t I 
Acts Provisions of the Acts 
specified in column (1 ) 
HI ж 
The Canals Act, 1864 
(Ben. Act V of 1864) 
The Indian F o r e s t Act, 
1927 (XVI of 1927) 
Section 6 (Power of Provincial 
Government to fix and al ter 
ra tes of tol ls) . 
Section 8 (Power of Provincial 
Government to appoint persons 
to collect tolls who may farm 
collection). 
Section 35 (Protection of forests 
for special purposes) . 
Section 36 (Power to assume 
management of forests) . 
P a r t Π 
Acts Provisions of the Acts 
specified in column (1 ) 
(1) (2) 
The Bengal Irrigation Act 
1876 (Ben. Act III of 1876). 
The Bengal Embankment Act, 
1882 (Ben. Act. II of 1882). 
Indian Fores t Act, 
(XVI of 1927). 
1927 
P a r t III (Power of the 
maintenance of canals). 
Section 41 of P a r t IV (Power 
of Canal Officer to issue notice 
to person causing obstruction). 
Section 42 of P a r t IV (Power 
of Canal Of l icer to cause 
obstructions to be removed). 
P a r t II (Powers of Collector 
and procedure thereon). 
P a r t III (Powers of Collector in 
cases of imminent danger to life 
or property). 
Section 36 (Power to assume 
management of forests) . 
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Appendix В 
DAMODAR VALLEY CORPORATION 
Anderson House: Alipore 
CALCUTTA 
No. WG-81/55-2048 March 14, 1960 
MEMORANDUM 
Sub: Administrative and Financial Powers of 
the General Manager and Secretary 
The Corporation has been pleased to delegate all administrative 
and financial powers of the Corporation to the General Manager & 
S e c r e t a r y except the following:-
(i) Cases which the Secretary or the Financial Adviser 
desired to be referred to the Corporation; 
(ii) Cases in which the Financial Adviser is unable to agree 
with the S e c r e t a r y ; 
(iii) Sanction to Project and Budget Estimates ; 
(iv) Cases relating to Audit Reports and comments of the 
Public Accounts Committee ; 
(v) Acceptance of (a) tenders other than the lowest tender 
where the value exceeds Rs.1 lakh (100,000 rupees) 
and (b) tenders exceeding Rs.25 lakhs in value; 
(vi) Award of contracts based on quotation or negotiation if 
the value exceeds Rs.1 lakh; 
(vii) Acceptance of single tenders of value exceeding Rs . 2 
lakhs ; 
(viii) Write-off of losses of all kinds exceeding Rs.1 lakh or 
where disciplinary or penal action or fraud is involved; 
(ix) Allocation of power to consumers ; 
(x) Creation of, and appointment to, posts of which the 
minimum pay to the scale is R s . 1 300/- or more. 
(xi) Cases of disciplinary action where dismissal is 
proposed in respect of officers the minimum pay of 
whose pay scale exceeds R s . 600/- ; 
(xii) Administrative approval of new schemes or works 
involving more than Rs . 20,000/- subject to prior 
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concurrence of the Government of India in respect of 
works covered by Section 12(d) and (f) of the DVC Act; 
(xiii) Amendment of Statutory Regulations and Rules. 
2. For proper and timely discharge of the business and 
functions of the Corporation, the General Manager and Secretary is 
also authorised in emergent circumstances, to pass orders on 
reserved matters subject to a report being made to the Corporation. 
3 . Cases of creation of, and appointment to, posts of which 
the minimum pay in the scale is above Rs .600 / - and below Rs .1300/ -
should be reported to the Corporation in the form of a monthly list. 
4. This supersedes Resolution No.293(n) of the 243rd meeting 
of the Corporation held on 4th February 1959, and all previous orders 
issued in this regard. 
S d . / -
(K.L. Dutta) 
Joint Secretary. 
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AppendixC 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(This questionnaire was used both for obtaining information and 
opinions through correspondence and for personal interviews 
with various individuals connected with the affairs of the DVC. 
Relevant sections of the questionnaire were used for part icular 
respondents . The respondents included legis la tors , Members of 
the Board and officials of the DVC, civil servants of the two 
State Governments and the Government of India, Trade Union 
leaders and resea rch workers . For the ease of communication 
and getting response to part icular situations, open-ended 
questions were used in the questionnaire). 
A. AIMS AND OBJECTS 
Par t of the difficulty and conflict in DVC ' s working is due to the 
fact that although the subjects of irrigation and power are 
included in the State List of Legislative powers, the DVC Act 
of 1948 entrusts them to the autonomous Corporation of the 
Damodar Valley insofar as they relate to the area of the Valley. 
(a) In this context, do you think that matters would have 
improved if these legislative powers of State Governments 
had been retained intact but the DVC been made responsible 
for implementation of the plans of Participating 
Governments within the Valley? In this case , the 
responsibility of financing and planning would be that of 
the State Governments. 
(b) Do you think some other Constitutional or organizational 
arrangement would have ensured the conflicting principles 
of respecting the Legislative autonomy of the States and 
need for a coordinated development of the Valley? 
Please specify. 
Initially the management of the Irrigation activities in the 
Valley was entrusted to the DVC. However, responsibility was 
later t ransferred to the State Government of West Bengal. 
Can you please indicate briefly the reasons for this change as 
well as i ts economic and political consequences? 
According to the DVC Act, the Corporation was supposed to 
undertake multipurpose development in the Valley in the fields 
of irr igation, power, rehabilitation, industrialisation, 
education, public health, e tc . ; in course of t ime, its functions 
were reduced mainly to power generation and distribution. 
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What, according to you, were the respons ib le factors for this 
change: 
(i) Pol i t ical (please specify) 
(ii) Economic (please specify) 
(iii) S o c i a l (please specify) 
(iv) Impact of particular personal i t i e s 
(v) Others 
4 . You know that the inspiration for DVC originated in a similar 
organization cal led the T . V . A . which was fair ly success fu l 
in the U . S . A . What according to you are the main di f ferences 
in the economic, soc ia l and polit ical backgrounds of the two 
countr i e s , accounting for these di f ferences in their performance? 
B . BOARD OF THE DVC 
1 . Do you think that the "policy" type of Board was suitable for 
the DVC? 
2 . Under the DVC Act, i ts Board c o n s i s t s of a Chairman and two 
Members appointed by the Government of India, in consultation 
with the State Governments. 
(a) Do you agree with this composition of the Board? 
(b) Do you think the Board could have been constituted 
differently? P l e a s e amplify. 
3 . Continuity in the membership of a Board often makes for good 
pol icy-making, but in c a s e of the DVC, this was not adequately 
e n s u r e d . 
Do you think the Act was defect ive in this regard? 
4 . Do you think that the distribution of powers or functions 
between the Board and the General Manager i s adequate? When 
it was a functional board, the Board enjoyed many more powers 
which were delegated to the General Manager on i ts convers ion 
into a pol icy board. 
(a) Do you think that this reduced the importance of the DVC 
Board and made it superfluous? 
(b) Do you think that even the pol icy dec i s ions which the 
policy board was supposed to take were in rea l i ty taken 
by the Part ic ipat ing Governments? 
5 . What rea l changes have taken place in the ro le and function 
of the General Manager as a resu l t of convers ion of the Board 
into a pol icy Board? 
6 . What do you think of the posit ion of the Financial Adviser in 
the DVC: 
(a) Before convers ion of the Board into a pol icy Board? 
P l e a s e spec i fy . 
(b) After convers ion of the Board into a policy Board? 
P l e a s e spec i fy . 
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(c) In this connection, what do you think of the practice of the 
Financial Advise r ' s reserving matters on which he 
disagreed with the Board, for consideration of the Finance 
Ministry? 
(d) Do you think this resulted in improving the financial 
working and profitability of the DVC, or in over-emphasis 
of the control function of finance and delays in execution? 
What do you think of the relations between the DVC and the 
Ministry of Irrigation and Power of the Government of India? 
Do you think that this relationship in reality amounted to more 
centralization of decision-making in New Delhi and curtailment 
of DVC autonomy? 
Please give instances. 
C. FINANCE 
(a) The DVC Act provides for sharing the total expenses 
incurred by the Corporation between the State Governments 
of West Bengal and Bihar and the Government of India, in 
proportion to the anticipated benefits accruing to each of 
them. Do you think this satisfactory? If not, please give 
r ea sons . 
(b) Could some other financial arrangement, like the entire 
expenditure being met by the Government of India, e t c . , 
have been more effective? 
The DVC Act provides for appointment of a Financial Adviser 
by the Government of India and auditing of i ts accounts by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, to ensure proper 
financial management of the DVC. 
(a) Do you think that this objective has been realized through 
the above provisions? 
(b) If not, what changes in the Act would you suggest? 
Public enterpr ises in India often complain that the type of 
audit conducted by the Auditor and Comptroller General of 
India amounts to pin-pricking, finding out minor faults and 
i r regula r i t i es , without ensuring a rea l performance audit. 
(a) What do you think of the auditing done in the DVC in this 
context? 
(b) Do you think this has ensured better accountability? 
In the DVC, the system of commercial accounting, general 
practice in en te rp r i ses , is not used. Instead, the system in 
vogue in government departments is pract ised. 
(a) Do you think this desirable? 
(b) If not, what changes would you suggest? 
What do you think of the existing delegation of financial powers 
to the various technical heads of Departments in the DVC? Are 
they adequate and judiciously used? 
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6. Do you cons ider the ex is t ing format and arrangements of 
budgeting in the DVC sat isractory? If not, p lease specify the 
gaps and poss ible measures for improvement. 
D . P E R S O N N E L 
1 . Most sen ior off ic ials of the DVC, a s well a s members of the 
Board, have been off icers of the Government of India or the 
State Governments of Bihar and West Bengal , who were deputed 
to the DVC for a few years and then returned to their 
departments . In such a situation, the incumbents do not have 
much stake in the organization they s e r v e . In your opinion, did 
this arrangement'affect the n e c e s s a r y and des irable continuity 
of leadership in management and pol icy-making? If not, would 
the situation have been different if sen ior off icers had been 
permanent off icials of the Corporation? 
2 . Although the DVC Act does not specify that appointments to 
posts should be made only from among Biharis and Benga l i s , 
in rea l i ty this seems to be the c a s e . In fact , the two Sta tes 
vehemently tried to secure a s many posts a s poss ib le for their 
people . 
(a) Do you think that this pract ice of barring talent from the 
r e s t of India affected the Corporat ion's ef f ic iency? 
(b) Was the balance between the two S ta te s maintained in top 
managerial p o s t s ? 
3 . Although the DVC i s an autonomous Corporation, i t s s e r v i c e 
r u l e s and regulat ions are based on s imilar prac t i ces as in the 
Government of India, which are perhaps not suitable for an 
e n t e r p r i s e . In fact , even the organizational s tructure of the 
DVC mirrors the situation in the Government of India 
S e c r e t a r i a t . Would you comment on the c a u s e s of this situation 
and i ts impact on D V C ' s day- to -day working? 
4 . It i s understood that there are two trade unions which have 
been recognized by the DVC: 
(a) Can you explain how this has come about? 
(b) What has been the effect of this situation on handling of 
workers-management re la t ions in the DVC? 
(c) What i s the attitude of the Trade Unions towards innovation 
and change in work prac t i ce s? 
(d) Have there been many s t r ikes in the DVC and, if s o , what 
were their c a u s e s . 
E . PERFORMANCE 
1 . The DVC has not been able to meet i t s targets on time and to 
the sat is fact ion of the two State Governments . To which of 
the following factors would you ascr ibe this: 
(a) Delay in sanction of foreign exchange by the Government 
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of India for purchase of imported equipment, e t c . ? 
(b) Delays in compulsory purchase of needed raw materials 
and equipment inside the country through the Central 
Purchase Agency? 
(c) Dilatory piecemeal control exercised by the Ministry of 
Finance result ing in delayed approval of expenditures? 
(d) Lack of motivation and expert ise on the part of personnel? 
(e) Lack of proper communication between the DVC and 
Participating Governments ? 
(f ) Any other reasons ? 
What would you say about the efficiency of the DVC in 
implementing i ts various programmes? How would you compare 
it with other public corporations in India or with similar 
activities of the State Governments. 
The DVC construction programme caused large-sca le 
displacement of people in the valley. The Corporation took 
upon itself to rehabilitate these people in better surroundings 
and in the shortest possible time. Do you think the rehabilitation 
programme of the DVC has been successful? 
(a) If so , please specify to what extent? 
(b) If not, what were the difficulties? Please elaborate along 
the following l ines: 
(l) People ' s response to DVC efforts. 
(lì) Administrative handling of the scheme. 
(ill) Inadequacy of r e s o u r c e s . 
(IV) Defective planning. 
(v) Vested in te res t s . 
(Vi) Any other r ea sons . 
F . INTERPLAY OF POLITICAL FACTORS 
What were the attitudes of the State Governments towards 
DVC expansion programmes, especially in the field of power 
generation? 
Do you think that in teres ts of the DVC and the State 
Governments were at loggerheads? How were the^e interests 
comprised? 
Although the States of West Bengal and Bihar were par tners 
in the DVC, r ival ry existed between them to claim as many 
benefits as possible for their own regions . Could you comment 
on this? 
What kind of vested interests 'caused this r iva l ry? What was 
i ts impact on the working of the DVC? 
In the light of the above, what would you say about the location 
of DVC Headquarters in Calcutta, while the bulk of the power 
generation and flood control establishments are located in 
Bihar? Why could the decision to shift it from Calcutta not be 
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implemented? 
4. DVC's canal s t ructure was t ransferred to the Government of 
West Bengal in 1964. 
(a) Can you please say why and how this happened? 
(b) What political and personal factors, if any, were 
responsible for this changeover? 
5. What was the final decision with regard to distribution of 
expenditure on flood control, on various dams? 
(a) Was it based on political considerations? If so, please 
specify. 
(b) Can you explain why a decision on this issue was so late 
in being taken? 
6. The Government of West Bengal was not favourably disposed 
towards sharing the financing of the Chandrapura power-plants 
out of its allocation in the Third Plan. This plant is located in 
Bihar. 
How was this question ultimately decided and work started on 
the plant? 
7. How did the two State Governments look at the DVC in general: 
(a) As a curb on their autonomy? 
(b) As a r ival? 
(c) As an imposition? 
(d) As a cooperative agency for regional development? 
С PUBLIC RELATIONS 
The reputation of an organization depends upon its image in the 
eyes of the people. The DVC had an Information Department and a 
Public Relations Officer to better this image. In this context, could 
you please comment on the following: 
(a) Was the public relations aspect looked after adequately by 
the DVC? 
(b) If so, how would you describe the picture of the DVC drawn 
by the P r e s s and the common man? If not, was this 
car icature very discouraging? 
If the answer to (a) is negative, what in your opinion were 
the reasons for this inadequacy? Please amplify. 
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STELLINGEN 
1 . At its bir th, the Damodar Valley Corporation was conceived as a 
multi-purpose autonomous public corporation, mainly patterned 
after America ' s Tennessee Valley Authority. In two decades, it 
became instead a single-purpose inter-governmental agency 
enjoying little autonomy and little resemblance to i ts original model. 
2. The DVC Act of 1948 was envisaged by its architects as an 
instrument of in ter-s ta te harmony. Social , economic, political 
and administrative real i t ies made the DVC in fact a cause of 
estrangement between the two States which the Corporation was 
supposedly to have brought together. 
3 . As the DVC Act of 1948 no longer has much relation to socio-
political r ea l i t i e s , it should be changed to conform more closely 
to actual conditions. 
4 . There is more consensus on goals and more willingness to 
cooperate when there is no economic development. Opposition 
grows increasingly after the s tar t of the development p rocess . 
The central issue of the transitional period concerns the old 
issue of politics: "Who gets what, when, how". 
5. There is need for an empirical theory of constitutionalism. 
6. Federalism in the absence of a political consensus is not conducive 
to economic development. 
7 . The wellknown Indian phrase "unity in diversi ty" is a cliché used 
to cover up an actual situation of division and disharmony. 
8. "Any politician can r a t ; it takes a certain amount of ingenuity 
to r e - r a t " , said Churchill returning Lloyd George ' s gibe: 
"Churchill, no man can rat twice ." Judged by this cri terion Indian 
politicians would score high on an ingenuity sca le . 
9. Administrative and political models transplanted from alien lands 
are not likely to prosper in a new environment, unless kept in a 
glasshouse. 
10. The mushroom-growth of Dutch political par t ies may well give 
birth to a new and inexhaustible political nomenclature such as : 
"D'TO", "Anti-D'TI" and so forth. 
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